Nuclear weapons: the state of play by Ramesh Thakur & Gareth Evans
NUCLEAR WEAPONS:THE STATE OF PLAY
EDITORSRamesh ThakurGareth Evans
CONTRIBUTORSJohn CarlsonPeter HootonJohn Page
CONSULTANTSStockholm International Peace Research Institute
© 2013 Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
All rights reserved.
This publication may be reproduced in full or in part if accompanied with the following citation:Ramesh Thakur and Gareth Evans, eds., Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play (Canberra: Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2013)
Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University Canberra, ACT 0200 Australia Tel: 6125-0913; Fax: 6125-7985; Email: cnnd@anu.edu.au
For electronic copies of this report, please visit: cnnd.anu.edu.au ISBN: 978-0-9874879-0-2Printing: Paragon, CanberraDesign: ANU Marketing
PREFACE .............................................................................................................................................................ixSYNOPSIS ......................................................................................................................................................... xiiiCONTRIBUTORS ..........................................................................................................................................xviiABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................................................... xix
PART I THE STATE OF PLAY: PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES
1. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT§1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................3§1.2 Objectives and General Strategy .................................................................................................9§1.3 Disarmament Principles ............................................................................................................. 141.3.1 Irreversibility ............................................................................................................ 141.3.2 Transparency ............................................................................................................ 15
1.3.3	 Verification ................................................................................................................ 17§1.4 Reducing Weapons Numbers .................................................................................................... 181.4.1 Current Nuclear Arsenals .................................................................................... 181.4.2 Unilateral Measures ............................................................................................... 311.4.3 Bilateral Processes ................................................................................................. 321.4.4 Multilateral Processes ........................................................................................... 351.4.5 North Korea ............................................................................................................... 37§1.5 Nuclear Doctrine  ........................................................................................................................... 401.5.1 No First Use ............................................................................................................... 451.5.2 Extended Nuclear Deterrence ........................................................................... 461.5.3 Negative Security Assurances ............................................................................49§1.6 Nuclear Force Posture.................................................................................................................. 511.6.1 Weapons Deployment ........................................................................................... 511.6.2 Launch Alert Status ................................................................................................ 52§1.7 Parallel Security Issues................................................................................................................ 581.7.1 Ballistic Missile Defence....................................................................................... 581.7.2 Weapons in Space ................................................................................................... 621.7.3 Biological and Chemical Weapons ...................................................................641.7.4 Conventional Weapons ......................................................................................... 64
CONTENTS
iii
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Playiv §1.8 Mobilizing Political Will .............................................................................................................. 671.8.1 Disarmament Education ...................................................................................... 671.8.2 Civil Society Action ................................................................................................. 681.8.3 Nuclear Weapons Convention ........................................................................... 701.8.4 The Humanitarian Dimension ........................................................................... 72
2. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION§2.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 75§2.2 Objectives and General Strategy  ............................................................................................. 82
§2.3	 NPT	Safeguards	and	Verification ............................................................................................. 862.3.1 Comprehensive Safeguards ................................................................................ 862.3.2 Additional Protocol ................................................................................................ 882.3.3 “State-Level” and “Integrated” Safeguards ...................................................90§2.4 NPT Compliance and Enforcement ........................................................................................ 932.4.1 Compliance Generally ........................................................................................... 932.4.2 Iran ................................................................................................................................ 942.4.3 Response to Withdrawal ...................................................................................... 98§2.5 IAEA Resources ............................................................................................................................... 99§2.6 Export Controls ............................................................................................................................ 1012.6.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 1012.6.2 Nuclear Suppliers Group .................................................................................. 105§2.7  Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones ................................................................................................ 1092.7.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 1092.7.2 Middle East ............................................................................................................. 115§2.8 Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms ................................................................................... 1182.8.1 Proliferation Security Initiative ..................................................................... 1182.8.2 Missile Proliferation ........................................................................................... 119§2.9 Nuclear Testing ............................................................................................................................ 122§2.10 Fissile Material ............................................................................................................................. 128
3. NUCLEAR SECURITY§3.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 141§3.2 Objectives and General Strategy  .......................................................................................... 147§3.3 Global Nuclear Security Architecture ................................................................................. 1513.3.1 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material .............. 1533.3.2 International Convention for the Suppression   of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism ........................................................................... 155 
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play v
3.3.3 UN Security Council Resolutions ................................................................... 1573.3.4 Radioactive Sources ............................................................................................ 1613.3.5 Global Cooperation Mechanisms ................................................................... 161§3.4 Role of the IAEA ........................................................................................................................... 1653.4.1 Setting Guidelines ................................................................................................ 1663.4.2 Advisory and Peer Review Services ............................................................. 1673.4.3 Filling the Gaps ..................................................................................................... 170§3.5 International Cooperation ...................................................................................................... 1733.5.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 1733.5.2 Information Exchange ........................................................................................ 1733.5.3 Information Security .......................................................................................... 1753.5.4 Transportation Security .................................................................................... 176
3.5.5	 Combating	Illicit	Trafficking............................................................................ 176§3.6 National Nuclear Security Regulations .............................................................................. 177§3.7 Sensitive Nuclear Materials .................................................................................................... 178§3.8 Nuclear Forensics ....................................................................................................................... 186§3.9 Role of Nuclear Industry  ......................................................................................................... 188§3.10 Nuclear Security and Safety Interface ................................................................................ 190§3.11 Nuclear Security Culture  ........................................................................................................ 191
4. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY§4.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 195§4.2 Objectives and General Strategy ........................................................................................... 198§4.3 Nuclear Cooperation ................................................................................................................. 2004.3.1 Among States ......................................................................................................... 2004.3.2 Role of the IAEA in Nuclear Cooperation ................................................... 204§4.4 Mitigating Proliferation Risks ................................................................................................ 2074.4.1 Safeguards, Technology and National Supply Policies ......................... 2074.4.2 Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle .................................................... 212§4.5 Nuclear Safety and Security Commitments ..................................................................... 216
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Playvi
PART II SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE 2010: ACTION PLAN ................................................... 231
B. NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMITS 2010 & 2012: COMMITMENTS ...................... 243
C. ICNND REPORT 2009: RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 257
TABLES1.1 Military and Nuclear Weapons Expenditures (2010/2011) .......................................121.2 The World’s Nuclear Arsenals (2012) .................................................................................. 191.3 China’s Nuclear Forces (2012) ................................................................................................. 231.4 France’s Nuclear Forces (2012) ............................................................................................... 241.5 Russia’s Nuclear Forces (2012) ............................................................................................... 251.6 UK Nuclear Forces (2012) .......................................................................................................... 261.7 US Nuclear Forces (2012) .......................................................................................................... 281.8 India’s Nuclear Forces (2012) .................................................................................................. 291.9 Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces (2012) ........................................................................................... 301.10 Israel’s Nuclear Forces (2012) ................................................................................................. 311.11 French Increases/Decreases of Nuclear Arsenal .............................................................321.12 British Increases/Decreases of Nuclear Arsenal ..............................................................321.13 New START ....................................................................................................................................... 341.14 Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Abolition ...................................................................... 692.1 NWS Safeguards Agreements ................................................................................................... 882.2 India’s Civil Nuclear Cooperation ........................................................................................ 104
2.3	 NWS	Ratification	of	the	Treaty	of	Tlatelolco ................................................................... 110
2.4	 NWS	Ratification	of	the	Treaty	of	Rarotonga .................................................................. 111
2.5	 NWS	Ratification	of	the	Treaty	of	Pelindaba ................................................................... 1132.6 IMS Facilities (November 2012)........................................................................................... 1263.1 Status of CPPNM, CPPNM Amendment, and ICSANT (December 2012) ............ 1543.2 IAEA Nuclear Security Advisory Services......................................................................... 1683.3 IAEA Nuclear Security Publications .................................................................................... 1683.4 Fissile Material Stocks, Military and Civil Material (tonnes, January 2012) ..............179
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play vii4.1 World Nuclear Energy (January 2013) ............................................................................. 2014.2 2011 IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund Expenditure by Technical Field .......... 2054.3 IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Missions ........................................ 2064.4 States with Demonstrated Enrichment and/or Reprocessing Capability .......... 208
4.5	 	States	with	Significant	Nuclear	Activities:	Participation	in	Nuclear	 Safety Conventions  .................................................................................................................... 219
4.6	 	States	with	Significant	Nuclear	Activities:	Participation	in	Nuclear Security Conventions ................................................................................................................ 2224.7 Participation in Liability Conventions by States with Nuclear Power ................. 226
FIGURES2.1 Estimated Number of Nuclear Explosions (1948–2012) .......................................... 1243.1 The Global Nuclear Security Regime .................................................................................. 1523.2 UNSCR 1540 Reporting Mechanism ................................................................................... 1583.3 Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, paragraph 2 .................................... 1583.4 Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, paragraph 3 (a) and (b) ............ 1593.5 Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, paragraph 3 (c) and (d) ............. 1593.6 Resources Required for Implementing Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 ....... 1693.7 Categories of Weapon-Useable Nuclear Materials Globally (2012) ...................... 1853.8 Characteristics of Nuclear Security Culture .................................................................... 1923.9 IPPAS Mission Process .............................................................................................................. 194
MAPS2.1 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (2012)..............................................................862.2 Missile Possession Worldwide (2012) .............................................................................. 120
2.3	 IMS	Verification	Regime-Stations	Worldwide	(2012) ................................................. 1272.4 Enrichment (2012) .................................................................................................................... 1332.5 Reprocessing (2012) ................................................................................................................. 1383.1 Nuclear Research Reactors (2012) ..................................................................................... 181
BOXES3.1 Nuclear Security Incidents (1998–2012) ......................................................................... 1484.1 The Fukushima Nuclear Meltdown 2011 ......................................................................... 218

ix
By the end of 2009 hopes were higher than for many years that the world was at last seriously headed towards nuclear disarmament. Maybe, just maybe, we could not only stop further proliferation of the most indiscriminately inhumane weapons ever invented, but actually, over time, eliminate them from the face of the globe once and for all. President Barack Obama’s Prague Speech of 2009 had set the tone, with its superbly articulated vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 2009, following others before it, had set an achievable global agenda, describing in detail all the building blocks that had to be constructed along the way. In 2009 the United States and Russia were back negotiating nuclear arms control more seriously than they had been for a decade. A major Nuclear Security Summit was planned for 2010, with a sharply practical agenda designed to inhibit both proliferation and nuclear terrorism. And there was every sign, in the lead-up to the 2010 Non-Proliferation 
Treaty	Review	Conference,	that	–	utterly	unlike	its	failed	predecessor	five	years	earlier	
–	there	would	be	consensus	for	significant	forward	movement	across	the	whole	spectrum	of inter-related disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful-uses issues.By the end of 2012, however, much of the sense of optimism of three years earlier had evaporated. Certainly some progress had been made, and on a few issues, on the face of it, quite substantial progress. The New START treaty, signed by the United States and 
Russia	in	2010,	will	significantly	reduce	the	number	of	deployed	strategic	weapons.	The	2010 US Nuclear Posture Review did make some moves in the direction of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. The 2010 NPT Review Conference succeeded in reaching agreement on 64 action points (a refreshing change from zero in 2005), adopted strong new language on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, and supported initial moves towards a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. And at the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) in both 2010 and 2012, states made strong commitments to ensure that weapon-useable materials, and weapons themselves, do not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorists.But New START left both US and Russian stockpiles intact, their high-alert status undisturbed, weapons-modernization programs in place, disagreements about missile defence and conventional arms imbalances unresolved – and talks on further draw-downs going nowhere. Nuclear weapons numbers have decreased overall, as a result of actions by the United States and Russia in particular, but there has been an actual acceleration of nuclear-weapons programs in India, Pakistan, and China. The cautious initial doctrinal move by Washington towards accepting that the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons is to respond to nuclear threats, not those of any other kind, has gone nowhere, inhibited by resistance from its Northeast Asian and more nervous Central and Eastern European allies. 
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Nuclear Weapons: The State of Playx By the end of 2012, again, the push for talks on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had stalled, and the absence of any real bite in the 2010 NPT Review Conference outcomes on regime-strengthening measures was all too apparent. North Korea seemed no closer to being put back in its NPT box, and Iran perhaps closer than ever to jumping out of it. The US Senate was no closer to ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, while China, India, and Pakistan, among others, took shelter behind that inaction, with a fragile voluntary moratorium the only obstacle to resumed testing. Negotiations 
in	Geneva	on	a	treaty	to	ban	production	of	fissile	material	for	nuclear	weapons	remained	at a total impasse. And even on nuclear security, there is not much reason for optimism that the original target will be met, of achieving security of all nuclear materials by 2014.So the unhappy reality is that while nuclear weapons continue to pose an existential threat to humanity, progress on their abolition, and on strengthening barriers to their proliferation, remains achingly slow. Road-maps do exist to walk us away from the edge of the nuclear cliff, authoritatively endorsed at inter-governmental conferences and summits and recommended by international commissions. But these commitments and recommendations, whatever their degree of ambition, are of little utility unless effectively implemented. A key recommendation of the ICNND was that, to help build and sustain political will over time, a regular “report card” should be published and widely disseminated among 
policymakers	 and	 those	 who	 influence	 them.	 Such	 documents	 would	 evaluate,	 with	rigorous objectivity, the performance of both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states against the benchmarks set not only by intergovernmental agreement but also, often more ambitiously, by independent commissions like the ICNND itself. The present report is our effort to implement that recommendation. It describes in detail the progress – or lack of it – on the commitments and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the 2010 and 2012 NSS, and the rather more ambitious ICNND, as at December 2012. Its publication in early 2013 is timed to assist the deliberations of the NPT PrepCom process, and it will be followed by a further updated volume in 2015, prior to that year’s NPT Review Conference. While there are some other “report card” publications in existence, or in preparation, aimed at tracking particular sets of recommendations or the performance of particular groups of states, we believe that the present volume is the most comprehensive of its kind. The layout of the report should be self-evident, but it should be noted that its two parts are closely inter-related. Part I is intended to be a systematic analytical discussion of all the key issues, grouped into four chapters addressing, respectively, disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear security and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Part II then tabulates all the relevant NPT, NSS and ICNND commitments and recommendations, cross-references them to the discussion in the main text, and ranks each on a scale ranging from “No Progress” (red) to “Fully Implemented” (green). It is, in effect, the index to the detailed Part I text. The synopsis which follows this preface is intended to give no more than a quick, broad-brush, overview of our evaluations, area by area – gathering together the general assessments that are made in the “Overview” section introducing each chapter. Necessarily highly condensed, these snapshots should be seen as a quick 
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play xiintroductory guide to the much more detailed text which follows, not a substitute for reading it!This State of Play report is published by the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (CNND), part of the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra, which was established in 2011 with substantial funding support from both the Australian Government and the ANU, which we warmly acknowledge and appreciate. The Swiss Government has also provided support, for which we are grateful, for the dissemination and discussion of the report with the Geneva-based international policy community. The Centre’s Director is Ramesh Thakur and its Research Director Peter Hooton, and 
these	 two,	 together	with	 part-time	 administrative	 officer	 Robert	 Luton	 and	 research	assistant Srinjoy Bose – for whose help we are indebted – constitute its core staff, 
supplemented	for	the	specific	purposes	of	this	report	by	John	Carlson	and	John	Page.	The Centre has an International Advisory Board chaired by Gareth Evans, whose members are former ICNND co-chair Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan), James Acton (United Kingdom), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Mark Fitzpatrick (United States), Bates Gill (United States), Francois Heisbourg (France), Pervez Hoodbhoy (Pakistan), Patricia Lewis (Ireland), Pan Zhenqiang (China) and Jennifer Allen Simons (Canada). We are grateful to them for their support and advice in the design of this project, and in a number of cases for comment (although deadlines were impossibly 
tight)	on	the	final	draft.	The report was conceived and designed by the editors, and written by them and the Centre staff named with further very substantial input, as consultants, from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). We are indebted to SIPRI for the access this gave us to its superb and very up-to-date data base, and in particular to its staff members Ian Anthony, Andrea Viski and Vitaly Fedchenko who, with support from other Institute colleagues, responded quickly and professionally to our many requests for information and analysis on particular issues.We hope that Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play as at December 2012, and its proposed successor reports, will advance helpfully the global nuclear policy debate by providing an informative and authoritative advocacy tool for governments, organizations and individuals committed to achieving a safer and saner nuclear-weapon-free world. We would appreciate any feedback that would help us in the design and writing of future reports.
Gareth Evans 
Ramesh Thakur Co-Editors
Canberra, 1 February 2013

SYNOPSIS
1. Disarmament
Disarmament Objectives and Strategy [Paras 1.18–31]: Nuclear-armed states pay at best lip-service to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, 
and	none	has	committed	to	any	“minimization	objective,”	nor	to	any	specific	timetable for their major reduction – let alone abolition. On the evidence of 
the	size	of	their	weapons	arsenals,	fissile	material	stocks,	force	modernization	plans, stated doctrine and known deployment practices, all nine nuclear-
armed	 states	 foresee	 indefinite	 retention	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 a	continuing role for them in their security policies.
No Progress
Disarmament Principles [Paras 1.32–53]: Some nuclear-weapon states (NWS) provide more information about their nuclear weapons than others, but none paints a full picture. The NWS are talking about improving 
transparency	and	have	reaffirmed	their	commitment	to	report	against	2010	Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference disarmament objectives to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee.
Some Progress
Nuclear Arms Reductions [Paras 1.54–103]: The global stockpile stands at nearly 18,000 nuclear weapons: while nearly half of these are earmarked for dismantlement, there is currently little prospect of major further reduction. 
Significant	cuts	in	Russian	and	US	stockpiles,	mainly	under	previous	treaty	obligations, have continued, but no agreement on further cuts is likely while divisions over missile defence and conventional weapons remain. France has met the limited disarmament objective it set itself in 2008, and the United Kingdom could complete planned reductions in warhead numbers ahead of schedule. But elsewhere – in China, India, and Pakistan – nuclear arsenals are growing.
Some Progress
Nuclear Doctrine [Paras	1.104–46]:	There	have	been	no	significant	publicly	declared shifts in nuclear doctrine in recent years, although US doctrine has given some acknowledgement to President Barack Obama’s 2009 undertaking to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy,” and an interagency review is examining revised constructs of deterrence and stability. 
Minimal Progress
Nuclear Force Posture [Paras 1.147–74]: Apart from the reductions in deployed US and Russian strategic weapons under the New START treaty, the 
only	significant	changes	in	deployment	practice	elsewhere	have	been	aimed	at enhancing the survivability of nuclear weapons in case of attack. No progress has been made in reducing the dangerously high launch-alert status of large numbers of US and Russian weapons.
Minimal Progress
No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Significant Progress Fully implemented
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Parallel Security Issues [Paras 1.175–214]: Tensions between the United States and Russia and China are rising over ballistic missile defence, and an emerging new generation of advanced US conventional weapons, and prospects for progress in conventional arms control have receded. This complicates an 
already	very	difficult	environment	for	nuclear	disarmament	talks.
No Progress
Mobilizing Political Will [Paras 1.215–36]: Work done to promote nuclear disarmament has had little impact outside specialist disarmament and non-proliferation circles. The UN Secretary-General’s welcome calls to prioritize nuclear arms control and disarmament have so far fallen largely on deaf ears. Civil society organizations, however dedicated and active, have achieved little of the traction needed to put relevant governments under serious political pressure. But the recent new emphasis on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons may show the way forward.
Minimal Progress
2. Non-Proliferation
Safeguards and Verification [Paras 2.36–66]: Additional Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols have entered into force but there is still strong resistance by some states to the idea of making APs obligatory. The IAEA’s evolving state-level approach to safeguards has been criticized – albeit not compellingly – as discriminatory by some states who want the emphasis to return from an information-driven and detection-focused approach to traditional nuclear material accounting.
Some Progress
Compliance and Enforcement [Paras 2.67–87]: The 2010 NPT Review Conference made no progress on non-compliance and withdrawal issues and 
none	has	been	made	since.	Efforts	by	the	five	permanent	members	of	the	UN	Security Council (P5) and Germany to negotiate a resolution of the stand-off with Iran have made no substantive progress.
No Progress
IAEA Resources  [Paras 2.88–96]: The IAEA’s regular budget has seen some 
modest	real	growth	in	recent	years	but	is	still	insufficient	to	allow	the	agency	
to	fulfil	its	responsibilities	and	to	meet	the	expectations	of	member	states.
Some Progress
Export Controls [Paras 2.97–123]: A growing number of countries are making use of multilateral guidelines in developing national export controls. But the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s 2008 decision to exempt India from its comprehensive safeguards requirement, and China’s determination to supply more nuclear reactors to Pakistan, have damaged this key mechanism’s credibility, and no progress has been made towards adopting a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT.
Some Progress
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones [Paras 2.124–53]: No new NWFZ has been 
established.	There	has	been	only	modest	movement	on	protocol	ratifications.	The Middle East NWFZ Conference mandated by the NPT Review Conference 
for	2012	has	been	postponed	indefinitely.
Minimal Progress
Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms [Paras 2.154–67]: The Proliferation Security Initiative now has the support of around 100 countries and has helped make illicit weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related transfers harder. But, despite many attempted constraints, ballistic missile technologies continue to proliferate.
Some Progress
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Nuclear Testing [Paras 2.168–81]: Of nine Annex 2 states which had not 
ratified	the	Comprehensive	Test	Ban	Treaty	(CTBT)	in	May	2010,	only	one,	Indonesia, has since done so. The United States and China are among those who have not. That said, voluntary moratoriums on nuclear tests remain in place, although North Korea continues to threaten more. 
Minimal Progress
Fissile Material [Paras 2.182–231]: There has been no progress in beginning 
negotiations	on	a	global	ban	on	the	production	of	fissile	material	for	nuclear	weapons purposes, a central non-proliferation policy objective. But NWS have not produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapon-grade plutonium for years and the facilities used for these purposes have been either shut down or converted to other uses in at least four of them: the status of facilities in China is unknown. Russia and the United States are reducing excess HEU stocks and have a bilateral agreement in force for 
surplus	 plutonium	disposition	 from	2018.	 The	most	 significant	 growth	 in	
fissile	material	may	be	occurring	in	the	non-NPT	nuclear-armed	states	but,	as with nuclear weapons stockpiles, their total stock is still hugely below that 
of	the	five	NPT-recognized	NWS.
Minimal Progress
3. Nuclear Security
Global Nuclear Security Architecture [Paras 3.32–72]: States have implemented many Nuclear Security Summit commitments, additional 
states	 have	 ratified	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Physical	 Protection	 of	 Nuclear	Material and its Amendment, more are taking advantage of IAEA tools and services, and states have cooperated with one another. However, NPT 2010 and ICNND 2009-recommended support for universal application of the 
CPPNM	and	early	ratification	of	the	2005	amendment	is	not	in	sight.	Much	of	the architecture lacks any means to judge whether commitments are being met.
Some Progress
Role of the IAEA [Paras 3.73–95]: The IAEA is providing a wide range of advisory services and other assistance on nuclear security issues. The centrality of the IAEA’s role makes a predictable and stable budget for nuclear security essential.
Some Progress
International Cooperation	 [Paras	 3.96–111]:	 Significant	 international	
cooperation	is	taking	place	in	detecting	and	thwarting	illicit	trafficking,	but	
this	needs	to	be	expanded	as	gaps	are	identified.	States	need	to	commit	more	fully to cooperation in developing and sharing nuclear security best practices.
Some Progress
National Nuclear Security Regulations [Paras 3.112–15]: UN Security 
Council	Resolution	1540	has	played	a	significant	role	in	this	area,	resulting	in	a substantial increase in the number of states with legislative measures to prohibit proliferation of nuclear weapons. But more needs to be done in national implementation.
Significant Progress
Sensitive Nuclear Materials [Paras 3.116–37]: While progress is being made on minimization of civil HEU use, states have been reluctant to ban outright HEU use in civilian applications. On non-civilian uses, the United States and Russia are on track to complete the conversion of 500 tonnes of HEU to low enriched uranium by the end of 2013 and have committed to the 
elimination	of	significant	quantities	of	excess	weapon-grade	plutonium.
Some Progress
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Nuclear Forensics		[Paras	3.138–45]:	In	addition	to	significant	work	going	on at the national level in some countries, the IAEA continues to provide assistance with building nuclear forensics capacity in member states, both through its own activities and by teaming with member states to hold workshops and other training.
Some Progress
Role of Nuclear Industry [Paras 3.146–50]: There is general understanding that effective nuclear security is strongly in the interests of the nuclear industry. More work is needed on identifying practical ways the nuclear industry and state authorities can work together to improve nuclear security.
Minimal Progress
Nuclear Security and Safety Interface [Paras 3.151–54]: The IAEA in cooperation with member states is providing training and other assistance in this area. A number of training centres have been established which emphasize an integrated approach to nuclear safeguards, safety and security.
Some Progress
Nuclear Security Culture [Paras 3.155–63]: Increasing organizational activity suggests some progress here, but the extent to which a genuine nuclear security culture exists is unclear because of the lack of monitoring and reporting on whether states are implementing best practice standards and recommendations.
Some Progress
4. Peaceful Uses
Nuclear Cooperation [Paras 4.22–46]: NPT 2010 commitments and ICNND 2009 recommendations are generally being met. There are grounds for criticism that technical cooperation assessed funding has not increased more – though it has increased substantially over the years – but the additional funding provided by a number of states is consistent with the increase called for in the NPT 2010 Action Plan.
Significant Progress
Mitigating Proliferation Risks [Paras 4.47–85]: Most states are meeting their NPT peaceful use commitments, but non-compliance cases – especially Iran and North Korea – are cause for concern. Issues of nuclear latency and hedging are not being addressed. The spread of sensitive nuclear technology and the prospective spread of fast reactors and plutonium fuels in the future will present serious challenges unless addressed. HEU minimization is proceeding, though large quantities of HEU remain in the civil cycle; but no effort has been made to minimize plutonium (as mixed oxide, or “MOX”). The establishment of two fuel banks and the work of the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation are positive developments, but further elaboration, and acceptance, of multilateral approaches have a long way to go.
Some Progress
Safety and Security Commitments [Paras 4.86–118]: Not all states with 
significant	nuclear	activities	have	joined	the	Convention	on	Nuclear	Safety,	and	there is a lack of international standards, transparency and accountability. Many states with power reactors remain outside the liability regimes. On nuclear 
security,	 many	 states	 remain	 outside	 the	 CPPNM,	 and	 there	 are	 insufficient	
ratifications/accessions	 for	 the	 Amended	 CPPNM	 to	 enter	 into	 force.	 Again	international standards, transparency and accountability are lacking.
Some Progress
xvii
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31. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
§1.1 Overview§1.2 Objectives and General Strategy§1.3 Disarmament Principles§1.4 Reducing Weapons Numbers§1.5 Nuclear Doctrine§1.6 Nuclear Force Posture §1.7 Parallel Security Issues§1.8 Mobilizing Political Will
§1.1 Overview
1.1 As the world in 2012 marked fifty years since the Cuban missile crisis, there were 
still almost 18,000 nuclear warheads distributed among nine nuclear-armed states. 
About 94 per cent of these are in Russian and US arsenals. There are many fewer nuclear 
weapons today than during the Cold War, and the risk of a deliberate nuclear war being 
started between the United States and Russia may well be negligible. Yet, paradoxically, 
the overall risks of nuclear war have grown – as more countries in more unstable regions 
have acquired these deadly weapons, terrorists continue to seek them, and as command 
and control systems in even the most sophisticated nuclear-armed states remain 
vulnerable not only to system and human error but, increasingly, to cyber attack. Even a “limited” regional nuclear war would have catastrophic global consequences.
1.2 While the need for total nuclear disarmament is more urgent than ever, its 
achievement remains little or no closer, both among the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) 
as defined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), viz. China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the other four nuclear-
armed states outside the NPT, viz. India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. There has been some small progress in reducing the overall US and Russian nuclear weapons 
stockpiles and the number of deployed strategic weapons, and in improving transparency 
among some NWS. But there has been only minimal progress in shifting nuclear doctrine, 
and no progress in either taking weapons off high-alert launch status, or in addressing 
the issues of ballistic missile defence and conventional arms imbalances, differences 
over which are presently seriously inhibiting further disarmament movement. And, 
despite the efforts of many dedicated non-governmental organizations and research 
centres, the cause of nuclear disarmament has achieved very little of the civil society traction needed to put governments under serious political pressure.
No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Significant Progress Fully implemented
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Review Conference outcomes, and the recommendations of blue-ribbon international 
panels like the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament 
(ICNND), these might be described as:
 > Rapid movement towards a major overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types 
of nuclear weapons;
 > Such reduction to be accompanied, and assisted, by moves to further delegitimize 
nuclear weapons, reduce their role and significance in military doctrine and strategy, 
and dramatically curtail their operational deployment;
 > The major reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles to be followed as soon as possible 
thereafter by their complete elimination; and
 > The disarmament process throughout to be irreversible, verifiable, and transparent.
1.4 Such progress as there has been on specific issues – on reducing weapons numbers, 
curtailing their operational deployment, reducing their doctrinal salience, and on 
achieving acceptance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency – 
is summarized in the following paragraphs and discussed in detail in the remaining 
sections of this chapter. As to the overall picture, progress in winning acceptance in 
practice from the nuclear-armed states for a two-phase objective – rapid major reduction 
followed by complete elimination – can be described as non-existent.1.5 While nuclear disarmament continues to be very strongly supported by the 
overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-armed states, it remains for every nuclear-armed 
state at best an open-ended, incremental process, with broad and indeterminate links to 
global and regional stability. There is no appetite for a multilateral nuclear disarmament 
process and no disposition on the part of the NWS to discuss nuclear disarmament 
timelines. All nine nuclear-armed states have long-term nuclear-weapons system 
modernization programs under development and in progress. Based on current arsenals, 
deployments and force postures, and on planned expansions, upgrades and 
modernization, every nuclear-armed state is committed to the indefinite retention of 
significant nuclear-weapon capability.
Overall Evaluation of Acceptance of Disarmament Objectives and Strategy: 
No Progress. Nuclear-armed states pay at best lip-service to the ultimate 
elimination of nuclear weapons, and none has committed to any 
“minimization objective,” nor to any specific timetable for their major 
reduction – let alone abolition. On the evidence of the size of their weapons 
arsenals, fissile material stocks, force modernization plans, stated doctrine 
and known deployment practices, all nine nuclear-armed states foresee 
indefinite retention of nuclear weapons and a continuing role for them in their security policies.
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Overall Evaluation of Disarmament Principles: Some Progress. Some NWS 
provide more information about their nuclear weapons than others, but 
none paints a full picture. The NWS are talking about improving transparency 
and have reaffirmed their commitment to report against 2010 NPT Review 
Conference disarmament objectives to the 2014 NPT PrepCom.
1.6 Disarmament Principles. Of the five NWS, only the United States publishes official 
figures on aggregate warhead numbers (most recently in September 2009). Consistent 
with the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) provisions, both Russia and 
the United States declare the number of deployed strategic warheads and deployed and 
non-deployed launchers captured by the treaty; but Russia does not release data on the 
overall size of its arsenal or the number of non-strategic weapons. France and the United 
Kingdom have provided information on stockpile ceilings. China and the non-NPT 
nuclear-armed states provide no information on the size and composition of their 
nuclear weapons inventories. Only the United States has provided figures for warhead 
dismantlement (most recently in May 2010).
1.7 The NWS have established a semi-regular habit of meeting to discuss nuclear 
weapons issues, giving particular attention to issues of “transparency, mutual confidence 
and verification,” and have given at least initial consideration to a standard disarmament 
reporting form. While four of the five NWS (China is the exception) have taken steps in 
recent years to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals, only the United States and 
Russia have international (in their case, bilateral) verification measures in place.
1.8 Reduced Numbers of Nuclear Weapons. The overall global stockpile in 2012 is 
assessed in this report as just under 18,000. This compares very favourably with the figure 
for 2009 given in the ICNND report of over 23,000, but unfortunately it is not possible to 
conclude that stockpile numbers in fact declined by some 5,000 weapons during the period in question. While there has been a continuing reduction in US and Russian stockpiles 
under the older bilateral START and SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions) treaties, and 
some additional unilateral reductions by both these powers, reductions by other nuclear-
armed states have either been very modest (in the case of France and the United Kingdom), 
non-existent, or negative (in the sense that stocks have increased).
1.9 Most of the apparent overall downsizing can be explained by better information and 
research methodology with, in the 2009 ICNND report, the Russian figures in particular 
likely to have been significantly overstated. The better news, although it does not affect 
the size of the total stockpile of existing weapons, is that the New START Treaty will 
bring about a significant reduction in the number of strategic weapons actually deployed 
by the United States and Russia, and many weapons previously identified as held in reserve by both countries are now more accurately to be counted as “awaiting dismantlement.”
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1.10 Russia and the United States will find it hard to reach agreement on further cuts while 
divisions, particularly over ballistic missile defence, remain. China, too, believes “global” 
missile defence to be detrimental to the strategic balance and to prospects for nuclear 
disarmament. It seems that the more confident the United States becomes of the superiority 
of its conventional weapons, and of the efficiency of its anti-missile systems, the more reluctant Russia and China are likely to be to negotiate serious nuclear arms reductions.
1.11 France has met the objective set in 2008 to reduce by one-third its nuclear 
deterrent’s airborne component, and the United Kingdom expects its planned reduction in nuclear warhead numbers to have been completed by 2015. But the nuclear arsenals 
of India, Pakistan and China meanwhile continue to grow, albeit modestly in terms of 
absolute numbers, and North Korea has also made clear its intention to expand, not 
dismantle, its small nuclear weapons stockpile.
Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Arms Reductions: Some Progress. The global 
stockpile stands at nearly 18,000 nuclear weapons: while nearly half of these 
are earmarked for dismantlement, there is currently little prospect of major 
further reduction. Significant cuts in Russian and US stockpiles, mainly 
under previous treaty obligations, have continued, but no agreement on 
further cuts is likely while divisions over missile defence and conventional weapons remain. France has met the limited disarmament objective it set 
itself in 2008 and the United Kingdom could complete planned reductions in 
warhead numbers ahead of schedule. But elsewhere – in China, India, and 
Pakistan – nuclear arsenals are growing.
1.12 Nuclear Doctrine. There have been no significant publicly declared shifts in nuclear 
doctrine since the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) the United States took some modest steps toward advancing the undertaking 
given by President Barack Obama in Prague in April 2009 to “reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons in [US] national security strategy”: while “not prepared at the present time to 
adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons…[the United States] will work to establish conditions under which such a 
policy could be safely adopted.” Obama subsequently asked the Pentagon to lead an 
interagency review to develop alternative constructs of deterrence and stability, with 
accompanying force sizes and postures. But in the opposite direction, India and Pakistan 
seem to be broadening their mix of nuclear weapon platforms and expanding the 
doctrinal role of nuclear weapons in their security strategies.
1.13 Of the five NWS, only China is publicly committed to no first use of nuclear weapons. 
Of the other nuclear-armed states, only India has made a similar commitment. NATO, at 
its Chicago Summit in May 2012, again affirmed its commitment to extended deterrence 
by declaring that “the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the 
United States” are the “supreme guarantee” of its security. Negative security assurances 
– not to use or threaten nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states – remain 
unequivocal and unconditional again only in the case of China.
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Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Doctrine: Minimal Progress. There have been 
no significant publicly declared shifts in nuclear doctrine in recent years, although US doctrine has given some acknowledgement to President 
Obama’s 2009 undertaking to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 
national security strategy” and an interagency review is examining revised 
constructs of deterrence and stability. India and Pakistan are, if anything, 
expanding the role of nuclear weapons in their respective national security strategies.
Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Force Posture: Minimal Progress. Apart from the reductions in deployed US and Russian strategic weapons under New 
START, the only significant changes in deployment practice elsewhere have 
been aimed at enhancing the survivability of nuclear weapons in case of 
attack. No progress has been made in reducing the dangerously high launch-
alert states of large numbers of US and Russian weapons.
1.14 Nuclear Force Posture. While the New START treaty will bring significant 
reductions in the number of strategic weapons deployed by Russia and the United States, 
no risk-reducing changes have occurred in the deployment by either of non-strategic 
weapons. Such changes as have occurred or been foreshadowed in the disposition of 
their warheads by other nuclear-armed states, including a gradual shift towards land-
mobile and sea-based weapons, appear to have been aimed at enhancing their 
survivability in the face of attack. This raises issues of attenuated command and control 
and adds to the risks of accidental and unauthorized use. China is close to establishing a 
stable nuclear triad and India too is firmly on this path. The United States and Russia, 
alone among the nuclear-armed states, continue to keep most of their deployed 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and in the case of the United States a majority 
of their submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), on very high alert – meaning a 
dangerously short launch-decision time requirement of just a few minutes for about 
1,000 warheads in each case.
1.15 Parallel Security Issues. Russia has taken strong exception to the planned 
deployment of US ballistic missile defence to Europe, interpreting it as a threat to its deterrent capability. Tensions are also rising in US relations with China over ballistic 
missile defence in Asia. The development of new US conventional systems, in particular 
long-range precision-strike weapons, has also been complicating the environment for 
nuclear disarmament talks. There is little sign of any movement on new conventional 
arms control measures or, despite some efforts for example by the European Union and 
the UN Group of Governmental Experts to try to break the deadlock, on regulating weapons in space to prevent its militarization.
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1.16 Mobilizing Political Will. The global strategic environment has deteriorated since 
2010; Russia has reacted strongly to planned US missile defence deployments in Europe; 
Russia and the United States have both stepped back from earlier signs of willingness to 
return to conventional arms control talks; US-China security relations have similarly 
cooled, with implications both for strategic nuclear disarmament and prospects for non-
proliferation and disarmament in North Korea; nuclear weapons arsenals are growing in 
Asia; proliferation pressures are increasing; and the risk of accident or miscalculation 
leading to a nuclear exchange is undiminished. Nuclear-armed states are not ready to 
negotiate a nuclear weapons convention and believe that, without them, negotiations 
would be meaningless. An annual resolution calling for the negotiation of such a 
convention is nonetheless supported by some two-thirds of the UN membership.
1.17 This said, nuclear disarmament and the possibility of nuclear war are not currently prominent public issues anywhere. Governments are under no real pressure to respond 
to expressions of popular concern because truly popular concern barely exists. Despite 
the efforts of many dedicated non-governmental organizations and research centres, the 
cause of nuclear disarmament has achieved very little traction. But the recent new focus 
on the indescribably horrific consequences of a nuclear detonation, with strong advocacy 
from a number of states in the UN General Assembly First (Disarmament) Committee 
and elsewhere, may show the way forward.
Overall Evaluation of Parallel Security Issues: No Progress. Tensions between the United States and Russia and China are rising over ballistic missile 
defence, and an emerging new generation of advanced US conventional 
weapons, and prospects for progress in conventional arms control have 
receded. This complicates an already very difficult environment for nuclear disarmament talks.
Overall Evaluation of Mobilizing Political Will: Minimal progress. Work done to promote nuclear disarmament has had little impact outside 
specialist disarmament and non-proliferation circles. The UN Secretary-General’s welcome calls to prioritize nuclear arms control and disarmament 
have so far fallen largely on deaf ears. Civil society organizations, however 
dedicated and active, have achieved little of the traction needed to put relevant governments under serious political pressure. But the recent new 
emphasis on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear 
weapons may show the way forward.
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§1.2 Objectives and General Strategy
1.18 The NPT, which was signed in 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970, contains 
the only global treaty-level commitment to nuclear disarmament. Article VI requires 
each of the parties to the treaty to undertake “to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.” The formulation is weak and the link to 
“general and complete disarmament” unhelpful and unrealistic, but it would be a mistake 
to underestimate the contemporary normative force of Article VI and the expectations of 
the international community, which have been clarified and strengthened in subsequent 
reaffirmations.
1.19 The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference made clear, for example, that the 
five NPT NWS bore the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and that they 
were expected to take “systematic and progressive steps” to this end;1 while the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its July 1996 advisory opinion on the question 
concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons concluded, inter alia, that 
there “exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international 
control” (emphasis added).2
1.20 The eighth NPT Review Conference (May 2010), buoyed particularly by positive US 
re-engagement in multilateral disarmament diplomacy, reaffirmed the largely unrealized 
aspirations of previous years. The NWS promised to accelerate “concrete progress on 
the steps leading to nuclear disarmament” and, to this end, were called upon “to promptly engage” with a view to rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global 
stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; further diminishing the role and significance 
of nuclear weapons in military doctrine and strategy; reducing the operational status of 
nuclear weapons in ways that promote international stability and security; and further 
enhancing transparency and mutual confidence.
1.21 The 2010 NPT Review Conference took place against the backdrop of a major 
speech in Prague in April 2009 in which newly-elected President Obama pledged the 
United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” and 
to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in [its] national security strategy.” He promised, 
and delivered, a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russians; 
and foreshadowed further cuts in nuclear arsenals which, he hoped, would include all 
the NWS. He also undertook “immediately and aggressively” to pursue US ratification of 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to support the negotiation of a 
fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).3  Later in the year, President Obama chaired a 
United Nations Security Council session which unanimously adopted US-sponsored 
1. http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm – NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex. 
2. Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996. The added emphasis indicates how the ICJ opinion interpreted and 
strengthened the article VI obligation.
3. Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, 5 April 2009; www.whitehouse.gov.
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Resolution 1887 “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” (S/
RES/1887, 24 September 2009).
1.22 Over the years, a number of international commissions4 have drawn very similar 
conclusions about the all-encompassing nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, 
their dubious utility, and the steps needed to get rid of them. The ICNND report, published 
shortly before the 2010 NPT Review Conference, introduced a number of new, including 
time-bound, elements to the nuclear disarmament agenda. It argued for the 
delegitimization of the role of nuclear weapons and for a two-phase approach to their 
elimination, recommending that “minimization” be achieved between 2012 and 2025, 
and “elimination” as soon as possible thereafter. The ICNND took the view that, given the 
myriad of difficult political, security and technical verification and enforcement issues 
that remained to be resolved before any state would be prepared to give up its last 
nuclear weapons, it would not be credible, and might well be counterproductive, to 
identify now a specific target date for abolition.
1.23 The ICNND’s “minimization point,” to be achieved by 2025 at the latest, would be 
characterized by:
 > Low numbers: a global total of no more than 2,000 nuclear warheads, with the 
United States and Russia reducing to a total of 500 nuclear weapons each, and with 
at least no increase (and desirably significant reductions) in the arsenals of the other 
nuclear-armed states;
 > Agreed doctrine: every nuclear-armed state committed to no first use of nuclear 
weapons (on the basis that their sole remaining purpose is to deter the use of nuclear 
weapons by others); and
 > Credible force postures: verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine.5
1.24 The ICNND Report emphasized the need to incorporate all the nuclear-armed states, 
not just the NPT nuclear-weapon states, in a fully inclusive nuclear disarmament process. 
It called on the NWS to reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament 
(which they did, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference), and for the non-NPT nuclear-
armed states to accept similar undertakings towards the eventual total elimination of 
their nuclear arsenals, and the universal and binding nature of the norms against testing, 
acquisition and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons other than for defence against nuclear attack.6 It also encouraged all nuclear-armed states to accept and announce as 
soon as possible a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in their security policies and to 
make appropriate preparations for a multilateral disarmament process.
4. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 1996; the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-proliferation 
and Disarmament, 1999; the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004; and the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Blix) Commission, 2006.
5. ICNND (Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi co-chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global 
Policymakers. Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (Canberra and Tokyo: 
ICNND, 2009), pp. 72–78.
6. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 153 .
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1.25 In 2009 the worldwide campaign organization, Global Zero, launched a four-phase 
Action Plan, much more ambitious than ICNND’s, setting 2023 as the target date for 
negotiating a legally binding international agreement, signed by all nuclear-capable 
countries, that would lead to the phased, verified and proportionate reduction of all 
nuclear arsenals, with complete dismantlement of all the world’s nuclear weapons to be achieved by 2030.7 Part of the plan is for the United States and Russia to negotiate 
bilaterally to achieve reductions of their stockpiles to 1,000 weapons each by 2018 and, 
in a wider multilateral context, to achieve further reductions to 500 each by 2021.
1.26 The credibility of the argument of both ICNND and Global Zero that a massive 
reduction in global arsenals can be achieved by the early 2020s (however long it might 
take thereafter to get to zero) has been reinforced recently by a study done for Global 
Zero by a panel under the leadership of retired US General James Cartwright, the former 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and including Senator Chuck Hagel.8 This 
recommends a dramatic drawdown over one decade of US and Russian nuclear forces to 
900 total nuclear weapons (including both strategic and non-strategic) each, divided 
equally between deployed (450) and held in reserve on de-alerted status (450). For the 
United States, the total would consist of 360 strategic missile warheads deployed on ten 
ballistic missile submarines and 360 held in reserve; plus 18 B52 bombers armed with 
90 deployed gravity bombs and 90 held in reserve. All US land-based ICBMs would be completely dismantled. Stocks in reserve could be regenerated to launch readiness 
within 24–72 hours for offensive strikes. The alternative deterrence construct would 
thus require a robust command, control, communications and early warning system that 
can withstand the shock of the initial strike and manage the transition to regenerated 
nuclear forces.1.27 The Cartwright study argues that once the two major nuclear powers had reduced 
their arsenals to these levels, China could be drawn into the negotiations followed by the 
other nuclear-armed states. Dialogue with China could begin with information sharing 
on numbers, types and locations of nuclear stocks as laying the groundwork for drawing 
Beijing into the formal arms control talks.9  With each new entrant into the multilateral 
arms control negotiations, it would become progressively more difficult for the remainder to stay outside the process.1.28 The study describes bilateral drawdown by the United States and Russia to 900 
weapons each as being wholly consistent with the maintenance of a full deterrence – and 
extended deterrence – posture, and as being desirable and possible for five reasons:
 > Mutual nuclear deterrence is no longer a cornerstone of the bilateral US–Russia 
relationship;
7. Global Zero Action Plan, http://www.globalzero.org/files/pdf/gzap_3.0.pdf.
8. James Cartwright, et al., Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture. Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy 
Commission Report (Washington DC: Global Zero, 2012), www.globalzero.org/en/us-nuclear-policy-commission-report.
9. Cartwright, et al., Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, p. 4.
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 > Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to a broad range of contemporary threats – rogue 
and failed states, terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, conflict and 
environmental refugees, climate change and the like;
 > Only deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals to the levels of the other nuclear-armed 
states will remedy a basic deficiency in the framework of nuclear arms talks, namely 
the exclusion of the rest;
 > At a time of economic stagnation and in a fiscally constrained environment, it seems 
irrational to spend in excess of $1 trillion per decade on producing and maintaining 
nuclear weapons (Table 1.1) and mitigating their health and environmental 
consequences; and
 > The launch-ready nuclear postures of Russia and the United States are very high-risk 
(see §1.6 below).10
10. Cartwright, et al., Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, pp. 1–5. 
Table 1.1 Military and Nuclear Weapons Expenditures  
(US $ bn, 2010 exchange rates)
Total Military Spending Nuclear Weapons (2011, estimated) 
(2010) Core Cost Full CostUSA 687 34.0 61.3Russia 53-86 9.8 14.8China 129 6.4 7.6France 61 4.7 6.0
UK 57 4.5 5.5India 35 3.8 4.9Israel 13 1.5 1.9Pakistan 7.9 1.8 2.2
North Korea 8.8 0.5 0.7
Total 1052-1085 67.0 104.9
Core costs refer to researching, developing, testing, operating, maintaining and upgrading the nuclear arsenal (weapons 
and delivery vehicles) and the nuclear command -control-communications and early warning infrastructure. Full costs 
add unpaid/deferred health and environmental costs, missile defences assigned to defend against nuclear weapons, and 
nuclear threat reduction and incident management. Air defences, anti-submarine warfare and nuclear weapons- related 
intelligence and surveillance expenses are not included. 
Source: Bruce Blair and Matthew A. Brown, “World Spending on Nuclear Weapons Surpasses $1 Trillion Per Decade” 
(Washington DC: Global Zero, June 2011). Available at: http://www.globalzero.org/en/page/cost-of- nukes.
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1.29 Derived from these various sources, CNND suggests that the overall objectives and strategy that the international community should be pursuing in relation to nuclear 
disarmament might realistically be described as:
 > Rapid movement towards a major overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types 
of nuclear weapons;
 > Such reduction to be accompanied, and assisted, by moves to further delegitimize 
nuclear weapons, reduce their role and significance in military doctrine and strategy, 
and dramatically curtail their operational deployment;
 > The major reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles to be followed as soon as possible 
thereafter by their complete elimination; and
 > The disarmament process throughout to be irreversible, verifiable, and transparent.
1.30 The unhappy reality is that by the end of 2012 very little progress has been made 
towards realizing any of these broad objectives. The optimism and energy that marked 
the year leading up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference have largely evaporated. 
Currently there is little appetite for further US–Russian nuclear arms reduction 
negotiations and none for a multilateral nuclear disarmament process; no inclination to 
embrace no first use or sole purpose doctrine on the part of nuclear-armed states that 
have not already done so; no willingness on the part of Russia and the United States to 
lower the launch alert status of their ballistic missiles; and no sign of any agreement on 
issues like ballistic missile defence and perceived conventional force imbalances which 
are seen as inhibiting further disarmament progress.
1.31 Specific questions relating to progress, or lack of it, on disarmament principles, 
reducing weapons numbers, nuclear doctrine, nuclear force posture and parallel security 
issues like ballistic missile defence are addressed in the following sections. For present 
purposes, the important point is that no visible progress has been made in extracting 
any kind of serious practical commitment to complete disarmament, or even to any kind 
of “minimization” target. There has been no disposition on the part of any NWS or other 
nuclear-armed states to discuss nuclear disarmament timelines of any kind – either 
modest, like the ICNND’s and Cartwright studies, or highly ambitious, like Global Zero’s 
2030 abolition target. All nuclear-armed states have long-term nuclear weapons system 
modernization programs under development and in progress. Based on current arsenals, 
deployments and force postures, and on planned expansions, upgrades and 
modernization, every one of them is committed to the indefinite retention of significant 
nuclear-weapon capability.
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§1.3 Disarmament Principles
1.3.1 Irreversibility
1.32 The 2010 NPT Review Conference committed all states “to apply the principles of 
irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their 
treaty obligations” (Action 2). The concept of “irreversible nuclear disarmament” first 
seems to have been used in the framework of efforts to denuclearize the Korean 
peninsula. However, the term entered the multilateral disarmament lexicon after it was incorporated into the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament elaborated at the 
2000 NPT Review Conference. While the term was used in this context, it was not defined 
and there does not seem to be general agreement on what it means. The recollections of 
participants at the 2000 NPT Review Conference suggest that the expression should 
probably be interpreted in a broad manner and seen as a series of measures that, taken 
together, can reduce the likelihood of backsliding on agreed commitments.1.33 Irreversible nuclear disarmament is here understood to encompass warhead 
dismantlement, the removal from nuclear weapons programs of fissile material no 
longer required for military purposes, and the decommissioning and dismantling of 
weapon-grade fissile material production plants. Fissile material production and 
disposition are covered in Chapter 2, although it may be noted here that four of the five 
NWS have declared an end to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; 
and the exception, China, is thought not to have produced such material for more than 
two decades. Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have each declared some 
weapon-grade fissile material excess to defence requirements. Non-NPT states parties 
India, Pakistan and North Korea all continue to produce fissile material for nuclear 
weapons; and Israel may do so. France, the United Kingdom and the United States have 
closed and are in the process of decommissioning their fissile material production 
facilities. In 2008, France invited international experts to observe the dismantlement of 
its facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte.
1.34 China, France and the United Kingdom provide no information on warhead dismantlement.11 Russia is dismantling retired warheads but provides no details of this 
activity. It currently has two operating nuclear weapon assembly/dismantlement plants, 
at Lesnoy (formerly Sverdlovsk-45) and Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-36).12 
1.35 The United States dismantled 8,748 nuclear warheads over fifteen years (1994–
2009).13  No more recent figures are currently publicly available. The US National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) has, however, since announced (in October 2011) the 
completion of dismantlement programs for the W62 warhead (August 2010) and the 
B53 bomb, the oldest weapon in the US arsenal. It has also dismantled a number of B61 
and B83-0/1 bombs and W76-0, W80-0, W84 and W78 warheads. On 3 December 2012 
11. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the Conclusions And Recommendations for Follow-On Actions Adopted 
at the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions 1–22: Monitoring Report (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2012), p. 15.
12. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2011, p. 5 – www.fissilematerials.org.
13. NNSA, “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” Fact Sheet, 3 May 2010.
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it announced that it had “accomplished 112 per cent of its goal for planned stockpile dismantlements in FY 2012.”14
1.3.2 Transparency
1.36 Transparency in this context refers to the willingness of a state to voluntarily expose 
credible information about its strategic aims, intentions, doctrines and current and prospective nuclear weapon capabilities and deployments. Transparency in relation to 
nuclear weapons doctrine, numbers and deployment can promote reciprocity and boost 
mutual confidence, and is a necessary condition for serious disarmament negotiations.
1.37 Public statements of the intent to pursue total elimination of nuclear weapons are 
hedged with so many caveats and qualifications as to render them meaningless in 
practice. Seven of the nine nuclear-armed states have at various times published 
statements of doctrine. None of them has said explicitly, however, when and how its 
nuclear weapons would be used. Of the exceptions (North Korea and Israel) little can be 
said. Israel shows no sign of relaxing its policy of nuclear opacity, while North Korea’s 
periodic warnings of nuclear annihilation would appear to signal a willingness to use nuclear weapons against its enemies.
1.38 China provides no details of the size, composition and deployment of its nuclear 
arsenal. It claims that, given the small size and limited capabilities of that arsenal, it 
needs to rely relatively far more than Russia and the United States on secrecy with 
respect to the survivability of its nuclear arsenal, infrastructure and national command 
authority. Chinese leaders and experts appear to believe that transparency is the enemy 
of confidence in survivability and retaliatory capability.
1.39 France has declared a stockpile ceiling of less than 300 operational nuclear 
warheads, with no warheads in reserve.15 The United Kingdom has gone further, 
announcing revised target ceilings for its stockpile and the number of operationally 
available warheads, including the number of warheads deployed on each submarine.
1.40 Consistent with New START Treaty provisions, Russia and the United States declare 
numbers of deployed strategic warheads and deployed and non-deployed launchers 
covered by the treaty. The United States has also published (most recently as of 30 
September 2009) an aggregate figure for its nuclear weapons stockpile. Russia does not 
release data on the overall size of its arsenal, including warheads in reserve, or on the 
number of non-strategic weapons.16 
1.41 Neither India nor Pakistan provides details of the size, composition and deployment 
of its nuclear arsenal. At a recent conference at the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations in Moscow, Russian experts advised India and Pakistan to do 
more to enhance mutual transparency and set up verification mechanisms to build on 
confidence-building measures already agreed to, like the commitment not to attack each 
14. “NNSA Exceeds 2012 Goal for Nuclear Weapons Dismantlements,” Press Release, 3 December 2012,  
http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/dismantlements120312.
15. http://www.francetnp.fr/spip.php?article94.
16. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p.18
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Russians needed a reality check because of the prevailing levels of distrust between 
India and Pakistan, they were reminded that the trust divide was just as stark between Moscow and Washington when they began their nuclear arms talks in the 1970s.17 
1.42 Israel does not admit to the possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea provides 
no details of the number, composition and deployment of its nuclear weapons.
1.43 The 2010 NPT Review Conference encouraged states parties to “submit regular 
reports” on implementation of the conference action plan and previous commitments 
(Action 20); and encouraged NWS “to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting 
form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily 
providing standard information without prejudice to national security” (Action 21). At 
the same time, the United Nations Secretary-General was “invited to establish a publicly-
accessible repository” to include information provided by the NWS.
1.44 The ten-nation (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)18 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Initiative (NPDI) conveyed a draft standard reporting form to the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council (P5), who happen also to be the five NWS recognized 
as such by the NPT, prior to their meeting in Paris in July 2011. The P5 have not 
commented on the form (since made available to all states at the First Preparatory 
Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna in May 2012) but have 
confirmed, at their most recent meeting in Washington in June 2012, that they had 
“considered proposals for a standard reporting form.” The P5 recognized “the importance 
of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, 
and [promised to] continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5, with a view 
to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 
20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon final document.”19 
1.45 In May 2012, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) presented a 
number of proposals on transparency to the First Preparatory Committee of the 2015 
NPT Review Conference in Vienna. These included baseline declarations on nuclear 
weapons numbers and fissile material holdings by NWS to the 2014 NPT Preparatory 
Committee meeting and a commitment by NWS at the 2015 Review Conference “to 
develop information on the histories of their nuclear warhead and fissile material 
stockpiles, which could later provide the basis for public declarations.”20  Meanwhile, an 
online repository established by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs pursuant to Action 21 remains empty.
17. Vladimir Radyuhin, “Cold War lessons for India and Pakistan,” The Hindu (Chennai), 19 November 2012.
18. Seven of the ten shelter under the US nuclear umbrella, the exceptions being Chile, Mexico and the UAE. 
19. US Department of State, “Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT,” Media Note, 29 June 2012,  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/194292.htm.
20. Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material Stocks as a Step Toward Disarmament,  
International Panel on Fissile Materials, Vienna, 3 May 2012, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2012/05/ipfm_presents_
proposals_o.html.
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1.3.3 Verification
1.46 “Verification” refers to the process, established or approved in a bilateral agreement 
or multilateral arms control treaty, by which individual state parties or an appropriately empowered international body determine the degree to which the parties to the 
agreement have implemented its provisions. In the context of nuclear disarmament, it 
refers to the checks carried out by competent authorities using qualified personnel, 
technical means, or a combination of the two, to confirm that agreed commitments on 
numbers, stockpiles, force postures, deployments and the like have been implemented. 
The task can be undertaken outside the governmental or intergovernmental framework. 
For example, VERTIC (the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), set 
up in London in 1986, is an independent non-governmental organization with the 
mission “to support the development, implementation and effectiveness of international 
agreements and related regional and national initiatives, with particular attention to 
issues of monitoring, review, implementation and verification.” 21
1.47 As has been noted in introducing this section, the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
committed all states “to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and 
transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations” (Action 2). In 
addition, all states agreed on “the importance of supporting [international] cooperation… 
aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient 
verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament” (Action 19).
1.48 China has taken no steps to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal. It has made no 
claims to have shifted nuclear warheads from deployed to reserve status or to have 
dismantled any. The question of verification therefore is not relevant.
1.49 Neither France’s nor the United Kingdom’s unilateral nuclear arms reduction measures 
are subject to independent verification. UK Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt told 
Parliament on 9 June 2010 that the United Kingdom had “no plans to establish procedures 
to allow the international community to verify the UK’s nuclear warhead stockpile.”22 
1.50 The United Kingdom and Norway have however, since 2007, been conducting joint 
research into possible methodologies for nuclear warhead dismantlement. The UK–
Norway Initiative has “focused on the joint development of effective and mutually trusted solutions to technical and procedural disarmament hurdles which will not breach our 
respective non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.”23 The two countries hosted a 
“managed access exercise” in the United Kingdom in 2010. In December 2011, they 
briefed technical experts from twelve interested non-NWS on the progress of their 
research. And in April 2012, the United Kingdom hosted an expert-level briefing for P5 
partners on lessons learned from the UK–Norway Initiative and invited their views. The 
two countries made a presentation on the initiative at the first meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna in May 2012. The United 
21. http://www.vertic.org/.
22. Beatrice Fihn, ed., The 2010 NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and Reaching Critical Will, 2012), p. 41.
23. Statement by UK Head of Delegation (under Cluster 1 – Disarmament) at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 
NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012.
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Kingdom is also cooperating with the United States on the development of disarmament 
verification technology, as discussed further below.1.51 The New START Treaty between Russia and the United States incorporates a range 
of bilateral verification measures, including data exchanges, inspections and notifications. 
The United States is cooperating with the United Kingdom on the development of 
disarmament verification technology. Other members of the P5 were given an overview 
of this work at the third P5 conference in Washington in June 2012 and “agreed to 
consider attending a follow-up P5 briefing… to be hosted by the United States.”24
1.52 In order to provide confidence that states do not retain undeclared nuclear weapons 
or fissile material and to facilitate future verification, the ICNND Report recommended 
that “nuclear archaeology” steps be taken now by the nuclear-armed states “to ensure 
that all relevant records are identified, secured and preserved, and relevant measurements 
and samples are taken” (Recommendation 48). All states have a shared interest “in 
ensuring that future verification is able to provide credible results.”25
1.53 Since most states with nuclear weapons have stopped production of both highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, “nuclear archaeology” in this context would 
take the form of historical materials accountancy. Documenting the total production of 
HEU and/or plutonium over a few decades is a large and time-consuming effort, and the 
results are inevitably presented in aggregated form with significant associated 
uncertainties. The United States and the United Kingdom have made such efforts. The 
United States published the results of its historical accounting for both HEU and 
plutonium, while the United Kingdom has published a report on HEU.26
§1.4 Reducing Weapons Numbers
1.4.1 Current Nuclear Arsenals
1.54 As the world marked fifty years since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, there 
were still almost 18,000 nuclear warheads distributed among nine nuclear-armed states. 
The size and distribution of the current global stockpile are shown in Table 1.2. On the 
one hand, as the table shows, 94 per cent of the world’s stocks of nuclear weapons are 
held in Russian and US arsenals. On the other hand, not shown, concerns about the growth 
in nuclear weapons stockpiles are focused on China, India, North Korea and Pakistan.
24. “Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT,” Press Release, Newsroom America Feeds, 29 June 2012.
25. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 171.
26. US Department of Energy (DOE), Highly Enriched Uranium, Striking a Balance: A Historical Report on the United States 
Highly Enriched Uranium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization Activities from 1945 through September 30, 1996 (DOE: 
Washington, DC, 2001); DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium Inventory: Amounts of Highly Enriched Uranium in the United States 
(DOE: Washington, DC, 2012); DOE, Plutonium: the First 50 Years (DOE: Washington, DC, 1996); DOE, The United States 
Plutonium Balance, 1944–2009 (DOE: Washington, DC, 2012); UK Ministry of Defence, “Historical accounting for UK defence 
highly enriched uranium,” March 2006, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/
HealthandSafetyPublications/DepletedUranium/.
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Table 1.2: The World’s Nuclear Arsenals (2012) 
Strategic Other
To be
Total 
by 
Yield 
Range 
Total 
Yield 
Deployed Reserve Deployed Reserve  Dismantled Country (kt) (Mt)USA  1722a 2450b 200 300 3100 7772c Sub- kt -455 535Russia 1799d   700e  0f ~860 
- 1040f 5500g  8859 -9039  Sub- kt - 1000  773China 200h  40 – – – 240 184-240  294France 300 – – – – 300 100-300 55
UK  160   65 – – – 225i  100 21Israel  80 – – – –  80j – 1.6-12India  80-100 – – – –  80-100 15 -200 1Pakistan 90- 110 – – – –  90-110k Sub-kt-50 1.7
DPRK – – – – – –l Sub- kt- 8 0.05
Totals 4431 
- 4471
3255 200 1160 
-1340
8600 17646 
-17866
1682 
 -1693
All figures are based on S. N. Kile, et al., “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 307–44 unless otherwise noted below. All figures are estimates.
Notes to Table 1.2
a.  This number is based on the most recent information drawn from the exchange of data 
pursuant to the 2010 Russia–US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).27 These warheads are fielded on 806 
active ICBMs, submarine-based missiles and bombers. The number has decreased from 
2,200 reported in the ICNND report of November 2009 due to the continued implementation 
of strategic arms reduction agreements. The United States will have to offload approximately 
170 further warheads by 2018 in order to meet the New START limit.
b.  The United States has a total of 2,750 warheads held in reserve. Of these, 2,450 are 
strategic and 300 are non-strategic.28 The United States possesses around 760 non-
strategic nuclear warheads. This includes approximately 200 B61 gravity bombs 
deployed in Europe, 300 US-based bombs on reserve, and around 260 warheads for the 
Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile awaiting dismantlement.29 The total number of 
non-strategic warheads has been decreasing partly due to steps delineated in the 2010 
NPR including the planned retirement of nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles.c.  Reductions in the US total stockpile can be attributed to obligations under bilateral arms 
control treaties with Russia, including the START and SORT treaties, as well as steps 
taken as a result of the 2010 NPR. Part of the total stockpile number includes the ongoing 
27. US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of 
Strategic Offensive Arms,” Fact Sheet, 30 November 2012.
28. S.H. Kile, P. Schell and H.M. Kristensen, “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 309.
29. Kile, et al., “World Nuclear Forces,” p. 313.
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retirement of excess W76 warheads.30  The US Navy is estimated to have downloaded 
each missile to an average of 4-5 warheads to meet a warhead ceiling mandated by SORT.
d.  This number is based on the most recent information drawn from the exchange of data 
pursuant to New START and further represents 300 bomber weapons thought to be present at bomber bases.31 These warheads are deployed on 491 extended-distance 
delivery systems. This number has decreased from 2,800 reported in the ICNND report 
of November 2009 due to continued implementation of strategic arms reduction agreements.
e.  There is substantial lack of data available regarding Russian strategic warheads in 
reserve, as well as unresolved definitional issues concerning the differentiation between warheads in reserve and warheads awaiting dismantlement. The 2009 ICNND table gave 
this number as 4,750 but qualified the figure as a rough approximation due to Russia’s 
lack of transparency. The 2012 number for the strategic reserve comprises 700 strategic 
warheads thought to be in reserve for SSBNs and bombers.32 Based on SIPRI Yearbook 
information, many of the strategic warheads classified by the ICNND table as being in 
reserve are actually awaiting dismantlement, explaining the discrepancy between ICNND and SIPRI numbers in this category.
f.  Previous calculations regarding the size of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces have 
been based on approximations that may have overestimated the real number owing to 
lack of a clear methodology. The difficulty in arriving at an accurate estimate is partly 
due to the fact that only the strategic forces of the United States and Russia have been 
subject to verification and transparency measures due to bilateral treaty obligations. The 
estimate used in this table is based on a report that uses a new and defined methodology 
for estimating the composition and size of Russia’s operational non-strategic nuclear stockpile.33  The methodology uses open-source information to establish “assignment 
rules” for nuclear-capable portions of Russia’s military and the numbers attained come 
forth as reliable as they match reasonably accurately official and semi-official statements. 
The general trend has been a decrease since the end of the Cold War, with a 50 per cent decrease in the past seven years based on the study’s methodology.
g.  This number includes approximately 3,500 strategic warheads and 2,000 non-strategic warheads.34 
h.  China is thought to be expanding its nuclear arsenal as part of a modernization program, 
explaining the slight increase from 2009 ICNND numbers.
i.  The 2010 UK Strategic Defence Review aims to decrease the size of the British nuclear 
arsenal from 225 warheads to “no more than 180 by the mid 2020s.” Deployed strategic warheads will be reduced to no more than 120.35
j.  Israel’s policy of “nuclear opacity” makes any estimate of nuclear weapons numbers and 
capabilities essentially a matter of speculation.
30. Kile, et al., “World Nuclear Forces,” p. 309.
31. US, “New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.”
32. Kile, et al., “World Nuclear Forces,” p. 317.
33. Igor Sutyagin, “Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces” (London: Royal United 
Services Institute, November 2012).
34. Kile, et al., “World Nuclear Forces,” p. 315.
35. UK Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence Security Review, Cm 7948 (HM 
Stationary Office: London, October 2010), p. 38, paragraph 3.11.
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k.  Pakistan has roughly doubled its nuclear arsenal since the ICNND report. Pakistan is now 
the world’s fifth largest nuclear power. Several experts believe that Pakistan could double its nuclear stockpile within a decade based on increased military plutonium production capabilities.36 
l.  A currently inoperative reactor is estimated to have produced enough weapon-grade 
plutonium for perhaps 10 nuclear warheads.37
1.55 The significant discrepancy in numbers between Table 1.2 (which shows a global 
total of just under 18,000 nuclear weapons in 2012) and its counterpart, Box 2.2 in the ICNND Report38 (which shows a figure of over 23,000 in 2009) does not mean that we 
can conclude that stockpile numbers in fact declined by some 5,000 weapons during the period in question. While there has been a continuing reduction in US and Russian 
stockpiles under the older bilateral START and SORT treaties, and some additional 
unilateral reductions by both these powers, reductions by other nuclear-armed states 
have either been very modest (in the case of France and the United Kingdom), non-
existent, or negative (in the sense that stocks have increased).
1.56 Most of the apparent overall downsizing can be explained by better information 
and research methodology with, in the 2009 ICNND report, the Russian figures in 
particular likely to have been significantly overstated. The better news, although it does 
not affect the size of the total stockpile of existing weapons, is that the New START Treaty 
will bring about a significant reduction in the number of strategic weapons actually 
deployed by the United States and Russia, and many weapons previously identified as held in reserve by both countries are now more accurately to be counted as “awaiting dismantlement.”
1.57 The definitions used in this table are not universally agreed among the NWS. They are 
currently working on a glossary of terms intended to resolve definitional discrepancies. 
While Russian–US disarmament practice establishes some useful benchmarks, it should 
be noted that New START does not in fact define the terms “deployed” or “reserve” 
warhead. New START only regulates the number of warheads on deployed delivery 
vehicles, and warhead numbers reported by each state under the treaty reflect this 
practice. The term “reserve,” while not defined in New START, is most often used to refer to 
warheads that have been placed in long-term storage (that is, they are not located on an 
operational base). The term “strategic” is typically based on the range of the delivery 
vehicle. Again, the term is not explicitly defined in New START, but given the treaty and its 
predecessors address the issue of “strategic offensive arms” reductions, any nuclear delivery vehicle not meeting the range requirements encompassed by New START is 
typically assumed to be non-strategic or tactical. However, outside of Russia–US 
agreements, other states with nuclear weapons generally consider all of their nuclear 
forces to be strategic, regardless of the ranges of their delivery vehicles.
36. D. Albright and P. Brannan, “Pakistan appears to be building a fourth military reactor at the Kushan site,” Institute for 
Science and International Security (ISIS) Report, 9 February 2011.
37. Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, Arms Control Association, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/
factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
38. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 20.
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1.58 Of the five NPT NWS, only China’s nuclear arsenal is growing. China, however, does 
not publish or otherwise provide details of the size and composition of its nuclear 
arsenal, although it did claim in April 2004 to have the smallest arsenal among the NWS.39 With the United Kingdom taking steps to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, 
this is no longer the case (Table 1.2). Taking into account estimates of China’s fissile 
material production, the proportion of fissile material likely to have been used to make 
weapons, delivery vehicle numbers and other relevant factors, Hans M. Kristensen and 
Robert S. Norris estimate China’s total stockpile to be approximately 240 warheads.40 
This figure appears to be the general consensus among non-government experts.41 
General C. Robert Kehler, commander of the US Strategic Command, responding to recent 
studies suggesting that China could have between 1,600 and 3,000 warheads – for 
example, from the Russian Academy of Science’s Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO RAN), arguing for a figure of 1,600-1,80042 – has rejected claims that the Chinese arsenal is much higher than commonly believed.43
1.59 China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear weapons systems, as the Second 
Artillery Force continues progressively to improve its missile force structure in both 
nuclear and conventional configurations, and the navy to enhance its strategic deterrence 
and counter-attack capability.44 China is reported to be working on a third generation 
ICBM equipped with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and 
to be within two years of establishing a “near-continuous at-sea strategic deterrent” 
with the deployment of JL-2 SLBMs on JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.451.60 China’s nuclear arsenal has evolved and grown rather more slowly than was the 
case historically with the United States and the former Soviet Union. There is nothing to suggest that China is engaged in a “sprint to parity” with Russia or the United States and 
plenty of evidence to conclude that it is not. China is believed to have made between 200 
and 300 warheads in total, of which about 50 were used for the 45 nuclear tests it 
conducted before the CTBT-related moratorium in 1996. The number estimated to be 
prepared for deployment is approximately 155. It has about 150 land-based missiles 
capable of carrying nuclear payloads, of which some 50 have a long enough range 
(7,000–12,000 km) to reach the continental United States. Outside analysts do not
39. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Fact Sheet, 27 April 2004, www.fmprc.gov.cn.
40. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67:6 
(November/December 2011), pp 81–87, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/6/81.full.pdf+html.
41. See for example Federation of American Scientists Status of World Nuclear Forces,  
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html, or Arms Control Association,  
Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,  
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
42. Victor Yesin, “China’s Nuclear Capability” in Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds., Prospects 
of China’s Participation in Nuclear Arms Limitations, (Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 
Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012), pp 26–33.
43. “STRATCOM Commander Rejects High Estimates for Chinese Nuclear Arsenal,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, 22 August 
2012, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2012/08/china-nukes.php.
44. China Defence White Paper 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-03/31/content_22263885.htm.
45. “China ‘is two years from arming its submarines with nuclear weapons’, says U.S. report,” MailOnline, updated 9 November 2012.
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believe that its missiles are armed with multiple warheads. Its small stock of air-deliverable nuclear weapons are not believed to have any “primary mission.”46
 
1.61 France no longer has a ground-based missile force. Its nuclear weapons are deployed 
on its four submarines and aircraft. Despite recent cuts in the airborne component of 
France’s nuclear deterrent, its nuclear arsenal is being modernized and upgraded with 
the progressive introduction of longer-range missiles and new warheads.47
46. Gregory Kulacki, “China’s Nuclear Arsenal: Status and Evolution,” Union of Concerned Scientists (October 2011), pp. 1–2.
47. Fihn, ed., The 2010 NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report, p. 28.
Table 1.3: China’s Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type NATO 
Designation
Year 
Deployed
Range 
(km)
Warhead x 
Yield (Kt)
No. of 
Warheads
Land‐based  
missiles
DF- 3A CSS- 2 1971 3100 1 x 3300 16
DF-4 CSS-3 1980 5400(+) 1 x 3300 12
DF-5A CSS-4 Mod 2 1981 13000(+) 1 x 4000-5000 20
DF-21A CSS-5 Mod ½ 1991 2150 1 x 200-300 60
DF-31 CSS-10 Mod 1 2006 7200 1 x 200-300(?) 10-20
DF-31A CSS-10 Mod 2 2007 11200 1 x 200-300(?) 10-20
Submarine‐launched  
ballistic missiles
JL-1 CSS-NX-3 1986 1000(+) 1 x 200-300 12
JL-2 CSS-NX-14 – ca. 7400 1 x 200-300(?) 36
Aircraft
Hong- 6 B-6 1965 3100 1 x bomb 20Others – – – 1 x bomb (20)
Total ca. 240
Source: SIPRI
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1.62 As noted above, while Russia declares the number of deployed strategic warheads 
and deployed and non-deployed launchers, it does not release data on the overall size of 
its arsenal or the number of non-strategic weapons.48 It is currently thought to have 
some 9,000 nuclear warheads in total, including 5,500 retired strategic and non-strategic warheads awaiting dismantlement.
1.63 Russia is committed to reducing the size of its deployed strategic weapons arsenal 
in accordance with the provisions of the New START agreement, but is also modernizing 
its strategic nuclear forces. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 
2020, adopted in May 2009, states that “Russia will undertake all necessary efforts, with 
minimum expenditure, to maintain parity with the United States of America in the area 
of strategic offensive arms.”49 In an article published in August 2010, Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov said that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, Russia’s national security 
must be strengthened by phasing in modern, more effective and reliable types of strategic 
offensive weapons in conditions of coordinated and planned reduction of their aggregate 
amount.” And in February 2011, First Deputy Minister of Defence Vladimir Popovkin 
told journalists that Russia would spend some US $70 billion on its strategic nuclear 
forces over the next ten years.50
48. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 18.
49. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian 
Federation 12 May 2009 No. 537, paragraph 96.
50. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 8.
Table 1.4: France’s Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type No. 
Deployed
Year 
Deployed
Range 
(km)
Warhead x 
Yield (Kt)
Warheads 
in stockpile
Land‐based  
aircraftMirage 2000N 20 1988 2750 1 x 300 20
Rafale F3 20 2010-2011 2000 1 x 300 20
Carrier‐based  
aircraft
Rafale MK3 10 2010-2011 2000 1 x 300 10
Submarine‐launched  
ballistic missilesM45 32 1996 6000 4-6 x 100 160M51.1 16 2010-2011 6000 4-6 x 100 80M51.2 0 -2015 6000 4 -6 x TNO 0
Total 300
Note: TNO = Tête Nucléaire Océanique (Oceanic Nuclear Warhead)  
Source: SIPRI
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Table 1.5: Russia’s Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type NATO 
Designation
Year 
Deployed
Range 
(km)
Warhead x 
Yield (Kt)
Warheads
Strategic offensive  
weapons
Bombers
TU- 95MS6 Bear-H6 1981 6500- 10500 6 x AS -15A 
ALCMs, bombs
168
TU-95MS16 Bear-H16 1981 6500- 10500 6 x AS -15A 
ALCMs, bombs
496
TU-160 Blackjack 1987 10500-13200 12 x AS-15B 
ALCMs or AS-16 
SRAMS, bombs
156
ICBMs
SS-18 Satan 1979 11000-15000 10 x 500-750 500
SS-19 Stiletto 1980 10000 6 x 500-750 288
SS-25 Sickle 1985 10500 1 x 550 135
SS-27 Topol-M 1997 10500 1 x 550 164
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray 1978 6500 3 x 200 144
SS-N-23 Skiff 1986 9000 4 x 100 384
SS-N-32 – (2012) – 6 x 100 (192)
Subtotal ca. 2430
Non‐strategic and  
defensive forcesABMs
SH-11/SH-08 Gorgon/Gazelle 1989/86 1 x 1000/10 68
SA-10 Grumble 1980 1 x low 340
SSC-1B Reduct 1973 1 x 500 17Bombers and 
Attack aircraft
Backfire/
Fencer/ Fullback
ASM, bombs 730
Ground-based
SS-21 Scarab 1 x low 150
SS-26 Stone 1 x low 24Naval
Subs/ships/air 660
Subtotal ca. 2000
Total 4430 
Note: This table includes the latest available disaggregated specific data for Russian nuclear forces. The lower figure for 
Russian deployed strategic forces in Table 1:2 is based on more recent aggregate New START data, which does not include 
information on specific force elements. The significantly lower number attached to Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in 
Table 1:2 is a product of new and more accurate methodologies used to calculate the figure.  
Source: SIPRI
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1.64 Russia is retiring some of its older land-based missiles and replacing them with SS-
27s and its variants, including the road-mobile RS-24 Yars, which is equipped with MIRVs. It is reported to be developing a new ICBM with the capacity to overcome ballistic missile 
defences, though current projected deployment dates (2016/2018) may be unrealistic.51 
1.65 Russia is also modernizing its nuclear submarine fleet and SLBMs. The first of eight 
fourth-generation Borei class nuclear submarines entered active service at the beginning 
of 2013.52 The submarines will carry up to sixteen new Bulava missiles which “can 
transport 10 independently targeted nuclear warheads over distances approaching 5,000 miles.”53 Russia is reported to have plans to develop a fifth-generation nuclear submarine and to have started research and development work on a new strategic bomber.54 1.66 The United Kingdom’s relatively small nuclear arsenal consists entirely of sea-
launched Trident missiles deployed on Vanguard-class submarines. The existing fleet of 
four Vanguard-class submarines is due for replacement in the 2020s. The ruling 
Conservative Party favours a “like-for-like” nuclear modernization plan as the most 
viable way of maintaining what it sees as the required capability for continuous at-sea 
deterrence. Its Liberal Democratic coalition partner has, however, demanded a fresh 
assessment of the alternatives that could possibly include fewer new Vanguard-class 
submarines, or no new submarines and a switch from Trident ballistic missiles to 
nuclear-capable cruise missiles. In the meantime, senior military commanders are 
reported to have private doubts about the wisdom of investing in a replacement for the 
Trident submarines at the cost of cutbacks in other areas that would adversely affect the 
operational combat capability of British armed forces.55 While a final decision on the 
shape of Britain’s future nuclear deterrent will now not be taken until after the next 
general election in 2016, the government has already placed some GBP 4 billion worth 
of orders for design and development of new submarines.56 
Table 1.6: UK Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type Designation No. 
Deployed
Year 
Deployed
Range 
(km)
Warhead x 
Yield (Kt)
Warheads in 
StockpileSLBMs
D-5 Trident II 48 1994 >7400 1-3 x 100 225
Total 225
Source: SIPRI
51. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, pp. 8–9.
52. “Russian Nuke Sub Goes on Duty,” Global Security Newswire, 3 January 2013.
53. Global Security Newswire, 29 June 2012.
54. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 9.
55. Oliver Wright and Kim Sengupta, “Top military chiefs go cold on nuclear deterrent,” The Independent (London), 26 September 2012.
56. Rachel Oswald, “U.K. Defense Secretary Says Trident Renewal is Most Cost-Effective Way to Ensure Deterrent,” Global 
Security Newswire, 19 July 2012.
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1.67 The United Kingdom is also modernizing its nuclear weapons complex. This 
includes a new facility for manufacturing uranium components for weapons at 
Aldermaston and a new warhead assembly/disassembly plant at Burghfield. Both plants 
are expected to enter into service between 2016 and 2020.57 
1.68 As of 30 September 2009 (the most recent publicly available figures), the United 
States’ aggregate nuclear weapons stockpile (deployed and non-deployed, strategic and 
non-strategic nuclear weapons) comprised 5,113 warheads.58  Under New START Treaty 
provisions, the United States declares deployed strategic warhead and deployed and 
non-deployed launcher numbers biannually (see Section 1.4.3).
1.69 The April 2010 NPR Report confirmed that the United States would maintain its 
nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The US long-term nuclear 
modernization program currently includes twelve new nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarines, a new air-launched stand-off nuclear missile, and eventual replacement of 
the Minuteman III ICBM and B-52H strategic bomber.59 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will 
also be made nuclear-capable.60 
1.70 As the BASIC Trident Commission reminds us, it is important to remember that 
“planned reductions in deployed and Treaty-counted U.S. forces are… taking place in the 
context of an extensive Obama administration commitment to maintain and modernize 
the U.S. nuclear force and its supporting infrastructure for the long-term.”61  In 2010, 
senior US officials told hearings of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 
New START Treaty that “Over the next decade, the United States will invest well over 
$100 billion in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing capabilities and modernize 
some strategic systems. U.S. nuclear weapons will also undergo extensive life extension 
programs in the coming years to ensure their safety, security and effectiveness.”62 
1.71 The rapidly escalating costs of these programs are, however, sharply at odds with 
US efforts to rein in public spending. The life-extension program for the air-delivered 
B61 nuclear bomb is now expected to cost some US $10.4 billion, more than two-and-a-
half times the original estimate. Around 200 of these nuclear weapons in Europe are to 
be maintained and upgraded “despite the fact that no military commander can be found 
anywhere who would actually reach for them, in any scenario.”63 Critics have attributed 
the massive cost overrun to “an overly ambitious refurbishment project” which involves 
redesigning most of the bomb’s major components and “for all practical purposes 
building new [bombs] from scratch.”64 Cost estimates for a new plutonium laboratory, 
57. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2011, p. 6.
58. US Department of Defense, “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” Fact Sheet, 3 May 2010.
59. Ian Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, Discussion Paper 1 of the British 
American Security Information Council (BASIC) Trident Commission (London: BASIC, November 2011), p. 4; available at: 
http://www.basicint.org/publications/dr-ian-kearns-trident-commission-consultant/2011/beyond-uk-trends-other-
nuclear-armed-s.
60. US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington: April 2010), p. 27; http://www.defense.gov/
npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.
61. Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom, p. 11.
62. Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom, p. 11.
63. Des Browne and Ian Kearns, “NATO, Russia, and the Nuclear Disarmament Agenda: Reflections Post-Chicago,” ELN 
European Security Policy Brief 4 (London: European Leadership Network, August 2012), p. 10.
64. John Fleck, “Billions more needed to refurbish B61 nuclear bombs,” Albuquerque Journal, N.M., 4 November 2012. 64. 
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Table 1.7: US Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type Designation No. 
Deployed
Year 
Deployed
Range Warhead x 
Yield (KT)
No. of 
Warheads
Strategic
Forces
Bombers
B-52H Stratofortress 9
3/44
1961 16000 ALCM/A
CM 5-150
200
B-2 Spirit 2
0/16
1994 11000 Bombs 100
ICBMs
LGM-30g Minuteman III
Mk-12A 200 1979 13000 1-3
W78 x 335
250
Mk-21/SERV 250 2006 – 1
W87 x 300
250
SSBNs/SLBMs
UGM-133A Trident II 
(D-5)
Mk-4 n.a. 1992 >7400 4W76 x 100 468
Mk-4A 2008 – 4W76 x 100 300
Mk-5 n.a. 1990 >7400 4
W88 x 455
384
Subtotal 1952
Non‐Strategic
Forces
B61-3, -4,
-10 bombs
n.a. 1979 n.a. .3-170 200
TomahawkSLCM n.a. 1984 2500 1 x5-150 0
Subtotal 200Reserve 2800Total ca. 5000
Note: This table includes the latest available disaggregated specific data for US nuclear forces. The 
lower figure for US deployed strategic forces in Table 1:2 is based on more recent aggregate New 
START data, which does not include information on specific force elements.
Source: SIPRI   
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Table 1.8: India’s Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type Range (km) Payload (kg) Status
Ballistic Missiles 
(Land‐based)
Prithvi I/II 150/250 800/500 Weapons system entered service in 1994. Prithvi I has nuclear capability and Prithvi 
II is also believed to do so. Approx. fewer than 50 launchers deployed.Agni I 700 1000 Entered service in 2004Agni II 2000 1000 Entered service in 2004. Operational status uncertain.Agni III 3000 1500 Operational since 2011.
Agni IV >3000 1000 Under development.
Agni V >5000 1000 Under development.
Ballistic Missiles
(Sea‐based)Dhanush 350 500 Under development.
K-15 700 500-600 Under development.
K-4 3500 1000 Under development.
Aircraft
Mirage 2000H  
Vajra
1850 6300 Aircraft is capable of delivering nuclear gravity bombs.
Source: SIPRI   
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at Los Alamos, needed to meet 
an anticipated annual requirement for between 50 and 80 new plutonium pits for nuclear 
warheads, are reported to have increased tenfold, from US $600 million to US $6 billion.65 
The administration had intended to delay construction as a cost-cutting measure but has 
since approved defence authorization legislation which includes a requirement for the new 
facility to be fully operational by the end of 2026 – and caps expenditure on the project at 
US $3.7 billion.66 And a new multi-billion dollar Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 
Nuclear Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has had to be redesigned after it was recognized that current plans could not have accommodated the equipment needed.67 1.72 India’s nuclear arsenal is growing. It is currently estimated to possess some 80-100 
warheads for delivery by missiles and aircraft.68 
64. (cont) The life extension program, which the administration says is needed “to provide nuclear extended deterrence to 
NATO allies and to continue a gravity bomb capability on the B-2 stealth bomber,” is expected to see the consolidation, in the 
B61-12, of four current versions of the weapon. Hans M. Kristensen, “B61 Nuclear Bomb Costs Escalating,” http://www.fas.
org/blog/ssp/2012/05/b61cost.php.
65. Kate Brannen, “Pentagon More Than Doubles Cost Estimate for B61 Nuclear Bomb,” Defense News, 25 July 2012.
66. Diane Barnes, “Obama Inks Defense Spending Legislation,” Global Security Newswire, 3 January 2013.
67. Brannen, “Pentagon More Than Doubles Cost Estimate for B61 Nuclear Bomb”; Fleck, “Billions more needed to refurbish B61 nuclear bombs.”
68. S.H. Kile, P. Schell and H.M. Kristensen, “Indian Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012, p. 332.
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warheads for delivery by missiles and aircraft.69 Estimates of the number of weapons in 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are based on fissile material stock estimates and evidence of nuclear weapons design.
1.74 Israel’s policy of “nuclear ambiguity” or “nuclear opacity” makes any estimate of 
nuclear weapons numbers and capabilities essentially a matter of speculation. It is, 
however, thought to have an arsenal of some 80 nuclear weapons (50 for delivery by 
ballistic missiles and 30 non-strategic nuclear weapons).70 
69. S.H. Kile, P. Schell and H.M. Kristensen, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012, p. 337.
70. S.H. Kile, P. Schell and H.M. Kristensen, “Israeli Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012, pp. 341–42.
Table 1.9: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces  (2012)
Type Range (km) Payload (kg) Status
Ballistic Missiles 
(Land‐based)
Abdali (Hatf-2) 180 200-400 Under developmentGhaznavi  
(Hatf-3)
290 500 Entered service in 2004. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed.Shaheen I  
(Hatf -4)
600-800 750-1000 Entered service in 2004. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed.Shaheen II  
(Hatf-6)
2500 (approx. 1000) Under development
Ghauri I
(Hatf-5)
1200 700-100 Entered service in 2003. Fewer than 50 launchers deployed.Nasr
(Hatf- 9)
60 – Under development
Cruise missilesBabur
(Hatf-7)
600 400-500 Under development
Ra’ad
(Hatf-8)
350 – Under development. Air -launched.
Aircraft
F-16A/B 1600 4500 Currently being upgraded. Expected to be 
completed in 2013–2014
Mirage III/V 2100 4000
Source: SIPRI   
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1.75 North Korea may have enough fissile material for between 4 and 12 nuclear 
warheads, depending on warhead yield and design.71 On such information as is available, 
it may also have some 50 KN-02 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with an 
approximate range of 100-120 km; developed an intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM), Musadan, with a range of 2,500-3,000 km; and have up to ten Taepodong-1 
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), range 1,500-2,500 km, and some operational 
Taepodong-2 ICBMs.72 
1.4.2 Unilateral Measures
1.76 As noted above, such reductions as have occurred in US and Russian nuclear weapon 
stockpiles have resulted from a combination of bilateral commitments and unilateral decisions. The only other reductions known to have occurred have been in France and 
the United Kingdom, in each case as a result of unilateral decision rather than any treaty 
process. At the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference (Vienna, April–May 2012), France’s Head of Delegation confirmed that his country had met the objective set by the French President in 2008 to reduce its deterrent’s 
airborne component (that is, missiles and nuclear warheads) by one-third. “All in all, in 
the last 15 years, we have cut the number of nuclear warheads by half and… announced 
the ceiling of nuclear warheads in our possession, which now number less than 300.”73
71. www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korea-nuclear-disarmament/.
72. National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) (2011), “An Overview of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program,”  www.ncnk.org.
73. General Debate Statement by the Head of the French Delegation at the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee of 
the 2015 NPT Review Conference (Vienna, 30 April–11 May 2012).
Table 1.10: Israel’s Nuclear Forces (2012)
Type Range (km) Payload (kg) Comments
Ballistic Missiles
Jericho II 1500-1800 750-1000 Approx. 50 missiles. Introduced in 1990.
Jericho III >4000 1000-1300 Status unknown.
Aircraft
F-16
A/B/C/D/I
1600 5400 205 aircraft. It is believed that some have nuclear weapons delivery purposes.
Source: SIPRI   
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1.77 The United Kingdom has announced reductions in the size of its arsenal since the 
2010 NPT Review Conference. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review 
concluded that the UK’s minimum credible deterrence needs could be met with fewer 
nuclear weapons. As a consequence, the United Kingdom announced that by the mid- 
2020s, it would:
 > Reduce the number of warheads on each of its submarines from 48 to 40;
 > Reduce the requirement for operationally available warheads to no more than 120;
 > Reduce the number of launch tubes on each submarine, from 12 to 8; and
 > Reduce its overall nuclear weapons stockpile to no more than 180.
1.78 The United Kingdom has since confirmed that the projected changes have already 
been implemented with respect to at least one submarine, and that it expects the reduction in operationally available warhead numbers to have been completed by 2015.74 
1.4.3 Bilateral Processes
1.79 The 2010 NPT Review Conference saw Russia and the United States “commit to 
seek the early entry into force and full implementation of New START.” They were also 
encouraged “to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper 
reductions in their nuclear arsenals” (Action 4).
1.80 The New START Treaty entered into force on 6 February 2011, after ratification by 
the United States on 22 December 2010 and by Russia on 25 January 2011. The treaty 
74. Statement by UK Head of Delegation (under Cluster 1 – Disarmament) at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 
NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012.
Table 1.11: French Increases/Decreases of Nuclear Arsenal
Date Increases/Decreases Number of Warheads
1995–2000 -9.38% -48
2000–2005 -25.00% -116
2005–2010 -13.79% -48
2010–2012 0.00% 0
Source: SIPRI
Table 1.12: British Increases/Decreases of Nuclear Arsenal
Date Increases/Decreases Number of Warheads
1995–2000 9.95% 42
2000–2005 -25.00% -116
2005–2010 -35.34% -123
2010–2012 0.00% 0
Source: SIPRI
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commits the two countries to establish new limits on deployed strategic offensive 
nuclear weapons by 2018. For warheads, these are 74 per cent lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30 per cent lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit 
of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. For deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy 
bombers, the limits are less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicle limit of the 1991 START Treaty. The aggregate limits established by the treaty are 
1,550 deployed strategic warheads (with each deployed nuclear-capable heavy bomber 
counting as just one warhead toward the limit) and a combined (deployed and non-
deployed) limit of 800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers), of which no more than 700 may be deployed.75 Each party is permitted to determine its 
own strategic force structure within these limits.
1.81 The treaty’s verification regime provides for up to 18 on-site inspections per year, 
data exchanges (through a common database) and notifications (numbers, locations and 
technical specifications of weapons systems and facilities subject to the treaty), non-
interference with national technical means of verification, and an annual exchange of 
telemetric information (missile performance measurements) for up to five ICBM and SLBM launches per year.
1.82 The treaty also establishes a compliance and implementation body – the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission – that meets at least twice a year. The commission has so far 
met four times since the treaty’s entry into force: in March–April 2011, October–
November 2011, January–February 2012, and September 2012. The two countries 
conducted the maximum allowable number of inspections (18 each) for a twelve month 
period between April 2011 and February 2012. They each conducted a further 15 
inspections in the period to December 2012, and have exchanged in excess of 3,400 
notifications since entry into force.76 
1.83 By December 2012, Russia and the United States had exchanged data on aggregate 
numbers of strategic arms subject to the treaty on four occasions. Figures were made 
publicly available online. Between February 2011 and September 2012, Russia reduced its 
deployed warhead numbers by 38 (from 1537 to 1499); the United States by 78 (from 1800 
to 1722). Over the same period, the number of Russian strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
fell by 30 (from 521 to 491); and that of the United States by 76 (from 882 to 806).77 
1.84 The Senate, in its resolution consenting to US ratification of New START, said that 
the United States should seek, within a year (that is, by February 2012), to initiate new negotiations with Russia to address tactical nuclear weapons stockpile disparities “and 
to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.” President Obama told the Senate in March 2011 that he would try to do this. Russia’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sergei Ryabkov has said publicly that Russia is open to discussing further 
reductions in tactical nuclear weapons inventories, although Russia’s “non-strategic 
nuclear potential” was now “no more than 25 per cent of that of the USSR in 1991.”78  As 
75. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol.
76. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm.
77. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm.
78. The United States similarly claims to have reduced the number of its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 per cent 
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a first step, others should follow Russia’s example by returning tactical nuclear weapons 
to the territory of the possessor states, dismantling the infrastructure for their rapid deployment overseas and renouncing “nuclear sharing.”79 On 27 December 2011, acting 
US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose 
Gottemoeller conceded, in remarks to RIA Novosti, that the two sides were not yet ready to embark on new negotiations.80 
 
1.85 Differences over missile defence also stand firmly in the way of progress on further 
nuclear arms reductions for the moment. In a written address to a meeting of International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in Hiroshima, President Vladimir Putin said 
that, while Russia is open to the idea of additional cuts in Russian and US nuclear arsenals, 
this will only be possible “if all factors affecting international security and strategic 
stability are taken into account.” Inhibiting factors include “the unilateral and totally 
unlimited deployment of a global U.S. missile defense system,” the possible weaponization 
of space, and conventional arms imbalances in Europe.81 The issue of conventional arms 
imbalances, not just in Europe, and particularly of US global superiority in conventional 
weapons capability, will complicate and may significantly impede future bilateral, and 
multilateral, disarmament negotiations. (See further §1.7 below)
1.86 On 21 June 2012, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn R. Creedon told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the US 
between 1967 and September 2009. US Statement (under Cluster 1 – Disarmament) at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of 
the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012.
79. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, US–Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Current Record and Possible 
Further Steps, 25 October 2011, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org.
80. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, pp. 21–22.
81. Reuters, “Putin Links Nuclear Cuts to U.S. Shield,” Moscow Times, 27 August 2012. See also 1.7.1 Parallel Security Issues: 
Ballistic Missile Defence.
Table 1.13: New START
Type Russia US
Maximum number of weapons after 7 years
Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers 700 700
Warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, deployed and heavy bombers 1550 1550
Deployed and non -deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers 800 800
Reductions as of 2012Deployed warheads 38 78Strategic delivery vehicles 30 76
Inspections and Notifications as of 2012Inspections 33 33
Notifications exchanged 3436 3436
Source: SIPRI
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“experience so far demonstrates that the New START’s verification regime works and 
will help push open the door to new and more complicated verification techniques in the 
future.”82 The only complaint so far has come from the United States which accused 
Russia of a treaty violation in the course of a Russian military exercise on 19 June 2012, 
when two Tu-95MS Bear H bombers armed with cruise missiles flew into the 200-mile 
air defence zone near Alaska, prompting US and Canadian jet fighters to intercept them.83
1.4.4 Multilateral Processes1.87 Conference on Disarmament. The world’s only standing multilateral disarmament 
negotiating forum is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) based in Geneva. It has been 
unable to agree and implement any program of work since the conclusion of nuclear-test-ban treaty negotiations in 1996. There has been protracted disagreement over the priority 
to be given to core issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material production ban, 
preventing an arms race in outer space, and assurances of immunity from nuclear attack 
for non-NWS. With Pakistan having in recent years taken the lead in blocking the adoption 
of a program of work because of its unshakeable opposition to fissile material cut-off treaty 
negotiations, the CD remains essentially moribund and in no position to “establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.”84 The impasse in the CD, its eroding 
credibility, and efforts to get it back to work are discussed in the next chapter (§2.10).1.88 Permanent Five/NWS. While China advocates “the complete prohibition and 
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,”85 and has until now taken steps consistent with 
this position (for example, its unconditional no first use and negative security assurance 
declarations), it has taken no steps in support of any initiative in nuclear disarmament, 
believing this to be the particular responsibility of the two most heavily armed NWS. As 
such, China believes that Russia and the United States “should further drastically reduce 
their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally-binding manner, so as to 
create the necessary conditions for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.”86 
1.89 Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov assured a July 2011 meeting of the 
European Leadership Network (ELN) in Berlin that his country was fully committed to 
the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Multilateralizing nuclear disarmament would 
require a supporting legal framework “closely reproducing the intricate system of rules, 
definitions, proceedings and mutual obligations that has been created bilaterally by Russia and the United States.” Progress towards the goal would require the involvement 
of all nuclear-armed states, non-deployment of “strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear 
configuration,” and the “cessation of conventional capabilities’ development coupled 
with efforts to resolve other international issues, including regional conflicts.” Russia also wanted to see agreement reached on a global treaty prohibiting intermediate and shorter range missiles.87 
82. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116849.
83. http://freebeacon.com/false-start/.
84. 2010 NPT Review Conference Action 6.
85. China Defence White Paper 2010.
86. China Defence White Paper 2010.
87. Ryabkov, US–Russian Nuclear Disarmament.
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1.90 The United Kingdom sees nuclear disarmament as an incremental, benchmarked 
and truly multilateral process based on nuclear non-proliferation, growing trust and 
confidence among states (including confidence in the efficacy of safeguards and 
verification techniques), and other “tangible steps towards a safer and more stable 
world where countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them”88 – but, apart 
from its verification work with Norway, discussed above, has not been visible in operationalizing this approach.
1.91 In the case of the United States, the 2010 NPR report described as “very demanding” the conditions that would “ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity.” 
Among them were “success in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, much greater 
transparency into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern, verification 
methods and technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations, 
enforcement measures strong enough to deter such violations, and ultimately the 
resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival states to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons.”89 
1.92 In a carefully worded statement delivered by the United States to the First Meeting 
of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference on 3 May 2012, the 
P5 jointly reaffirmed their “enduring commitment” to the fulfilment of their obligations 
under Article VI of the NPT and to the Action Plan adopted at the eighth review conference 
in 2010. They attributed the success of the 2010 Review Conference to “the international 
community’s shared commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the 
conditions for a world without nuclear weapons… in a way that promotes international 
stability, peace and security; based on the principle of undiminished security for all; and 
underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal” (emphases 
added). The statement notes, with a degree of satisfaction that would be hard for even 
some of the P5’s closest friends to share, “the unprecedented progress and efforts made 
by the nuclear-weapon states in nuclear arms reduction, disarmament, confidence-building and transparency.”90 1.93 The statement describes the dialogue process begun in September 2009 at the 
London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament. A 
second meeting was held in Paris in July 2011 to discuss implementation of the 2010 
NPT Review Conference Action Plan. In Paris, the P5 agreed to establish a working group 
under the direction of China to compile a glossary of terms to facilitate future engagement 
on nuclear disarmament issues. After more than forty years of the NPT, and some twenty 
years after the end of the Cold War, this would seem at best to be a modest achievement.
1.94 The P5 met for the third time in Washington in June 2012 where they continued 
their discussions on “transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered 
88. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 37.
89. US, Nuclear Posture Review, Executive Summary, p. xv.
90. “P5 Statement to the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012.” The 
added emphasis draws attention to some persistent, and troubling, elements of P5 nuclear disarmament doctrine: getting rid 
of nuclear weapons is not just the responsibility of the nuclear weapons possessors; the world will have to change first; and 
any further increase in the number of nuclear-armed states will make an already distant objective recede even farther over the horizon.
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proposals for a standard reporting form.” They also shared views on how best to 
“discourage abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision” (Article X) and discussed “concrete 
proposals for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the universal 
adoption of the Additional Protocol.” They reiterated their commitment to “promote and 
ensure the swift entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization” (without 
mentioning the conspicuous absence of China and the United States from the ranks of 
Annex 2 States that have ratified the treaty). They discussed ways to advance FMCT 
negotiations and “exchanged perspectives on ways to break the current impasse in the 
CD, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such 
negotiations within the CD” (and, by implication, nowhere else). They agreed to hold a 
fourth conference “in the context of” the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting 
(Geneva, April 2013).91 
1.4.5 North Korea
1.95 The situation in North Korea requires separate discussion, because it has only very 
recently joined the ranks of the nuclear-armed states,92 possesses a much smaller 
nuclear arsenal than the other eight, and remains the subject of intense diplomatic 
efforts aimed at dismantling its nuclear weapons program. North Korea effectively 
confirmed its withdrawal from the NPT in January 200393 – the only country so far to 
have done so – after being accused of operating a clandestine uranium enrichment 
program. North Korea cited the “grave” threat to its security and sovereignty posed by 
the US “tyrannical nuclear crushing policy toward the DPRK” (Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea).94 This led also to the collapse of the 1994 US–DPRK Agreed 
Framework which had facilitated the suspension of an earlier notice of withdrawal and 
“froze Pyongyang’s plutonium-based nuclear program for nearly a decade.”95 
1.96 In September 2005, at the fourth round of Six Party Talks (between North Korea, 
South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States) begun in 2003 with the aim of 
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, North Korea, in return for security assurances and 
the promise of economic cooperation, “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons 
and existing nuclear programs” and to returning to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.96 A 
year later, North Korea tested its first nuclear explosive device. This prompted UN 
Security Council resolution 1718 (14 October 2006) demanding North Korea “abandon 
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and “return immediately to the Six 
91. “Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT,” Press Release, Newsroom America Feeds, 29 June 2012.
92. While the ICNND in its 2009 report, paragraph 2.15, took the view that it was then premature to describe North 
Korea as having finally withdrawn from the NPT, it is now difficult to argue otherwise. Discussion of its status now belongs, 
accordingly, in a chapter on disarmament, not non-proliferation.
93. A state party has the right to withdraw from the NPT if it decides that “extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of [the] Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country” (Article X). North Korea announced its 
withdrawal from the NPT on 12 March 1993 but then suspended it on 11 June 1993, the day before the decision would 
have taken effect. In January 2003, North Korea ended the suspension, which for all practical purposes meant withdrawal 
with immediate effect. Christer Ahlstrom, “Withdrawal from arms control treaties,” SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 763–77.
94. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 22 January 2003.
95. George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “NPT Withdrawal: Time for the Security Council to Step In,” http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/Bunn_Rhinelander.
96. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
zxxx/t212707.htm.
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weapons import-export ban, on North Korea.
1.97 In 2007, the six parties reached agreement on a plan to implement the 2005 Joint 
Statement,98 but the agreement did not hold. In 2009, North Korea tested a second 
nuclear explosive device and announced its permanent withdrawal from the Six Party Talks.99 UN Security Council resolution 1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the test “in the 
strongest terms” and demanded that “the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology.”100 The resolution strengthened the 
compulsory international sanctions imposed three years earlier. The Panel of Experts 
established pursuant to resolution 1874 reported in 2012 that North Korea continued 
actively to violate Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874. The Panel found that 
North Korea was using elaborate techniques to evade Security Council sanctions and the 
vigilance of UN member states.101 
1.98 North Korea revealed the presence of a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon in 2010.102 It is developing a progressively more extensive range of ballistic missile 
capabilities. North Korea has close links with Iran and Syria and is a major proliferator 
of ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related systems and 
technology. A February 2012 deal that would have had North Korea suspend uranium 
enrichment and nuclear weapon and long-range missile tests, and the United States send 
nutrition aid, collapsed in April 2012 in the face of Pyongyang’s determination to proceed 
with a long-range rocket launch.
1.99 The April launch was a failure. But there was no reason to believe that North Korea 
would abandon its quest for nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities that it sees as 
critical to the maintenance of its international standing and national security, and as 
contributing to the domestic credibility and cohesion of the regime. And so it proved. 
North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket on 12 December 2012 that drew 
a condemnation from the UN Security Council president for constituting a clear violation 
of its resolutions. The United States which, along with South Korea, Japan and others 
regards the launch as a disguised ballistic missile test forbidden by previous Security 
Council resolutions, warned of unspecified consequences.103 South Korean military 
officials said that the test would make them speed up plans for a comprehensive missile 
defence system.104 A satellite aboard the rocket was also successfully put into orbit, 
97. S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006).
98. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005.
99. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), “KCNA report on one more successful underground nuclear test,” 25 May 2009, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200905/news25/20090525-12ee.html.
100. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm.
101. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/422
102. In November 2010, North Korea showed a visiting delegation of US scientists a new uranium enrichment facility, 
located in a former fuel-rod fabrication building at Yongbyon. The scientists were told that the facility contained 2,000 
centrifuges in six cascades; that it was built between April 2009 and November 2010; and that it was producing uranium 
with an average enrichment level of 3.5 per cent for a civilian light-water reactor program. S.S. Hecker, “What I found in 
North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, 9 December 2010, p. 4;  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67023/siegfried-s-hecker/what-i-found-in-north-korea.
103. Some anti-nuclear activists asked why North Korea was singled out for worldwide condemnations while tests by India 
(Agni), Pakistan (Nodong-derived Ghauri) and the United States (Minuteman III) over the preceding weeks in November and December were hardly mentioned by anyone.
104. Kim Eun-jung, “Seoul says N. Korea’s satellite circling Earth ‘normally’,” Yonhap News Agency, 13 December 2012, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/12/13/63/0301000000AEN20121213005153315F.HTML.
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despite some initial reports doubting this. Japanese experts were impressed by the 
precision of the rocket technology and by the fact that the test was planned for and 
executed during adverse winter conditions.105 
1.100 North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are a source of instability and tension in a region vital to global security and economic prosperity. Its nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile programs weigh on nuclear disarmament efforts and will have to be dismantled as reductions elsewhere in nuclear weapon numbers proceed.
1.101 Its nuclear weapons are claimed by North Korea to be a hedge against attack 
particularly by the United States. In March 2010, a North Korean spokesman, commenting 
on joint military exercises between US and South Korean forces, promised that “those 
who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK… [would] fall victim to the unprecedented 
nuclear strikes of the invincible army.”106 North Korea also sees a nuclear weapons 
capability as a means of maximizing positive outcomes from negotiations with its adversaries.
1.102 A successful negotiated reversal of North Korea’s nuclear program would reinforce 
the view that nuclear arms reductions can be made safely, “based on the principle of 
increased and undiminished security for all.”107 North Korea has repeatedly violated its 
international non-proliferation obligations, undermining confidence in the NPT and 
associated safeguards arrangements and thus also in the integrity of the nuclear 
disarmament–non-proliferation bargain. The international community must be 
confident that states cannot walk away from their non-proliferation commitments with 
impunity. In 2003, the Security Council failed to live up to its responsibilities in this 
regard when it took no action in response to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT. 
Developments to that point, and certainly since, have provided ample evidence that 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT posed a threat to international peace and security. This was subsequently recognized in Security Council sanctions resolutions 1718 and 1874.
1.103 Resumption of the Six-Party Talks – or at least some further process leading to a 
multilaterally negotiated set of agreements, involving the key players in and around the 
Korean peninsula – still offers the best hope of pursuing a comprehensive, negotiated 
resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue. The situation should not be allowed to drift. 
However reluctantly, key players may need again to consider an initiative to bring North 
Korea back to the negotiating table. North Korea must realize that its nuclear weapons 
program has detracted from, rather than enhanced, its international standing and 
national security; and that isolation and eventual economic collapse pose a far more real 
threat to the regime than external attack. Recognizing that the international community 
is dealing with a disarmament problem created by a former, but not current, NPT state 
party, the objective must be either North Korea’s return to the NPT as a non-nuclear-
weapon state and resumption of, and full compliance with, its IAEA safeguards 
105. Ayako Mie, “Significant leap for Pyongyang missile tech,” Japan Times, 13 December 2012.
106. KCNA report, 26 March 2010.
107. A much-used phrase in this context. See, for example, 2010 NPT Review Conference, Conclusions and recommendations 
for follow-on actions I (Nuclear Disarmament) A (Principles and Objectives) iv.
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obligations; or else, at the very least, getting North Korea to sign up to NPT-equivalent 
export, transfer and assistance disciplines through parallel agreements.
§1.5 Nuclear Doctrine
1.104 Reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies 
of the nuclear-armed states is a crucial step on any road to nuclear disarmament. This has 
been recognized in the prominence given to this subject in NPT Review Conference 
discussions, every major commission and panel report, and indeed in President Obama’s 
pathbreaking 2009 Prague speech, when he said that “To put an end to Cold War thinking 
we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge 
others to do the same.” Unhappily, however, this recognition has been matched by very 
few, if any, significant moves in this direction by the nuclear-armed states.
1.105 Taken at face value, China’s stated nuclear doctrine goes further than the other 
nuclear-armed states in limiting the role of nuclear weapons. Its weapons, declared 
doctrine and force posture and deployment patterns are said to be designed neither to 
coerce others nor to fight a nuclear war with the expectation of winning, but to counter 
any attempt at nuclear blackmail. According to Li Bin, director of the Arms Control 
Program in Tsinghua University’s Department of International Relations, China “chooses 
to keep a small, off-alert nuclear force” as a means of “countering nuclear coercion” but does not consider nuclear weapons to have any real military utility.108 Its 2010 Defence 
White Paper says that China “has always exercised the utmost restraint in the 
development of nuclear weapons” and will continue to “limit its nuclear capabilities to 
the minimum level required for national security.” China, at least as far as its declared 
doctrine is concerned, remains firmly committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons “at any time and in any circumstances” and has made an “unequivocal commitment” not to 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS and nuclear-weapon-free 
zones: that is, it would not use its nuclear weapons even in the extreme circumstances of its very survival being at stake under conventional attack. China wants the NWS to 
conclude treaties on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons and to provide unconditional 
treaty-based negative security assurances to non-NWS.109 All that said, questions are 
being asked about the extent to which China’s intense nuclear force modernization may 
be indicative of a likely future hardening of its nuclear doctrine. While debate within 
China on nuclear doctrine, including no first use, is not new,110 China’s lack of transparency 
will continue to make it difficult to assess whether evolving force structures and postures 
do in fact accord with published statements of doctrine.
1.106 President Nicolas Sarkozy gave a clear exposition of France’s nuclear doctrine in a 
speech in Cherbourg in March 2008. He emphasized France’s strong attachment to its 
nuclear deterrent. While nuclear weapons would only be used “in extreme circumstances 
of legitimate defence,” their role was not simply to protect France against nuclear attack 
108. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/LiBin.
109. China Defence White Paper 2010.
110. See for example, Phillip Saunders, “Chinese Nuclear Forces and Strategy,” 26 March 2012, http://www.uscc.gov/
hearings/2012hearings/written_testimonies/12_3_26/saunders.pdf
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but from “any aggression against [its] vital interests emanating from a State – wherever 
it may come from and whatever form it may take.” France’s nuclear deterrent was “quite 
simply the nation’s life insurance policy.”111 The 2008 French White Paper on defence and national security similarly describes nuclear deterrence as “the ultimate guarantee 
of the security and independence of France.”112 1.107 Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a WMD attack on 
it or its allies or if the country was under conventional attack and its very existence was 
under theat. According to the most recent version of military doctrine, published in 
February 2010, Russia’s nuclear weapons are intended to prevent military conflict and, 
as such, have a potential role to play in regional and large-scale conflicts involving not 
only nuclear or other WMD but also conventional weapons. Whereas, however, the 
previous (2000) version of the doctrine envisaged a resort to nuclear weapons “in 
situations critical for [the] national security” of Russia, the 2010 version foresees their 
use only in circumstances where “the very existence of Russia is under threat.”113 
1.108 Then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published an article in February 2012 in which he described Russia’s “robust nuclear deterrent” as a counterweight to US strength 
and a contribution to international stability. He ruled out any concessions on tactical 
nuclear weapons. Russia’s armed forces were in fact “preparing additional stronger weapons.” Final nuclear disarmament would only be possible when Russia had 
“exceptionally accurate non-nuclear systems of similar effectiveness”114 (to those under 
development in the United States).1.109 The United Kingdom states that it will only consider using nuclear weapons “in 
extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of [its] NATO Allies” but 
remains “deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale [it] would contemplate their use.”115 The United Kingdom is committed to the long-term goal of a 
world without nuclear weapons, but not while large arsenals of nuclear weapons remain 
and there is any risk of nuclear proliferation. Until then, “only a credible nuclear capability 
can provide the necessary ultimate guarantee [of] national security. The UK Government 
is therefore committed to maintaining a minimum national nuclear deterrent, and to 
proceeding with the renewal of Trident and the submarine replacement program.”116 1.110 In the United States, the Obama administration has shown in multiple ways that it 
is acutely conscious of the significance of nuclear doctrine in setting the scene for serious 
movement towards disarmament, but so far its achievements in this respect have been 
111. Speech by President Nicolas Sarkozy, Cherbourg, 21 March 2008, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0803/doc09.htm.
112. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_
Press_kit_english_version.pdf.
113. Nikolai Sokov, The New 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle; http://npsglobal.org/.
114. “Strong Russian Nuclear Force Deters Conflict, Putin Says,” Global Security Newswire, 27 February 2012. This last 
statement is hard to reconcile with his deputy foreign minister’s proposed prohibition of “strategic offensive arms in non-
nuclear configuration.” Putin’s comments are, however, broadly consistent with current Russian military doctrine which 
“assigns high-precision [apparently, conventional] weapons to the mission of strategic deterrence.” Sokov, The New 2010 
Russian Military Doctrine.
115. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 37.
116. General Statement by UK Head of Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 
Vienna, 30 April 2012. A final decision on the shape of Britain’s future nuclear deterrent will not, however, be taken until 
after the next general election in 2016.
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more rhetorical than real. The April 2010 NPR Report recognized that, with “the growth 
of unrivalled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile 
defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries,” there was now an opportunity and the 
need to better align US nuclear doctrine with contemporary national security priorities: 
preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.117 Furthermore, by “reducing 
the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons – and thereby demonstrating that we are 
meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament – we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join 
with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime 
and secure nuclear materials worldwide against theft or seizure by terrorist groups.”118 
1.111 The NPR affirmed that the primary function of US nuclear weapons was to deter 
nuclear attack on the United States, its allies and partners. Although nuclear weapons 
would continue to have a role in deterring non-nuclear attacks (conventional, biological 
and chemical), this role had diminished and would continue to do so. While the United States was “not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring 
nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons,… [it] will work to establish 
conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”119 The United States 
would now only consider the use of nuclear weapons “in extreme circumstances to 
defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”120 Henceforth, 
non-nuclear systems could be expected to make an increasingly significant contribution to US deterrence and reassurance goals.
1.112 In February 2011, the Department of Defense published a new National Military 
Strategy which affirmed “the fundamental role” of US nuclear weapons in a nuclear-armed world. It promised nonetheless to support “the President’s vision” by reducing 
“the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective 
strategic deterrent.” US nuclear forces would “continue to support strategic stability 
through maintenance of an assured second-strike capability,” and the United States 
would “retain sufficient nuclear force structure to hedge against unexpected geopolitical 
change, technological problems, and operational vulnerabilities.”121 
1.113 New strategic guidance published by the White House and the Department of 
Defense in January 2012 under the heading “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 
for 21st Century Defense” similarly commits the United States to “field nuclear forces 
that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of 
unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and 
other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.” But, 
taking its cue from the NPR and the previous year’s National Military Strategy, it too suggests that the United States may be able to achieve its deterrence goals “with a 
117. Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p. 6.
118. Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p. 7.
119. Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p. viii.
120. Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p. 16.
121. US Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s 
Military Leadership (Washington DC: February 2011), pp. 7 and 19;  
http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf.
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smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.”122 
1.114 President Obama reinforced this message at the second Nuclear Security Summit 
in Seoul in March 2012 when he said that, after New START, the United States would still 
have more nuclear weapons than it needs and that it was “now conducting the follow-on 
analysis called for in the NPR to set goals for future nuclear reductions in line with 
strategic requirements.” The NPR meanwhile had ruled out development of “new U.S. 
nuclear warheads and new missions and capabilities for existing warheads.”123 1.115 India first conducted what it called a “peaceful nuclear explosion” on 18 May 1974. 
It confirmed its nuclear-armed status almost twenty-five years later with five tests over 
the period 11–13 May 1998. India’s declared aim is to “pursue a doctrine of credible 
minimum nuclear deterrence.” It will not be the first to use nuclear weapons but would 
“respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” India has pledged not to use 
nuclear weapons against non-aligned non-NWS.124 It has, however, reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical weapons attack.125 
1.116 India’s National Security Advisory Board published its draft report on nuclear 
doctrine in 1999, and it was officially adopted by the cabinet on 4 January 2003. Kanti 
Bajpai divides India’s analysts into three camps: rejectionists; maximalists; and 
pragmatists, who accept that nuclear weapons have both a security (deterrence and 
prevention of nuclear coercion) and political (global prestige) role to play in India’s 
defence and foreign policy.126 The stated doctrine of credible minimum deterrence reflects 
the triumph of the pragmatists. While “credibility” is defined by retaliatory capability, 
command-control-communications survivability, and political will on the part of the 
national command authority, “minimum” defines size, cost, posture, doctrine and use.127 
1.117 Former External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna has described nuclear weapons as 
integral to India’s national security and said that they would “remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.”128 National Security Adviser 
Shivshankar Menon believes that India’s possession of nuclear weapons has, “empirically 
speaking, deterred others from attempting nuclear coercion or blackmail against India.” 
India’s nuclear weapons are not meant, however, to counter the superior armed strength 
of others or for use in theatre-level conflict.129 India’s primary objective nonetheless is to 
strengthen its strategic deterrent against China. With respect to Pakistan, the Indian 
establishment continues to believe, as said openly by Defence Minister George Fernandes 
122. US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC: 
January 2012), p. 5.
123. US Statement (under Cluster 1 – Disarmament) at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012.
124. Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August 1999;  
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/990817-indnucld.htm.
125. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/indiaprofile.
126. Kanti Bajpai, “India’s Nuclear Posture after Pokhran II,” International Studies 37:4 (October 2000), pp. 267–301.
127. Tanvi Kulkarni and Alankrita Sinha, “India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence: A Decade Later,” Institute of Peace 
and Conflict Studies (New Delhi), IPCS Issue Brief 179 (December 2011), www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB179-NSP-
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128. “India Says Nuclear Weapons ‘Integral’ to Security,” Global Security Newswire, 22 August 2012.
129. “India Says Nuclear Weapons ‘Integral’ to Security.”
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in 2002, that India can survive a nuclear attack but Pakistan cannot.130 India explicitly 
rejects the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states established by 
the NPT and has made it very clear that it will not join the NPT as a non-NWS.1.118 Pakistan, which has had a nuclear weapons program since the early 1970s, 
followed India’s nuclear weapons tests with six of its own on 28 and 30 May 1998. 
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is similarly based on the principle of “credible minimum 
deterrence,” with resort to nuclear weapons envisaged only in response to an existential 
threat which need not be the result of an attack by any category of WMD (biological, 
chemical or nuclear weapons).131 Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-specific, although, 
particularly after the US raid on Abbotabad in May 2011 that killed Osama bin Laden and 
in light of continuing strong differences of opinion on regional security issues, the 
expansion and modernization of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may also now be driven 
partly by fears of a US raid to capture or secure its nuclear forces.132 
1.119 The development of tactical nuclear weapons as a counter to India’s superiority in 
conventional arms, and to compensate for its lack of strategic depth, would seem to leave 
open the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons against India, particularly in the case 
of invasion. While battlefield nuclear weapons may be thought to give Pakistan the 
chance of denying “victory” to India in a nuclear war by inflicting particularly severe 
damage, they would also expose Pakistan to a very high risk of nuclear retaliation and, if 
used against Indian forces inside Pakistan, to the certainty of partial irradiation of the 
homeland. Deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons requires the delegation of 
command and control to military units in the field. This increases the risks of 
miscalculation, accident, theft, and infiltration by militant groups.133 
1.120 Pakistan is the only one of the nine nuclear-armed states where nuclear weapons 
were developed by the military, are essentially under military control, and the decision 
to use them will be made by the military rather than civilian leadership. Pakistan for this 
purpose is not a unitary actor and this poses a “particular challenge for deterrence 
stability in the context of a disunity in the chain of command between top Pakistani 
authorities and actors who may commit violence against India… of a scale that could 
lead to inter-state war with potential to escalate to potential use of nuclear weapons.”134 
For so long as Pakistan is unable or unwilling to take effective preventive action to stop 
extremists based on its territory from planning and launching attacks on India, the 
latter’s presumption of state–jihadists collusion will remain powerfully operative.1.121 Israel does not admit to the possession of nuclear weapons. It has maintained a 
policy of “nuclear ambiguity” or “nuclear opacity” since the 1960s when Prime Minister 
130. Michael Richardson, “Q&A George Fernandes: India and Pakistan are not ‘imprudent’ on nuclear option,” International 
Herald Tribune, 3 June 2002.
131. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Pakistan/nuke-battlefield.htm.
132. Shyam Saran, “Dealing with Pakistan’s brinkmanship,” The Hindu, 7 December 2012.
133. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Pakistan/nuke-battlefield.htm.
134. George Perkovich, “The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia” (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 13 November 2012), p. 3,  
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Nuclear Disarmament 45
Levi Eshkol declared that Israel would “not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East”135 – nor the second, add some Israeli wags. The policy has served Israel well, 
providing “the benefits of existential deterrence at a very low political cost” without 
directly opposing US non-proliferation objectives.136 In the absence of a declared nuclear-
weapons capability, the circumstances in which Israel might be prepared to use such 
weapons have not been publicly documented, although prior to the first Gulf War, in 
response to Iraqi missile threats, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir warned of Israel’s “very 
strong deterrent capability” and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan referred, none too subtly, to Israeli weapons “which the world does not yet know about.”137 It would thus seem 
reasonable to assume that Israel sees an undeclared but barely disguised nuclear-weapons 
capability as compensating for its small size and population, lack of strategic depth, and as 
an appropriate response to the multiplicity of existential threats confronting it in its region.
1.5.1 No First Use
1.122 The ICNND Report recommended that, pending the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, every nuclear-armed state “make an unequivocal ‘no first use’ declaration, 
committing itself to not using nuclear weapons either preventively or pre-emptively 
against any possible nuclear adversary” (Recommendation 49); and that, until this is 
done, they should “at least accept the principle that the sole purpose of possessing 
nuclear weapons… is to deter others from using such weapons” against them or their 
allies (Recommendation 50).
1.123 Of the five NWS, only China is publicly committed to no first use of nuclear 
weapons. Of the other nuclear-armed states, only India has made a similar commitment. 
China’s commitment to no first use dates back to the 1960s. China holds that all NWS 
“should abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons” 
and “conclude a treaty on no first use of nuclear weapons against each other,” pending 
the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.138
1.124 The 2010 NPR was the first comprehensive reassessment of US nuclear weapons 
policy in a decade (the previous NPR was in 2001). This makes no reference to no first 
use but does take a very small step in the direction of “sole purpose” when it says that, 
as already noted above, while the United States is “not prepared at the present time to 
adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear 
weapons,… [it] will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be 
safely adopted.”139 The NPR failed to reassess existing nuclear weapons deployment and 
targeting policies, and President Obama subsequently asked the Pentagon to lead an 
interagency review to develop alternative constructs of deterrence and stability with 
accompanying force sizes and postures. Decisions on any new nuclear policy guidance 
and force levels have not yet been announced.
135. Noam Sheizaf, “Clear and Present Danger,” Haaretz, 21 March 2012.
136. http://www.nti.org/country-profilesd/Israel/nuclear/.
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138. China Defence White Paper 2010.
139. Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p. viii.
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1.5.2 Extended Nuclear Deterrence
1.125 “Extended nuclear deterrence” refers to the role of nuclear weapons of the NWS in 
protecting allies from external attack.140 While it applies to the Russian nuclear umbrella 
extended to allies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet republics), 
the concept has particular force with respect to the network of US alliances in Europe, 
the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific. In this context, Russia appears in practice to envisage a possible resort to nuclear weapons only in response to a WMD attack on its allies.141  For the United States, while the primary function of US nuclear weapons is seen 
as deterring nuclear attack,142  as already indicated it has not yet excluded the possibility 
of a nuclear response to non-nuclear threat contingencies.1.126 NATO. Many believe that NATO has a responsibility to provide leadership on the 
alliance’s nuclear policy and on the NATO–Russia relationship. Instead, NATO is 
“pursuing an enhanced nuclear capability in Europe that can neither be afforded nor 
makes strategic sense in current or likely future circumstances.”143 Under current NATO 
nuclear-sharing arrangements, there are understood to be a total of some 200 American 
B-61 tactical nuclear weapons on bases in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands and Turkey), all of them non-NWS signatories to the NPT.
1.127 NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, 
commits NATO to “the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear 
weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO 
will remain a nuclear Alliance.” However, unlike its predecessors, which called for the 
indefinite preservation of nuclear deployments in Europe, the 2010 Strategic Concept 
does not exclude a possible end to nuclear-sharing arrangements. The new formulation 
– “Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, 
remains a core element of our overall strategy” – does not call for nuclear weapons to be 
in Europe indefinitely or indeed at all. It does, however, clearly identify “the strategic 
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States,” as “the supreme 
guarantee” of NATO’s security.144 
1.128 The Lisbon Summit mandated a review of NATO’s “overall posture in deterring 
and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance” which, in the shape of the 
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), was adopted by the NATO Summit in 
Chicago on 20 May 2012. The DDPR describes, in standard terms, the alliance’s resolve 
“to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear 
weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT.” Rather more significantly, though, it 
also describes nuclear weapons as “a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for 
deterrence and defence” and affirms that the review has demonstrated “the Alliance’s 
nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence 
140. This is a subset of the wider concept of “extended deterrence,” which refers to the commitment by a state to defend its 
allies from external attack by any means, nuclear or non-nuclear.
141. Sokov, The New 2010 Russian Military Doctrine.
142. Nuclear Posture Review, p. 16.
143. Browne and Kearns, “NATO, Russia, and the Nuclear Disarmament Agenda,” p. 2.
144. Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010.
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that “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic 
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States” and goes on to 
observe that “the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and 
France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence 
and security of the Allies.”145 
1.129 Because it includes three of the world’s five NWS (France, the United Kingdom and 
the United States) and eight of the fourteen states that have nuclear weapons on their 
territory (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and 
the United States), NATO “has a responsibility to be the change it wants to see in the 
world, not just to advocate for that change on the part of others.”146 Instead, having 
committed to President Obama’s goal in Prague in April 2009 of creating the conditions 
for a world without nuclear weapons, at the Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO ignored the 
commitment in making its own nuclear policy. For example, it has chosen to modernize 
and enhance its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, not just to maintain the current capability.147 The DDPR disappointed those who had hoped that it might provide an 
opportunity to soften NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture, for example by declaring “that 
the central purpose of nuclear weapons was to discourage a similar attack” or by 
responding positively to calls “for the immediate reduction, withdrawal, or consolidation” 
of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.148 Instead, Allies simply acknowledged “the 
importance of the independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France” and, “while seeking to create the conditions 
and considering options for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned 
to NATO,” promised to “ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain 
safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance.”149 
1.130 The DDPR emphasized that, since the end of the Cold War, NATO had “dramatically 
reduced the number, types, and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its 
reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.” Against this background, it was ready to 
consider “further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to 
the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater 
Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.”150 
1.131 Nuclear-sharing is a Cold War relic originally intended to offset the Soviet Union’s 
conventional weapons superiority and a means of involving NATO non-NWS in the 
potential nuclear defence of Europe. At the peak in 1971, there were 7,300 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.151 Nuclear-sharing is of little relevance to today’s Europe 
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and is not a prerequisite for US extended nuclear deterrence (cf. Japan and South Korea). 
To many, the DDPR was an opportunity missed “to make a comprehensive, coherent and 
balanced assessment of the mix of capabilities required by the Alliance in the years ahead” and “to spell out the potential contribution that arms control and disarmament could make to reducing nuclear risks in Europe and more widely.”152 1.132 Asia Pacific. In the Asia Pacific, extended nuclear deterrence is understood in the 
context of the reliance by a number of US allies (especially Japan and South Korea) on US 
nuclear capability, not only to deter possible nuclear attack, but also to deter or respond to 
threats from biological and chemical weapons, and indeed overwhelming conventional 
forces, deployed against them. The particular significance of the US commitment here is 
seen as lying in its very strong incentive for Japan and South Korea not to acquire a deterrent 
nuclear capability of their own, although the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan in 
particular acts as a very powerful disincentive for any government to go down that path.
1.133 Extended nuclear deterrence nonetheless appears in practice to have operated 
more as an expression of closeness between the United States and its allies rather than 
as a concrete security measure. To the extent that there is a diminished role for nuclear 
weapons, and emphasis on conventional military capabilities, envisaged in current US 
strategic guidance, this should have little impact on the substance of US security 
relationships with Japan and South Korea. As ever, these relationships will rest upon 
non-nuclear defence and security cooperation.
1.134 The limitations of extended nuclear deterrence are those of nuclear deterrence 
generally. As already noted, the United States has stated that it would only consider 
using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances. Washington is also acutely conscious 
that the use of nuclear weapons to defend an ally against a nuclear-armed adversary 
would risk nuclear retaliation against the United States. It is thus hardly surprising that, 
while the United States has firm security commitments to countries in North Asia, these 
do not include specific commitments to use nuclear weapons in their defence.153 
1.135 Within Japan and South Korea there is a range of views on the value of extended 
nuclear deterrence. Leaving aside its dubious utility, there is no reason why stable 
deterrence cannot be maintained as nuclear weapon numbers are reduced. As Japan’s 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said in a December 2009 letter to US Secretaries Hillary 
Clinton and Robert Gates, “While the Japanese Government places trust and importance 
on your government’s extended deterrence, this does not mean that the Japanese 
Government demands a policy of your government which conflicts with the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”154 It remains to be seen, however, whether Okada’s more conservative successors will maintain this perspective.
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1.5.3 Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)
1.136 A negative security assurance in this context is one given by a nuclear-armed state 
that it will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states. At the 
2010 NPT Review Conference, all states agreed that the CD should “immediately begin 
discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States 
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” (Action 7). The ICNND Report called 
on all nuclear-armed states to provide “new and unequivocal negative security 
assurances… supported by binding Security Council resolution” to all non-NWS 
(Recommendation 53).
1.137 Understandably, and particularly since the NPT’s entry into force in March 1970, states which have pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons have been keen to secure 
from the treaty’s five recognized NWS firm assurances that nuclear weapons will not be 
used against them. Assurances were provided, individually by each of the five NWS, at 
the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament (May–June 
1978) and reaffirmed in the lead-up to the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 
1995 as part of efforts to win support for the treaty’s indefinite extension.155 
1.138 Of the NWS, only China has given an unconditional undertaking not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states. Of the non-NPT 
nuclear-armed states, only Pakistan has given a like undertaking. China and Pakistan are 
the only two nuclear-armed states to support the idea of transforming this undertaking into a legally binding international instrument. There has been no substantive discussion 
of this, or any other disarmament issue, in the CD since 2009 (ICNND report) and 2010 
(NPT Review Conference).
1.139 Four of the five NWS (France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons against NPT non-NWS except in the case of 
an invasion or any other attack on the state concerned, its territory, its armed forces or 
other troops, its allies or on a state towards which it has a security commitment, carried 
out or sustained by such a non-NWS in association or alliance with a NWS.156
1.140 Two NWS, the United Kingdom and the United States, have qualified their 
assurances by specifying that beneficiaries must be in compliance with their obligations 
under the NPT. Most recently, in its April 2010 NPR, the United States said that it would 
not “use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are 
party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” The United States nonetheless reserved “the right to make any adjustment in the 
assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.”157 
1.141 For countries not covered by this assurance (other nuclear-armed states, and 
states deemed by Washington not to be in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation 
155. See Jayantha Dhanapala (President of the 1995 NPT conference), “The Permanent Extension of the NPT, 1995,” 
in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming 2013).
156. UN Security Council documents S/1995/261, 262, 263 and 264 of 6 April 1995.
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obligations), there remains “a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the 
United States or its allies and partners.” The United States is thus, as already noted, not 
ready to make a “sole purpose” affirmation (that “deterring nuclear attack is the sole 
purpose of nuclear weapons”), but “will work to establish conditions under which such 
a policy could be safely adopted.”158 
1.142 The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review similarly provides an 
assurance that “the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT,” noting that the assurance “would not apply to 
any State in material breach of [its] non-proliferation obligations.” It also reserves the right 
to review this assurance if “the future threat, development and proliferation of [other 
weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological] make it necessary.”159 
1.143 China has adopted a different approach. Its April 1995 declaration opened with an 
undertaking “not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances” and went on to promise that China would not “use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at 
any time or under any circumstances” (emphasis added). China urged all NWS to follow 
its lead by providing both no-first-use declarations and unqualified NSAs, incorporating 
nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs); and concluded by calling for “the early conclusion 
of an international convention on no first use of nuclear weapons as well as an 
international legal instrument assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-
weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”160 China’s 
unequivocal NSA is reaffirmed in its most recent National Defence White Paper.
1.144 Of the five NWS, all but China oppose the idea of a legally binding international instrument on NSAs and routinely abstain on a UN General Assembly resolution 
promoting the “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-
nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”161 1.145 Pakistan has given an “unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against states not possessing nuclear weapons” and is “ready to transform this pledge into a legally binding international instrument.”162 1.146 India’s position is less clear. The Indian National Security Advisory Board’s 1999 
Draft Report on Nuclear Doctrine says that India “will not resort to the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.”163 
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§1.6 Nuclear Force Posture
1.147 “Trust, but verify,” US President Ronald Reagan famously said about arms control 
agreements with the Cold War enemy the Soviet Union. Whatever the declared policy, 
statements on nuclear doctrine reducing the role of nuclear weapons have credibility 
only if backed by appropriate nuclear force postures, that is, arrangements for the 
deployment of nuclear arsenals, and the launch alert status of those weapons, which are consistent with the stated doctrine.
1.6.1 Weapons Deployment1.148 Only Russia and the United States currently maintain a nuclear triad of land, air 
and sea-based nuclear weapons. Their deployed strategic offensive weapons – to be 
significantly reduced in number under present New START obligations, as discussed 
above, but still constituting formidable arsenals – include ICBMs, SLBMs and gravity 
bombs. Russia appears to be making changes to the deployment patterns of land-based 
strategic forces to increase their survivability. The road-mobile single warhead Topol-M 
and a new road-mobile multiple warhead missile, the Yars, will be the backbone of the 
Russian strategic rocket forces in the coming decades. Both Russia and the United States 
also have inventories of “tactical” or “non-strategic” weapons. The United States currently 
deploys some 200 B-61 bombs at bases in five NATO countries. “Russia’s non-strategic nuclear warheads are normally kept in central storage.”164 US and Russian nuclear 
missiles are de-targeted. Re-targeting can be accomplished quickly, but a missile 
launched accidentally will land in an area of open ocean and an additional decision from the command authority is required prior to an authorized launch.1.149 China provides no details of its nuclear arsenal. China is believed to have a small 
stock of air-deliverable nuclear weapons but depends heavily on land-based missiles. It 
is actively modernizing its land-based ballistic missiles by replacing ageing liquid-
fuelled, silo-based missiles with newer solid-fuelled, road-mobile models to increase the 
survivability and strengthen the retaliatory capabilities of its nuclear forces.165 Beijing is 
also believed to be within two years of establishing a “credible sea-based nuclear 
capability.” According to the US Department of Defense, two of China’s newly developed 
Jin-class SSBNs appear to be in service. A third boat is believed to be under construction. 
The associated JL-2 SLBM, however, has faced technical delays and is expected to become operational within two years.166 While the development of a sea-based component of 
China’s nuclear arsenal would significantly increase the survivability of its nuclear 
forces, it remains unclear how many Jin-class SSBNs China plans to build and what 
strategy it envisions for its future sea-based nuclear forces.167 China’s nuclear doctrine 
stipulates that “in peacetime the nuclear missile weapons of the Second Artillery Force are not aimed at any country.”168 Its stockpile is not thought to be fully deployed.
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and a mix of land- and carrier-based aircraft. At any given time, at least one submarine is 
at sea, providing continuous deterrence. In December 2012, France denied that it was 
contemplating a change to its nuclear force posture such that it would no longer have a 
sea-borne deterrent 365 days in the year. This would happen if its fleet of submarines 
was reduced from four to three as a cost-cutting measure. A Defence White Paper for 
2014–2019 is to be released in January 2013. A related speculation is that air-deliverable 
nuclear weapons on Mirage 2000 and Rafale jets would also be jettisoned.169 1.151 The United Kingdom has only sea-launched Trident missiles deployed on four 
Vanguard-class submarines, one of which is always at sea. Over the next several years, the 
number of warheads on each submarine is to be reduced from 48 to 40. Missiles are de-
targeted. The Vanguard-class submarines are due for replacement in the 2020s. While 
both the ruling Conservative and opposition Labour parties support the maintenance of a 
nuclear deterrent, a final decision on the configuration of the United Kingdom’s future 
nuclear forces will not be taken until after the next general election in 2016. In the 
meantime, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Conservatives’ Liberal Democratic 
coalition partner has demanded a fresh assessment of possible alternatives to Trident.1.152 Neither India nor Pakistan provides details of its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan 
are working to create survivable nuclear forces based on a mix of different launch platforms. 
Indian plans to deploy nuclear weapons at sea are based on the development of a ballistic 
missile launched from a nuclear-powered submarine. Both elements are in the development testing phase and the capability may be deployed in coming years. Pakistani plans are not 
thought to be as far advanced. Both India and Pakistan have developed road-mobile 
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Their stockpiles are not thought to be fully deployed.
1.6.2 Launch Alert Status
1.153 In the middle of a nuclear crisis, if strategic doctrine and operational plans require 
a very quick decision on strategic force employment, the possibility grows of 
miscalculation or a decision based on the wrong information by the national command 
authority. This is why the issue of launch alert status has been of great interest to 
successive NPT review conferences and international commissions alike. Both the 2010 
NPT Review Conference (Action 5) and the ICNND Report emphasized the need for 
reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems as a confidence-building 
measure. ICNND urged changes to the deployment of nuclear weapons which, while 
allowing them to survive a potentially disarming first strike, nonetheless ensures that 
they are not “instantly useable” (Recommendation 55). Weapons should be taken off 
“launch-on-warning alert” as soon as possible (Recommendation 56).
169. Henry Samuel, “France denies claims it will ditch year-round seaborne nuclear deterrent,” The Telegraph (London), 
11 December 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/9727414/France-denies-claims-it-will-
ditch-year-round-seaborne-nuclear-deterrent.html.
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1.154 Terms like “hair trigger” and “launch-on-warning” may be criticized as technically inaccurate in that they imply automaticity. There are rigorous technical and procedural 
safeguards that require human agency: the decision has to be made to launch the nuclear 
weapons. But this does not negate the fact that thousands of Russian and US nuclear 
weapons are maintained on a “ready alert” or “day-to-day alert” status. The problem and 
the solution thus concern issues of nuclear doctrine and deployment. Regrettably, there have been no declared or assumed reductions in operational status since the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference.
1.155 Historically, alert levels of nuclear weapons systems have varied with changes in the 
overall security environment, the deployment patterns of the adversary, fiscal elasticity, 
and political pressures. At present, Russia and the United States keep about 1,000 warheads 
each on high alert, with the posture dictated by the approximately 30-minute flight time of 
a putative enemy missile. According to the Cartwright study for Global Zero already 
referred to, US early warning teams will have up to three minutes to determine that 
indications of an incoming nuclear attack are real and report to the president; the president 
would have a maximum of twelve minutes to decide whether to retaliate in kind or risk 
decapitation of nuclear command and control capacity and decimation of US nuclear 
forces; missile launch crews in underground command posts and submarines would have 
two and twelve minutes respectively to take the missiles out of their silos and tubes and 
launch them on their 30 minutes (or less) flight path to enemy targets.170 1.156 Some steps have been taken by the United States and Russia to address the potential risks arising in circumstances where there is only a short time available to reach a decision to launch nuclear weapons. The two countries operate Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centres, initially designed and launched as a single government-to-
government communications link, intended to provide a reliable channel of 
communication in times of crisis: this includes the direct communication line established 
in 1963 between Washington and Moscow to help reduce the risk of nuclear exchange 
precipitated by accident or mistake. (Similar lines exist between India and Pakistan and 
the United States and China.) But for all this, and despite the many calls that have been 
made by many commissions, experts and campaign groups for change – and see further 
the discussion of the case for de-alerting discussed below – there has been no movement 
on increasing launch decision times. As the ICNND report put it, “So long as the logic of 
mutual deterrence prevails in the minds and behaviour of U.S. and Russian decision-
makers…it has to be acknowledged that, for all the evident need to do so urgently, 
stepping back quickly from this precipice is going to prove rather more difficult than 
would appear at first sight.”171 
170. Cartwright, et al., Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, p. 5. See also ICNND Report, pp 
178–79.
171. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, pp. 178–79, paragraph 17.42.
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that another state has initiated a nuclear strike against Russia”). Sea- and air-based 
nuclear weapons are at lower levels of readiness. “Gravity bombs are not continuously 
deployed on heavy bombers and Russian SSBNs are not on continuous at-sea patrol.”172 
Increasing the mobility of ICBMs, and increasing the number of prepared and pre-
surveyed places from which they can be launched, could help increase the time available 
for reaching a decision to launch. Russia is also said to be implementing measures to 
reduce the risk posed by advanced conventional weapons to missiles prior to launch, 
including electronic counter-measures and decoys. But it remains extremely nervous about its overall vulnerability to superior US conventional capability. As the ICNND 
Report points out, whatever the unlikelihood may now be of war between them, Moscow 
sees mutual de-alerting of ICBMS, the principal launch-on-warning force, as making US missiles essentially invulnerable.173 1.158 The United States has combined a launch posture that safeguards against 
unauthorized launch of ICBMs with procedures that allow for rapid re-targeting and 
launch of strategic forces after a valid order is received from the national command 
authority. Little is known about the launch status of US submarine forces at sea, but it 
obviously would be impractical in the extreme for these to be without the ability to launch warheads without having to return to shore. Strategic submarines on combat 
patrol maintain a radio silence to help avoid detection, but could receive and carry out a 
launch order before enemy anti-submarine warfare assets could engage. In case of loss 
of communication with the national command authority, it is believed that the 
commanding officer performs a list of checks to indicate whether the command authority 
has been destroyed. If the indicators are positive, the commanding officer has sealed 
orders that explain the specific course of action to follow.1.159 The April 2010 NPR included a statement that the United States would continue to 
seek ways to maximize the time available to the president to consider whether to 
authorize the use of nuclear weapons. But the NPR did not change the alert status of US 
nuclear forces, summarized as “heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on 
alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.”174 Most US deployed 
ICBMs are at launch-on-warning. Eight or nine SSBNs are at sea at any given time, with 
up to five SSBNs on “hard alert.”175 In 2010 the United States revealed that all of its ICBMs 
are in so-called “open ocean target” mode, so that if there was an inadvertent launch the 
missile would land in the middle of one of the large oceans.176 
1.160 US officials contest the view that current launch status is “dangerously high,” 
arguing that a prudent balance has been struck between the survivability of nuclear 
forces and the capacity to implement a legal order from the proper command authority. 
172. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 29.
173. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 179, paragraph 17.42.
174. Testimony of James Miller to the Hearing on Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and 
Plans for Future Reductions in Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Vehicles, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the 
House of Representative Armed Services Committee, 4 May 2011.
175. S.H. Kile, P. Schell P. and H.M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012, p. 313.
176. Andrew Quinn, “U.S. reveals nuclear target: oceans,” Reuters, 6 April 2010.
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Modifying launch status to prolong the time taken to implement a lawful order would, 
according to officials, carry the risk of creating a “window” of time that an adversary 
might exploit to try and neutralize US strategic forces. US military representatives have 
also argued that re-alerting weapons in a crisis could trigger escalation by causing an 
adversary to conclude that a first strike was imminent – although it should be noted that 
US nuclear strategy already includes scenarios for increasing alert levels in a crisis.
1.161 The US Department of Defense is completing a review of the current deterrence 
strategy, including a nuclear targeting review, which may result in new presidential 
guidance. However, unlike the nuclear posture review process, there are not expected to 
be any unclassified documents to inform public debate or the international community.1.162 In France, one SSBN is always at sea on deterrent patrol. In the United Kingdom, at 
any given time, one SSBN is at sea on deterrent patrol and at several days’ “notice to fire.” 
China’s nuclear force posture would appear to be consistent with its stated view of the 
limited utility of nuclear weapons and the declared doctrine of using nuclear weapons solely to deter a nuclear attack and prevent any nuclear blackmail. China is believed to 
keep its nuclear weapons on low alert, with warheads separated from missiles and fuel. 
It is worth noting that under New START counting rules, this would reduce China’s nuclear weapons stockpile to zero.177 1.163 India and Pakistan also keep warheads separate from delivery systems. Published 
sources agree that India has decided against a strategy that requires launch-on-warning 
and has structured its nuclear forces accordingly. India’s nuclear arsenal is said to be 
dispersed in different locations, with warheads separated from delivery systems. 
Different organizations have custody of weapons and delivery systems in peacetime.178 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are believed to be kept on low alert. Missiles may not be 
mated with warheads under normal conditions and the two may be stored at different 
locations, though this is unclear. The suggestion that warheads were kept in disassembled 
form was denied by a former official from the weapons establishment.179 Information on 
Israeli practices is not available. 
1.164 The differences between Russia, the United States, France and the United Kingdom 
on the one hand, and the remaining nuclear-armed states on the other, may be ascribed 
to differences in doctrine (China), absence of early warning systems (India, Pakistan) or 
considerations of control and safety (India, Pakistan). Keeping nuclear weapons on high 
alert is not required for any political roles – of coercion and bargaining – seen for them by some weapons possessors.1.165 The Case for De‐alerting. A nuclear-armed state acquires credible first-strike 
capability against a nuclear rival when it can launch a nuclear attack without fear of 
reprisal. Taking nuclear warheads and weapons systems off high alert can deepen the 
stability of nuclear deterrence so that nuclear-armed rivals will not attack each other 
177. Kulacki, “China’s Nuclear Arsenal,” p. 2.
178. Manpreeth Sethi, Nuclear Deterrence in Second Tier Nuclear Weapon States: A Case Study of India, Centre de Science 
Humaine, CSH Occasional Paper no. 25, Dec. 2009, p. 54.
179. Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, evolution and risks, EU Non-proliferation 
Consortium paper no. 19, July 2012, p. 5.
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regardless of any rise in tension between them. The security environment of the 21st 
century is starkly different from the Cold War period, but the nuclear force posture is still trapped in the old paradigm with some 2000 nuclear warheads kept at high readiness 
to be launched en masse before the apprehended arrival of incoming enemy missiles.
1.166 Like nuclear terrorism, the launch of nuclear weapons on high alert by mistake, 
miscalculation or through a malfunction is low probability but high impact. In the tense 
environment of nuclear decision-making, high alert weapons carry a fourfold risk of 
unnecessary nuclear war:
 > Accidental launch (technical failure caused by malfunction);
 > Authority to launch being usurped by a subordinate official or by terrorists (custody 
failure leading to rogue launch). Unauthorized use is judged to be the least likely of 
these contingencies, although the risk increases in the middle of a crisis dispersion of 
nuclear weapons and in the case of countries like Pakistan whose organizational and 
technical safeguards may be brittle rather than robust;180 
 > Misinterpretation of incoming warning data (information failure leading to 
miscalculation);
 > Premature and ill-judged response to an actual attack (miscalculation caused by 
decision-making failure in a crisis).
1.167 Conversely, anything that lengthens the decision-making fuse – such that there is 
a significant extension of the timeline from the first report of an incoming threat to a 
decision to use a nuclear weapon and then the actual launch of the weapon – can only 
add to the existing tight margins of security from nuclear weapons.
1.168 Non-NWS have forcefully argued that lowering of the operational status of nuclear 
weapons would both reduce the risk of accidental or unintended nuclear war and provide 
a much-needed practical boost for disarmament and non-proliferation. A resolution on 
decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, first submitted in 2007 
by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland (later joined by Malaysia), and 
adopted annually by the UN General Assembly by over two-thirds majority, typically has 
only France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States voting against it. The four 
have usually argued that the resolution seeks to address a problem that does not exist 
because of physical locks, technical safeguards, and procedures that require the US or Russian president to decide to launch missiles and transmit authorization codes to launch 
crews who confirm authenticity before taking action.
1.169 Opponents of de-alerting also argue that high alert levels have not been a bar to 
Russia and the United States building a good strategic relationship. Conversely, nuclear risk reduction narrowly conceived could potentially undermine the overarching 
objective of strategic stability and equal security. Crisis stability is reduced when a 
potential enemy, who has cheated by either failing to de-alert fully or by secretly re-
alerting, has an incentive to launch an attack during a tense standoff before “re-alerting” 
has been completed. Therefore irreversible deep cuts are better than reducing 
180. Cartwright, et al., Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, p. 5.
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operational readiness of forces that do exist. Both crisis stability and deterrence are enhanced when nuclear rivals know that primary targets will not escape retaliatory 
strikes even if a surprise attack is launched first.
1.170 This is a questionable claim. A group of American and Russian experts has conducted simulations to show that strategic stability is enhanced by taking nuclear 
weapons off high alert.181 They point out that current nuclear postures call for massive 
re-alerting to mobilize two-thirds of nuclear arsenals rapidly during a Russia–US 
confrontation. Their model would suppress such re-alerting impulses by partitioning de-
alerted weapons into a First and Second Echelon. The First Echelon consists of equal 
numbers of high-yield, single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be quickly 
generated in hours to launch-ready status, which in themselves can survive in sufficient 
numbers to satisfy the requirements of deterrence. Their primary role is peacetime 
nuclear deterrence. The Second Echelon consists of deeply de-alerted but more diverse 
nuclear forces of road-mobile and sea-based systems with both single and multiple 
warheads that require weeks or months to become launch-ready. But they are 
invulnerable to enemy attack once re-alerted. The numbers are equal on each side in the 
Second Echelon, but the types of weapons are not symmetric.
1.171 The model shows that no advantage is gained by any re-alerting of either First or 
Second Echelon forces to launch a surprise attack. The conclusion holds even if Russia 
and the United States have cut their nuclear arsenals to 500-1,000 warheads each: 100 
cities of the attacker would still be hit by the victim’s retaliatory forces, causing unthinkable devastation.182 
1.172 “De-alerting has to be seen not only as a technical fix but also as a strategic step in 
deemphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons, in other words moving to retaliatory 
strike postures and doctrines instead of legacy preemptive or ‘launch-on-warning’ postures.”183 Current alert levels are full of inherent risks and are out of sync with 
improved political relations between Russia and the United States. De-alerting, by 
moving to retaliatory strike postures, is a strategic step in downgrading the military role 
of nuclear weapons. It is also a necessary step in transforming relations between nuclear 
adversaries from one of strategic confrontation to strategic collaboration. It confirms the 
now generally assumed status of nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort.
1.173 There is also a moral hazard argument. Nuclear weapons are believed to confer 
certain security benefits. This requires that nuclear rivals be convinced that states 
possessing nuclear weapons will use them as a last resort if under attack. The most 
effective way to instil such belief in nuclear rivals is by having a sufficient number of the 
181. Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew Mckinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev, “Smaller and Safer,” Foreign Affairs 
89:5 (September/October 2010), pp. 9–16 and “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States 
and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science & Global Security 
Archive 19:3 (2011), pp. 167–94. The technical details of the analysis is available at www.globalzero.org/files/FA_appendix.
pdf. See also John Hallam, “Straight from the Planning Department of Hell: Maximising Decision-making Time, Lowering 
Operational Readiness,” unpublished ms., May 2012.
182. However, these calculations can be upset by developments in strategic missile defence.
183. Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, East–West Institute, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand, Re-
framing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Arsenals (New York: East–West Institute, 
2009), p. 15.
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weapons in a state of high operational readiness. But this means that Russia and the 
United States cannot convince others that nuclear weapons now, in the post-Cold War 
era, are in fact playing a reduced role in their national security strategies. In turn this 
makes it more difficult to convince non-NWS that national security goals can be fully met 
without nuclear weapons. On the contrary, indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons on 
short-notice alert can legitimize the nuclear ambitions of others. There is thus a non-
proliferation as well as a disarmament and crisis stability argument for de-alerting. And 
reducing alert status is a confidence-building measure not just among NWS, but also 
between them and non-NWS, a point forcefully made by the latter at the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference.1.174 The reality is that whether the alarm about an incoming nuclear attack turns out 
to be genuine or false matters not at all. For in the real world, the sole purpose of nuclear 
weapons can only be deterrence, neither defence nor retaliation. There is no conceivable circumstance in which either Russia or the United States could launch massive nuclear 
strikes against the other without committing nuclear suicide itself. Even if all fixed site 
weapons and missiles could be destroyed in a surprise attack – regardless of how many 
nuclear weapons the enemy has on high alert – Russia would have more than enough 
mobile ICBMs and the United States would have more than enough sea and air-launched 
weapons to destroy the other. To this extent the debate over alert status is esoteric and surreal rather than grounded in reality.
§1.7 Parallel Security Issues
1.7.1 Ballistic Missile Defence
1.175 While the US withdrawal in 2002 from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty did not derail either the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty or New 
START, the shadow of US abrogation will continue to hover over future nuclear 
disarmament efforts. The ABM Treaty helped to contain the nuclear weapons competition 
between the United States and Russia by limiting the deployment of systems capable of 
destroying incoming ballistic missiles, thereby preserving the perceived deterrent value 
of each side’s strategic nuclear forces that rely on guaranteed second-strike retaliatory 
capability. Russia reacted strongly to planned US missile defence deployments in Europe which it believes could eventually undermine its own nuclear deterrent capability. The 
resulting distrust is inhibiting US–Russia and NATO–Russia cooperation on nuclear and wider international issues.1.176 The ICNND believed that “severe limits” should be set on strategic ballistic missile 
defences which “now constitute a serious impediment to both bilateral and multilateral 
nuclear disarmament negotiations” (Recommendation 61). Missile defence has been 
revisited frequently, both bilaterally (US–Russia) and in the context of NATO–Russia 
relations, since the ICNND report (2009) and the eighth NPT review conference (2010).
1.177 The irony of the entire elaborate, protracted and intense debate on ballistic missile 
defence is that it proceeds on the assumption that the defence systems in question will 
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actually work in the real world, and be capable of destroying all, or the overwhelming 
majority, of hostile incoming missiles. As recent high-level US scientific assessments 
have shown – by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Science and Technology Issues 
of Early Intercept Missile Defense Feasibility, and the National Research Council of the 
National Academy of Sciences on Making Sense of Missile Defense – these programs may 
well be complete technological dead-ends.184 But such is the confidence of most US 
policymakers in the country’s own capability, and the extent to which that perception is 
shared by others, that the debate goes on.
1.178 Evolving US strategic doctrine assigns a progressively larger role to non-nuclear 
systems, including missile defence. Plans for extending missile defence to cover Europe, 
with geographical mission creep to the Middle East and Asia–Pacific, are criticized for 
promising a false sense of security to the United States and its allies while provoking a 
false sense of insecurity among Russia and China. False in both cases, because the 
deployment of the sophisticated sea and land based interceptors may not work. 
Cancelling the plan could save $8 billion per year,185 and make Moscow more open to 
cooperation on other international issues in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
1.179 The US approach to missile defence cooperation with friends and allies has 
changed in important ways. Whereas the Clinton Administration focused on the defence 
of the continental United States, George W. Bush integrated elements of cooperation 
with states in Europe, outside the framework of multilateral institutions, including 
NATO. The Obama Administration kept the cooperative element of the Bush approach, 
but brought it into a multilateral framework. Missile defence was integrated into NATO 
at the Lisbon summit in 2010. NATO now has missile defence as a collective mission, 
based on indivisibility of protection. The terms of bilateral cooperation agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic were changed when the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) was announced in 2009 “based on an assessment of the Iranian missile 
threat, and a commitment to deploy technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable to an evolving security environment.”186 
1.180 The main drivers for missile defence are the incremental improvements in range 
and accuracy of missiles close to Europe (and Asia), but there are also internal alliance 
dynamics to be considered, in particular relations between European allies and the 
United States. Cooperation with Russia on “strategic” missile defence has been an issue 
in bilateral relations with the United States since the 1960s, but could not really be an 
issue for NATO because the alliance was only active in theatre missile defence programs 
and had no strategic missile defence plans of its own prior to 2010. As soon as NATO had 
a program, it made the discussion of cooperation with Russia an important part of it.
184. Philip Coyle,” The Failures of Missile Defence”, The National Interest, 26 July 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/
commentary/the-failures-missile-defense-7248 
185. Yousaf Butt (a nuclear physicist), “Obama, Congress should push NATO missile defense program off ‘fiscal cliff ’,” 
Christian Science Monitor, 15 November 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/1115/Obama-
Congress-should-push-NATO-missile-defense-program-off-fiscal-cliff
186. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy.
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1.181 The issue of strategic missile defence has been addressed in the bilateral US–
Russia context in many forums, unofficial as well as official. However, the positions of the 
two sides cannot currently be reconciled. Russia seeks “clear legal guarantees… verifiable under mutually approved technical criteria” that the system will not be directed against 
Russia’s nuclear forces, and has threatened military retaliation if differences remain unresolved.187 Options under consideration include deployment of nuclear-capable 
short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave and a ramping up of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization created after the fall of the Soviet Union.188 The United 
States maintains that Russian objections are valid neither on political nor military–technical grounds.
1.182 The possibility of cooperation on theatre missile defence has been a part of NATO–
Russia documents since 1997, but has not led to any meaningful joint projects. NATO and 
Russia held a fifth theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise in Germany from 
26–30 March 2012.
1.183 Russia has suspended discussion of missile defence cooperation pending (i) 
provision by NATO of clear and verifiable assurances that its missile defence systems 
will be directed against the risks that are being generated outside the Euro–Atlantic 
region; (ii) clarification of President Obama’s comment to then-President Dmitry 
Medvedev that the United States could be more flexible on missile defence after his re-
election; and (iii) clarity on the consequences of the US budget decision on sequestration 
and its implications for defence spending – missile defence programs may be cut or 
modified unilaterally by the United States as part of that package.
1.184 Current plans for implementing the EPAA are (relatively) low cost and 
straightforward, and they are scalable (it is possible to increase or decrease the force 
packages in a fairly flexible way depending on the threat). The EPAA is based mainly on 
the Aegis architecture developed for the Asian context in cooperation with Japan. US 
force deployments will not take place until systems are ready and will be tailored to the 
threat (of emerging missile forces, not the strategic forces of Russia).
1.185 US–Russia/NATO–Russia technical discussions are also at an impasse. Each side’s proposed approach to cooperation is currently unacceptable to the other. Russia 
proposes a sectoral approach, with NATO and Russia each taking responsibility for 
agreed airspace. This would mean that NATO is partly defended by Russian systems, which is not acceptable to the alliance. NATO suggests connecting sensor communication 
networks so that Russia and NATO can receive information from each other to supplement 
their respective national technical means. This would mean that information from 
Russian radars would supplement information gathered by the alliance but not replace it. There would be no mutual dependence. This is not acceptable to Russia because it 
places no restrictions on the scope or development of US/NATO missile defence systems.
187. Mansur Mirovalev, “Russia pessimistic about US missile defense talks,” AP, 3 May 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/; 
“Russia Warns West on Antimissile Effort,” Global Security Newswire, 21 August 2012.
188. “Putin slams US-Euro missile defence plans,” http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2012/s3452675.htm; 
“Russia Eyes Regional Ties to Help Counter U.S. Antimissile Systems,” Global Security Newswire, 24 October 2012. The CSTO 
comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
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plans for deployment of missile defences. However, cooperation with Russia on missile 
proliferation has been limited. Browne and Kearns suggest that NATO and Russia could 
create joint cooperation centres for pooling and sharing data from satellites and radar in 
real time; NATO should specify the maximum number of interceptors to be deployed in 
Phase IV of the EPAA; and Russia and the United States should increase transparency 
and warning and decision times in order to reduce fears of a short-warning nuclear or conventional attack.189 
1.187 If the purpose of the missile defence scheme truly is threats from a third party like 
Iran, then a solution may be feasible. The two sides need to find a system that offers 
protection against third-party missile strikes, assuages Russia’s concerns about 
undermining the credibility of its deterrent capability, and does not compromise the 
principle of sovereign control of national assets. Dmitri Trenin and James Collins propose 
a scheme for cooperative missile defence which could provide the platform to transform 
the semi-adversarial relationship that needs to be carefully managed into a collaborative 
strategic partnership. In turn, this could be the prelude to a genuine Euro–Atlantic 
security community in which war becomes unthinkable for the solution of political 
conflicts.190 The two sides’ information assets would be integrated, providing for real-
time sharing and exchange of data on third-country missile activity. Operational protocols would permit and mandate each side to intercept and destroy missiles 
overflying its territory to hit targets in the other side. Subject to sensitive material being 
screened out first, both sides would create jointly staffed cooperation centres for pooling 
and sharing information, satellite data and radar operations.
1.188 Such arrangements would facilitate the integration of data, the painting of a 
comprehensive picture of potential dangers, and the coordination of responses to the 
missile threats. A positive externality would be that each side would acquire a deeper 
understanding of the other’s national security strategy and nuclear doctrines. And the 
experience of joint missile defence could prove valuable in shaping both Russian and US 
relations with China and attenuating China’s concerns about missile defence systems in 
the Asia–Pacific.
1.189 The arguments made by Russia also apply to the Chinese assessment of missile 
defence, its relationship to strategic stability and implications for arms reduction. China 
has long opposed the general concept of strategic missile defence systems and views US 
cooperation with Japan on Aegis-based theatre ballistic missile defence in the Asia–
Pacific region with growing concern. In its latest biennial defence white paper, released 
in March 2011, Beijing reiterated that:China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international 
strategic balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will 
have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament. China holds that no state 
should deploy overseas missile defense systems that have strategic missile defense 
capabilities or potential, or engage in any such international collaboration.191 
189. Browne and Kearns, “NATO, Russia, and the Nuclear Disarmament Agenda,” pp. 5–6.
190. Dmitri Trenin and James Collins, “The Game Changer: Cooperative Missile Defense” (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 29 November 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/globalten/?fa=50173.
191. China Defence White Paper 2010.
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1.190 China has much smaller and less modern nuclear forces than Russia. Whereas 
Russia has nuclear forces that would survive under any scenario, China is still at a fairly 
early stage of creating a mobile missile force with intercontinental range and a 
submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. China is concerned that its current 
nuclear forces might be neutralized by a combination of preemption and missile 
defences. While Beijing conducted its own missile defence test in early 2010, there are 
no indications that China has decided to develop its own national missile defence system.
1.191 China responded firmly to March 2012 comments by US Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Creedon that the United States was discussing cooperative missile defence with 
Australia, Japan and South Korea. A senior foreign ministry official said that a missile 
defence system in the Asia–Pacific region would have “negative effects on global and 
regional strategic stability, and go against the security needs of the countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.”192 A senior Chinese military official subsequently warned that US missile 
defence activities could force China to “modernize its nuclear arsenal…. Beijing will have 
to improve its capabilities of survival, penetration… otherwise it is very difficult for us to 
maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence.”193 
1.192 If the United States proceeds to expand its missile defence system in the Asia–
Pacific to include Australia and South Korea, China is very likely to accelerate the 
expansion of its own nuclear and ballistic missile programs and possibly adopt a 
somewhat more robust nuclear deterrence doctrine. Such a response would be inevitable, 
and more marked, if the US missile defence plans were ever to encompass Taiwan.
1.7.2 Weapons in Space
1.193 There are a number of dimensions to the issue of space weapons: ground-based 
weapons that attack targets in space; space-based weapons that attack targets in space; 
and space-based weapons that attack targets on the ground. Many of the issues involved 
are caught up in the missile defence debate. In addition, space-based assets have become 
an increasingly important component of military missions such as surveillance, early 
warning, target acquisition, guidance and communications. The ability to degrade or 
destroy such assets can have a significant impact on military capability; equally, the 
capacity to hold such assets at risk can have a significant deterrent effect.
1.194 The ICNND Report called for strong support to be given to attempts to prevent the 
weaponization of space at the CD in Geneva (Recommendation 63). However, differences 
among the P5 and the enduring stalemate in the CD over the adoption of a work program 
continue to prevent any progress on the development of an international legally-binding 
instrument for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).
192. “China Lashes Talk of Asian Missile Shield,” Global Security Newswire, 12 April 2012.
193. “China Warns of Response to U.S. Missile Defense,” Global Security Newswire, 19 July 2012.
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1.195 The discussions on PAROS have focused on a Chinese–Russian draft text of a Treaty 
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Threat or Use of 
Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). A number of countries, but principally the 
United States, find the text unacceptable because it does not define a space weapon or 
suggest how such a weapon might be defined; identifies a need for, but includes no detail 
on the approach to be taken to, verification and compliance; and does not address the 
destruction of space-based assets using ground-based systems. The United States and 
several of its allies are not willing to proceed on the basis of the current draft and are not 
inclined to produce their own, while China and Russia have not tabled any more detailed document.
1.196 Given the deadlock in the CD, other processes have been initiated to try and move 
the discussion of space security issues forward. The European Union (EU) developed a 
draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in 2008, which was published in revised 
form in 2010. In January 2012, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the United 
States would initiate consultations and negotiations with other spacefaring nations to 
develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The United States 
did not endorse the draft Code of Conduct developed by the EU, but referred to it as a 
useful foundation and constructive starting point for developing a consensus on an international code.194
1.197 A UN Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building 
Measures in Outer Space Activities was established by the secretary-general in 2011 in 
response to General Assembly Resolution 63/68. The group’s objectives are “to improve 
international cooperation and reduce the risks of misunderstanding and 
miscommunication in outer space activities,” and to reach agreement on “conclusions 
and recommendations on transparency and confidence-building measures that can help ensure strategic stability in the space domain.” Russia and China were strong supporters 
of General Assembly Resolution 63/68. The United States abstained on the resolution, 
objecting to its mention of the draft PPWT, but has since publicly declared its support for the process. 195 The Group of Governmental Experts is expected to complete its work and 
issue a final report with recommendations in July 2013.
1.198 Other international efforts, such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities Working Group, focus essentially on civil space issues.196 
194. Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Department of State, 
“Pursuing an International Code of Conduct for the Security and Sustainability of the Space Environment,” National Space 
Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 18 April 2012.
195. Tiffany Chow, “Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs in Outer Space Activities: Fact Sheet,” Secure World 
Foundation (21 June 2012), http://swfound.org/media/84703/SWF%20-%20GGE%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20June%20
2012.pdf.
196. Chow, “Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs in Outer Space Activities.” The issues – military vs. civilian – are not, 
however, always easy to compartmentalize. For example, one of the major issues on the civilian side is debris mitigation, but 
the shooting down of satellites with ballistic missiles has been a significant recent cause of debris.
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1.7.3 Biological and Chemical Weapons
1.199 The ICNND Report, although focused on nuclear weapons, recognized that 
concerns about other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) impacted on the nuclear 
debate, and called for strong efforts to be made to promote universalization of the 
Biological (BWC) and Chemical (CWC) Weapons Conventions; and for the development 
of “more effective ways of defending against potential biological attacks, including – for 
all its difficulties – building a workable [Biological Weapons] Convention verification 
regime” (Recommendation 64). Progress on the biological weapons front, in particular, has been slow.
1.200 Parties to the BWC continue to lament the absence of a verification mechanism. 
Agreement on such a mechanism is no closer, however, with the United States remaining 
firmly of the view that effective BWC verification is impossible. Meanwhile, fear of a 
biological weapons strike exercises a conservative influence on nuclear doctrine, 
including, though not exclusively, in the case of the United States which has reserved “the right to make any adjustment [to its NSA] that may be warranted by the evolution and 
proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.”197 
1.201 Chemical weapons do not pose a threat of the magnitude of other categories of 
WMD (nuclear and biological), although their possible use, as has been seen recently in 
situations of regime breakdown and civil war (Libya and Syria), still arouses strong international concern. The CWC has achieved near universality with 188 states parties 
representing about 98 per cent of the worldwide chemical industry. While Russian and 
US failure to meet the final extended deadline (29 April 2012) for destruction of chemical 
weapons stocks was unhelpful (though expected and finally accommodated by other 
states parties), the focus of activity for the CWC’s implementing agency, the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is nonetheless moving progressively 
from monitoring and verification of CW destruction schedules to non-proliferation. 
Vigorous implementation, particularly of the CWC’s inspection provisions, will be 
essential for the treaty’s future effectiveness, given the globalization of industrial 
chemical production, the emergence of new technologies and chemical compounds 
suitable for CW applications, and the relative ease with which some existing facilities 
could be converted or returned to the production of CW or CW precursors.198 
1.7.4 Conventional Weapons
1.202 The ICNND Report argued that “the issue of conventional arms imbalances… 
between the nuclear-armed states, and in particular the relative scale of U.S. capability, 
needs to be seriously addressed if it is not to become a significant impediment to future bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.” It recommended revisiting 
matters covered in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 
“establishing comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment 
197. Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p. viii.
198. See Ramesh Thakur and Ere Haru, eds.,, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges and 
Opportunities (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006).
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in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) and mandating the destruction of excess 
weaponry,”199 and believed that “the development of more cooperative approaches to 
conflict prevention and resolution may well prove more productive in this context than 
focusing entirely on arms limitation measures” (Recommendation 65).
1.203 At the time of the report’s release and in the period immediately afterwards (late 
2009–2010), there were grounds for optimism about the prospects for renewed 
attention to conventional arms control in Europe. The Organization for Security 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-led dialogue on the European security framework (the 
“Corfu Process”) emphasized the need for renewed attention to the issue. Russia 
appeared to be willing to return to discussions about the future of the CFE Treaty, albeit without reversing its 2007 decision to suspend participation in the treaty. The Obama 
Administration emphasized its willingness to revisit the future of conventional arms 
control and, in their bilateral summit in 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev committed to strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in Europe.
1.204 In 2011 and 2012 hopes for any progress in this area faded, to the point where it 
is highly unlikely that the adapted CFE Treaty will ever enter into force and prospects for 
any meaningful negotiations on an alternative look remote. In 2011 the United States 
suspended its cooperation with Russia within the framework of the CFE Treaty (while 
continuing to meet its obligations to the other parties to the treaty). NATO allies party to 
the CFE Treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, followed the US lead. The US focal point 
and negotiator on conventional arms control was withdrawn. Perhaps most significantly, the United States and Russia repeatedly stated that the basic problem that CFE was intended to address had been resolved and was no longer relevant to European security.
1.205 Russia, the United States and other countries have said that they are willing to look 
at alternative approaches to conventional arms control, beyond CFE. It is, however, not 
clear how such a process could be organized. Confining the talks to NATO–Russia or to 
Europe would be difficult as many capabilities (and in particular those of most concern to 
Russia) are to be employed globally. There cannot be any Europe-wide agreement based 
on equal balance because the forces of the potential parties are extremely asymmetrical and uneven. Russia’s aim is to incorporate into the discussion weapon types that the 
United States has always insisted on keeping outside arms control agreements (naval 
forces, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space-based military assets).
1.206 Behind this is a fundamental disagreement on the problem that arms control 
should seek to address. While Russia’s objective is to contain the global power of the 
United States, NATO’s principal aim is to stabilize military security in specific “grey 
zones” around the periphery of the enlarged alliance.
1.207 The state of play on conventional arms control has important implications for 
nuclear arms control. Russia has argued that current US plans to develop a faster global conventional strike capability could have an impact on strategic nuclear arms control. 
Senior Russian officials generally refer to such weapons as “strategic offensive weapons with conventional warheads.” President Putin has said that Russia will only contemplate 
199. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 197, paragraph 18.35.
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additional nuclear weapons reductions “if all factors affecting international security and 
strategic stability are taken into account”,200 and has linked final nuclear disarmament to 
Russia’s acquisition of “exceptionally accurate non-nuclear systems of similar 
effectiveness” to those now under development in the United States.201 The United States, 
meanwhile, can be expected to seek to preserve its global advantage in conventional 
military capability as a guarantee of continuing strategic preeminence and as a hedge 
against future nuclear arms reductions.
1.208 The purpose of developing a “prompt global strike” (PGS) capability is to attack 
difficult-to-reach but very high value targets making use of real-time intelligence. These 
capabilities lie far in the future and New START is unlikely to be the point of reference. 
However, Russia has raised the issue of whether such weapons could confuse 
implementation of the treaty. Existing ballistic missiles converted for this mission count 
against New START ceilings, but a hypersonic weapon with a conventional warhead (or 
a kinetic kill vehicle with no warhead at all) has no nuclear mission and would clearly fall outside New START.
1.209 Russia suggests that a conventionally armed ballistic missile could be confused 
with a nuclear first strike if it is launched over a polar flight path, or that it could be used 
in a disarming first strike. None of the weapons will be available in the near term, but there is a suggestion that the complications will be greater in conditions where Russia has reduced its nuclear weapons holdings to low numbers.
1.210 The impact of the increasingly complex and ambiguous relationship between 
conventional and strategic nuclear forces is also visible in other strategic dyad 
relationships. Ballistic missile defence, long-range conventional strike systems and 
space-based systems have already emerged as major complicating factors in achieving 
or maintaining stable deterrence relationships, and these are likely to intensify as relevant military capabilities improve over time.
1.211 China, which has relatively small nuclear forces, may feel vulnerabilities more 
acutely than Russia. Beijing’s concerns about maintaining a credible second-strike 
capability can be closely linked to advances in non-nuclear strategic weapon systems, in particular by the United States. China will continue to develop strategies and technologies to counter evolving conventional threats. Should it choose to award a nuclear role to its 
land-attack and air-launched cruise missiles, this would signal a shift towards a more 
flexible nuclear posture to deter a broader range of threats. At the same time, China is 
developing its own conventional medium-range ballistic missiles, which are believed to 
have an anti-ship capability.
1.212 In its 2010 NPR, the United States emphasized its intention to deepen the strategic dialogue with Russia and to initiate a strategic stability dialogue with China. Conventional 
PGS capabilities and their implications would logically be a part of such discussions. It 
would seem, though, that the more confident the United States becomes of the superiority 
of its conventional weapons and of the efficiency of its anti-missile systems, the more 
200. Reuters, “Putin Links Nuclear Cuts to U.S. Shield,” Moscow Times, 27 August 2012.
201. “Strong Russian Nuclear Force Deters Conflict, Putin Says,” Global Security Newswire, 27 February 2012.
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in the absence of broader arms limitation talks.
1.213 In South Asia, Pakistan makes no secret of the fact that it sees nuclear weapons, 
including tactical nuclear weapons, as its principal means of offsetting India’s advantages 
in size, strategic depth and conventional military capability.
1.214 This creates a dilemma because, while it is obviously wrong to overlook or to 
undervalue the strength and persistence of these concerns, it is equally wrong to make 
nuclear disarmament contingent on their resolution, not least because to do so, while 
simultaneously maintaining the exclusive right of the NPT’s recognized NWS to possess 
such weapons, is to ignore present realities and to invite further proliferation. It is 
important to see conventional and nuclear disarmament as overlapping, rather than 
interdependent, security issues. To hold them hostage to each other – as the strategically 
weaker states, particularly, will be inclined to do – is likely to render progress on both impossible.
§1.8 Mobilizing Political Will
1.8.1 Disarmament Education
1.215 The ICNND Report drew attention to the need for “sustained campaigning… to 
better inform policy-makers and those who influence them about nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation issues” (Recommendation 71) and called for a “major renewed 
emphasis on formal education and training about nuclear disarmament and related 
issues in schools and universities” (Recommendation 72).
1.216 The UN General Assembly, by Resolution 57/60 of 30 December 2002, which 
affirmed a pressing need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and 
recognized the important role of civil society in promoting such education, welcomed 
the presentation of a UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and 
conveyed its 34 short and long-term recommendations “for implementation… by 
Member States, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society, 
non-governmental organizations and the media.” The Secretary-General was asked to 
prepare biennial reports on implementation of the recommendations. Five such reports 
have been published to date, the latest in July 2012.
1.217 The reporting record has been poor. Since the resolution’s adoption in 2002, a 
total of just 37 reports have been submitted to the United Nations. Of these, Japan and 
Mexico have each submitted four, and New Zealand three. Six reports were submitted in 
2010 (A/65/160), the lowest number to date. Nine were submitted in 2012 (A/67/138). 
Russia is the only NWS to have reported on its implementation of the UN study. Several 
countries that implement and finance projects to promote nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation education, including Norway, Sweden, and the United States, have not reported at all.202
202. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 63.
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1.218 A robust, urgent, credible and sustained global commitment to public education 
with a view to building broad popular support for nuclear disarmament is badly needed 
and, in this context, Global Zero’s efforts to build an international movement for nuclear disarmament among students in multiple countries is particularly to be welcomed.
1.8.2 Civil Society Action1.219 While only governments and intergovernmental organizations can set authoritative 
standards, establish duly recognized international norms and negotiate treaties, civil 
society organizations have a crucial role to play in promoting global norms, monitoring 
state compliance with agreed commitments, and in reflecting community values and 
concerns that may not always find appropriate expression in governmental processes. Their critiques and policy prescriptions have demonstrable consequences in the 
governmental and intergovernmental allocation of resources and in the exercise of 
political, military and economic power.
1.220 In the nuclear field, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs have been awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize. Several regional nuclear-weapon-free zones have their origins in 
NGO advocacy and grassroots campaigns; and NGOs have formed coalitions to draft a universal Nuclear Weapons Convention that would prohibit nuclear weapons and to 
promote a range of nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, including the de-
alerting of “launch on warning” ICBMs. Global Zero is currently seeking support for its 
own step-by-step plan to completely eliminate nuclear weapons by 2030; highly 
regarded think tanks and study centres such as the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, the Monterey Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and 
the Nautilus Institute contribute significantly to our understanding of the challenges 
facing us in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament field; while the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, and the famous Doomsday Clock (whose hands remain set – in the 
group’s latest alarming judgment in January 2013 – at five minutes to midnight), provide 
timely information and analysis of threats to our survival and development from nuclear 
weapons, climate change and emerging technologies in the life sciences.
1.221 In addition, coalitions such as Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament (PNND), the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 
the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) and the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom (WILPF) use their extensive networks to support the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. Likewise, the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) works to 
reduce the global threat from WMD, including by supporting leadership networks of 
former senior political, diplomatic and military figures, in Europe (ELN), the Asia–Pacific 
(APLN) and Latin America. The Moscow-based International Luxembourg Forum on 
Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe is another organization focusing on senior decision-
makers. All these groups are engaged in efforts to energize public opinion, and especially 
high-level policy makers, to take seriously the very real threat posed by nuclear weapons 
and to do everything possible to achieve a world in which they are contained, diminished and ultimately eliminated.
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1.222 Sadly, though, it still has to be said that most of the very good work done to promote 
nuclear disarmament, by a wide range of highly credible and committed civil society 
actors, currently has little impact outside specialist disarmament and non-proliferation 
circles. In most countries, when asked whether they would prefer to live in a world 
without nuclear weapons, most people will say yes. But the very real possibility of nuclear 
war, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, is not presently an issue which brings 
large numbers of people together on a regular basis. Consequently, governments are 
under no real pressure to respond to expressions of popular concern because truly 
popular concern barely exists. Shaping and delivering the messages required to galvanize public opinion must be a priority and remains very much a work in progress.
1.223 World Public Opinion.org conducted a survey of public attitudes to nuclear weapons in 2008.203 The poll involved more than 19,000 respondents in 21 countries. 
Results in eight of the nine nuclear-armed states are shown below: no information was 
available from North Korea. Respondents were asked whether they supported the idea 
of an internationally negotiated ban on nuclear weapons under the terms of which 
countries with nuclear weapons would be required to dispose of them within a fixed 
timeframe and no other countries would be permitted to acquire them. The agreement 
would be subject to verification.
203. World Public Opinion.org, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international_security_bt/577.
php?lb=btis&pnt=577&nid=&id=.
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1.224 According to the survey, the majority of populations favour the complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons. The elimination of nuclear arsenals is strongly supported in France 
(86%), China (83%), Great Britain (81%) and the United States (77%). Sixty-nine per 
cent of Russians, 67% of Israelis, and 62% of Indians would also support such an 
agreement. Only in Pakistan did less than half the respondents (46%) favour the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. All this indicates that the potential for strong community 
support is there: the problem continues to lie in effectively harnessing and mobilizing it.
1.8.3 Nuclear Weapons Convention
1.225 A model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) was prepared in 1997 in response 
to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons and updated in 2007. It 
brought together an impressive international consortium of lawyers, doctors and 
scientists and attracted the interest, involvement and support of many civil society arms 
control groups. It continues to enjoy the support of many NGOs, non-NWS and the United 
Nations General Assembly. The model NWC would prohibit the development, making, 
testing, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. A fifteen-year timetable for 
the elimination of nuclear weapons by NWS (“nuclear-capable states” outside the NPT 
would be given only five years to reach the same objective) includes de-alerting, removal 
from deployment, dismantlement, and placement of all fissile material under 
international control. The model NWC’s UN sponsors have described the draft convention 
as “a useful tool in the exploration, development, negotiation and achievement of such an instrument or instruments.”204 1.226 Some such convention will undoubtedly be necessary in the long run to embed the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a universal treaty. The ICNND Report, while 
sceptical that the model convention at its present stage of evolution could, in an area as 
complex as this, be an effective “campaign treaty” on the model of the Ottawa and Oslo 
Conventions discussed below, recommended further work on “refining and developing the concepts in the model Nuclear Weapons Convention now in circulation… with the 
objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral 
disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum” (Recommendation 73). There are 
many technical, legal and political hurdles to be overcome and details to be clarified 
before any NWC can be finalized. But the very act of beginning a deliberate and sustained 
conversation on the topic would compel states to take the prospect of an NWC seriously 
and to begin to address particularly the “hard basket” issues of verification, compliance 
and enforcement.
1.227 While the ICNND report saw formal negotiations now as premature, and the NPT 
Review Conference simply noted the UN Secretary-General’s Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear 
Disarmament, an annual resolution (for example, A/RES/67/64 of 3 December 2012) calling 
for the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons “as an important 
step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of those weapons within a 
specified timeframe” is supported by some two-thirds of the UN membership.205 
204. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 225, paragraph 20.40.
205. “General Assembly, in Wake of High-Stakes Debate in First Committee that Championed Common Positions but Fell 
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1.228 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in a landmark speech in October 2008 that 
still serves as a rallying call for nuclear arms control and disarmament advocates, urged 
all NPT parties, in particular the NWS, to fulfil their treaty obligations through 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. In the first step of his five point-plan, he 
suggested that they could do this either by negotiating a “nuclear-weapons convention, 
backed by a strong system of verification” or, only marginally less ambitiously, “by 
agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments.”206 The 
elements of such a framework are clearly visible today. They include a CTBT in force; an 
FMCT negotiated, adopted and in force; legally binding NSAs; reciprocal no-first-use 
declarations; ratification by all nuclear-armed states of the NWFZ treaty protocols; and 
the commencement of transparent, progressive and irreversible multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
1.229 The aspiration for a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, embodying a 
workable verification and enforcement system, must not be abandoned: it is the 
indispensable international legal framework for achieving ultimate abolition. The 
question, however, remains whether it would be productive to seek the commencement 
of negotiations on it now, with those fundamental verification and enforcement issues unresolved and multiple geopolitical issues inhibiting any likely agreement to the 
process by the present nuclear-armed states.
1.230 The international community has so far banned two entire classes of weapons of 
mass destruction – biological and chemical weapons.207 It has also negotiated treaties 
prohibiting some categories of particularly indiscriminate and inhumane conventional 
weapons – mines and cluster munitions. By no means every country has signed these 
conventions: the biggest users and producers of cluster munitions, and those with the 
largest anti-personnel-mine stockpiles, are not parties to the Cluster Munitions (Oslo) or 
Mine Ban (Ottawa) Conventions. But the conventions nonetheless exercise strong 
normative force and quite directly influence the behaviour of non-states parties. The CTBT 
provides a very clear example of this for, although its peculiar requirement for universal 
ratification by Annex 2 states prior to entry-into-force could leave the treaty in perpetual 
limbo, the current voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing which stands as a place-holder 
for the treaty has enormous practical effect and makes any return to nuclear testing by 
states not party to the treaty a fraught and challenging calculation indeed.
1.231 A nuclear weapons convention negotiated in the absence of all the nuclear-armed 
states would, however, be in a class of its own. These states are firmly of the view that it 
is far too early to be thinking seriously about a NWC and that, without them, such a 
convention would be meaningless. This may not in fact be completely the case. Four 
Short of Bridging Divides, Adopts 58 Texts”; http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11321.doc.htm.
206. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament is contained in the text of an 
address (“The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”) to the East–West Institute in New York on 24 
October 2008, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11881.doc.htm.  The other four points in the plan focused on P5 
initiatives; renewed efforts at treaty ratification; greater transparency and accountability; and new measures against WMD terrorism.
207. Although a bilateral arrangement, it should also be recorded here that, in December 1987, the United States and the 
USSR signed the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty). Final inspections under the treaty were conducted in May 2001.
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answers suggest themselves as to the purposes such an instrument could serve:
 > It would compel consideration of the full range of technical, legal and political 
obstacles to the negotiation and signing of the convention, including the physical 
infrastructure and the multilateral agreements and protocols required for verification 
and enforcement;
 > It would demonstrate that a continuing determination on the part of the NWS to 
interpret Article VI as no more than aspirational and tied to at best remote general 
disarmament objectives was not without serious reputational cost;
 > It would have a non-proliferation benefit by supporting that increasingly beleaguered 
leg of the NPT, although non-NWS with nuclear weapons ambitions would almost 
certainly not ratify it; and, perhaps most importantly
 > The negotiations themselves could provoke some new thinking among all the 
nuclear-armed states, and possibly help stimulate serious multilateral disarmament 
talks among them as a step up from the first tentative confidence-building exchanges 
of recent years. They should also help strengthen public engagement and support for nuclear disarmament.
1.232 To achieve even these modest goals, however, a nuclear weapons convention 
negotiation would have to attract a significant and broadly representative level of 
participation by non-nuclear-armed states. Negotiation outcomes would, likewise, have 
to express a very broad non-nuclear-armed states consensus. The road to nuclear 
disarmament will always be long and obstacle-strewn, but the survival of this planet 
demands that we keep on trying to find ways to travel it.
1.8.4 The Humanitarian Dimension
1.233 The most productive way forward for both committed state and civil society actors 
to generate political momentum for the nuclear disarmament cause may be to emphasize 
the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The almost 
indescribable horror associated with any such use informed the very first resolution of 
the UN General Assembly in 1946, and has been a recurring campaign theme ever since. 
It was the primary motivation for the challenge to the legality of nuclear weapons 
mounted in the International Court of Justice by the UN General Assembly on the 
initiative of the World Health Organization which resulted in the 1996 advisory opinion 
concluding that their use was indefensible except, possibly, in self-defence when a state’s 
very survival was at stake. And this was in turn the major motivation for those who 
prepared the 1997 model nuclear weapons convention, as noted above. But it is only 
recently that the humanitarian dimension has resumed any prominence in high-level state discourse.
1.234 The ICNND in 2009 made the point that there was much to be said for focusing on 
nuclear disarmament not through the lens of traditional arms control, but rather 
international humanitarian law: “The argument is that nuclear disarmament is at heart 
a humanitarian imperative because of the grotesquely inhumane and enormous impact 
of nuclear weapons; that the single most important thing is to prevent their use and the 
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most certain way of achieving that objective is to eliminate them completely; and that 
the best way of achieving that in practice – motivating like-minded governments and 
civil society alike – would be negotiations conducted through a humanitarian and 
human-rights focused process.”208
1.235 This theme was picked up by the 2010 NPT Review Conference in its Final 
Document, which expressed “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirm[ed] the need for all states at 
all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”209 In the 2012 NPT PrepCom, sixteen countries issued a “Joint 
Statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament,” read by Ambassador 
Benno Laggner of Switzerland, arguing that “it is essential that the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons are thoroughly addressed.”210 The chairman of the 
PrepCom summarized the debates on this issue as:
States parties recalled their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of 
any use of nuclear weapons. Many States parties stressed their serious concern that in such 
an event, these humanitarian consequences would be unavoidable and emergency relief 
could not be provided to affected areas. They expressed their expectation that the 
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons would be addressed during the current review cycle.211 
1.236 The momentum was sustained in the First (Disarmament) Committee of the UN 
General Assembly when, on 22 October 2012, Ambassador Laggner read out the same 
joint statement, this time on behalf of 34 countries. It stated that “the unique destructive 
capacity and uncontrollable effects” of nuclear weapons mean that all the international 
humanitarian law rules of distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality 
and precaution “apply fully” to nuclear weapons. So too do the prohibitions against 
causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury and severe and long-term damage 
to the environment. As long as nuclear weapons exist, they will pose a threat to the very 
survival of humanity. Their “catastrophic humanitarian consequences… concern the 
community of states as a whole.” Under no circumstances must they ever be used again. 
“The only way to guarantee this is the total, irreversible and verifiable elimination of 
nuclear weapons, under effective international control.”212 
208. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, pp. 218–19, paragraph 20.18.
209. 2010 NPT Review Conference, Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions I (Nuclear Disarmament) A 
(Principles and Objectives) v.
210. “Joint Statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament” (New York: 22 October 2012), available at: 
http://www.psr.org/resources/joint-statement-on-the.html.
211. “Chairman’s factual summary,” (Working paper), paragraph 9; Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna, 30 April–11 May 2012; NPT/
CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.53; http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/PrepCom2012/documents.html.
212. “Joint Statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament.”
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§2.1 Overview
2.1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rests on a straightforward understanding: 
countries without nuclear weapons will not seek to acquire them, while those with 
nuclear weapons move progressively towards complete nuclear disarmament, and all 
parties are to cooperate in the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. A 
troubling imbalance of obligations has, however, become steadily more obvious over the 
years. While the non-proliferation obligation is legally binding, subject to compulsory 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and enforceable by the United 
Nations Security Council, the commitment to disarm is – according to the nuclear-
weapon states (NWS) – conditional, and not subject to international verification, 
enforcement or deadlines. While the non-proliferation regime has been strengthened 
over the life of the NPT (albeit not to the extent necessary), the disarmament effort has 
been patchy and episodic.
2.2 The NWS place greater emphasis and a higher value on the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation than they do on nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is their business and 
is conducted on their terms in their own time. Non-proliferation, on the other hand, is 
truly a shared global responsibility. This attitude is putting the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime under increasing strain, and reinforcing resistance to predominantly Western 
efforts to enforce new safeguards measures. While the NPT’s record of containing 
proliferation has been very good thus far, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change rightly warned in December 2004 that “[w]e 
are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could 
become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”
No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Significant Progress Fully implemented
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2.3 The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed calls by previous review conferences 
for universal adherence to the treaty; for the signing and bringing into force, by states 
which have yet to do so, of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) and Additional 
Protocols (APs); for regular assessment and evaluation of IAEA safeguards; and for the 
application of comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in 
peaceful nuclear activities. While some progress has been made in some of these areas, 
overall the record of achievement has been manifestly unsatisfactory.2.4 Safeguards. Between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2012, CSAs entered into force for four 
states and APs for fifteen but, as at 31 December 2012, thirteen non-NWS parties to the 
NPT had still to bring CSAs into force and eight states with significant nuclear activities 
had yet to begin AP negotiations with the IAEA. While many countries, particularly 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), argue that the AP should be recognized 
and accepted universally as a condition of nuclear supply, others, particularly within the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), have stressed the AP’s voluntary nature and have 
resisted efforts to transform it into an obligation, not least because they see this as 
evidence of some states’ determination further to entrench the imbalance between non-
proliferation and disarmament obligations.
2.5 The IAEA is moving progressively to develop and implement a state-level approach 
to safeguards. This is an iterative process in which an evaluation of all information 
available to the agency serves as the basis for safeguards planning, implementation and 
evaluation, and continues the evolution of the safeguards regime from one based almost 
wholly on nuclear material accounting to one strongly focused on detection. By 
facilitating the adoption of “integrated safeguards” in countries which qualify – a sign of 
the agency’s confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
those states – the state-level approach allows the agency to make the most efficient use 
of its finite resources by making “differentiated assessments about which states’ nuclear 
programs pose more risk.” Some states have labelled the approach discriminatory and 
have called for the focus of the system to return to traditional nuclear material accounting.
Overall Evaluation of Safeguards and Verification: Some Progress. Additional 
CSAs and APs have entered into force but there is still strong resistance by 
some states to the idea of making APs obligatory. The IAEA’s evolving state-
level approach to safeguards has been criticized as discriminatory by some 
states who want the emphasis to return from an information-driven and 
detection-focused approach to traditional nuclear material accounting.
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Overall Evaluation of Compliance and Enforcement: No Progress.  The 2010 
NPT Review Conference made no progress on non-compliance and 
withdrawal issues and none has been made since. Efforts by the P5 and 
Germany to negotiate a resolution of the stand-off with Iran have made no 
substantive progress.
2.8 Export Controls. The 2010 NPT Review Conference urged all states to ensure that 
nuclear-related exports are not misused to assist in the development of nuclear weapons 
and encouraged them to draw on multilateral guidelines and understandings in 
developing national export controls. A growing number of countries, without themselves 
being members of an international export control regime, are making use of the 
guidelines for this purpose. In September 2011, the Security Council’s Resolution 1540 
committee noted that 90 states had reported having export licensing provisions in place 
for nuclear weapons-related materials (compared with 76 in 2008).
2.9 Controversy has surrounded the most important nuclear export control mechanism, 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), since it decided in 2008 to exempt India from its 
requirement for application of comprehensive safeguards to trigger list items. This has 
raised questions of consistent treaty interpretation, of consistent application of NSG 
guidelines and finally, among states already critical of the NPT’s bias towards the nuclear 
“haves,” of the credibility of the whole nuclear non-proliferation enterprise.
2.6 Compliance and Enforcement. The 2010 NPT Review Conference failed, in the face 
particularly of Iranian and other hard-line NAM opposition, to make any progress on 
non-compliance and withdrawal issues. Notwithstanding the adoption of resolutions 
highly critical of North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009, the UN Security 
Council has yet to make clear, as the ICNND Report sensibly recommends, that any future 
withdrawal “will be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, 
with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.”
2.7 Since an initial IAEA Board of Governors finding of non-compliance in September 
2005, Iran has been the subject of six UN Security Council resolutions demanding a halt 
to its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Regular IAEA reports to its Board of 
Governors show that Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities; nor has 
it clarified to the satisfaction of the international community outstanding issues giving 
rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear program. The IAEA 
has been able to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its 
CSA. It has not, however, been able to provide a credible assurance of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and thus to conclude that all nuclear 
material in Iran is in peaceful activities, and efforts by the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council (P5) and Germany to negotiate a resolution of the stand-off with 
Iran have so far been unsuccessful.
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Overall Evaluation of Export Controls:Some Progress. A growing number of 
countries are making use of multilateral guidelines in developing national 
export controls. But the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s 2008 decision to exempt 
India from its comprehensive safeguards requirement and China’s 
determination to supply more nuclear reactors to Pakistan have damaged 
this key mechanism’s credibility, and no progress has been made towards 
adopting a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states 
outside the NPT.
2.10 The ICNND Report recommended that the NSG develop “a criteria-based approach 
to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT,” thereby establishing conditions 
for further exceptions based on new rules, rather than on an exemption from old ones. It 
will be hard, though, to persuade Pakistan or Israel to accept terms more rigorous than 
India’s; or India to make additional commitments (for example, to ratify the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to end unsafeguarded fissile 
material production) when it already has the deal it wants. The NSG’s credibility 
problems are compounded by China’s determination to supply more nuclear reactors to 
Pakistan. In November 2010, the United States declared its support for Indian 
membership of the NSG and other international export control regimes. While there is 
support for India’s membership bid within the NSG, there is no consensus.
Overall Evaluation of IAEA Resources:  Some Progress. The IAEA’s regular 
budget has seen some modest real growth in recent years but is still 
insufficient to allow the agency to fulfil its responsibilities and to meet the 
expectations of member states.
2.11 IAEA Resources. The IAEA’s regular budget has seen some modest real growth in 
recent years but is still insufficient to allow the agency to fulfil its responsibilities and to 
meet the expectations of member states. Important programs continue to depend on 
extra-budgetary contributions. The resources debate is complex and political. The IAEA 
is under pressure to become more cost-efficient, without letting its attention to 
safeguards implementation slide. While some states want the agency to pay more 
attention to nuclear security, others see this as likely further to diminish the resources 
available for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in 
developing countries. They want priority, and more money, to be directed to technical 
cooperation. The debate is further complicated by concerns expressed by some states 
that the IAEA’s evolving state-level approach to safeguards, which is driven at least partly 
by budget pressures, is discriminatory, subjective and unreliable.
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Overall Evaluation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Minimal Progress. No 
new NWFZs have been established. There has been only modest movement 
on protocol ratifications. The Middle East NWFZ Conference mandated by 
the NPT Review Conference for 2012 has been postponed indefinitely.
2.14 Other Non-Proliferation Mechanisms. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 
established by the United States in 2003 to prevent the shipment of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and associated materials to state and non-
state actors of concern, has the support of around 100 countries. The ICNND 
recommended that it “be reconstituted within the UN system as a neutral organization,” 
but this has not so far been seriously considered.
2.15 The proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles continues to cause growing 
international concern. In parallel with the steady spread of these technologies and the 
absence of an international instrument specifically governing the development, 
production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of missiles, the international 
community has tried to elaborate measures that would increase transparency and 
constrain the pace of, or roll back, missile proliferation. These efforts have enjoyed some 
success. Over the past decade, however, many countries have acquired technologies for 
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, while India, Iran, Israel, North Korea and 
Pakistan have been developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
2.12 Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs). The 2010 NPT Review Conference 
encouraged the establishment of further NWFZs and the ratification by NWS of the 
relevant protocols to existing NWFZ treaties. NWFZs have been proposed for Northeast 
Asia and the Arctic. Russia ratified Protocols One and Two of the Treaty of Pelindaba in 
March 2011. There have been no other ratifications by NWS of existing NWFZ protocols 
since the 2010 NPT Review Conference. US President Barack Obama has submitted the 
protocols to the treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba to the US Senate for ratification, but 
there is no indication of when this might be accomplished.
2.13 The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the central importance of the 1995 
Resolution on the Middle East and called on the UN Secretary-General to convene a 
conference in 2012, to be attended by all Middle East states, on the establishment of a 
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. A 
conference tentatively scheduled for 17 December 2012 in Helsinki has been postponed 
indefinitely. While it is understood that there are formidable challenges to the creation of 
a NWFZ in the prevailing security and political environment in the Middle East, failure to 
convene a conference on the issue will have a negative impact on the NPT review process.
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Overall Evaluation of Other Non-Proliferation Mechanisms: Some Progress. 
The Proliferation Security Initiative now has the support of around 100 
countries and has helped make illicit WMD-related transfers harder. But on 
missile proliferation, despite many attempted constraints, ballistic missile 
technologies continue to proliferate.
2.16 Nuclear Testing. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, NWS undertook to ratify the 
CTBT “with all expediency” and not to conduct nuclear-weapon tests in the meantime. Of 
the five NPT-recognized NWS, China and the United States have yet to ratify the CTBT. Of 
nine Annex 2 states which had not ratified the CTBT in May 2010, only one, Indonesia, 
has since done so. A substantial number of US Senators remain firmly opposed to US 
ratification and rejection by the Senate, for a second time, would be a huge setback to 
prospects for the CTBT’s eventual entry into force. All five NWS maintain a voluntary 
moratorium on nuclear tests, but at least three (Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) and possibly China, conduct “subcritical” tests on small amounts of 
nuclear material at high pressure using conventional explosives without generating a 
sustained nuclear chain reaction. Of the non-NPT nuclear-armed states all except North 
Korea have observed the moratorium.
2.17 Fissile Material. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all states agreed that the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) should “immediately begin negotiation of a treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices” and invited the UN Secretary-General to convene a high-level meeting 
in September 2010 in support of the work of the CD (Action 15). The CD has not been 
able to implement a program of work since the conclusion of CTBT negotiations in 1996. 
In recent years, Pakistan has consistently blocked the adoption of any program of work 
in the CD because it will not agree to Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations 
in the absence of prior agreement to include existing stocks of weapon-grade fissile 
material, where it believes itself to be at a particular disadvantage to India. The 
recommended high-level meeting was convened but made no real progress. In 2012, the 
CD again failed to adopt a program of work and concluded its annual session on 14 
September with nothing to show for it.
2.18 Of the five NWS, only China has not declared an end to the production of fissile 
Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Testing: Minimal Progress.  Of nine Annex 2 
states which had not ratified the CTBT in May 2010, only one, Indonesia, has 
since done so. Neither the United States nor China has ratified the treaty. 
That said, voluntary moratoriums on nuclear testing remain in place. 
Meanwhile, North Korea continues to threaten further tests.
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material for weapons purposes. The United States has declared 210 tonnes of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) excess to military requirements. HEU taken from dismantled 
Russian nuclear weapons is converted to low enriched uranium (LEU) and sold to the 
United States for use in nuclear power plants under the 1993 US–Russia HEU Purchase 
Agreement. By the end of 2013, the program is on schedule to have eliminated a total of 
500 tonnes of weapon-origin HEU, an amount equivalent to some 20,000 nuclear weapons.
2.19 Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have each declared some 
plutonium excess to military requirements. A Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement (PMDA), signed by the United States and Russia in September 2000, and 
tentatively scheduled to begin in 2018 under IAEA verification, commits each country to 
dispose of 34 tonnes of excess weapon-grade plutonium by converting it to mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel and using it in nuclear power reactors. Neither China nor France has declared 
any stocks of weapon-grade fissile material in excess of its defence needs.
2.20 Although it has not said so, China is believed no longer to produce either HEU for 
weapons or weapon-grade plutonium. The current status of facilities previously used for 
these purposes is, however, unclear. France’s military fissile material production facilities 
at Marcoule and Pierrelatte are being dismantled. Russia’s uranium enrichment plants are 
all now designated civilian facilities and its last operating plutonium production reactor 
was shut down in 2010. The UK’s only indigenous source of HEU stopped producing HEU 
in 1962, closed in 1982, and is now being decommissioned. Its closed former plutonium 
production reactors are the subject of long-term decommissioning plans.
2.21 Most US HEU was produced at two gaseous diffusion plants, both of which stopped 
producing HEU for weapons in 1964. The demolition of one is progressing and a contract 
for the decontamination and decommissioning of the second was awarded in 2010. The 
last of 14 US plutonium production reactors was shut down in 1987. The United States 
has begun decommissioning five heavy-water plutonium production reactors at 
Savannah River. Five of the nine reactors at Hanford had been “cocooned” by 2005. 
Another is currently being cocooned, with two more to follow. The remaining reactor 
has been turned into a museum.
Overall Evaluation of Fissile Material: Minimal progress. There has been no 
progress in beginning negotiations on a global ban on the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes, a central non-proliferation 
policy objective. But NWS have not produced HEU or weapon-grade 
plutonium for years and the facilities used for these purposes have been 
either shut down or converted to other uses in at least four of them: the 
status of facilities in China is unknown. Russia and the United States are 
reducing excess HEU stocks and have a bilateral plutonium surplus 
disposition agreement in force. The most significant growth in fissile 
material may be occurring in the non-NPT nuclear-armed states but, as with 
nuclear weapons stockpiles, their total stock is still hugely below that of the 
five NPT-recognized NWS.
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§2.2 Objectives and General Strategy
2.22 The overall and overriding objective of all non-proliferation efforts is to ensure that 
no more states seek to acquire or succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. As distilled from 
the language of the NPT Treaty and Review Conference outcomes, and reports of 
international commissions, the strategies in support of this objective may be described as:
 > To strengthen NPT and non-NPT mechanisms:
 − safeguards in all their manifestations;
 − compliance and enforcement;
 − the IAEA;
 − export controls; and
 − NWFZs;
 > To avoid breakout by existing non-NWS who are members of the NPT, for example Iran;
 > To identify creative and innovative mechanisms and formulas by means of which the 
non-NPT nuclear-armed states (India, Israel and Pakistan) can be signed up to NPT-
equivalent global disciplines;
 > To ensure the entry into force of the CTBT; and
 > To conclude an FMCT.2.23 NPT Treaty and Review Conference Outcomes. States’ nuclear non-proliferation 
obligations are set out in Articles I–III of the NPT. Under Article I, NWS party to the treaty 
undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not 
to help or encourage any non-NWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons. 
Article II requires non-NWS not to receive, manufacture or otherwise seek to acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
2.24 Under Article III.1, non-NWS agree to accept IAEA safeguards as a means of verifying 
the fulfilment of their treaty obligations; while Article III.2 obliges each state party to the 
treaty not to provide source or special fissionable material, or “equipment or material 
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special 
fissionable material,” to any non-NWS unless the source or special fissionable material is 
“subject to the safeguards required by this Article.”
2.25 Like the disarmament undertaking in Article VI, these obligations have been shaped 
over the years by a succession of treaty review conferences. The Principles and Objectives 
for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference have a special significance in this regard. They affirm the 
importance of:
 > Universal adherence to the treaty;
 > The IAEA’s role as the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with 
safeguards agreements reached in line with states’ obligations under Article III.1, 
and for the investigation and reporting of apparent or possible non-compliance with 
those obligations;
 > States parties which have not yet done so signing and bringing into force the CSAs 
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required by Article III;
 > A regular review of IAEA safeguards, the steady strengthening of their effectiveness, 
and of the agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities;
 > States not party to the NPT entering into CSAs with the IAEA;
 > As a condition of new nuclear supply arrangements, acceptance of IAEA comprehensive 
safeguards1 and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
 > Placing under agency safeguards fissile material transferred from military to peaceful 
use;
 > The maintenance of high standards of safety, accounting, physical protection and 
transport of nuclear materials; and
 > Ensuring that the IAEA has the financial and human resources it needs to discharge 
its responsibilities effectively.2 
2.26 These principles and objectives have been largely reaffirmed at subsequent NPT 
review conferences. As discussed further below, they have since been augmented by the 
emergence of the IAEA Model Additional Protocol, and diminished by the erosion of the 
comprehensive safeguards provision as a condition of nuclear supply.
2.27 There has been a growing convergence of non-proliferation and nuclear security 
goals over the past decade, with nuclear security issues assuming progressively greater 
prominence in the post-9/11 environment. Consistent with this trend, close to a third of 
the actions included under the nuclear non-proliferation heading in the final document 
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference were nuclear security items (discussed separately 
in the next chapter). Among other things, the conference encouraged states “to maintain 
the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials 
and facilities” (Action 40); called on states parties to the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify the amendment to the Convention as 
soon as possible (Action 42);3  called on states parties “to improve their national 
capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials” (Action 
44); and encouraged states parties that have not yet done so to become party to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) 
(Action 45).2.28 International Commissions. The report of the UN Secretary-General’s 2004 High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identified two key threats to the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. The first has states parties to the NPT taking advantage of the 
treaty to develop either full-scale or threshold nuclear weapons capabilities, with a view 
1. The purpose of “comprehensive” (sometimes also referred to as “full scope”) safeguards is to verify that fissionable 
material is not diverted from civilian uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the basic safeguards 
measure being nuclear material accountancy, carried out through on-site inspections, supported by containment and 
surveillance measures (e.g. seals and cameras). They are “comprehensive” in the sense of being required to be accepted on 
all a state’s current and future nuclear activities.
2. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex: Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament.
3. The CPPNM applies to the international transport of nuclear material in peaceful uses. The amendment to the 
convention expands the scope of the CPPNM to cover, inter alia, the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, 
storage and transport, and the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage.
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to withdrawing from the treaty when caught and censured, or at the point of 
weaponization.4  North Korea, which confirmed its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 
and tested nuclear weapons in 2006 and 2009, provides a ready example of this kind, 
and there is concern that Iran could provide another.
2.29 The second and closely related threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime stems 
from concerns about its possible collapse in the face of an erosion of confidence in and 
respect for the NPT’s legal and normative constraints, which could lead to the sort of 
proliferation cascade – made so much easier now by the ever growing diffusion of 
sophisticated nuclear and dual-use technology – that the United States and others were 
predicting in the 1960s prior to the negotiation and adoption of the NPT.5
2.30 The various international commissions on nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament (including the Canberra (1996) and Blix (2006) Commissions, the Tokyo 
Forum (1999), ICNND (2009), and the more broadly mandated High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change(2004)) have largely agreed on the steps needed to 
promote effective nuclear disarmament, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
strengthen global non-proliferation norms. Prominent among their common themes are 
calls for:
 > A strong IAEA, with the authority and resources necessary to carry out its mandate 
fully and effectively;
 > Stronger safeguards, including, and with progressively more vigour since the Model 
Additional Protocol’s emergence in 1997, global endorsement both of CSAs and APs, 
signed and in force, as the new international safeguards standard;
 > Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle (international fuel banks, enrichment, 
reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities) as a means of diminishing the risk of 
proliferation by reducing incentives to establish national fuel cycle facilities;
 > The phasing out of HEU in civil research programs (and of separated plutonium in 
energy programs) as alternatives become available; and
 > A determination, underwritten by the UN Security Council, to hold states withdrawing 
from the NPT responsible for violations committed while party to the treaty.
2.31 The ICNND Report, published in the lead-up to the May 2010 NPT Review 
Conference, recommended that nuclear non-proliferation efforts focus on both demand 
and supply, by “persuading states that nuclear weapons will not advance their national 
security or other interests” and by making it “as difficult as possible for states to buy or 
build such weapons” (Recommendation 4). It proposed a group of four safeguards and 
enforcement priorities (Recommendation 41) for the conference to consider:
 > A recommendation that all states should accept the application of the AP and that, to 
encourage its universal take-up, acceptance should be made a condition of all states’ 
nuclear exports;
 > A declaration that a state withdrawing from the NPT is not free to use for non-peaceful 
4. A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New 
York: United Nations, document A/59/565, 2 December 2004), p. 38, paragraph 108.
5. A more secure world, pp. 38–39, paragraphs 109–11.
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purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT;
 > A recommendation that the Security Council make clear that withdrawal from the 
NPT will be regarded prima facie as a threat to international peace and security; and
 > A recommendation to states that they make it a condition of nuclear exports that 
safeguards agreements continue to apply after any such withdrawal.6 
2.32 With the partial exception of the first proposal (Action 28 “encourages all states 
parties… to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols,” while Action 30 
endorses universal application of comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols in 
a nuclear-free world), none of these found its way into the conference outcomes 
document. The reasons for this entrenched resistance to the idea of transforming the AP 
from a matter of sovereign choice into one of international obligation, and opposition 
from members of the hard-line NAM group to progress of any kind on non-compliance 
and withdrawal issues, are discussed below.
2.33 Recognizing that the three nuclear-armed states now outside the NPT – India, 
Pakistan and Israel – were not likely to join it “any time soon,” the ICNND report 
recommended that they be encouraged to participate “in parallel instruments and 
arrangements which apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations” 
(Recommendation 17) and that, “provided they satisfy strong objective criteria 
demonstrating commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and sign up to 
specific future commitments in this respect,” they should have NPT-equivalent access to 
nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes (Recommendation 18).
2.34 It has not proven easy to find some means of accommodating, in multilateral non-
proliferation and disarmament processes, nuclear-armed IAEA member states excluded 
from joining the NPT as NWS by the treaty’s own definition,7  and unlikely to accede to 
the treaty as non-NWS. To the extent that effort is currently essentially India-driven 
(involving a coincidence of US commercial and strategic objectives with India’s desire for 
formal admission to the nuclear club), questions have been raised of consistent treaty 
interpretation, of consistent interpretation and application particularly of NSG 
guidelines, and finally, among states already critical of the NPT’s bias towards the nuclear 
“haves,” of credibility for the whole nuclear non-proliferation enterprise.
2.35 The ICNND Report, conscious of these concerns, recommended that the NSG adopt 
“a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT” 
(Recommendation 15) that would establish conditions for further exceptions based on 
new rules, rather than on an exemption from old ones, but this approach has yet to be 
embraced. NSG related issues are discussed further later in this chapter.
6. International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) (Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi 
co-chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers (Canberra and Tokyo: ICNND, 2009), pp. 
257–58.
7. For the purposes of the NPT, a nuclear weapon state is “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” (Article IX.3).
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§2.3 NPT Safeguards and Verification
2.3.1 “Comprehensive” Safeguards: Traditional Materials Accounting
2.36 Under Article III.1 of the NPT, the IAEA assumed responsibility for negotiating, with 
non-NWS parties to the treaty, safeguards agreements that would allow the agency to 
verify the fulfilment of states’ obligations under the treaty “with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.”2.37 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/153). Under a CSA, a state 
undertakes to accept safeguards “on all source or special fissionable material in all 
peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under 
its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not 
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”8  The objective of the 
CSA is to deter diversion “by the risk of early detection.”9
Map 2.1: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (2012) 
8. IAEA INFCIRC/153, Basic Undertaking.
9. IAEA INFCIRC/153, paragraph 28.
Source: SIPRI
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2.38 The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the call by previous review conferences 
for the application of comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable 
material in peaceful nuclear activities (Action 24). It called on those states which have yet 
to do so to bring into force CSAs (Action 25) with the assistance of the IAEA (Action 29).
2.39 Between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2012, CSAs entered into force for four states 
(Andorra, Montenegro, Mozambique and Republic of Congo). As of 30 June 2012, 179 
states (and Taiwan) had safeguards agreements in force with the agency. Fourteen non-
NWS parties to the NPT had yet to bring CSAs into force (Map 2.1).10 At 31 December 
2012, the number of states without a CSA in force had dropped by one, to thirteen.112.40 Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs). Under a small quantities protocol (SQP), a 
state which claims that it carries on little or no nuclear activity is exempted from most of 
the safeguards procedures set out in its CSA. A revised standard text of the SQP was 
approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2005. The modified SQP reduced the scope 
of exemptions and is not available to a state with an existing or planned nuclear facility. 
“Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised text of the SQP, the 
requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the 
Agency’s right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in 
abeyance.”12 In other words, the amended SQP gives the IAEA the authority to verify a 
claim by inspection.
2.41 The 2010 NPT Review Conference encouraged all states parties with SQPs which 
had not yet done so “to amend or rescind them.” Between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2012, 
SQPs were amended for nine states (Antigua and Barbuda, El Salvador, Gambia, 
Guatemala, Moldova, Panama, San Marino, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). Ghana rescinded 
its SQP. By the end of June 2012, of the 93 states with operative SQPs, 46 had brought 
modified SQPs into force.13 As of 21 September 2012, 54 states had accepted SQPs in 
accordance with the modified text endorsed by the Board of Governors.142.42 Voluntary Offer Agreements. Under a voluntary offer agreement (VOA), the IAEA 
applies safeguards to nuclear material in facilities selected by it from an NPT nuclear 
weapon state’s list of eligible facilities. The purpose of such safeguards is “to verify that 
the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the 
agreement.” Among the motives for choosing a particular facility may be its capacity to 
“satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the state.”15
10. GC(56)/14, 25 July 2012, document of IAEA General Conference 56th regular session.
11. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/nptstatus_overview.html. Confirmed correct at 31 December 
2012 in CNND email exchange with IAEA.
12. IAEA Safeguards and Verification: Safeguards Statement for 2010, p. 3, http://iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/
es2010.html.
13. GC(55)/16, 26 July 2011; GC(56)/14, 25 July 2012.
14. GC(56)/RES/13, September 2012.
15. IAEA, Safeguards Statement for 2010, p. 7.
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2.43 All five NPT NWS have both voluntary offer agreements and APs in force.
Table 2.1: NWS Safeguards Agreements
State Voluntary Offer 
Agreement
Additional Protocol
China INFCIRC/369 28 March 2002
France INFCIRC/290 30 April 2004
Russian Federation INFCIRC/327 16 October 2007United States INFCIRC/288 30 April 2004
United Kingdom INFCIRC/263 6 January 2009
Source: SIPRI
2.44 The 2010 NPT Review Conference called for the wider application of safeguards to 
peaceful nuclear facilities in the NWS (Action 30). But there has been no widening of the 
scope of application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities in states with a voluntary 
offer agreement since then.2.45 INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 
(1965) safeguards are applied to specific nuclear materials, facilities and other items in 
three non-NPT nuclear-armed states (India, Israel and Pakistan) with a view to ensuring 
their exclusively peaceful use. These agreements have no substantive impact on nuclear 
weapons programs.
2.3.2 Additional Protocol: Verifying the Absence of Undeclared Activity
2.46 The push for stronger safeguards was given greater urgency in the early 1990s as 
evidence emerged of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq and of discrepancies 
in North Korea’s initial safeguards declarations.16 In response, the IAEA Board of 
Governors established a committee to draft a model protocol that granted the agency 
authority additional to that provided by its CSAs with states, by giving it greater access 
to information and sites, thereby permitting the agency to provide assurance about both 
declared nuclear activities and the absence of possible undeclared nuclear activities. 
The Model Additional Protocol was approved in May 1997 as INFCIRC/540.
2.47 An AP in force obliges a state to provide the agency with information about and 
access to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mines, fuel fabrication and 
enrichment plants, and nuclear waste sites; as well as information on nuclear fuel cycle-
related research and development, and the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-
related technologies. It also provides for short-notice access to all buildings on a nuclear 
site and, in some circumstances, for environmental sampling beyond declared locations.17 
16. Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, “Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Special Committee to the Rescue?” http://
www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-Safeguards.
17. Wider area environmental sampling requires the approval of the Board of Governors and consultations with the state 
concerned. IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,  
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html.
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Together, a CSA and AP in force and fully implemented enable the IAEA both to verify the 
non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful use and to determine whether 
there is evidence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
2.48 The ICNND Report recommended that all states should accept the application of the 
AP and that acceptance should be made a condition of all states’ nuclear exports 
(Recommendations 5 and 41). While many countries, particularly members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), have argued that the AP should be recognized and 
accepted universally as a condition of nuclear supply, others, particularly within NAM, 
have stressed the AP’s voluntary nature and have resisted efforts to transform it into an 
obligation, not least because they see this as evidence of some states’ determination to 
further entrench the imbalance between non-proliferation and disarmament obligations.
2.49 As a consequence, the 2010 NPT Review Conference could only agree to “encourage” 
states parties which had not yet done so “to conclude and to bring into force additional 
protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry 
into force” (Action 28). The conference president’s review of the operation of the treaty 
nevertheless noted that “numerous” states took the view that a CSA and AP in combination 
were now integral parts of the IAEA’s safeguards system and that, together, the measures 
contained in both instruments represented “the enhanced verification standard.”18 
While it was for states to decide whether or not to conclude an additional protocol, a 
protocol in force became a legal obligation. And, in calling for the “wider application of 
safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon states,” the conference 
was able to agree that “comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be 
universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons [had] been achieved” 
(Action 30; emphasis added).
2.50 Between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2012, APs, based on the Model Additional Protocol, 
entered into force for 15 states (Albania, Andorra, Bahrain, Costa Rica, Gambia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Republic of 
Congo, Swaziland and the United Arab Emirates). By 23 October 2012, the number of 
APs in force had risen, with Iraq’s ratification, to 119.19 In November 2012, just ahead of 
a milestone visit by US President Barack Obama, the Government of Myanmar announced 
that it was now prepared to sign the AP.20 Eight states with significant nuclear activities 
have yet to commence AP negotiations with the IAEA.21
18. NPT/CONF.2010/L.2 (27 May 2010): Final Document: Part I: Review of the operation of the Treaty, paragraphs 18 and 19.
19. IAEA, “Iraq Ratifies Additional Protocol,” 23 October 2012, http://iaea.org/newscenter/news/2012/iraqap.html.
20. AFP, “Myanmar to sign new nuclear safeguards: govt,” Times of Myanmar, 19 November 2012, http://www.
timesofmyanmar.com/?p=2024.
21. Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria and Venezuela.  Brazil and Argentina argue, albeit not 
compellingly, that their membership of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material 
(ABACC) puts them in a special situation vis-à-vis the AP. “Significant nuclear activities” encompasses any amount of nuclear 
material in a facility, or nuclear material in excess of the exemption limits in INFCIRC/153 paragraph 37 in locations outside 
facilities. Neither Israel nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. North Korea gave notice of withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003.
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2.3.3 “State-Level” and “Integrated” Safeguards: Detection-Focused and 
Information-Driven
2.51 The 2010 NPT Review Conference called for regular assessment and evaluation of 
IAEA safeguards (Action 32). The IAEA inspections regime has become progressively 
more robust over the years, firstly by strengthening and continually upgrading its 
safeguards systems and procedures, and secondly by enlarging the scope of the agency’s 
policy authority independently of its Board of Governors. This has facilitated a shift in 
emphasis from nuclear material accountancy to a detection-based approach in IAEA 
safeguards procedures governing IAEA activities vis-à-vis states. A downside is an 
incipient backlash to the IAEA’s expanding remit and jurisdiction as some states see this 
as impacting on their sovereignty. Many of these larger issues have become entangled in 
the growing crisis over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program.
2.52 Until the first Gulf War (1990–91), IAEA safeguards were applied on the basis of 
accountancy procedures. States made their declarations to the IAEA on their facilities 
and activities and the agency conducted investigations to verify their peaceful purposes. 
The system failed to catch Saddam Hussein’s clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons 
and others like North Korea and Syria also failed to declare all their nuclear activities. 
2.53 To rescue its dented credibility, the IAEA began to develop alternative and more 
reliably effective inspection practices for detecting undeclared activities. The need for 
this became steadily more urgent as more reactors were built and commissioned and 
the number of facilities and the volume of nuclear material subject to safeguards grew. 
The IAEA response has been governed by four parameters: there are more commercial-
scale nuclear fuel cycle installations being built; more facilities and materials are being 
brought under IAEA safeguards; there is not, and is not likely to be in the foreseeable 
future, any commensurate increase in the agency’s resources; and most states have a 
demonstrable record of responsible stewardship of nuclear operations for peaceful 
purposes. Putting the four propositions together, to perform effectively the IAEA had to 
become more targeted in its operations, focusing on states of possible concern rather 
than dividing its attention and fragmenting its scarce resources by mechanistically 
inspecting every state with nuclear facilities and activities.
2.54 This has led the IAEA to move progressively over the past fifteen years to develop 
and implement what is now described as a “state-level approach” to the planning, 
implementation and evaluation of safeguards. This is an iterative process in which an 
evaluation of all information available to the agency (that is, information provided not 
only by the state itself, but by other states, as well as information derived from inspections 
and visits, from commercial satellite imagery and from international databases on, for 
example, nuclear trade and illicit trafficking) serves as the basis for planning future 
safeguards objectives and activities. The IAEA believes that the state-level approach is 
flexible and responsive to change, thereby helping to ensure that peaceful use assurances 
provided to the international community remain credible and current.22
22. GC(55)/16, 26 July 2011.
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2.55 As an important step on this path, integrated safeguards – “the optimum combination 
of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards 
agreements and additional protocols”23 – were implemented in 53 countries in 2012, an 
increase of six over 2010. The adoption of an integrated safeguards approach is a sign of 
the agency’s confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a 
state and permits the application of reduced safeguards measures at some facilities. This 
allows the agency to pay ever-increasing attention to possible undeclared activities and 
to make the most efficient use of its finite resources by making “differentiated 
assessments about which states’ nuclear programs pose more risk.”24
2.56 Some states – including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Russia, South Africa and 
Switzerland – have begun to argue that the state-level/integrated safeguards approaches 
are discriminatory rather than targeted. They have called for a return to a nuclear 
material accounting-based system of IAEA safeguards practices. There is concern in 
some quarters that the IAEA could be captured by the most powerful countries or by its 
strongest financial backers. The recent history of IAEA–Iran confrontations feeds into 
this narrative by some states that the agency’s proliferation judgments can be tainted by 
“subjective conclusions and insufficiently vetted third-party information.”25
2.57 At the most recent meeting of the IAEA General Conference in September 2012, 
critics of the state-level approach were able to secure, in the annual safeguards resolution, 
the inclusion of a paragraph requesting the secretariat “to report to the Board of 
Governors on the conceptualization and development of the state-level concept for 
safeguards.”26 The required report will be prepared in the first half of 2013.2.58 Strengthening the Technology Base. The 2010 NPT Review Conference 
encouraged states to “further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective 
international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among 
Member States and with the IAEA” (Action 34). The agency continues to use high-
resolution imagery from commercial aerial and satellite-based sensors to enhance its 
ability to monitor nuclear sites and facilities worldwide, and contracts have been 
concluded with new imagery providers to diversify sources and ensure the integrity and 
authenticity of satellite imagery. Having a variety of national providers of imagery gives 
the IAEA greater confidence that imagery is accurate and has not been tampered with to 
reinforce one country’s assertions.
2.59 The IAEA has developed and improved its safeguards approaches to a range of 
existing facilities, and continues to prepare to safeguard new types of facilities, including 
geological repositories, pyro-processing plants and laser enrichment facilities. Through 
its International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and in 
cooperation with the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), the IAEA is working to 
improve safeguards on future nuclear energy systems. Canada, Finland and Sweden have 
23. International Nuclear Verification Series No.3, “Foreword,” in IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 ed. (Vienna: IAEA, 2002).
24. Mark Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA Safeguards,” 20 November 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=50075.
25. Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA Safeguards.”
26. GC(56)/RES/13, September 2012.
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initiated “safeguards by design interactions” with the IAEA for future facilities.27
2.60 The IAEA has tested an inspection concept using new combinations of existing 
techniques and technologies (including remote monitoring, unattended measurements, 
and unannounced or short-notice inspections) to enhance safeguards implementation.28 
However, practical implementation of the concept has its limitations. In some countries, 
a “short-notice inspection” can in fact take weeks to arrange, which gives the state 
concerned ample time to prepare for the arrival of IAEA inspectors.2.61 Outreach and Facilitation. As the IAEA itself observes, “the effectiveness and 
efficiency of IAEA safeguards depend… on the effectiveness of state and regional systems 
of accounting for and control of nuclear material… and on the level of cooperation 
between state or regional authorities and the Agency.”29 To this end, the agency provides 
training, at international, regional and national level, for personnel of state and regional 
authorities responsible for implementing safeguards obligations. In March 2012, the 
agency published comprehensive “Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols.”
2.62 In addition, an IAEA advisory service provides advice and recommendations to 
states on the establishment and strengthening of state systems of accounting for and 
control of nuclear material. By the end of June 2012 (the most recent information 
available publicly), a total of fifteen such missions had been conducted since the program began in 2004.
2.63 The IAEA continues to encourage and to facilitate wider adherence to the safeguards 
system, consistent with the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the 
agency’s updated Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements 
and Additional Protocols (September 2010). GC(44)/RES/19 calls for:
 > Intensified efforts by the director general to conclude safeguards agreements and 
APs, especially with states which have significant nuclear activities;
 > Assistance by the agency and member states to other states on how to conclude and 
implement safeguards agreements and APs; and
 > Reinforced coordination between member states and the secretariat in their efforts 
to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs.30 
2.64 The IAEA’s June 2012 Status of Implementation report gives as evidence of ongoing 
implementation of the agency’s Plan of Action three outreach activities: briefings on 
safeguards for a number of permanent missions in New York (October 2011); similar 
briefings for states in the Pacific region in Fiji (June 2012); and a regional seminar in 
Mexico City for states in the greater Caribbean region with limited nuclear material and 
activities (June 2012). “Bilateral consultations on the conclusion of CSAs and APs and the 
amendment/rescission of SQPs were also held throughout the year with representatives 
from both Member and non-Member States in Berlin, Fiji, New York and Vienna.”31 
27. GC(55)/16, 26 July 2011; GC(56)/14, 25 July 2012.
28. GC(55)/16, 26 July 2011.
29. GC(56)/14, 25 July 2012.
30. GC(55)/16, 26 July 2011.
31. IAEA, “Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols” (no date), p. 1; 
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2.65 The report notes that, for the year ending 30 June 2012, “a CSA entered into force 
for one state and APs for seven states. During the same period, two additional states 
signed CSAs and APs. SQPs were amended for four states, and one state rescinded its 
SQP.” It rightly describes as “encouraging” the progress made in recent years with regard 
to the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. “In May 2005… 38 
NNWS [non-NWS] had not yet brought into force their NPT safeguards agreements; this 
number had decreased to 26 by the end of June 2009 and to 14 as of June 2012…. [W]hile 
in May 2005 only 66 States had APs in force, by the end of June 2010 this number had 
risen to 101; two years later, in June 2012, 116 states had such APs in force.”32 
2.66 At a regional level, the Asia–Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) came into operation 
on 1 October 2009 and held its inaugural meeting in Bali in June 2010. The objective of 
the network is “to strengthen the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards 
implementation in the Asia–Pacific region, working closely with the IAEA, through 
activities such as training, professional development and sharing of experience.”33 
§2.4 NPT Compliance and Enforcement
2.4.1 Compliance Generally
2.67 The IAEA has the mandate, authority and expertise to determine whether or not a 
state is complying with its safeguards obligations. The UN Security Council is responsible 
for enforcement. Under Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA, the agency’s inspectors 
are required to report any non-compliance by a state with its safeguards obligations to 
the director general. The report is then transmitted to the Board of Governors and, by 
the board, to all members, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. A non-
compliance finding may also be reached via paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 which allows 
the board to make the reports provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute if “upon 
examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General [it] finds that 
the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material… to 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”34
2.68 Countries to have been found in non-compliance are Iraq (1991), Romania (1992), 
North Korea (1993), Libya (2004), Iran (2005) and Syria (2011). Of the six, Iran and 
Syria are currently judged by the international community to be in non-compliance with 
their safeguards obligations.35 Both are parties to the NPT and members of the IAEA, 
with CSAs, but not APs, in force. In June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors declared 
Syria to be in non-compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sg_actionplan.pdf.
32. “Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” pp. 1–2.
33. John Carlson, “Strengthening safeguards through regional cooperation: establishment of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards 
Network”; http://www.dfat.gov.au/asno/publications/strengthening-safeguards-through-regional-cooperation.
34. See John Carlson, “Defining Noncompliance: NPT Safeguards Agreements,” Arms Control Today 39 (May 2009), pp. 
22–27, www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Carlson.
35. North Korea is in a different category at present, as resolution of the nuclear issue became the subject of a political 
process (that is, the Six-Party Talks). The IAEA’s role became one of monitoring the freeze at Yongbyon under the previous 
Agreed Framework, and now the IAEA is on standby to do what the parties request under the Six-Party Talks, but there is no 
agreement in sight.
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the agency and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. The resolution was based 
on an IAEA finding that an installation destroyed by Israel at Dair Alzour in September 
2007 was “very likely” to have been an undeclared nuclear reactor. Recent IAEA reports 
to the board reveal no progress in agency efforts to secure access to Dair Alzour and 
three possibly functionally-related sites. Iran is discussed below. North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent emergence as a nuclear-armed state was 
discussed previously in Chapter 1.
2.69 The 2010 NPT Review Conference failed, in the face particularly of Iranian and 
other hard-line NAM opposition, to make any progress on non-compliance and 
withdrawal issues. It simply underscored “the importance of resolving all cases of non-
compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and 
Member States’ respective legal obligations” and called on states to cooperate with the 
agency (Action 27).
2.4.2 Iran
2.70 Iran has a growing and increasingly sophisticated nuclear program which currently 
includes facilities dedicated to uranium conversion and enrichment, heavy water 
production, research and development, power generation and the production of isotopes 
for nuclear medicine. The rise in tensions over Iran’s alleged and suspected nuclear 
weapons program has provoked a flurry of speculation and commentary about:36 
 > The benefits and limitations of sanctions as a means of containing its nuclear 
ambitions;37 
 > The costs and risks of pre-emptive and preventive war against the risks of not 
stopping Iran before the window of opportunity (or Iran’s “zone of vulnerability”) 
for military action closes;38 
 > Israeli and US red lines that might trigger such attacks and the impact of the Israel 
factor in shaping the US calculus on these decisions;39 
36. For a collection that canvasses all these issues in one volume, albeit from the US perspective, see Robert D. Blackwill, 
ed., Iran: The Nuclear Challenge (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).
37. Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, RS 20871, 15 October 2012); 
Jeffrey J. Schott, “Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Is the Third Decade a Charm?” (Washington DC: Petersen Institute for 
International Economics, July 2012), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=2173; Ray Takeh 
and Suzanne Maloney, “The Self-limiting Success of Iran Sanctions,” International Affairs 87:6 (2011), pp. 1297–1312; and 
Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis,” FAS Issue Brief 
(Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, June 2012), www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/IssueBrief-Sanctions.pdf.
38. Morton Abramowitz, et al., Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action against Iran (New York: The Iran Project, 
2012), http://theiranproject.org; David Albright, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker, Christine Walrond and Houston Wood, 
“Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining Its Future Nuclear Options” (Washington DC: Institute for 
Science and International Security, 5 March 2012), http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/category/iran/#2012; Anthony H. 
Cordesman, Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 4 September 2012), csis.org/files/publication/120906_Iran_US_Preventive_Strikes.pdf; James Kitfield, 
“The Path to War with Iran,” National Journal, 24 September 2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/the-
path-to-war-with-iran-20120924; Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran 
(National Defense University, McNair Paper 69, 2005).
39. Andrew J. Bacevich, “How We Became Israel,” The American Conservative, 10 September 2012, http://www.
theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-we-became-israel/; Colin H. Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton and Matthew Irvine, Risk 
and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb (Washington DC: Center for New American Security, June 2012); Jim Zanotti, et al., 
Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, R42443, 27 
March 2012).
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 > The driving US motive being non-proliferation or regime change;40  and
 > The uneasy parallels with the Iraq War in 2003.41 
2.71 For all the emotion generated, there remains as at the end of 2012 a broad 
international consensus that, while Iran may well be working on elements of a nuclear 
weapon, it has not taken the strategic decision to build one. The IAEA has been able to 
verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its CSA. It has not, 
however, been able to provide a credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear 
material and activities in Iran, and thus to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in 
peaceful activities. To this extent, even if Iran never does take the strategic decision to 
actually build a nuclear weapon, its activities pose a significant challenge to the credibility 
and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime, and it remains crucial to bring the 
issue to satisfactory early resolution.
2.72 Since an initial IAEA Board of Governors finding of non-compliance in September 
2005, Iran has been the subject of six UN Security Council resolutions demanding a halt 
to its enrichment and reprocessing activities.42 A steadily increasing range of commercial 
and financial sanctions have been imposed on Iran by the United Nations and, 
autonomously, by individual states and the European Union (EU).
2.73 The ICNND Report called for continuing efforts to be made by the five permanent 
members of the Security Council (P5) and Germany (+1), the Security Council and IAEA 
member states to achieve “a satisfactory negotiated resolution of the issue of Iran’s 
nuclear capability and intentions, whereby any retention of any element of its enrichment 
program would be accompanied by a very intrusive inspection and verification regime, 
giving the international community confidence that Iran neither has nor is seeking 
nuclear weapons” (Recommendation 60).
2.74 Regular IAEA reports to the board show that Iran has not suspended its uranium 
enrichment activities, nor clarified to the satisfaction of the international community 
outstanding issues giving rise to concerns about a possible nuclear weapons program. In 
an annex to a November 2011 IAEA safeguards report, the agency gave a detailed account 
of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.43 This documented, for 
the first time in one place, a range of activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear 
explosive device,”44 including warhead/missile payload design and experiments with 
high explosives.45 The agency’s conclusions were based on information provided by “a 
number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided 
40. Paul Pillar, “The Temptation of Regime Change,” The National Interest, 3 October 2012,  
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-temptation-regime-change-7554.
41. Rolf Ekéus and Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Don’t Go Baghdad on Tehran,” Foreign Affairs, 18 October 2012, http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138201/rolf-ekeus-and-malfrid-braut-hegghammer/dont-go-baghdad-on-tehran.
42. S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006), S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006), S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007), S/RES/1803 (3 March 
2008), S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008), and S/RES/1929 (9 June 2010).
43. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions on the 
Islamic Republic of Iran – Report by the Director General (Vienna: IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2011/65, 8 November 
2011).
44. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Iran: Nuclear,” July 2012, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear.
45. S. Kile, “Iran and nuclear proliferation concerns,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 366–73.
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by Iran itself.”46 They indicated that, “prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place 
under a structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still 
be ongoing.” The IAEA claims to have obtained additional corroborative information 
since November 2011.47 
2.75 The documents on which the November 2011 account was based have not, however, 
been released publicly nor made available to Iran. Iran has dismissed the report as 
dishonest in its methodology and wrong in its conclusions.48 One of the documents 
apparently cited by the IAEA, and subsequently leaked to the media, purports to be a 
graphic representation of a potential nuclear armament’s explosive force.49 A commentary 
published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists describes the graph as featuring “a quite 
massive error, which is unlikely to have been made by research scientists working at a 
national level.”50 Similar (and presumably more reliable) graphs are to be found in 
nuclear science textbooks and on the Internet.51 
2.76 In its latest (November 2012) report to the Board of Governors and to the Security 
Council on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and Security Council 
resolutions in Iran, the IAEA notes that, notwithstanding several rounds of talks between 
the agency and Iran, no agreement has been reached on a “structured approach” to 
resolving outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 
program and to the agency’s request for access to the Parchin military site where Iran is 
believed to have “constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct 
[possible nuclear weapons-related] hydrodynamic experiments.” In the meantime, the 
“extensive and significant” site modification activities which have taken place at Parchin 
since February 2012 “have seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to undertake 
effective verification.”52 
2.77 In violation of the resolutions of the Board of Governors and Security Council, Iran 
has not suspended uranium enrichment, nor construction of a heavy water moderated 
research reactor at Arak. Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol, which it 
signed in 2003 but has not ratified.
2.78 Efforts by the P5 and Germany to negotiate a resolution of the stand-off with Iran 
have so far been unsuccessful. An agreement reached in Geneva in December 2010 that 
would have seen a (then) significant quantity of Iranian LEU exchanged for research 
(medical) reactor fuel collapsed early in 2011. Russia subsequently proposed a 
progressive easing of sanctions in return for improved cooperation and transparency by 
Iran, but the idea was not taken up by Russia’s P5 colleagues and received at best an 
ambivalent reception in Tehran. High-level talks resumed in Istanbul in April 2012, but 
46. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/55, 16 November 2012.
47. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, GOV/2012/55, 16 November 2012.
48. “Iranian envoy criticizes IAEA conduct,” Press TV, 22 November 2011, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/211406.html.
49. “Iran Modeled Nuclear Bomb Blast, Document Indicates”, Global Security Newswire, 27 November 2012.
50. Yousaf Butt and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, “DIY Graphic Design,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 28 November 2012, 
www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/diy-graphic-design; Gareth Porter, “Fake AP Graph exposes Israeli fraud and IAEA 
credulity,” Lobelog, 1 December 2012, http://www.lobelog.com/fake-ap-graph-exposes-israeli-fraud-and-iaea-credulity/.
51. Butt and Dalnoki-Veress, “DIY Graphic Design.”
52. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, GOV/2012/55, 16 November 2012.
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made no substantive progress. Further inconclusive meetings were held in Baghdad 
(May 2012) and Moscow (June 2012). Since then, there have been further exploratory 
exchanges between EU foreign and security policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton 
(acting on behalf of the P5+1) and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. The United 
States meanwhile is reported to be considering a “more for more” deal with Iran and to 
be “looking for a solid bilateral channel that will augment multilateral talks.”53 
2.79 Iran has indicated that it is ready to suspend enrichment to just below 20 per cent 
U-235 in return for the lifting of sanctions.54 It has not been willing, however, to accede 
to demands to suspend all enrichment, surrender its existing stock of uranium enriched 
to just under 20 per cent, and close the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.55 The parties 
remain deeply at odds and, while a negotiated resolution of the issue is still a priority, 
tension grows with every kilogram of enriched uranium produced, despite the temporary 
relief provided by Iran’s transformation some months ago of what was then more than a 
third of its existing stock of uranium enriched to just under 20 per cent into “a powdered 
form [uranium oxide] largely unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons.”56 
2.80 In December 2012, in an open letter, a group of 24 experts – including former 
generals, diplomats and officials – urged US President Barack Obama to table a new 
proposal whereby Iran would be offered relief from sanctions in return for some progress 
in meeting international concerns about its nuclear weapons program. As a first step, 
Tehran should be required to halt its accumulation of uranium enriched to just under 20 
per cent in exchange for a relaxing of some “international and financial sanctions.” 
Beyond this, the P5+1 negotiators’ overall goals should include restricting Iran’s 
enrichment to “normal reactor-grade levels”; limiting its stockpiles to actual nuclear 
power and other peaceful needs; having Iran accept “more extensive and effective” IAEA 
inspections; and having Iran “account for previous weapons-related experiments to 
ensure that they have been halted.” In the longer term, a new framework agreement 
could be negotiated to cover nuclear cooperation, security and transparency.57 
2.81 If conflict is to be avoided, all parties to the dispute (not just, but especially, Iran and 
the United States) are going to have to modify their expectations and change their 
behaviour. Iran must understand that none of the P5 is prepared to accept its emergence 
as a nuclear-armed state, and that the world has a right to demand credible and 
comprehensive proof of its assurances that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear 
weapons. The United States must find some means of accommodating Iran’s demand for 
positive (rather than negative) recognition as a country of global significance and for 
unqualified admission to the society of advanced nuclear-capable states. While Iran 
might one day be persuaded to join actively in the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, for the time being at least its enrichment activities must be accommodated under 
appropriate international supervision.
53. Barbara Slavin and Laura Rozin, “US Considers ‘More for More’ with Iran,” Al-Monitor, 12 November 2012.
54. “Iran Reaffirms Uranium Restriction Proposal,” Global Security Newswire, 25 September 2012.
55. “Khamenei Has Final Say on Iran-U.S. Talks: FM,” Global Security Newswire, 13 November 2012.
56. “Iran Pulverizes Uranium Portion, Attempting to Calm Fears on Nuclear Program,” Global Security Newswire, 9 October 2012.
57. Julian Borger, “Former generals and diplomats urge Obama to put sanctions on table in Iran talks,” Guardian, 19 
December 2012.
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2.82 While there were signs as 2012 ended that Iran might be moving towards accepting 
a “structured approach” to the resolution of its disagreements with the IAEA, analysts 
remain cautious about the lengthy and fragile process needed to resolve the decade-long 
standoff between Iran and the agency before both sides agree on and implement a 
methodical work plan that gives the IAEA access to sites, facilities and activities of 
interest to it.58 
2.4.3 Response to Withdrawal
2.83 A state party has the right to withdraw from the NPT if it decides that “extraordinary 
events, related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country” (Article X). As discussed in Chapter 1, North Korea asserted its 
withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 – the only country so far to have done so – 
after the United States said that Pyongyang had admitted to operating a clandestine 
uranium enrichment program. Several states remain unconvinced of the validity of the 
North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, questioning what “extraordinary events” 
justified it. Regardless, the IAEA has not implemented safeguards in North Korea since, 
and for all practical purposes that withdrawal should now be treated as a fait accompli.
2.84 The ICNND Report recommended that a state withdrawing from the NPT should 
not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials and technology acquired 
while a party to it (Recommendation 10). It added that states should make it a condition 
of their nuclear exports that safeguards agreements will continue to apply in the event 
of a recipient state’s withdrawal from the treaty (Recommendation 11).
2.85 The 2010 NPT Review Conference consensus outcomes document made no 
reference at all to withdrawal from the treaty, although the conference president’s 
summary review of the operation of the treaty (paragraph 120), while reaffirming the 
universally recognized right of withdrawal, recorded views expressed by “many” states 
that, under international law, a withdrawing party remained responsible for violations 
of the treaty committed prior to its withdrawal and, apparently though more elliptically, 
for its safeguards obligations to nuclear supplier countries. It also noted (paragraph 
122) that “numerous” states acknowledged the prerogative of nuclear supplier countries 
to “consider incorporating dismantling and/or return clauses” in the event of withdrawal.
2.86 North Korea’s NPT withdrawal and subsequent nuclear weapons tests damaged all 
three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation and cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The security and stability benefits that all states receive 
from the nuclear non-proliferation regime depend on all states meeting their shared 
non-proliferation obligations. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in an attempt to 
avoid being held accountable for violating its treaty obligations, and then used plutonium 
produced while a party to the treaty for nuclear explosive purposes after withdrawal. 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent emergence as a nuclear-armed 
state has shown that a state can misuse NPT membership to acquire nuclear materials 
58. Simon Sturdee, “Mooted IAEA–Iran ‘deal’ just the beginning: analysts,” AFP,  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/18/mooted-iaea-iran-deal-just-beginning/ev0y.
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and sensitive nuclear technology before withdrawing from the treaty and quickly 
developing nuclear weapons.
2.87 Those advocating action on withdrawal are not seeking to remove the right to 
withdraw or to reinterpret Article X. Their intention is to ensure that any future 
withdrawal is fully consistent with the provisions of the treaty, including the requirement 
that advance notice of withdrawal be given not just to other NPT parties but also to the 
UN Security Council. Sadly, the Security Council failed to act following North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, despite the fact that North Korea’s nuclear history 
plainly signalled that its withdrawal from the treaty would pose a threat to international 
peace and security. By resolution 1887 (24 September 2009), however, the Security 
Council did undertake in future to address without delay any state’s notice of withdrawal, 
including the events described in its statement of explanation, and affirmed that a state 
remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior 
to its withdrawal. That said, notwithstanding the adoption of this resolution and others 
highly critical of North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009, the Security 
Council has yet to make clear, as the ICNND report recommended, that any future 
withdrawal “will be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, 
with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter” (Recommendation 9).
§2.5 IAEA Resources
2.88 The IAEA is the lead international organization for the safe, secure and peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, science and technology. With a secretariat of 2,300 professional 
and support staff, the IAEA is the centrepiece of international efforts to combat 
proliferation from within the NPT regime. Although autonomous, the IAEA is a member 
of the UN system and reports annually to the General Assembly on its work. Several 
nuclear-weapon-free zones also link their regional verification systems to the global 
IAEA inspections regime. It pursues a three-pronged strategy to combat nuclear risks: 
prevention of illicit and non-peaceful use of nuclear material; the timely detection of any 
such efforts; and swift and decisive referral to the Security Council when nuclear risks 
are apparent. It has three main areas of work: confirming that nuclear material and 
activities (such as power generation) are not used for military purposes; protecting 
people and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation; and developing and 
promoting peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
2.89 The 2010 NPT Review Conference called on states parties “to ensure that IAEA 
continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to 
effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the 
Treaty” (Action 33). The ICNND Report went further, picking up on a number of 
recommendations of the 2008 Zedillo Commission on the role of the IAEA to 2020 and 
beyond.59 It recommended a one-off injection of funds to refurbish the Safeguards 
Analytical Laboratory; a significant increase in regular budget support, with no “zero 
59. Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond (Vienna: IAEA, 
2008).
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real growth” constraint; and security of future funding sufficient to enable medium to 
long-term planning (Recommendation 13).
2.90 The Zedillo Commission saw a need for a possible doubling of the regular budget by 
2020 to permit the required “expansion of work on nuclear reactors and the fuel cycle, 
security and safety, and support for meeting basic human needs through nuclear 
applications and technical cooperation.” It believed that “the statutory functions of the 
Agency – including nuclear energy, nuclear applications, development, safety, security, 
and safeguards – should be fully funded from assessed contributions,” and that the 
Technical Cooperation Fund, while still based on negotiated targets, should be 
“predictable on a multi-year basis, and assured.” Recipient states, though, should be 
required to meet some of the costs of technical cooperation.60
2.91 The IAEA’s regular budget has seen some modest real growth in recent years, 
although the core problem of dependence on extra-budgetary (voluntary) contributions 
remains unresolved. In 2009, the regular budget for 2010 was increased by €8.1 million, 
a real increase of 2.7 per cent over 2009 levels.61 This was followed by an increase of 
€6.9 million for 2012, a real increase of 2.1 per cent over 2011. The regular budget 
remains inadequate, however, to allow the IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities and to meet 
the expectations of member states.
2.92 Important programs continue to depend on extra-budgetary contributions. Such 
funding is unpredictable and its level uncertain, creating problems for program 
implementation, efficiency and forward planning. Extra-budgetary funding of €113.8 
million and €107.4 million is predicted for 2012 and 2013 respectively, while annual 
regular budget resources for these years are expected to be €331 million. In some key 
areas, reliance on extra-budgetary funds is chronic – for example, about 80 per cent of 
Nuclear Security Fund expenditure for 2012 and 2013 is expected to come from extra-
budgetary contributions.
2.93 The resources debate is complex and political. The IAEA is under pressure to 
become more cost-efficient, without letting its attention to safeguards implementation 
slide. While some states want the agency to pay more attention to nuclear security, 
others tend to see this as a preoccupation (as with non-proliferation) of the nuclear 
“haves” and as likely to further diminish the resources available for the development of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in developing countries. They want priority, 
and more money, to be directed to technical cooperation. The debate is further 
complicated by concerns expressed by some states that the IAEA’s evolving state-level 
approach to safeguards, which is driven at least partly by budget pressures, is 
discriminatory, subjective and unreliable (see discussion above).
60. Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: Recommendations 9(3), 9(5) and 9(6).
61. All the IAEA budget figures in this section are from: IAEA Programme and Budget, 2010–11, especially pp. iii, 1, 3 and 
6; http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-5_en.pdf.
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2.94 Meanwhile, the new Clean Laboratory Extension to the Environmental Sample 
Laboratory at Seibersdorf was officially opened on 7 September 2011. This enhances the 
IAEA’s nuclear analytical and forensic capabilities. Construction of a new Nuclear 
Material Laboratory has also begun at Seibersdorf and is scheduled for completion by 
2014. While the former provides assurance that no undeclared activities have occurred, 
the latter provides assurance that member states are providing accurate information 
when they make declarations about the types and quantities of nuclear materials held 
on their territory. The new facility will also be used to train nuclear security professionals 
from member states.62
2.95 Efforts have continued to expand the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories in 
order to facilitate the analysis of both nuclear material and environmental swipe 
samples. The network currently consists of the agency’s own facilities and 19 laboratories 
in eight member states and the European Commission. Since June 2010, laboratories in 
Australia, Brazil and France have been added to the network; and laboratories in 
Argentina, Belgium, China, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Republic of Korea 
and the United States are either undergoing preliminary assessment or are at various 
stages of the qualification process.63
2.96 The ICNND Report recommended that consideration be given to “an external 
review, by the Zedillo Commission or a successor panel, of the IAEA’s organizational 
culture, in particular questions of transparency and information sharing” 
(Recommendation 14). There has been no move to embrace this recommendation.
§2.6 Export Controls
2.6.1 General
2.97 Export controls are intended to reduce the risk that nuclear trade and commerce 
undertaken for legitimate peaceful purposes will contribute to nuclear weapons 
programs. They have evolved in response to technological developments and to changes 
in the nature both of the proliferation threat and of business practices in the nuclear 
industry. There is now a very widespread acceptance in the international community of 
the need for national export controls.
2.98 Some export control obligations are anchored in the NPT, in particular the 
responsibility of NWS, under Article I of the treaty, not “in any way to assist, encourage, 
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Under Article III of the NPT, all parties 
undertake not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material 
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-NWS for 
peaceful purposes, unless it is subject to safeguards.
62. Safeguards for the Next 40 Years, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/cleanlabext.html.
63. GC(55)/16, 26 July 2011, p. 6; GC(56)/14, 25 July 2012.
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2.99 Efforts to translate NPT obligations into governance mechanisms led in 1971 to the 
establishment of the informal Zangger Committee (named after its inaugural Swiss 
Chairman). The Committee’s 38 members include the five NPT NWS.64 Its decisions are 
taken by consensus and are not legally binding on members. It reached common 
understandings on the definition, absent from the NPT, of what constituted “equipment 
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material,” and on the conditions and procedures that would govern 
their export “on a basis of fair commercial competition.”65 This enabled the committee to 
create a “Trigger List,” which it continues to publish, of nuclear-related materials and 
equipment, a guide to the identification of items to which safeguards should apply. 
Committee guidelines establish three conditions of supply: a non-explosive use 
assurance, an IAEA safeguards requirement, and a re-export provision which requires 
the receiving state to accept safeguards on the re-exported item.
2.100 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – discussed in detail below – was established 
in 1975 after the “peaceful nuclear explosion” by India the previous year provided 
evidence of the misuse of nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes. While 
the Zangger Committee aimed to promote consistent implementation of states’ 
obligations under Article III.2 of the NPT, and does this by focusing on practical means of 
defining and meeting those obligations, the NSG assumed a broader mandate and 
coverage of nuclear-related dual-use items, and is today a much more prominent 
mechanism. Like its predecessor, the NSG includes the five NPT NWS and works on a 
consensus basis. Its guidelines are implemented by participating governments in 
accordance with their national laws and licensing practices.66 
2.101 These are not the only two currently relevant export control arrangements 
(leaving aside for present purposes the Proliferation Security Initiative – discussed later 
in this chapter – which is about export interdiction rather than control in the sense being 
discussed here). Such arrangements are also implicit, for example, in nuclear-weapon-
free zone (NWFZ) treaties, discussed later in this chapter, whose clauses variously 
complement and reinforce the NPT provisions on the export of proliferation sensitive 
material and equipment.
2.102 More specifically, concerns about nuclear terrorism have prompted significant 
further changes to the nuclear trade’s international legal and regulatory framework. 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3) created a legal 
obligation, binding on all states, to implement “appropriate and effective” export 
controls.67 In September 2011, the third report of the committee established pursuant to 
64. Zangger Committee members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
65. Zangger Committee, http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Seiten/default.aspx.
66. Nuclear Suppliers Group, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm. NSG members: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
67. S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004).
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that resolution noted that 124 states had reported legislative/enforcement measures in 
place for nuclear materials (compared with just 76 in 2008); while 90 states reported 
having export licensing provisions in place for nuclear weapons-related materials 
(compared with 76 in 2008).68 The report also noted that many states had put in place 
laws and regulations governing the delivery of relevant ancillary services, such as 
brokering or financial services, and strengthened border controls as an aid to enforcement.
2.103 The 2010 NPT Review Conference, in Action 35 of the outcomes document, urged 
all states to ensure that nuclear-related exports are not misused to assist in the 
development of nuclear weapons and encouraged them to draw on multilateral 
guidelines and understandings in developing national export controls (Action 36). A 
growing number of countries, without themselves being members of the NSG or Zangger 
Committee, are indeed making use of the guidelines for this purpose. In addition, Action 
44 called on all states “to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt 
illicit trafficking in nuclear materials” and “to establish and enforce effective domestic 
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their 
relevant international legal obligations.”
2.104 These mild exhortations were, however, more than balanced by calls “to observe 
the legitimate right of all states parties, in particular developing states, to full access to 
nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes” 
(Action 38), and to eliminate, with respect to nuclear transfers and international 
cooperation, “any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty” (Action 39).69 Regime 
members insist that their guidelines are consistent with the obligations of all states 
under the NPT and do not hinder nuclear trade between NPT states parties in compliance 
with their treaty obligations. The conference president noted that “numerous” states 
believed “effective and transparent” export controls to be an important means of 
facilitating “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which, in the view of 
those states, depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation.”
2.105 Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, a number of NPT states parties have 
entered into civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India (Table 2.2), and other such 
agreements are under negotiation. The exceptionally loose wording of Action 37 
(“consider whether a recipient state has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations 
in making nuclear export decisions”) seems broad enough to cover this contingency. 
However, it is not possible to conclude unreservedly, with respect to nuclear-related 
exports to nuclear-armed states outside the NPT, that such exports have not “directly or 
indirectly” assisted the development of nuclear weapons in those states (Action 35).
68. Report of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), UN Document S/2011/579, 12 
September 2011.
69. NPT/CONF.2010/L.2 (27 May 2010): Draft Final Document: Part I: “Review of the operation of the Treaty,” paragraph 27.
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Table 2.2: India’s Civil Nuclear Cooperation
State Date Type of CooperationArgentina 23/09/2010 Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses  
of nuclear energyaCanada 29/06/2010 Civil nuclear cooperation deal signed in Toronto (still not 
ratified)b
France 20/02/2006 Joint declaration on the development of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposesc
26/01/2008 Joint statement on terms for India’s acquisition of nuclear 
equipment and fuel from Franced
30/09/2008 Agreement on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energye
19/12/2008 Agreement between the Nuclear Power Corporation of India 
Limited and French nuclear company AREVA for the supply of 
300 tons of uranium to Indiaf
6/12/2010 Agreement on the Protection of Confidentiality of Technical 
Data and Information relating to cooperation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energyg
Kazakhstan 16/04/2011 Civil nuclear cooperation agreementh
Mongolia 14/09/2009 Agreement for peaceful uses of radioactive minerals and 
nuclear energyi
Namibia 14/08/2009 Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses  
of radioactive materials and nuclear energyj
South Korea 25/07/2011 Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses  
of nuclear energyk
Russia 6/12/2008 Agreement to construct four nuclear reactors at Kudankulaml
8/12/2009 Civil nuclear cooperation agreementm
12/3/2010 Agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses  
of nuclear energyn
United Kingdom 11/2/2010 Joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperationoUnited States 10/10/2008 Civil Nuclear Agreement (123 Agreement)p
Notes  
a. India, Argentina ink agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, The Hindu, September 24, 2010.  
b. Ending Freeze, India, Canada Sign Nuclear Deal, The Times of India, June 29, 2010.  
c. Government of India, Press Release, February 21, 2006. http://pmindia.nic.in/press-details.php?nodeid=396.  
d. French Embassy in New Delhi, http://ambafrance-in.org/Presidential-visit-India-France.  
e. Embassy of India in Paris, http://www.ambinde.fr/indo-french-relations.  
f. AREVA, www.areva.com/EN/group-1476/india-demand-continues-to-grow.html.  g. AREVA, www.areva.com/EN/group-1476/india-demand-continues-to-grow.html.  
h. India, Kazakhstan welcome civil nuclear cooperation agreement, Thaindian News, 16 April 2011.  
i. Prasad, K.V. India -Mongolia pace for uranium supply, The Hindu, September 12, 2009.  
j. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, August 23, 2012.  
k. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=510117869&flg=1.  
l. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, August 23, 2012.  
m. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, December 8, 2009.  
n. Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, http:www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/75.  
o. India, UK sign joint declaration of nuclear cooperation, The Economic Times, February 11, 2010.  
p. US Department of State, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2008/oct/110920.htm.
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2.6.2 Nuclear Suppliers Group
2.106 Taking account of work done by the Zangger Committee, the NSG after its creation 
in 1975 adopted its own guidelines for nuclear transfers with the aim of ensuring their 
non-diversion to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. 
Recipient governments were required to provide formal assurances to this effect. The 
guidelines also required particular caution to be exercised in the transfer of sensitive 
nuclear facilities, materials and technology; the adoption by recipient governments of 
appropriate physical protection measures; and incorporation of stronger re-export 
provisions. The IAEA published the guidelines in 1978 as INFCIRC/254.
2.107 The work of a committee reviewing implementation of Article III at the 1990 NPT 
Review Conference had a significant impact on the NSG, especially its recommendation that 
“nuclear supplier states require, as a necessary condition for the transfer of relevant nuclear 
supplies to non-nuclear-weapon states, the acceptance of IAEA Safeguards on all their current 
and future nuclear activities” (that is, comprehensive or “full scope” safeguards).70 
2.108 This, and evidence of Iraq’s active pursuit of a clandestine nuclear weapons 
program facilitated by the acquisition from NSG participating governments of dual-use 
items not covered by existing NSG guidelines, prompted the NSG in 1992:
 > To establish and adopt guidelines for the transfer of nuclear-related dual-use 
equipment, materials, software and related technology that could make “a significant 
contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.” 
These were subsequently published as Part 2 of IAEA INFCIRC/254;71 
 > To establish procedures for exchanging dual-use-related export denial notifications; and
 > To make a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA a condition of supply 
for future nuclear transfers to non-NWS.
2.109 The comprehensive safeguards provision was subsequently adopted at the 1995 
NPT Review and Extension Conference. The requirement applies only to items that are 
exclusively for nuclear use, the so-called Trigger List items defined in Part I of the NSG 
control list: nuclear material, nuclear reactors and related equipment, non-nuclear 
material for reactors, plant and other equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and 
conversion of nuclear material, and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production, and 
technology associated with each of the above items. Indeed, these items are often called 
trigger list items because they “trigger” full scope safeguards.
2.110 At its plenary meeting in Warsaw in 1992, the NSG agreed that the transfer of 
trigger list items “should not be authorized to a non-nuclear weapon State unless that 
State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of 
safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future 
peaceful nuclear activities.”72 Transfers, though, are not prohibited in all cases. Paragraph 
IV(a) of Part I of the guidelines says that they may take place “in exceptional cases when 
70. IAEA Information Circular, 16 September 1997.
71. Nuclear Suppliers Group, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm.
72. Ian Anthony and Vitaly Fedchencko, Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(Stockholm: SIPRI, 2004).
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they are deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities and if safeguards 
are applied to those facilities.” Different conditions, not including a comprehensive 
safeguards requirement, apply to transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, 
material, software and related technology (Part II of the control list).2.111 Issues of Consistency and Credibility: The Case of India. International export 
control regimes are sometimes portrayed by non-member states as supplier cartels 
whose aim is to intensify the existing imbalance between non-proliferation and 
disarmament obligations by denying states access to nuclear technology and the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy in contravention of Article IV of the NPT. Outreach programs have 
been only modestly successful in changing this image and in encouraging non-member 
states to adopt the regimes’ export control lists and guidelines as a reasonably 
straightforward way of meeting their NPT non-proliferation obligations.
2.112 The NSG though has a particular credibility problem, a result of the decision taken 
in September 2008, under strong US pressure, to exempt India from the NSG’s 
requirement for application of comprehensive safeguards to trigger list items. It has 
been argued that, in doing so, the NSG missed an opportunity “to commit India to a 
responsible non-proliferation policy.” The United States had of course just negotiated a 
bilateral peaceful uses (“123”) agreement with India which exempted India from the 
undertaking given by all NPT non-NWS “to disavow nuclear weapons programs in order 
to access civil nuclear technologies.”73 The agreement imposed no constraint either on 
India’s nuclear weapons program: “this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so 
as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with… military nuclear facilities” (Article 4); or 
on its right to reprocess transferred nuclear material: “the Parties grant each other 
consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred 
pursuant to this Agreement” (Article 6.iii).
2.113 The NSG decision to exempt India from its nuclear trade restrictions was 
nonetheless based on a negotiated series of commitments by India: to separate its 
civilian from its military nuclear facilities and to place some civilian facilities under IAEA 
safeguards; to sign and implement an AP with respect to civilian nuclear facilities under 
safeguards; to adhere to NSG guidelines and control lists; to refrain from transferring 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them; to maintain 
a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests; and to work collaboratively with other states 
on an FMCT.
2.114 While there are clearly some positives on this list, as the ICNND argued, “the main 
substantive problem with the deal was that it removed all non-proliferation barriers to 
nuclear trade with India in return for very few significant non-proliferation and 
disarmament commitments by it. The view was taken that partial controls – with civilian 
facilities safeguarded – were better than none. But New Delhi was not required, for 
example, to commit to sign the CTBT or to undertake a moratorium on production of 
fissile materials, either unilaterally or even upon reciprocation by Pakistan and China.”74
73. Pierre Goldschmidt, “NSG Membership: A Criteria-based Approach for Non-NPT States,” 24 May 2011, http://
carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=44147.
74. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, paragraph 10.7.
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2.115 India’s formal recognition by NPT nuclear supplier countries as a fully credentialed 
nuclear trading partner outside the established global non-proliferation and 
disarmament framework could not but damage the integrity of the NPT and the NSG’s 
credibility as an instrument for reliable and consistent implementation of the treaty’s 
Article III safeguards provisions. While India has an undeniably superior non-
proliferation record to Pakistan’s, and is more transparent than Israel, it is still only a 
special case because the NSG has chosen to make it one. In doing so, the NSG has stoked 
the fires of those who are all too ready to believe that the NPT and its supporting export 
control regimes are simply tools for the selective enforcement of non-proliferation 
norms by an elite group of countries which is ready to bend and change its own rules for 
commercial and strategic advantage.
2.116 During a visit to India in November 2010, President Obama declared his support 
for Indian membership of the NSG and three other export control regimes – related to 
missile proliferation (MTCR), chemical and biological weapons (Australia Group), and 
conventional weapons (Wassenaar Arrangement). While the NSG is India’s priority, it 
considers itself well-qualified for membership of all four regimes given its firm 
commitment to non-proliferation, effective export controls and capacity to produce 
regime-regulated goods and technologies.
2.117 The NSG first considered this question at its meeting in Noordwijk in June 2011. 
No decision was expected and none was taken. The United States apparently suggested 
two possible ways forward for the group: “one would be to revise the admission criteria 
‘in a manner that would accurately describe India’s situation.’ The other would be to 
‘recognize’ that the criteria, known as ‘Factors to be Considered’, are not ‘mandatory 
criteria’ and that a candidate for membership does not necessarily have to meet all of 
them.”75 One criterion for membership of the group is that a country should be a fully 
compliant party to the NPT or to a NWFZ treaty. Early signs are that most NSG members 
will find this criterion especially hard to overlook. While there is support for India’s 
membership within the NSG, there is no consensus. No evidence of progress was visible 
at the NSG’s most recent plenary meeting in Seattle on 21–22 June 2012. A public 
statement issued at the end of the meeting said only that the NSG “continued to consider 
all aspects of the implementation of the 2008 statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
with India and discussed the NSG relationship with India.”76
2.118 The NSG’s credibility problems are compounded by China’s apparent determination 
to supply more nuclear reactors to Pakistan. When it joined the group in 2004, China 
formally advised the NSG of an existing commitment to supply two nuclear reactors 
(Chashma I and II) to Pakistan. As these were not new commitments, China argued that 
they were effectively “grandfathered” under the NSG’s full scope safeguards guidelines.77 
No mention was made at the time of plans for further reactor sales but, in September 
75. Daniel Horner, “NSG Revises Rules on Sensitive Exports,” July/August 2011,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_%2007-08/Nuclear_Suppliers_Group_NSG_Revises_Rules_Sensitive_Exports.
76. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nuclear Suppliers group Plenary Meeting Public statement, Seattle, 22 June 
2012. http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/nsgstatement062212.
77. The so-called grandfather clause refers to paragraph 4 (c) of Part I of the NSG guidelines which says that the full scope 
safeguards requirement on trigger list items does not apply to agreements or contracts drawn up on or before 3 April 1992.
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2010, China announced its intention to supply two additional reactors (Chashma III and 
IV) to Pakistan.78 Chashma III is nearing completion, while Chashma IV has progressed 
to advanced site engineering. All four reactors are subject to full IAEA safeguards.
2.119 While China may continue to insist that any number of nuclear reactors can be 
“grandfathered,” consistent with NSG guidelines, under its 1991 nuclear cooperation 
agreement with Pakistan, its NSG colleagues are unlikely to find this argument 
compelling. They are not, however, in a strong position to argue in the aftermath of their 
decision on India, and have no formal dispute resolution mechanism at their disposal.
2.120 Members can be expected to continue gently to press China for further information 
(as they did most recently in Seattle in June 201279 ) but, with the India exception now 
firmly in place, preceded by the US–India civil nuclear agreement and Russia’s own 
earlier recourse to the “grandfather” clause as a justification for its nuclear trade with 
India in the 1990s, it would be surprising if China felt under any particular pressure to 
change course. Meanwhile, the NSG’s adoption in 1992 of the comprehensive safeguards 
requirement, “hailed at the time as a significant accomplishment,” now has a decidedly 
hollow ring to it, giving NPT parties “good reason to complain because the actions of NSG 
members have made a mockery of Article IV of the NPT by giving non-NPT parties India 
and Pakistan the same benefits as NPT parties but without the accompanying 
obligations.”80
2.121 The ICNND Report, while recognizing the flaws in the India exception, suggested 
that the NSG might salvage the situation by developing “a criteria-based approach to 
cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT, taking into account factors such as 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), willingness to end 
unsafeguarded fissile material production, and states’ records in securing nuclear 
facilities and materials and controlling nuclear-related exports” (Recommendation 15). 
This would establish conditions for further exceptions based on new rules, rather than 
on an exemption from old ones.
2.122 Pierre Goldschmidt gives even more specific shape to this recommendation by 
suggesting that, to become a member of the NSG, a non-NPT state should, inter alia:81
 > Undertake to comply with the requirements of Articles I, III.2 and VI of the NPT;
 > Have in force a voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT state 
undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear 
sites on the list of facilities eligible to be safeguarded by the IAEA under INFCIRC/66-
type safeguards agreements;
 > Have ratified an AP to its safeguards agreement;
 > Not be in material breach of an IAEA safeguards agreement;
 > Commit not to export or transfer items specified in the NSG Guidelines to a non-NWS 
78. “China says Pakistan nuclear deal ‘peaceful’,” BBC News, 17 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10340642.
79. “China Brushes Off Fears Over Reactor Sales to Pakistan,” Global Security Newswire, 27 June 2012.
80. Fred McGoldrick, “The Road Ahead for Export Controls: Challenges for the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” January/February 
2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/4642.
81. Goldschmidt, “NSG Membership.”
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unless such state has a CSA and AP in force with the IAEA;
 > Have in place legal measures to ensure the effective and uninterrupted implementation 
of the NSG Guidelines, including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures 
and penalties for violations;
 > Commit to share information on “catch all” denials with the IAEA and the members 
of the NSG;
 > Have signed and ratified the CTBT;
 > Commit, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to adhere to a unilateral moratorium 
on nuclear explosion tests;
 > Fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter that relate to nuclear proliferation or terrorism (in particular, Resolution 
1540);
 > Adhere to the MTCR and have in place the corresponding export control legislation;
 > Have ratified the CPPNM, as amended in 2005;
 > Be party to ICSANT; 
 > Agree to the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes with a view to its 
conclusion within five years.
2.123 The challenge will be to persuade Pakistan, and Israel should it show any interest 
in joining the NSG, to accept terms more rigorous than India’s. It will be just as challenging 
to persuade India to make additional commitments (for example, to ratify the CTBT and 
to end unsafeguarded fissile material production) when it already has the deal it wants.
§2.7 Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)
2.7.1 General
2.124 Nuclear-weapon-free zones deepen and extend the scope of the NPT and embed 
the non-nuclear-weapon status of NPT states parties in additional treaty-based 
arrangements.82  This is why several NPT review conferences have affirmed repeated 
support for existing NWFZs and encouraged the development of additional NWFZs. The 
first NWFZ was established in (uninhabited) Antarctica in 1959. Since then, five more 
have been established in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast 
Asia, Africa, and Central Asia. Mongolia has also declared itself a national NWFZ in law. 
All NWFZs seek to do two minimum things. First, they prohibit the acquisition, testing, 
stationing and use of nuclear weapons within the designated territory of the zone. 
Second, they include protocols for binding the NWS to pledges not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against members of the NWFZ.83 
82.  Ramesh Thakur, ed., Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (London/New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
83.  In addition to the treaties mentioned in this paragraph, the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Seabed Arms Control 
Treaty (1972) prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space and on the 
ocean floor respectively.
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2.125 The 2010 NPT Review Conference encouraged the establishment of further 
NWFZs. It also encouraged “all concerned States… to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free 
zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to 
bring about the entry-into-force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such 
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties which include negative security assurances” (Action 
9). New NWFZs have been proposed for the Middle East (discussed below) and Northeast 
Asia (also discussed below). The InterAction Council of Former Heads of State and 
Government has also recommended the exploration of a NWFZ in the Arctic.84 Russia 
ratified Protocols One and Two of the Treaty of Pelindaba in March 2011. There has been 
no other ratification by any NWS of existing NWFZ protocols since the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference. On 2 May 2011, President Obama did submit the protocols to the treaties of 
Rarotonga and Pelindaba to the US Senate for ratification – fifteen years after signature 
– but there is no indication of when, if at all, Senate ratification might be expected.2.126 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production 
or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and 
any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, by Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. The parties are also required to conclude agreements individually with the 
IAEA for the application of safeguards to their nuclear activities. The IAEA has the 
exclusive power to carry out special inspections.
2.127 The treaty includes two protocols. The first, by which parties agree to apply key 
provisions of the treaty to their territories within the zone, has been signed and ratified 
by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. All NWS have signed and ratified 
Protocol II, which promises respect for the treaty’s aims and provisions, and provides 
negative security assurances (NSAs: pledges not to attack non-NWS with nuclear 
weapons) to states parties. The United States, however, did so with two significant 
reservations. First, it sought to preserve its interpretation of “the relevant rules of 
international law” under which contracting parties retained “exclusive power and legal 
84. Thomas Axworthy (Secretary-General of the InterAction Council), “A Nordic–Canadian nuclear-weapon-free zone,” 
Embassy (Ottawa), 28 November 2012, http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2012/11/27/a-nordic-canadian-nuclear-
weapon-free-zone/42901.
Table 2.3: NWS Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
Country Protocol One Protocol Two
China Not Applicable 06/02/1974
France 24/08/1992 22/03/1974
Russia Not Applicable 08/01/1979
United Kingdom 11/12/1969 11/12/1969United States 23/11/1981 12/05/1971
Source: SIPRI. For the current status of the accession/ratification of the treaty by eligible states,  
see: http://www.opanal.org/opanal/Tlatelolco/P-Tlatelolco-i.htm.
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competence… to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges.” 
Second, it qualified its NSA by making clear that an armed attack by a contracting party 
in which it was assisted by a NWS would be incompatible with the contracting party’s 
own obligations under the treaty.85 
2.128 There has been no recorded violation of the treaty by states parties. However, in 
February 2012, Argentina accused the United Kingdom of violating its commitment 
under Protocol I by sending a nuclear-capable submarine to the South Atlantic. UK 
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg dismissed the allegation as baseless.86 2.129 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The Treaty of Rarotonga prohibits 
the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device, as well as possession or 
control of such device, by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone, which is 
defined in an annex. The parties also undertake not to supply nuclear material or 
equipment, unless subject to IAEA safeguards, and to prevent in their territories the 
stationing as well as the testing of any nuclear explosive device. They undertake not to 
dump, and to prevent the dumping of, radioactive waste and other radioactive matter at 
sea anywhere within the zone. Each party remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, 
by foreign ships and aircraft regardless of whether they are conventionally or nuclear 
powered and whether they may or may not be carrying nuclear weapons. The treaty is 
open for signature by members of the Pacific Islands Forum. Three eligible states 
(Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau – which, as former members 
of a UN trusteeship administered by the United States, are now in “free association” with 
the United States) have not signed the treaty.
Table 2.4: NWS Ratification of the Treaty of Rarotonga
Country Protocol One Protocol Two Protocol Three
China Not Applicable 21/10/1988 21/10/1988
France 20/09/1996 20/09/1996 20/09/1996
Russia Not Applicable 21/04/1988 21/04/1988
United Kingdom 19/09/1997 19/09/1997 19/09/1997United States Yet to ratify Yet to ratify Yet to ratify
Source: SIPRI. For the current status of the accession/ratification of the treaty by eligible states,  
see: http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/SPNFZ%20Status%20Report.pdf.
2.130 The treaty includes three additional protocols. Protocol II (which provides NSAs 
to states parties) and Protocol III (which bans nuclear testing anywhere in the zone) 
have been ratified by all NWS other than the United States. Protocol I, by which parties 
agree to apply key provisions of the treaty to their territories within the zone, has been 
ratified by France and the United Kingdom.
85. http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/tlatelolco.
86. “‘Argentina submarine claim baseless’, says Nick Clegg,” BBC News, 27 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-17524714.
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2.131 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the 2010 NPT Review Conference on 3 
May 2010 that the administration was preparing to submit the treaty protocols to the US 
Senate for approval. President Obama submitted all three protocols to the Senate in May 
2011 with a view to securing the Senate’s consent to ratification. The Senate has so far 
taken no action on the matter.
2.132 Questions have been raised about possible or potential violations of the South 
Pacific (and African and Central Asian) NWFZ treaties with various decisions and 
agreements to sell uranium to India, which is not party to the NPT. The three zones 
prohibit the transfer of source or special fissile material and equipment to any non-NWS 
that is not subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards under Article III.1 of the NPT. 
Australia (and – in the case of the Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk Treaties – South Africa, 
Namibia, and Kazakhstan) have either decided in principle or have signed agreements to 
sell uranium to India, or are reported as contemplating doing so.
2.133 Some critics argue that these possibly NWFZ-non-compliant agreements confirm 
that the India–US civil nuclear cooperation deal drove a cart and horse through the NPT 
regime’s prohibitions on trade in nuclear material with non-NPT countries. But others 
argue that, legally speaking, India has no status under the NPT as either a NWS or a non-
NWS, and therefore is not covered by such NWFZ prohibitions; moreover, it does apply 
facility-specific IAEA safeguards to some of its civilian nuclear activities. They further 
argue that the 2008 NSG “clean waiver” granted to India confirms this interpretation 
that trade in nuclear materials with India is not inconsistent with the NPT.872.134 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The Treaty of 
Bangkok prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition or testing of nuclear 
weapons by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone, as well as the stationing and 
transport of nuclear weapons in or through the zone. Each state party may decide for 
itself whether to allow visits and transit by foreign ships and aircraft. The parties 
undertake not to dump at sea, or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the 
zone, any radioactive material or waste, or to dispose of radioactive material on land. The 
parties are also required to conclude agreements individually with the IAEA for the 
application of full-scope safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. The zone includes 
not only the territories but also the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) of the states parties. The treaty is open for signature by all states of Southeast Asia.
2.135 The one protocol to the treaty is open for signature by the five NWS and commits 
the parties to “respect the Treaty… and not to contribute to any act which constitutes a 
violation of the Treaty or its Protocol.” The protocol also commits the parties not to use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty or within the 
zone itself. None of the five NWS has ratified the protocol (although see reference to 
China below). Prominent among their concerns is the geographical scope of the treaty 
(which includes states parties’ continental shelves and EEZs) and its implications for 
87. For the contrasting legal analyses, see Donald R. Rothwell, Australia’s Obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty and Uranium Sales to India (Melbourne: ICAN, November 23, 2011), www.icanw.org/files/ICANW~Legal%20
Opinion~FINAL.pdf; and Kalman A. Robertson, “The Legality of the Supply of Australian Uranium to India,” Security 
Challenges 8:1 (Autumn 2012), pp. 25–34. Although the two analyses are specifically in the context of the South Pacific zone, 
because the other zones have generally equivalent clauses, they are broadly relevant to all three cases.
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freedom of navigation in international waters.
2.136 Long-running negotiations were expected to conclude with a signing ceremony at 
the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
in Phnom Penh on 12 July 2012, but late submission of reservations by France, Russia, 
the United Kingdom and the United States led to its postponement.88 A rescheduled 
signing ceremony was again postponed on the eve of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh 
in November 2012,89  much to the ASEAN nations’ disappointment.90 China’s concerns 
about the implications of the treaty’s geographic area of application for its territorial 
claims in the South China Sea have been addressed separately via a Memorandum of 
Understanding which clarifies “the understanding among the States parties and China 
on the application of the treaty and the protocol.”91 2.137 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Treaty of Pelindaba prohibits 
research, development, manufacture and acquisition of nuclear explosive devices and 
the testing or stationing of any nuclear explosive device. Each party remains free to 
allow visits and transit by foreign ships and aircraft. The treaty also prohibits any attack 
against nuclear installations. The parties undertake not to dump or permit the dumping 
of radioactive waste and other radioactive matter anywhere within the zone. Each party 
should individually conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of 
comprehensive safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities. The zone includes the 
territory of the continent of Africa, island state members of the African Union (AU) and 
all islands considered by the AU to be part of Africa. The treaty is open for signature by 
all states of Africa.
2.138 Six states – Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia and Zambia – have 
acceded to the treaty since the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The treaty currently has 
36 states parties, with 18 countries yet to ratify it. Morocco signed and ratified the treaty 
in April 1996, but is not a member of the African Union.
Table 2.5: NWS Ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba
Country Protocol One Protocol Two Protocol Three
China 06/09/1996 06/09/1996 Not Applicable
France 31/07/1997 31/07/1997 31/07/1997
Russia 11/03/2011 11/03/2011 Not Applicable
United Kingdom 27/02/2001 27/02/2001 Not ApplicableUnited States Yet to ratify Yet to ratify Not Applicable
Source: SIPRI. For the current status of the accession/ratification of the treaty by eligible states,  
see: http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/pelindaba%20Treaty_0.pdf.
88. Xinhua, “4 nuke states postpone signing SEANWFZ protocol next week,” 8 July 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/world/2012-07/08/c_131702340.htm.
89. “Powers Not Yet Expected to Sign SE Asia Nuke-Free Zone Protocol,” Global Security Newswire, 15 November 2012.
90. Xinhua, “No signing of SE Asia nuke-free zone protocol at upcoming 21st ASEAN Summit,” 15 November 2012, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-11/15/c_131976633.htm.
91. Xinhua, “4 nuke states postpone signing SEANWFZ protocol next week.”
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2.139 The treaty includes three additional protocols. Protocols I (which provides NSAs 
to states parties) and II (which bans nuclear testing anywhere in the zone) have been 
ratified by all NWS other than the United States. Protocol III, by which parties agree to 
apply key provisions of the treaty to their territories within the zone, has been ratified 
by all eligible states other than Spain. Secretary Clinton told the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference on 3 May 2010 that the administration was preparing to submit the treaty 
protocols to the US Senate for approval. President Obama submitted Protocols I and II to 
the US Senate in May 2011 with a view to securing the Senate’s consent to ratification. 
The Senate has so far taken no action on the matter.2.140 Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk requires 
the parties not to research, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, 
possess or have control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device 
anywhere. There are five parties to the treaty: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
2.141 The treaty has a single protocol (NSAs) which is not yet open for signature. Three 
NWS (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) do not recognize the zone. 
They argue that Article XII, which says that the treaty “does not affect the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under other international treaties which they may have 
concluded prior to the date of the [treaty’s] entry into force,” would allow the stationing 
of Russian nuclear weapons in Central Asia if the Tashkent (Collective Security 
Organization) Treaty is invoked.922.142 Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status. In September 2012, the five NWS and 
Mongolia signed “parallel political declarations regarding Mongolia’s self-declared 
nuclear-weapon-free status.”93 The P5, who have not before recognized a single-country 
NWFZ, reaffirmed security assurances made in connection with Mongolia’s nuclear-
weapon-free status at the UN General Assembly in October 2000 and agreed “to respect 
the nuclear weapon-free status of Mongolia and not to contribute to any act that would 
violate it.” Mongolia confirmed that it was fully compliant with its obligations as a non-
NWS party to the NPT and that it had in place laws giving it “the domestic legal status of 
being free of nuclear weapons.”94 2.143 Proposed Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. A NWFZ has been 
suggested for Northeast Asia as a means of finessing the dilemma over what to do with 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Any formal acceptance of North Korea’s possession of 
nuclear weapons would make it extremely difficult to avoid proliferation to South 
Korea and Japan, with commensurately enhanced risk of an armed conflict in the 
region in which nuclear weapons are used. But if international policy is to focus on
92. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the Conclusions And Recommendations for Follow-On Actions Adopted 
at the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions 1-22: Monitoring Report (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2012), p. 44.
93. US Department of State, “Five Permanent UN Representatives Support Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status,” Media 
Note, 18 September 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197873.htm.
94. US, “Five Permanent UN Representatives Support Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”; AFP, “Major powers 
recognize Mongolia as nuclear weapons free,” Bangkok Post, 18 September 2012, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/
asia/312850/major-powers-recognize-mongolia-as-nuclear-weapons-free.
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verifiably and permanently reversing North Korea’s nuclearization, then Pyongyang’s 
security fears of an external attack must be addressed.
2.144 One way to do this could be to establish, as part of a comprehensive agreement on 
peace and security in Northeast Asia, a regional NWFZ that includes the two Koreas, 
Japan and, possibly, Mongolia. Consistent with the provisions of other NWFZ treaties, 
these states would undertake not to acquire, manufacture, test or deploy nuclear 
weapons or to allow them to be stored on their territory. NWS parties to the treaty 
(China, Russia and the United States) would agree not to store nuclear weapons in the 
zone and otherwise to support the objectives of the treaty. They would extend negative 
security assurances to non-NWS parties to the treaty who were observing its terms. 
France and the United Kingdom would be asked similarly to commit to treaty provisions 
that applied to NWS.
2.145 To accommodate the required dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program, the treaty might include a transition period and be “structured so that it goes 
into effect when the three nuclear weapons states (the US, Russia and China) and the 
two non-nuclear states (Japan and South Korea) ratify it” but reserves for Japan and 
South Korea “the right to withdraw from the treaty after three or five years if the 
provisions were not being enforced effectively throughout the Korean Peninsula.”95 
2.7.2 Middle East
2.146 The 2010 NPT Review Conference emphasized “the importance of a process 
leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.” It further 
agreed that the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution 
(Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), in consultation with the states of the 
region, would convene a conference in 2012, “to be attended by all States of the Middle 
East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction.” The NPT Review Conference Action Plan provided, among 
other things, for the appointment of a facilitator “with a mandate to support 
implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of 
the region… and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference.”
2.147 A facilitator (Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State in Finland’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) has since been appointed and a venue (Helsinki) chosen, but efforts to 
convene a conference in 2012 ultimately stalled in the face of growing regional instability 
and the absence of agreement on what the conference might reasonably be expected to 
achieve. If, as now seems likely, no Middle East WMDFZ conference takes place before 
the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Geneva in April 2013, the mood of that 
meeting will be much influenced by exchanges on the consequences of a possible 
unravelling of the deal which produced a consensus outcome at the NPT Review 
Conference in 2010, and agreement to the treaty’s indefinite extension in 1995.
95. Morton H. Halperin, “A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia,” Nautilus Institute, 3 January 2012, 
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-proposal-for-a-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-in-northeast-asia/.
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2.148 Meanwhile, as part of international efforts to create suitable conditions for an 
initial gathering of regional states, the EU sponsored Track II informal seminars (July 
2011 and November 2012) in Brussels on a Middle East WMDFZ conference; and the 
IAEA convened (November 2011) a long-delayed forum in Vienna on “Experience of 
Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East.” 
Forum participants, which included “all States of the Middle East” apart from Iran, 
proposed “to continue working towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East; 
to consider declarations of good intentions as a first step to break the current stalemate; 
to make the best and most constructive use of every opportunity on the international 
agenda; and to identify specific and practical confidence-building measures.”96
2.149 The Arab League elected not to run its traditional Israeli Nuclear Capabilities 
Resolution at the last two IAEA General Conferences (2011 and 2012). The resolution 
calls on Israel to join the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. 
It was last adopted by a narrow margin in 2009 and defeated in 2010. The decision not 
to table the resolution in 2011 was presented as part of an effort to improve prospects 
for a Middle East WMDFZ conference, although it is also likely to have been driven, on 
both occasions, by the assessment that it would be defeated.
2.150 The UN General Assembly, on 2 December 2011, adopted without vote a resolution 
on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (A/
RES/66/25).97 Israel, in an explanation of vote, said that it remained “committed to a 
vision of the Middle East developing eventually into a zone free of Chemical, Biological, 
and Nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles.” It suggested that the process begin 
with “modest” confidence-building measures and be followed by “the establishment of 
peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good neighborliness, and 
complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures.” A 
“mutually verifiable” NWFZ could follow “in due course.”98 In December 2012, Israel 
again joined consensus on the resolution, noting the fragility of regional security and the 
absence of a mechanism for regional dialogue, without which it “was not possible to 
build confidence and defuse tension.”99
2.151 A three-day Middle East WMDFZ Conference was tentatively scheduled to begin 
on 17 December 2012 in Helsinki. On 23 November, the United States announced that 
there would be no conference in 2012 “because of present conditions in the Middle East 
and the fact that states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable 
conditions for a conference.”100 State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said 
that the United States “would not support a conference in which any regional state would 
be subject to pressure or isolation” (which generated speculation as to what would have 
96. IAEA, “Forum on Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone in the Middle East Closes,” http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/
news/2011/nwfz-forum-closes.html.
97. “General Assembly, gravely concerned about status of UN disarmament machinery, especially in Conference on 
Disarmament, invites States to explore options” http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/ga11182.doc.htm.
98. Beatrice Fihn, ed., The 2010 NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and Reaching Critical Will, 2012), p. 48.
99. “General Assembly, in wake of high-stakes debate in First Committee that championed common positions but fell short 
of bridging divides, adopts 58 texts,” http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11321.doc.htm.
100. “No Middle East WMD Meeting This Year: U.S.,” Global Security Newswire, 26 November 2012, quoting US State 
Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland.
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been said if Iran rather than Israel had been likely to be the principal focus of attention). 
Iran confirmed its willingness to attend a conference in Helsinki in December, although 
cynics believe it did this only once it was confident no conference would take place. Of 
the other principal co-sponsors, Russia was critical of the decision to postpone and of 
the absence of an alternative date for the conference; UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
called for the conference to be held early in the new year; and the United Kingdom 
welcomed conference facilitator Laajava’s commitment to conduct further consultations 
with a view to convening a conference in 2013.101 
2.152 As with North Korea, it has been suggested that because “the logic of using force to 
secure a nuclear monopoly flies in the face of international norms,” Israel could trade its 
nuclear weapons for a stop to Iran’s developing nuclear weapons capability by agreeing to a 
Middle East NWFZ.102 But as in Northeast Asia, this begs the question of whether a NWFZ can 
create conditions of common security in a region, or whether it can only be negotiated in 
conditions free of tension in the region. The present bleak security and political environment 
in the Middle East is particularly inauspicious for the creation of a NWFZ:103 
 > No NWFZ has previously been established among countries at war, as is the formal 
state of relations between Israel and Syria;
 > No NWFZ has previously been established when a regionally significant state is 
convulsed in a civil war (Syria);
 > No NWFZ has been established among states that refuse to recognize one another 
and do not engage in diplomatic relations, as is the case with Israel and several of its 
neighbours;
 > No NWFZ has been established among states one of whom (Israel) faces the dedicated 
pursuit of the destruction of its very existence by some of the other political actors 
in the region. It is difficult to see how negotiations can begin until all states explicitly 
accept the existence of Israel;
 > No NWFZ has been established by states not in compliance with safeguard agreements 
(Iran, Syria);
 > No NWFZ has been established with a state pursuing a nuclear weapons breakout 
capability (Iran);
 > No NWFZ has been established with a state that is not party to the NPT (Israel);
 > No NWFZ has been established to include a state that already has nuclear weapons 
stationed on its territory within an alliance which explicitly practices burden-sharing 
on tactical nuclear weapons stewardship (Turkey);
101. “No Middle East WMD Meeting This Year: U.S.,”; Paul Meyer, “Mideast nuclear-free vision turns into a mirage,” Toronto 
Star, 28 November 2012.
102. Uri Bar-Joseph, “Why Israel Should Trade Its Nukes,” Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/138224/uri-bar-joseph/why-israel-should-trade-its-nukes.
103. These are drawn from an amalgam of (1) Pierre Goldschmidt, “A Top-Down Approach to a Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone in the Middle East,” and (2) Ariel Levite, “Reflections on ‘The Regional Security Environment and Basic Principles for 
the Relations of the Members of the Zone’”: papers presented at the EU Non-proliferation Consortium seminar, Brussels, 
5–6 November 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/05/top-down-approach-to-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-
in-middle-east/ece2 and www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/backgroundpapers/levite.pdf; and (3) updated application 
of the analyses of NWFZ in Ramesh Thakur, “Stepping Stones to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,” in Thakur, ed., Nuclear 
Weapons-Free Zones, pp. 3–32
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play118
 > The Binyamin Netanyahu government in Israel seems more interested in a military 
solution to its security challenges, including the threat of a preventive strike on Iran, 
than in exploring diplomatic options;
 > The Arab Awakening has produced more ferment, volatility, weakening of state 
governance and social upheaval in the entire region than has been seen for decades. 
Not surprisingly, the depth and speed of changes have produced much unrest and 
anxiety among both the leaders and the people of the region;
 > The role and salience of extra-regional powers – the United States, Russia, China – are 
changing, heightening the sense of flux in the region;
 > The Sunni–Shia divide has sharpened;
 > Finally, Egypt, a leading proponent of a Middle East NWFZ, has yet to sign the IAEA 
Additional Protocol and the Chemical Weapons Convention, or ratify the CTBT, 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the African NWFZ. In addition, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, now influential in the current Egyptian government, 
has previously called for Egypt to develop its own deterrent, and a retired general 
called for the same and advocated that Egypt should emulate Iran to “deceive the 
international community.”104 
2.153 Against the backdrop of such a formidably difficult regional security environment, 
a conference, when and if it happens, will be significant in and of itself. Should it prove 
capable of providing a foundation for ongoing dialogue, so much the better. As an NPT 
non-state party, Israel is particularly wary of the proposal’s origins in a document to 
which it did not subscribe and which, with the reluctant agreement of the United States, 
singled Israel out for criticism. There was always a good chance that a meeting in Helsinki 
in December would simply have given Arab states, and Iran, another opportunity to 
condemn Israel’s nuclear opacity. But civil war in Syria and its expanding regional 
impact, as well as developments in Gaza, have further reduced the already poor prospects 
for a constructive exchange of ideas on Middle East WMD and related security issues.
§2.8 Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms
2.8.1 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
2.154 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was established by the United States in 
2003 with a view to preventing the shipment of WMD, their delivery systems and associated 
materials to state and non-state actors of concern. Its core objectives are contained in a 
Statement of Interdiction Principles to which all PSI-endorsing countries commit. These 
include support for interdiction efforts, the rapid exchange of relevant information and the 
strengthening of national legal authorities to facilitate interdiction. The PSI helps to build 
counter-proliferation capacity through workshops and exercises for participating states 
and observers. The number of countries participating in the initiative has grown from 
eleven at inception to 102, including four of the P5 (China is the exception).105 
104. Quoted in Goldschmidt, “A Top-Down Approach to a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.”
105. On 19 November 2012, Thailand became the 102nd state to declare its support for the PSI. “Thailand Backs 
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2.155 A recent (29 June 2012) report by the UN Security Council’s panel of experts on 
North Korea sanctions suggests that more and better surveillance of North Korea’s 
shipping fleet has made it easier to interdict suspicious cargo and harder for North Korea 
to traffic successfully in arms and weapon components.106 North Korea has responded to 
the challenge posed by closer international scrutiny of its ships by making greater use of 
alternative means of transport, including foreign-flagged vessels and aircraft – but these, 
too, have proven to be vulnerable to interdiction at least occasionally. Just how much of 
this activity can be attributed to the PSI is contestable, not least because of the character 
of the initiative itself, which is designed to accommodate a range of options, including 
unpublicized bilateral and plurilateral diplomatic and intelligence exchanges involving 
only directly affected PSI-endorsing states, and transit or destination countries.
2.156 The ICNND recommended that the PSI “be reconstituted within the UN system as 
a neutral organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make 
both generic and specific recommendations or decisions concerning the interdiction of 
suspected materials being carried to or from countries of proliferation concern.”107 This 
would go a long way towards addressing the concerns of states, including some PSI-
endorsing countries, who do not like the fact that it operates outside the UN framework. 
It would also give this still largely US-driven initiative a potentially broader focus and 
greater international “legitimacy” – although it must be asked if, with more than 100 
countries signed up to its guidelines, the PSI really lacks legitimacy. And greater 
legitimacy could come at a cost, reducing intelligence flows, lengthening decision times 
and making practical, timely and effective interdiction even harder than it is now. At any 
rate, nothing yet suggests that the PSI has seriously considered the recommendation.
2.8.2 Missile Proliferation
2.157 The growing sophistication and spread of ballistic and cruise missile technologies 
(see Map 2.2), and the missiles’ capacity to deliver a conventional or WMD payload to 
targets quickly and accurately, are adding to international tensions by increasing the 
perceived threat posed by states with missiles, further undermining confidence in the 
integrity and long-term effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and 
reducing incentives to wind back nuclear deterrence doctrine (see also the discussion of 
missile defence in Chapter 1). In parallel with the steady spread of these technologies, 
and the absence of any “universally accepted norm or instrument specifically governing 
the development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of 
missiles,”108 the international community has tried to elaborate measures that would 
increase transparency and constrain the pace of, or roll back, missile proliferation.
Proliferation Security Initiative,” Global Security Newswire, 20 November 2012.
106. Mark Hibbs, “Assessing UN Trade Sanction on North Korea,” 3 July 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/
publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=48742.
107. ICNND, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, pp. 96–97.
108. Ban Ki-moon, The issue of missiles in all its aspects. Report of the Secretary-General (New York, UN Doc A/63/176, 28 
July 2008), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/176&referer=http://www.un.org/disarmament/
WMD/Missiles/SG_Reports.shtml&Lang=E.
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Map 2.2: Missile Possession Worldwide (2012)
2.158 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR was established in 
1987 to address growing international concerns about the spread of nuclear-capable 
missiles.109 As is the case with the other export control regimes, MTCR guidelines are not 
legally binding, and members are responsible for implementing and enforcing them 
within the context of their own legal systems. The MTCR relies for its effectiveness on 
the cooperation of all missile technology possessors and suppliers, but does not include 
all such countries.110 In its public statements the MTCR has drawn attention to the risks 
arising from horizontal cooperation among countries of proliferation concern outside 
the MTCR.111 
2.159 In 1992, the scope of the regime was broadened to include all missiles and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons. Export restrictions are applied in two categories: the most stringent (Category 
I) includes complete rocket systems and UAVs capable of carrying payloads greater than 
500 kg to distances of more than 300 km, their production facilities and major sub-
systems; while a less restrictive Category II covers complete rocket systems and UAVs 
not included in Category I and a wide range of dual-use items.112 
109. The Missile Technology Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html.
110. C. Ahlström, “Non-proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: The 2002 Code of Conduct,” SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 749–59. The MTCR members are: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
111. The MTCR Plenary statement, Noordwijk, 1999, http://www.mtcr.info/french/press/noordwijk.html.
112. The Missile Technology Control Regime, “Equipment, Software and Technology Annex,” http://www.mtcr.info/
english/annex.html.
Source: SIPRI
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2.160 The MTCR’s successes include the cessation of ballistic missile programs by 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa, as well as the destruction of Soviet-era Scud 
missile inventories in former Eastern bloc countries. Although South Korea did not join 
the MTCR until 2000, its doing so was preceded by a long (5–6 year) bilateral discussion 
with the United States on range and payload caps for South Korean ballistic missiles 
using the MTCR 500 kg/300 km guidelines. Although South Korea decided in 2012 to 
abandon the range cap, the payload cap is still in place.
2.161 While Taiwan has not declared itself as adhering to MTCR guidelines, it has de 
facto adopted them in spite of developing a long-range missile in the 1980s. That said, 
Taiwan’s ballistic missile research and development base has not been dismantled and 
its current status is opaque. 
2.162 Over the past decade, many countries have acquired technologies for short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles, while countries such as India, Iran, Israel, North Korea 
and Pakistan have been developing long-range ballistic missiles.1132.163 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). In 
September 2001, MTCR members published the text of a draft International Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and recommended its universalization. 
The draft was considered at a series of well-attended international meetings before a 
launch and signing conference was held at The Hague in November 2002.114 The HCOC 
calls on subscribing states to provide information annually on ballistic missile systems 
(cruise missiles are not covered by the code), Satellite Launch Vehicles (SLVs) and land 
test-launch sites, as well as numbers and generic classes of ballistic missiles/SLVs 
launched, in accordance with the pre-launch notification mechanism established under 
the code. In the decade to November 2012, the number of HCOC state signatories grew 
from 96 to 134.115 
2.164 The European Union has played a prominent role in promoting participation in 
the HCOC and has sought to expand its scope and effectiveness by broadening 
participation, including by bringing other existing initiatives (such as the India–Pakistan 
bilateral arrangements on notification) under the HCOC umbrella; extending the code to 
include cruise and short-range missiles; and developing a standard baseline template 
for reporting.116  However, none of these changes has yet been agreed.2.165 UN Panel of Governmental Experts. Under the auspices of the United Nations, 
successive groups of government experts met at intervals from 2001 to 2008. Although 
they were able to agree that missile proliferation posed a threat to international peace 
and security, they could not agree on the scope and parameters of the threat, including 
which missiles should be the focus of their discussions.
113. A. Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 204–06.
114. A. Harris, “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” BASIC Notes,
18 July 2002. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002international_code.htm. The text of the HCOC is available at: 
http://www.hcoc.at/index.php#.
115. “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” Austrian Foreign Ministry, http://www.bmeia.
gv.at/.
116. “The European Union and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” European Consilium 
document, April 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EN-missiles_balistiques.pdf.
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2.166 The third and last of the panels did, however, identify some issues for further 
consideration, “without necessarily agreeing on all of them.” These included the growing 
military significance of missiles, the fact that they can be armed with conventional or 
non-conventional warheads, their increasing manoeuvrability, the growing use of cruise 
missiles as a stand-off delivery system for conventional ordnance, the commonalities 
between missile and SLV technology, and the associated need “to address security 
concerns without impinging on the peaceful uses of space-related technologies.” The 
panel agreed on the need for a “step-by-step approach” which could include improved 
national export controls, voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, the 
peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of peaceful uses of outer space.117 2.167 Proposal to Expand the Scope of the INF Treaty. The ICNND Report recommended 
that international efforts to curb missile proliferation should continue, but warned that 
failure to multilateralize the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range 
Missiles (INF Treaty) between the United States and then-Soviet Union should not be 
used as an excuse for either of the two existing parties to withdraw from it 
(Recommendation 62). At the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008, Russia 
proposed that a treaty analogous to the INF Treaty be opened to global participation. In 
November 2008, France presented a similar proposal in a paper called “Basic Elements 
of a Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate Range Ground-to-Ground Missiles.”118  While, 
however, the INF Treaty encompasses ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles 
with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km, the French proposal would lower the 
threshold for prohibition to 150 or 300 km. Although the idea of exploring the feasibility 
of a global INF treaty was endorsed by the European Union in 2008 during the French 
presidency, neither Russia nor the EU has pursued the issue.
§2.9 Nuclear Testing
2.168 The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions in all environments for civilian (“peaceful”) 
as well as military purposes. It was adopted by an overwhelming majority of members 
of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996. Since the treaty’s 
adoption, just a handful of nuclear-weapon test explosions have been conducted, by 
India and Pakistan in 1998 and by North Korea in the past decade. As of December 2012, 
183 states had signed the CTBT, of whom 157 had also ratified it. The CTBT, however, has 
yet to enter into force, being hostage to the requirement that all 44 states with nuclear 
reactors listed in Annex 2 of the treaty must first sign and ratify it.119 
2.169 At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all NWS undertook to ratify the CTBT “with 
117. Ban, The issue of missiles in all its aspects
118. Remarks by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Plenary Session of the Conference on 
Disarmament, Geneva, February 12, 2008,  http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/111B7DD616FD1472C32573EE0024A63D; 
Letter from President Sarkozy to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, December 5 2008.   
http://www.francetnp.fr/IMG/pdf/Letter_from_Nicolas_Sarkozy_to_Ban_Ki-Moon.pdf; “US Response to French Global INF 
Proposal,” WikiLeaks cable, 24 December 2008, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08STATE134228.
119. Annex 2 states are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Vietnam, Zaire.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation 123
all expediency” and acknowledged a “special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 
countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities, to sign and ratify” (Action 10). Pending its entry into force, all NPT state parties 
promised “to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear 
explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would 
defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty.” They further agreed that existing 
moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained (Action 11).
2.170 Of nine Annex 2 states which had not ratified the CTBT when the eighth NPT Review 
Conference convened in May 2010, only one, Indonesia, has since done so (6 December 
2011). Of the remaining eight, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States have signed 
the treaty while North Korea, India and Pakistan have not. The five NWS all maintain a 
voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions, although at least three (Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States), and possibly China, conduct “subcritical” tests of 
small amounts of nuclear material at high pressure using conventional explosives without 
generating a sustained nuclear chain reaction. As discussed in the previous chapter, all 
NPT and non-NPT nuclear-armed states have long-term nuclear weapons systems 
modernization programs under development and in progress.2.171 NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). China maintains a voluntary moratorium on 
nuclear test explosions, but possibly conducts “subcritical” tests of nuclear material.120 
China has not ratified the CTBT, but supports the treaty’s early entry into force, participates 
in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) and is 
preparing for national implementation of the treaty.121 Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao 
issued a joint statement in January 2011 reaffirming both countries’ support for early 
entry into force of the CTBT,122 and China repeated this at the first session of the 
Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna in May 2012.123 
2.172 The treaty has been presented to the National People’s Congress, which is said to 
be going through “the ratification formalities in accordance with the relevant 
constitutional procedure.”124 Many experts believe that the formal conclusion of this 
procedure would quickly follow US ratification, but China never speaks of the status of 
the domestic ratification process, nor does it acknowledge or imply any link to ratification 
by another state.125 It is unlikely that China would ratify the CTBT before the United 
120. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 48.
121. Viyyanna Sastry, “The Poor Prospects of the CTBT Entering Into Force,” 9 January 2012, Institute for Defence Studies 
and Analyses, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ThePoorProspectsoftheCTBTEnteringIntoForce_cvsastry_090112.
122. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “U.S.-China Joint Statement,” 19 January 2011, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
123. Statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations and 
Other International Organizations in Vienna, 30 April 2012, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/
PrepCom2012/statements/20120430/China.pdf; and “Nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war,” 
working paper submitted by China, 27 April 2012,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.40.
124. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan, to the Article XIV Conference, 4 September 2003, http://ctbto.org/
fileadmin/content/reference/article_xiv/2003/statements/0309_pm/0409_am/ 05_china_e.pdf.
125. For example, see “Joint Press Conference between Mr Gareth Evans and Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs, 
International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,” ICNND, 15 February 2009, http://icnnd.org/
Pages/090215_jpc_evans_kawaguchi.aspx; Deepti Choubey, “Don’t wait for the United States,” CTBTO Spectrum, April 2009, 
http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Spectrum/2009/2009_April_Spectrum12_p10-11.pdf.
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States has done so, not least because it would first want to be sure of what, if any, 
conditions had been inserted by the US Senate.
Figure 2.1: Estimated Number of Nuclear Explosions 1948–2012 
2.173 France and the United Kingdom have ratified the CTBT and maintain a voluntary 
moratorium on nuclear test explosions. The United Kingdom conducts “subcritical” tests 
of nuclear material.126 In November 2010, France and the United Kingdom declared that 
they had decided to collaborate on nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of their 
“respective independent nuclear deterrent capabilities… through unprecedented co-
operation at a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of… 
nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety.”127 
Russia has ratified the CTBT and maintains a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test 
explosions. It conducts “subcritical” tests of nuclear material.128 
126. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 48.
127. UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation,
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news, 2 November 2010.
128. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 48.
 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
North Korea 
Pakistan 
India 
China 
France 
UK 
USSR/Russia 
USA
200 
180 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0
N
um
be
r 
of
 te
st
s
Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1252.174 The United States maintains a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions. It 
conducts “subcritical” tests of nuclear material.129 As part of the pledge made in Prague 
in April 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” 
President Obama undertook “immediately and aggressively” to pursue US ratification of 
the CTBT.130 He also promised, and delivered, a new START Treaty (New START) with 
Russia and expended significant political capital in the process of securing US Senate 
consent to ratification of that treaty in December 2010. While the administration clearly 
hopes to persuade Senators that the situation has changed, to the advantage of the 
United States and the CTBT, since the Senate rejected a request for consent to ratify the 
treaty in 1999, and has been working steadily to this end, it has not submitted the CTBT 
to the Senate for approval. President Obama may be keen to bring the CTBT back to the 
Senate during his second term but the numbers in the new Senate are little changed 
from its predecessor and a substantial number of Senators remain firmly opposed to US 
ratification (a two-thirds majority is required for treaty approval). Ratification by the 
United States is critical to the treaty’s eventual entry into force. Its rejection by the 
Senate, for a second time, would almost certainly ensure that this did not happen for 
many more years.2.175 Non-NPT Nuclear-Armed States. India has not signed the CTBT but has 
maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions since 1998. In 2005 India 
committed to continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing as part of the joint 
US–India statement establishing the basis for renewed bilateral peaceful nuclear 
cooperation. It is not known whether India is able to conduct “subcritical” tests of 
nuclear material, but it is not generally believed to have such capability. Pakistan has not 
signed the CTBT but has, since 1998, maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test 
explosions. Again, it is not known whether Pakistan has the capacity to conduct 
“subcritical” tests, but this is thought to be unlikely. Israel may have conducted at least 
one nuclear test but this has never been confirmed. Israel has signed but not ratified the 
CTBT. It is not known whether Israel conducts “subcritical” tests of nuclear material. 
North Korea has not signed the CTBT, and tested explosive devices in 2006 and 2009: in 
February 2012 Pyongyang gave an undertaking to suspend nuclear testing but this was 
subsequently withdrawn, and further tests continue to be threatened.2.176 Promoting Entry Into Force. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all states that 
had ratified the CTBT recognized the importance of the biennial conferences on 
facilitating the entry into force of the treaty (Action 12) and undertook to promote the 
treaty’s entry into force and implementation at the national, regional and global levels 
(Action 13). Meanwhile, the CTBTO was encouraged to complete development of the 
treaty’s verification regime, “including early completion and provisional 
operationalization of the international monitoring system” (IMS) (Action 14).
2.177 Representatives of more than 160 countries, including the five NWS, attended the 7th biennial Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in New York on 
129. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 48.
130. “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, 5 April 2009” (Washington DC: White House, Office 
of the Press Secretary, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-President-in-Prague#transcript.
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23 September 2011. Participating states again adopted ten practical measures (a repeat 
of measures adopted by the previous Article XIV Conference in September 2009) “to 
accelerate the ratification process and bring the Treaty into force.”131 These included:
 > Encouraging further signatures and ratifications of the treaty;
 > Agreeing that ratifying states would “continue the practice of selecting coordinators 
to promote cooperation, through informal consultations with all interested countries, 
aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications”;
 > Calling on the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to continue promoting understanding 
of the treaty, including “the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the 
verification technologies”; and
 > Requesting the Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue to collect and publish 
information on outreach activities undertaken by ratifying states and states 
signatories.132
2.178 The CTBTO conducts an extensive program of outreach and capacity building 
around the world, including training and other assistance on maintaining and improving 
the CTBT’s verification regime.2.179 Addressing Verification and Stockpile Reliability Concerns. Even though the 
CTBT is not in force, construction and commissioning of the treaty’s supporting 
verification framework (the IMS) continues. The Final Declaration of the September 
2011 Article XIV Conference stressed the importance of maintaining momentum “in 
building all elements of the verification regime.” States promised to continue to provide 
the “political and tangible support required to enable the Preparatory Commission to 
complete all its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way, including the building 
up of the on-site inspection pillar of the verification regime and the progressive 
development of the coverage of the International Monitoring System.”133  In April 2010, 
255 of a planned total of 337 IMS facilities employing a range of technologies (seismic, 
radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound) had been certified. That number has since 
increased to 273 (Table 2.6 and Map 2.3).
Table 2.6: IMS Facilities (November 2012)
Facilities Number
Certified 273
Testing 14
Under Construction 22
Planned 28
Total 337
Source: SIPRI   
131. “Urgent calls by international leaders to bring test ban treaty in force,” 23 September 2011, http://www.ctbto.org/
press-centre/press-releases/2011/urgent-calls-by-international-leaders-to-bring-test-ban-treaty-in-force/.
132. Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, New York, 23 September 2011.
133. Final Declaration, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, 23 September 2011.
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Map 2.3: IMS Verification Regime-Stations Worldwide (2012)
Map 2.3: IMS Verification Regime-Stations Worldwide (2012) 
2.180 Of the five NPT NWS (three of which have ratified the CTBT), only the United States 
could still be prevented from signing up to the treaty by concerns about its implications 
for the efficacy of its Stockpile Stewardship Program. This, and the possibility of states 
either cheating or reneging on their CTBT commitments, is why some (and quite possibly 
a deciding minority) of Senators are reluctant to approve US ratification. A report 
commissioned by the White House from the National Research Council and released on 
30 March 2012 has reviewed and updated a 2002 study that looked at technical concerns 
raised about the CTBT. The report concluded, inter alia, that:
 > Even for tests of well below 1 kt magnitude conducted anywhere in the world, 
confidence levels for IMS seismic detection are 90 per cent;
 > US national technical means provide monitoring capability superior to the IMS and 
can focus on monitoring countries of concern to the United States; and
 > The development of weapons with lower capabilities is possible with or without the 
CTBT for countries of different levels of nuclear sophistication, but this would not 
require the United States to return to testing in order to respond effectively.134 
2.181 According to the report committee’s chair, “so long as the nation is fully committed 
to securing its weapons stockpile and provides sufficient resources for doing so, the U.S. 
has the technical capabilities to maintain safe, reliable nuclear weapons into the 
foreseeable future without the need for underground weapons testing.”135 
134. “U.S. Stockpile Security and International Monitoring Capabilities Strengthened, Says New Report on Technical Issues 
Behind the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” 30 March 2012
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12849.
135. Ellen D. Williams, chief scientist at BP and chair of the committee that wrote the report: The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Source: SIPRI
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§2.10 Fissile Material2.182 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Conference on Disarmament. More energy, 
probably, has been devoted by more policymakers to less practical effect on this issue 
than any other on the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. In 
December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending “the 
negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a… treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”136 
The “most appropriate international forum” is the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva. In March 1995, the CD decided, on the recommendation of Special Coordinator 
Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada, to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate 
a fissile material production ban. The “Shannon Mandate” was based on the General 
Assembly’s 1993 initiating resolution and allowed delegations to raise for consideration 
any concerns that they had about the appropriate scope of the convention, particularly 
whether it should encompass existing stocks as well as future production of fissile 
material.137 The ad hoc committee process failed, but the Shannon Mandate survived.
2.183 The fifth NPT Review Conference in 1995, in addition to calls for a nuclear-test-
ban treaty and progressive global efforts to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals, urged 
“the immediate commencement and early conclusion” of negotiations on a treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in accordance with the 
Shannon Mandate.138 Five years later, the sixth NPT Review Conference urged the CD “to 
agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of 
negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.”139 
2.184 The CD, however, has not been able to agree on and implement a program of work 
since the conclusion of nuclear-test-ban treaty negotiations in 1996. There have been 
protracted disagreements among the P5 over the priority to be given to the four main 
issues on the CD’s forward agenda: nuclear disarmament, an FMCT, the weaponization of 
space,140 and negative security assurances. Of these, only fissile material provides for 
immediate treaty negotiations. Previous efforts to commence FMCT negotiations in the 
CD have foundered on the issues of the inclusion of existing fissile material stocks, 
appropriate safeguards measures, verification, and links to parallel negotiations on a 
nuclear disarmament treaty.141 In recent years, attention has focused almost exclusively 
on Pakistan, which has consistently blocked the adoption of a program of work in the CD 
Test Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for the United States,
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12849.
136. A/RES/48/75L (16 December 1993).
137. The Shannon Mandate, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/armscontrol/shannon.html.
138. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part 1), Annex: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,   
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm.
139. Part 1, Article VI.15, http://www.acronym.org.uk/official-and-govt-documents/2000-npt-review-conference-final-
document-13-steps.
140. China, Russia and the United States particularly have been at odds over the need, which the United States does not see, 
for a new international instrument for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).
141. S. Kile, “A ban on production of fissile material for nuclear explosives,” SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 387–88; S. Kile, “The fissile material cut-off treaty,” 
SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
506–13; S. Kile, “The fissile material cut-off treaty,” SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 361–62.
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because it will not agree to FMCT negotiations in the absence of prior agreement to 
include existing stocks of weapon-grade fissile material, where it believes itself to be at 
a particular disadvantage relative to India.
2.185 At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all states again agreed that the CD should 
“immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for 
use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and invited the secretary-
general of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in 
support of the work of the CD. The ICNND report similarly encouraged all states to negotiate 
“to an early conclusion” in the CD an FMCT (Recommendation 22). In the interim, all 
nuclear-armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile 
material for weapons purposes (Recommendation 23). The report recommended a phased 
approach to the issue of pre-existing stocks (Recommendation 24).
2.186 The CD failed to reach agreement on a work program in 2010 and 2011. In March 
2012, the Egyptian President of the CD proposed a draft program of work which called 
for the establishment of working groups under each of the conference agenda items. The 
fissile material working group was “to deal with elements of a multilateral treaty banning 
the production of fissile material” on the basis of the Shannon Mandate.142 It was clearly 
hoped that the introduction of slightly less outcome-specific language (that is, the 
reference to treaty elements) might be enough to bring Pakistan to the table; but it 
wasn’t. Pakistan rejected the Egyptian proposal as ambiguous. Pakistan did not want the 
CD “to become irrelevant but, if forced to choose between national security and the 
future of the CD, Pakistan’s national security would take priority.”143 Having again failed 
to adopt a program of work, the CD occupied itself with yet more rounds of inconclusive 
discussion of “core issues” and concluded its 2012 session on 14 September with nothing 
to show for it.2.187 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: UN Consideration. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon convened a High-Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on 
Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations on 24 
September 2010. In his closing statement, the secretary-general acknowledged “broad 
concern” about the current state of the UN’s disarmament machinery, “in particular the 
impasse at the Conference on Disarmament, which is hurting its credibility and calling 
into question its relevance.” Failure to fix this “could result in states resorting to alternative 
arrangements outside the Conference on Disarmament.” Ban tasked his Advisory Board 
on Disarmament Matters to undertake a review of issues raised at the meeting. He said 
that he would consider further actions based on the board’s recommendations, including 
the establishment of a high-level panel of eminent persons.144 
142. CD/1933/Rev.1 of 14 March 2012.
143. “Conference on Disarmament Unable to Reach Consensus on Draft Programme of Work,” 15 March 2012, http://www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E.
144.  “Secretary-General’s closing statement to High-Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on 
Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations,” New York, 24 September 2010, http://www.
un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=4808.
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2.188 The secretary-general addressed the CD itself in Geneva on 26 January 2011, 
warning that its record of achievement had been “overshadowed by inertia” and that 
continued inaction would “endanger its future as a multilateral negotiating forum.” He 
reminded the CD that, at the previous September’s high-level meeting in New York, 
participants had been “unanimous in stressing that limited membership of the 
Conference on Disarmament is a privilege. So is the consensus rule. Members of the 
Conference must accept that this privilege comes with responsibility.”145 
2.189 The UN General Assembly met over three days in New York in July 2011 to follow 
up the 2010 high-level multilateral disarmament meeting. The General Assembly had 
before it the report of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters 
which had clearly failed to reach agreement on any particular course of action. The board 
could recommend only that:
 > The secretary-general “persist in encouraging the Conference on Disarmament to 
seek all efforts to achieve a breakthrough to the continuing impasse,” possibly by 
“encouraging progress on a programme of work for the Conference that facilitates 
work on the four core issues based on the consensus reached in document 
CD/1864”;146
 > Should a high-level panel of eminent persons be established, the secretary-general 
should ask it “to make recommendations on ways to revitalize the United Nations 
disarmament machinery as a whole, especially the Conference on Disarmament”; and
 > The secretary-general should “continue to raise public awareness and encourage 
civil society groups and non-governmental organizations to offer input on ways to 
overcome the prolonged stalemate.”147
2.190 The secretary-general expressed his own views more clearly. He saw “no 
fundamental flaw in the United Nations disarmament machinery that may be blamed for 
this deadlock, certainly none that cannot be overcome by changes in state policies. The 
problem lies not with the vehicle, but with the driver. What is needed most of all is a 
closer alignment between policy priorities and multilateral disarmament goals.” He 
foresaw “no quick fixes” but believed that, if the CD remained deadlocked, the General 
Assembly had a “responsibility to step in… [T]he CD should not be held perpetually 
hostage by one or two members.”148
2.191 These sentiments were subsequently echoed by others at the meeting, including 
Australia’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations who, 
speaking on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), urged 
the General Assembly’s First (Disarmament) Committee “to increase its practical 
relevance for disarmament and international security,” including by moving forward on 
145. “Secretary-General warns Conference on Disarmament that decade-long deadlock puts its credibility at risk,” Geneva, 
26 January 2011, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13367.doc.htm.
146. In 2009 the CD did manage to adopt a program of work (CD/1864) based on the establishment of issue-specific 
working groups. Pakistan, however, blocked implementation and the program’s mandate lapsed at the end of the year.
147. Ban Ki-moon, Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United 
Nations, document A/66/125, 11 July 2011).
148. “Secretary-General cites ‘growing crisis of confidence’ in remarks to General Assembly follow-up to 2010 high-level 
multilateral disarmament meeting, “New York, 27 July 2011, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13723.doc.htm.
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the FMCT and other core disarmament issues.149 The P5 for their part made clear that, its 
manifest shortcomings notwithstanding, “as the sole standing multilateral disarmament 
negotiating forum… the CD should maintain the primary role in substantive negotiations 
on priority questions of disarmament.” The P5 reiterated their support for “immediate 
commencement of negotiations at the CD on an FMCT” (emphasis added).150 
2.192 In December 2011, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on a “treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.”151 The resolution, sponsored by Canada, with strong support from other 
members of the NPDI, was more ambitious in scope than its predecessors, which had 
routinely urged the CD to agree, early in each new year, on a program of work that 
included the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty. This 
time, the General Assembly itself resolved “to consider options” for the negotiation of 
such a treaty should the CD “fail to agree on and implement a comprehensive program of 
work by the end of its 2012 session.” Along the way, Canada was obliged to drop, at the 
insistence of the P5 and others, an NPDI-sponsored request to establish a group of 
governmental experts to identify FMCT negotiating options for consideration by the 
General Assembly at its next session if the CD failed to adopt a work program by the end 
of March 2012. The revised text was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 158 
in favour, 2 (North Korea and Pakistan) against, and 21 abstentions.
2.193 At the 2012 UN General Assembly session, Canada was able to secure passage of a 
resolution which took that modest next step. As usual, the resolution urged the CD “to 
agree on and implement early in 2013 a balanced and comprehensive programme of 
work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning 
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.” In addition, however, it requested 
the secretary-general to seek the views of member states on such a treaty and “to 
establish a group of governmental experts with a membership of 25 states chosen on the 
basis of equitable geographical representation which, taking into account… the views of 
Member States, will make recommendations on possible elements which could 
contribute to a treaty.” The group of governmental experts would “operate on the basis 
of consensus, without prejudice to national positions in future negotiations” and meet in 
Geneva “for two sessions of two weeks” in 2014 and 2015. It would report back to the 
General Assembly in 2015, with the CD being invited to “take note” of the report and 
“consider further action as appropriate.”152 
2.194 The draft resolution was approved in First Committee by a recorded vote of 148 in 
favour to 1 against (Pakistan), with 20 abstentions. While it is certainly a step in the right 
direction, it is a very small one. The group of governmental experts will not meet until 
149. “Statement on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) at the Follow-up to the high-
level meeting held on 24 September 2010: revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward 
multilateral negotiations,” statement by H.E. Mr. Gary Quinlan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the 
United Nations, New York, 27 July 2011. Current members of the NPDI are: Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
150. Statement by Mr. Gerard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, on behalf of the P5 and in 
a national capacity, New York, 27 July 2011, http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article5694.
151. UN General Assembly Resolution 66/44 (2 December 2011).
152. UNGA 67 First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, 19 October 2012.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play132
2014 and is charged only with making recommendations, which the CD is free to ignore, 
on “possible elements” of a treaty. And even this modest objective may prove unattainable 
for a consensus-based group.
2.195 The First Committee also approved a draft resolution, sponsored by Norway, 
Austria and Mexico, on “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.” The 
resolution, approved by a recorded vote of 134 in favour to 4 against (France, Russia, 
United Kingdom, United States), with 34 abstentions, “decides to establish an open-
ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without 
nuclear weapons.”153 The group would convene in Geneva in 2013 for up to three weeks.
2.196 Speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, the representative of the 
United Kingdom saw “little value in initiatives taking forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations outside of the established forum, which only sought to 
circumvent the mechanism dealing with those issues…. [and]… could not support the 
establishment of such a group or any outcome it might produce.” China abstained but 
nonetheless made clear that it did not support the establishment of a working group 
which could “weaken the current multilateral disarmament mechanism and make it 
difficult to maintain the participation of major countries.”154 Similar concerns were 
expressed by others, including Algeria, Cuba, India and Pakistan.
2.197 The chairman’s “factual summary” of proceedings at the first meeting of the 
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference (Vienna, 30 April–11 May 
2012) draws carefully on language from 2010 NPT Review Conference Action 15 and 
resolutions adopted by the 2011 UN General Assembly to record states parties’ “deep 
concern at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the 
persistent failure to agree on and implement an agreed, comprehensive and balanced 
program of work,” and, in light of this, the need stressed by “a number of States parties… 
for the international community to consider options to ensure progress in multilateral 
disarmament negotiations.” Beyond this it manages only to have states parties “recall” 
that the CD “should immediately begin negotiation” of an FMCT.155 2.198 Fissile Material No Longer Required For Military Purposes. The 2010 NPT 
Review Conference encouraged NWS to declare to the IAEA all fissile material “designated 
by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material 
as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification” (Action 
16). All states were encouraged to support the development of legally binding verification 
arrangements “to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each 
nuclear-weapon state as no longer required for military purposes” (Action 17).
2.199 While China, alone among the five NWS, has not declared an end to the production 
of fissile material for weapons purposes, it is thought not to have produced such material 
153. UNGA 67 First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.46, 19 October 2012.
154. UNGA 67 First Committee 21st Meeting (AM) GA/DIS/3470, 6 November 2012, p. 8.
155. “Chairman’s factual summary,” (Working paper), paragraph 25; Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna, 30 April–11 May 2012; NPT/
CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.53; http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/PrepCom2012/documents.html.
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for more than two decades.156 It is believed to have ceased production of HEU in 1987 
and of plutonium some three years later.157 Its International Panel on Fissile Materials 
(IPFM)-listed uranium enrichment facilities are all designated as civilian.158 China 
provides no information on fissile material stocks. It is, however, estimated to have 
stockpiles of 16 (+/- 4) tonnes of HEU and 1.8 (+/- 0.5) tonnes of weapon-grade 
plutonium.159 China has declared no stocks of weapon-grade fissile material in excess of 
its defence needs.2.200 France stopped all fissile material production for weapons purposes in 1996. It 
provides no information on fissile material stocks. France is, however, estimated to have 
stockpiles of the order of 6 (+/- 1) tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium and 26 (+/- 6) 
tonnes of military HEU. 160 As of 31 December 2010, France had declared to the IAEA a 
civilian HEU inventory of 4.6 tonnes. France has not declared any fissile material in 
excess of defence needs but now almost certainly has more plutonium and HEU than it 
can use. France’s nuclear arsenal has halved in size since its Cold War peak and HEU is 
no longer used for naval propulsion.161 
Map 2.4: Enrichment (2012) 
156.  International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), “Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material 
Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament,” 3 May 2012, p. 14.
157. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2010, p. 97, http://fissilematerials.org.
158. Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 14
159. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2011, pp. 10, 18.
160. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, pp. 84–85.
161. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, p. 85; Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 10.
Source: SIPRI
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2.201 By the time the Soviet Union announced in 1989 that it was ceasing the production 
of HEU, it had already done so. Russia has the largest HEU stockpile – an estimated 737 
(+/- 120) tonnes in late 2011 – of any nuclear-armed state.162 HEU taken from dismantled 
Russian nuclear weapons is converted to LEU and sold to the United States under the 
1993 US–Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. In excess of 450 tonnes of HEU has so far 
been converted under the program, which is 90 per cent complete. By the end of 2013, 
the program will have eliminated a total of 500 tonnes of weapon-origin HEU, an amount 
equivalent to some 20,000 nuclear weapons. The down-blended HEU is delivered to the 
United States, fabricated into nuclear fuel and used in US nuclear power plants. “Nearly 
half of all commercial nuclear energy produced in the U.S. comes from nuclear fuel 
derived from Russian nuclear weapons.”163 The program is not subject to verification by 
the IAEA. It is estimated that Russia’s total holdings of HEU will have been reduced to 
some 665 tonnes by the end of the blend-down program in 2013. “At 20 kg per warhead, 
this would be sufficient for more than 30,000 warheads.”164 
2.202 Russia formally stopped producing weapon-grade plutonium in September 1994, 
although three plutonium production reactors remained in operation as power providers 
to the cities of Tomsk and Zheleznogorsk in Siberia. Under the 1997 US–Russia Plutonium 
Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA), Russia undertook not to use plutonium produced 
in these reactors in its nuclear weapons program.165 The agreement requires the 
cessation of weapon-grade plutonium production. The agreement’s monitoring 
provisions ensure that the reactors that are shut down in both countries are not 
restarted,166 and that plutonium produced in reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk 
after 1994 is not used for military purposes.167 
2.203 Russia’s weapon-grade plutonium stockpile is estimated to be of the order of 128 
(+/- 8) tonnes.168 While Russia does not include its excess military plutonium in its IAEA 
INFCIRC/549 declarations, it has declared a total of some 50 tonnes of plutonium (37.8 
tonnes of which is unirradiated) as surplus to requirements.169 
2.204 The United States and Russia signed a Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement (PMDA) in September 2000. The agreement was amended in April 2010 and 
entered into force in July 2011. Disposition of surplus plutonium is tentatively scheduled 
to begin in 2018 under IAEA verification. The agreement commits each country to 
dispose of 34 tonnes of excess weapon-grade plutonium by converting it to mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel and using it in nuclear power reactors. Consistent with the assumption that 
the average Russian and US nuclear warhead contains about 4 kg of plutonium, the US 
162. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, p. 58; Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 8
163. “NNSA Announces Elimination of 450 Metric Tons of Russian Weapons Highly Enriched Uranium,” Press Release, 9 July 
2012, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/450tons070912.
164. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, p. 58.
165. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, p. 46.
166. NNSA Treaties and Agreements, 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements.
167. http://dtirp.dtra.mil/tic/synopses/ppra.aspx.
168. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 18.
169. David Albright and Christina Walrond, “Civil Separated Plutonium in the INFCIRC/549 states – Taking Stock,” Institute 
for Science and International Security (ISIS) Report, 16 September 2010.
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National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) estimates that the 68 tonnes of 
plutonium encompassed in the program would be enough to make 17,000 nuclear 
weapons.
2.205 The amended PMDA reduces the agreed rate of plutonium disposition from no less 
than two to no less than 1.3 tonnes per year. It also allows Russia to use the plutonium to 
fuel fast breeder reactors, which the IPFM considers to be “a controversial strategy as 
Russia plans to eventually separate the plutonium again to provide start-up fuel for a 
planned fleet of plutonium breeder reactors.”170 2.206 The United Kingdom announced on 18 April 1995 that it “had ceased the production 
of fissile material for explosive purposes.” At 31 March 2002, the United Kingdom had a 
stockpile of some 21.9 tonnes of HEU, including HEU in spent naval-reactor fuel. The 
IPFM estimates that, by 2011, perhaps 0.7 tonnes of this HEU had been consumed by 
nuclear-powered submarines. The balance, 21.2 tonnes of HEU, was thought to include 
between 10 and 15 tonnes of unirradiated HEU, some of which was likely to have been 
set aside for naval propulsion. The United Kingdom does not provide details of its 
military HEU allocations.171 
2.207 As of 2010, the United Kingdom had a stockpile of 3.2 tonnes of weapon-grade 
plutonium. The United Kingdom includes excess unirradiated separated military 
plutonium in its INFCIRC/549 declarations. The United Kingdom has declared 4.4 tonnes 
of plutonium (including 4.1 tonnes of non-weapon-grade plutonium under European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards) as excess to military requirements.172 
2.208 The United Kingdom has not yet begun to dispose of its excess plutonium. It is 
currently considering a number of options for the disposition of plutonium in civilian 
use: “continued long term storage (prior to disposal); reuse as fuel followed by disposal; 
and prompt immobilization and disposal as soon as practicable.”173 The government’s 
current preferred approach is to reuse the plutonium as MOX fuel. A new facility for the 
disposition of surplus plutonium is, however, still a decade or so away.174 2.209 The United States stopped producing HEU for nuclear weapons in 1964, although 
it continued to produce HEU, enriched to more than 96 per cent in uranium-235, for 
naval propulsion until 1992. In 2006, the United States declared a stockpile, at 30 
September 2004, of some 690 tonnes of HEU. By mid-2011, this figure was estimated to 
have been reduced to around 610 tonnes, as a consequence of the progressive down-
blending of 210 tonnes of HEU declared excess to military requirements for use in the 
nuclear power industry.175 
170. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 17.
171. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, pp. 71–72; Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 10.
172. Albright and Walrond, “Civil Separated Plutonium in the INFCIRC/549 states – Taking Stock”; IPFM, Global Fissile 
Material Report  2010, p. 77.
173. Duncan Clark, “U.K. to Mull Case for Plutonium Power Reactor”, Global Security Newswire, 10 July 2012.
174. Clark, “U.K. to Mull Case for Plutonium Power Reactor”, Global Security Newswire, 10 July 2012.
175. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, p. 28; Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 9.
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2.210 The United States includes excess unirradiated military plutonium in its 
INFCIRC/549 declarations. It has declared a total of 61.5 tonnes of plutonium (including 
47 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium) as excess to military requirements, leaving an 
estimated 38 tonnes either in or available for nuclear weapons.176 A small amount of the 
fissile material (HEU and weapon-grade plutonium) designated as excess to military 
requirements has apparently been placed under IAEA safeguards, but there are no 
publicly available statistics to confirm this.
2.211 The 1997 US–Russia PPRA requires the cessation of weapon-grade plutonium 
production. The agreement’s monitoring provisions ensure that reactors shut down in 
both countries are not restarted.177 
2.212 In implementation of the Russia–US PMDA, the United States is building a MOX 
production facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Plutonium oxide feedstock 
from the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the H-Canyon Complex at Savannah River 
will be combined with depleted uranium to produce the fuel. A first tranche of 442 kg of 
plutonium oxide feedstock derived from nuclear-weapon triggers was delivered by the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory to the plant’s future operators in November 2012.178 
2.213 Not all of the excess plutonium is suitable for fabrication into MOX fuel. At least 
some of this will be sent to a geological repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New 
Mexico, for disposal. Plutonium sent to this plant will not be subject to IAEA monitoring. 
The IPFM believes this creates “a large uncertainty for any future international attempt 
to verify U.S. plutonium production and disposition.”179 2.214 India is known to produce HEU and weapon-grade plutonium. Official information 
on India’s fissile material production and holdings is sparse. So far, HEU is thought to 
have been enriched only to levels of 30–45 per cent for use in India’s nuclear submarine 
propulsion program. As of 2011, India’s HEU stockpile was estimated at 2.0 (+/- 0.8) 
tonnes and its weapon-grade plutonium stockpile at 520 (+/- 170) kg.180 India has not 
declared any stocks of weapon-grade fissile material surplus to military needs.
2.215 Like India, Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for military purposes. 
Uncertainties about Pakistan’s fissile material production histories and capacities make 
accurate estimates of its holdings difficult. HEU is produced for use in Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons program. As of 2011, Pakistan’s stockpile of HEU was estimated at 2.75 (+/- 1) 
tonnes and its weapon-grade plutonium stockpile at 135 (+/- 45) kg.181 Pakistan has not 
declared any weapon-grade fissile material as surplus to military needs.
2.216 Little is known about Israel’s fissile material production capacities. Israel “may 
have produced enriched uranium for military purposes in the past” and is believed to 
176. Albright and Walrond, “Civil Separated Plutonium in the INFCIRC/549 states – Taking Stock”; Communication 
Received from the United States of America Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/
Add.6/14, 20 September 2011; IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, p. 28. The 47 tonnes of excess weapon-grade 
plutonium includes some plutonium in spent fuel and some plutonium disposed of as waste (ref. US INFCIRC/ 549 
declaration of 29 October 2012)
177. NNSA Treaties and Agreements, http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements.
178. “Nuke Plutonium Turned Toward Fuel Production”, Global Security Newswire, 19 November 2012.
179. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 18.
180. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, pp. 10, 18, 117.
181. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, pp. 11, 19.
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have been “extracting plutonium for nuclear weapons from spent fuel since the mid-
1960s.” Israel continues to operate a production reactor but this may now be used mainly 
to produce tritium. While there is uncertainty about the reactor’s power level and 
operating history, as of 2011 it was estimated to have produced 820 (+/- 150) kg of 
weapon-grade plutonium.182 2.217 North Korea has a uranium enrichment plant but its operational status and 
whether it has produced fissile material is unknown. It is not known whether North 
Korea has additional enrichment plants. A currently inoperative reactor is estimated to 
have produced enough weapon-grade plutonium for some 10 nuclear warheads.183 2.218 Fissile Material Production Facilities. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all 
states that had not yet done so were encouraged to begin dismantling or converting for 
peaceful uses their weapon-grade fissile material production facilities (Action 18). China 
produced HEU for weapons at two sites: Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant (from 1964 to 
1980), and Heping gaseous diffusion plant (from 1975 to 1987). China also produced 
HEU for its research reactors and LEU for naval reactors at these sites. China now 
produces LEU for civilian purposes at two gas centrifuge enrichment plants at Hanzhong 
in Shaanxi province and at Lanzhou in Gansu province. A new plant using Chinese 
centrifuges may also be operating near Lanzhou.
2.219 China has produced weapon-grade plutonium at two sites: Jiuquan Atomic Energy 
Complex near Yumen in Gansu province (plutonium production reactor and reprocessing 
facility), and Guangyuan plutonium production complex in Sichuan province (plutonium 
production reactor and reprocessing facility). Production of weapon-grade plutonium is 
believed to have ended at both sites.184 2.220 France’s weapon-grade fissile material production facilities at Pierrelatte (HEU) 
and Marcoule (plutonium production reactor) were decommissioned in 1996.185 In 
March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy invited international experts to observe the 
dismantlement of those facilities. Several site visits have since taken place.186 France’s 
Pacific nuclear testing facility was dismantled in 1998.
2.221 Between 1949 and 1963, the Soviet Union built four large gaseous diffusion plants 
for uranium-enrichment. By the early 1990s, all had transitioned to gas centrifuge 
technology, and all are now designated as civilian facilities. The last operating plutonium 
production reactor in Russia (at Zheleznogorsk) was shut down in April 2010. The 
Zheleznogorsk reprocessing plant was expected to complete reprocessing of the final 
spent fuel from that reactor in 2012.187
182. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, pp. 3, 18, 107.
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(2010); Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (2008);  
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Map 2.5: Reprocessing (2012)
2.222 The United Kingdom’s HEU came from two sources: from indigenous production at 
Capenhurst gaseous diffusion plant; and from the United States, under the 1958 Mutual 
Defence Agreement. HEU production at Capenhurst ceased in 1962. Thereafter, the plant 
was used for unsafeguarded LEU production. It closed in 1982 and is now being 
decommissioned. 
2.223 Most of the UK’s weapon-grade plutonium was produced in six plutonium 
production reactors (the two Windscale Piles and the four Calder Hall reactors) at 
Sellafield. Four additional dual-use reactors at Chapelcross also produced plutonium for 
the UK’s nuclear weapons program. All reprocessing was done at Sellafield. The 
Windscale Piles were shut down after a graphite fire in 1957. The Calder Hall reactors 
were shut down in March 2003 and the Chapelcross reactors in June 2004. Under current 
decommissioning plans, the reactor structures will be dismantled late in the site 
clearance process (2041–65 for Windscale, 2105–17 for Calder Hall, 2116–28 for 
Chapelcross).188
2.224 In the United States, most HEU was produced at two gaseous diffusion plants, one 
at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the other at Portsmouth, Ohio. Oak Ridge produced HEU 
for weapons from 1945 to 1964, after which it produced LEU for nuclear fuel until 1985. 
Portsmouth produced HEU for weapons between 1956 and 1964. Thereafter, it too 
produced mainly LEU for nuclear power plants. Portsmouth also produced some HEU 
for naval reactors until 1992 “when huge quantities of excess weapon-grade HEU… 
188. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, pp. 72, 76, 83; Global Fissile Material Report  2011, p. 10.
Notes
Pakistan’s Chashma plant is under construction
North Korea’s Yongbyon plant is reportedly on stand by
Source: SIPRI
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became available due to the first post-Cold War downsizing of the U.S. weapons stockpile. 
Future U.S. naval reactors are being designed to be fueled with this uranium.” The 
demolition of Oak Ridge is in progress. The US Department of Energy awarded a contract 
for decontamination and decommissioning of Portsmouth in August 2010.
2.225 At its fissile-material-producing peak, the United States operated a total of fourteen 
plutonium production reactors: nine at the US Department of Energy’s Hanford site in 
Washington state, and five at its Savannah River site in South Carolina. Nine were shut 
down in the 1960s, while five continued into the 1980s, producing tritium for use in 
“boost” gas to increase the yield of fission triggers in nuclear weapons. The remaining 
reactors were finally shut down in 1987.
2.226 The United States has begun decommissioning the five heavy-water plutonium 
production reactors at Savannah River. Five of the nine reactors at Hanford had been 
“cocooned” – “partially taken apart with their cores encased to prevent the leakage of 
radiation” – by 2005. Another is currently being cocooned (scheduled for completion in 
2013), with two more to follow. The remaining reactor has been turned into a museum.1892.227 India is significantly increasing its fissile material production capacities. The 
existing centrifuge enrichment plant in Rattenhalli, Mysore is understood to have been 
improved and expanded in recent years. A second enrichment complex is planned for 
the Chitradurga district which, like Rattenhalli, will be unsafeguarded, leaving open the 
possibility of its use to produce HEU for weapons.
2.228 India has produced weapon-grade plutonium in two reactors, CIRUS and Dhruva. 
The CIRUS reactor, which produced the plutonium used in India’s first nuclear test in 
1974, was shut down in December 2010 after 50 years of operation. A new, higher 
powered reactor similar to the Dhruva reactor will replace CIRUS and is expected to be 
operational in 2017–18. A new reprocessing plant at Tarapur was inaugurated in January 
2011, adding to India’s three existing reprocessing plants: Trombay at Mumbai, an 
existing plant at Tarapur and KARP at Kalpakkam. Further reprocessing plants are under 
construction or planned, including to provide fuel for planned fast breeder reactors. 
India’s prototype fast breeder reactors could produce more than 100 kg of weapon-
grade plutonium per year if used for this purpose, significantly increasing India’s 
weapon-grade plutonium production capacity.190 2.229 Pakistan is understood to have been using gas centrifuges to produce weapon-
grade HEU since the early 1980s, and to have had a functioning plutonium production 
reactor since the late 1990s. Pakistan produces HEU for nuclear weapons at its Kahuta 
centrifuge enrichment plant. A possible additional enrichment plant may be operating at 
Gadwal. Pakistan is substantially expanding its capacity to produce weapon-grade 
plutonium. Two production reactors are operating at Khushab, the first since 1998 and 
the second since late 2009 or early 2010. A third reactor at Khushab is nearing completion 
and a fourth is under construction.191 Reprocessing is carried out at the New Laboratories 
189. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2010, pp. 28–30; Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference Disarmament Actions, p. 60.
190. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, pp. 10-11, 19, 23.
191. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report  2011, pp. 11, 19; David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Construction Progressing 
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Reprocessing Facility near Rawalpindi which has been operating since 2000. Construction 
of the larger capacity Chashma reprocessing facility at the Kundian nuclear complex is 
underway or may have been completed.192 2.230 Israel is widely assumed to have produced plutonium for nuclear weapons at its 
Dimona reactor and to have reprocessed spent fuel from Dimona at a facility in the Negev 
Nuclear Research Center. The Dimona reactor has operated since 1963.193 2.231 North Korea has produced weapon-grade plutonium at the Yongbyon 5MWe 
reactor and reprocessed spent fuel from the reactor at its Yongbyon reprocessing plant. 
The 5MWe reactor is currently inoperative and the reprocessing plant is understood to 
be on standby but not currently operating. North Korea is constructing a light water 
reactor at Yongbyon which could be completed by mid to late 2013. Light water reactors 
are not typically used for weapons plutonium production but can be used for this 
purpose, giving rise to concern that the light water reactor could substantially increase 
North Korea’s capacity to produce weapon-grade plutonium. In 2010, North Korea 
revealed at Yongbyon its only known enrichment plant. North Korea claimed that the 
plant was intended to produce LEU fuel for the light water reactor under construction. 
The current operational status of the enrichment plant is unknown.194 
Rapidly on the Fourth Heavy Water Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site,” ISIS, May 2012, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/
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3. NUCLEAR SECURITY
§3.1 Overview§3.2 Objectives and General Strategy§3.3 Global Nuclear Security Architecture§3.4 Role of the IAEA§3.5 International Cooperation§3.6 National Nuclear Security Regulations§3.7 Sensitive Nuclear Materials§3.8 Nuclear Forensics§3.9 Role of Nuclear Industry§3.10 Nuclear Security and Safety Interface§3.11 Nuclear Security Culture
§3.1 Overview3.1 “Nuclear security” means measures designed to address the risks associated with 
theft and trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials (including for the benefit of would-be proliferators), sabotage of nuclear facilities, and the danger of terrorists acquiring and using a nuclear weapon. Despite recent advances global nuclear security is inadequate. Because a major nuclear security incident would have far-reaching consequences, effective nuclear security must be a global concern. But most countries 
regard nuclear security as primarily a national concern, devoting insufficient attention to the development, promotion and application of international standards.3.2 The nuclear security regime consists of agreements, regulations, resolutions and 
guidelines that either existed or were close to being finalized before 2010. Further progress has been made in national implementation since leaders’ level Nuclear Security 
Summits (NSS) began in 2010. National ratifications of treaties and several projects were accelerated so that they could be announced at the summits. But nuclear security still lags well behind the other nuclear regimes for safety, safeguards and arms control. The current regime is reliant almost entirely on national protection and control systems in those countries that possess nuclear and radiological materials. It needs to be more comprehensive instead of incremental, covering all materials and all facilities at all times; integrated rather than disparate and piecemeal; and backed by global mechanisms in order to make the regime both robust and resilient. It also needs effective monitoring requirements, and authority, procedures and institutions for enforcing agreed 
commitments: without these, accountability is lacking and states cannot have confidence in the international nuclear security system.
No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Significant Progress Fully implemented
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play142 3.3 Global Nuclear Security Architecture. Globally, nuclear security is less well developed than nuclear safeguards and nuclear safety. The three main elements of the nuclear security regime are national laws and regulations; international agreements, instruments and institutions; and ad hoc and voluntary cooperative measures. The main global components are: The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM) (1980) which applies primarily to the protection of nuclear material in 
international transport; the CPPNM Amendment (2005) which extends the convention’s application to protection of nuclear material in domestic use and of facilities against sabotage; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(ICSANT) (2007); United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (28 April 2004); IAEA guidance documents like INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, the Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and INFCIRC/153; and various multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements and initiatives.
3.4 The need for effective nuclear security has been widely recognized. The Final 
Document of the eighth NPT Review Conference (2010) noted “the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection,” and supported nuclear security improvements. Two NSS have been held so far, on 12–13 April 2010 in Washington, DC and 26–27 March 2012 in Seoul. A third is planned for 2014 in the Netherlands. Nuclear security was an important issue for the International Commission 
on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), with its 2009 report including 
a number of recommendations on strengthening the international regime (ICNND Recommendations 27–31).3.5 The CPPNM has 148 States Parties, which means that about one-quarter of the world’s states have still not acceded to it. By December 2012, only 61 of the 99 accessions needed for the 2005 amendment to enter into force had been received. The long delay with entry into force of the CPPNM amendment is starkly at odds with continued international concern about nuclear security standards.
3.6 The Nuclear Security Series are International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications “relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, 
unauthorized access and illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities.” They embrace 
such fields as nuclear security fundamentals, recommendations, implementing guides and technical guidance. In the series, INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, a set of non-legally-binding guidelines, is generally considered to be the cornerstone of the international physical protection regime for nuclear materials and facilities and has been incorporated into the domestic law of many states, and also in some suppliers’ bilateral agreements as a condition of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Inclusion in bilateral nuclear supply agreements of a provision that recipient states apply INFCIRC/225 requirements is a means of making them legally binding in particular states. Effective nuclear security 
demands that all nuclear suppliers include the INFCIRC/225 condition (and a requirement that recipients be party to the CPPNM) in their agreements.
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Overall Evaluation of Global Nuclear Architecture. Some Progress  States 
have implemented many NSS commitments, additional states have ratified the CPPNM and its Amendment, more are taking advantage of IAEA tools and services, and states have cooperated with one another. However, NPT 2010 and ICNND 2009 support for universal application of the CPPNM and 
early ratification of the 2005 amendment is not in sight. Much of the architecture lacks any means to judge whether commitments are being met.
3.7 ICSANT is an important legally binding multilateral instrument establishing obligations to take domestic measures to prevent and punish nuclear terrorism and strengthening international cooperation in this area. The convention came into effect in 2007 but remains far from universal. A total of 115 nations have signed and 83 have 
ratified the convention to date.3.8 UNSCR 1540, passed by the UN Security Council to counter the dangers of nuclear terrorism by, inter alia, improving and enhancing international cooperation on nuclear 
security, has resulted in some significant progress but has yet to be fully implemented.3.9 The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003 with a supplement approved in September 2004, established detailed, non-legally binding guidance on international best-practice standards to prevent the misuse of radioactive sources including for “dirty bombs.” By December 2012, 115 states had expressed support for the Code of Conduct and 73 countries supported all aspects of the supplementary guidance as well. Continued regional and global assistance to states requiring it is vital to the effective control of radioactive sources.3.10 Global cooperation mechanisms have made an important contribution to improving nuclear security, particularly those launched in the post-Cold War period to reduce the risk of leakage of nuclear and radioactive materials, technology and expertise from the former Soviet republics. Among the most successful and effective is the 21-year old 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn-Lugar) program. In October 2012, Russia announced that it would let the program expire in May 2013 because it no longer needs foreign assistance and has concerns about nuclear security information being leaked. 
Another initiative to have made a significant contribution to nuclear security is the $20 
billion Global Partnership of the Group of Eight (G8) countries. The G8 Global 
Partnership’s mandate was to expire in 2012 but has been extended indefinitely. The 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), set up by Russia and the United States in 2006, had by December 2012 expanded its membership to include 85 countries plus four observers.
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Overall Evaluation for the Role of the IAEA. Some Progress. The IAEA is providing a wide range of advisory services and other assistance on nuclear security issues. The centrality of the IAEA’s role makes a predictable and stable budget for nuclear security essential.
Overall Evaluation for International Cooperation. Some Progress. Significant international cooperation is taking place on detecting and thwarting illicit 
trafficking, but this needs to be expanded as gaps are identified. States need to commit more fully to cooperation in developing and sharing nuclear security best practices.
3.11 Role of the IAEA. The IAEA’s lead role in strengthening international nuclear security – in particular through the services and assistance it provides under the Nuclear 
Security Plan for 2010–13, the third plan of its kind – is not reflected in the funding 
available for the agency’s nuclear security work which, as well as being insufficient, is not guaranteed because it overwhelmingly comes from voluntary contributions. In addition to the funding issue, consideration is needed on whether the IAEA’s authority and responsibilities in the nuclear security area should be expanded.
3.12 International Cooperation. In 2011 the IAEA published a reference text on 
computer security at nuclear facilities and several countries and organizations have held workshops and other events on this subject. A total of 116 states have joined the Illicit 
Trafficking Database Programme (ITDB). International cooperation such as the US Megaports Initiative is providing training, technical assistance and equipment to strengthen detection and interdiction capabilities. But the historical bias towards national secrecy and sovereignty on nuclear security continues to result in inadequate transparency and accountability, notwithstanding the global consequences of 
vulnerability. This is reflected in insufficient international cooperation on developing and implementing nuclear security best practice, although it is demonstrably possible to 
develop and share such practices consistent with the confidentiality of commercially or militarily sensitive information.
3.13 National Nuclear Security Regulations. In 2011 the UNSCR 1540 Committee was able to report that: “at least 140 States have now adopted legislative measures to prohibit proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as compared to 65 States in 2006.” However, work remains to be done in the national implementation of nuclear security measures. Continued provision of assistance to states requiring it is essential.
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Overall Evaluation for Sensitive Nuclear Materials. Some Progress. While 
progress is being made on minimization of civil HEU use, states have been reluctant to ban HEU use in civilian applications. On non-civilian uses, the United States and Russia are on track to complete the conversion of 500 tonnes of HEU to LEU by the end of 2013 and have also agreed to eliminate 
significant quantities of excess weapon-grade plutonium.
Overall Evaluation for National Nuclear Security Regulations. Significant 
Progress. UNSCR 1540 has played a significant role in this area, resulting in a substantial increase in the number of states with legislative measures to prohibit proliferation of nuclear weapons. But more needs to be done in national implementation.
3.14 Sensitive Nuclear Materials. With civilian uses, progress continues to be made on global efforts to eliminate excess weapon-grade plutonium and to shift from highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). The industrialized countries have assisted many others in HEU to LEU conversion efforts, but there has been a reluctance to ban outright HEU use in civilian applications. As to non-civilian uses, the 
United States and Russia have committed to the elimination of significant quantities of excess weapon-grade plutonium and are on track to complete the conversion of 500 tonnes of Russian HEU to LEU by the end of 2013, but no sensitive nuclear materials held anywhere for these purposes are subject to any international standards or assurance.
3.15 Nuclear Forensics. Nuclear forensics needs to continue to develop and expand with the aim of increasing its capacity to provide information on the source, production and history of nuclear material outside regulatory control. The IAEA in particular has published descriptions of nuclear forensics tools and procedures and provided training to states on this.
Overall Evaluation for Nuclear Forensics. Some Progress. In addition to 
significant work going on at the national level in some countries, the IAEA continues to provide assistance with building nuclear forensics capacity in member states, both through its own activities and by teaming with member states to hold workshops and other training.
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3.17 Nuclear Security and Safety Interface. The interface between nuclear safety and 
security has been recognized, including at the 2012 Seoul NSS. The overlaps between 
nuclear safety and security need to be fully reflected in the regulation, design and operation of nuclear facilities, including in risk assessments and training.
3.18 Nuclear Security Culture. In the absence of universal, binding nuclear security standards and adequate transparency and accountability mechanisms, a robust nuclear 
security culture is critical. The IAEA organizes training activities and workshops based 
on findings from the work of advisory missions. Its International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) is particularly noteworthy in helping states to develop and improve national nuclear security on request.
Overall Evaluation for Nuclear Security and Safety Interface. Some Progress. The IAEA in cooperation with member states is providing training and other assistance in this area. A number of training centres have been established 
which emphasize an integrated approach to nuclear safeguards, safety and security.
Overall Evaluation for Nuclear Security Culture. Some Progress. Increasing 
organizational activity suggests some progress here. However, the extent to which a genuine nuclear security culture exists is unclear because of the lack of monitoring and reporting on whether states are implementing best practice standards and recommendations.
Overall Evaluation for Role of Nuclear Industry. Minimal Progress. There is general understanding that effective nuclear security is strongly in the interests of the nuclear industry. More work is needed on identifying practical ways the nuclear industry and state authorities can work together to improve nuclear security.
3.16 Role of Nuclear Industry. The shared responsibility for nuclear security between 
state authorities and the nuclear industry has been recognized, including at the two NSS. But implementation of public–private sector cooperation to strengthen nuclear security 
is not significant.
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§3.2 Objectives and General Strategy3.19 Nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the three main pillars of the NPT regime. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, nuclear security concerns have been heightened owing to several developments: fears that terrorist groups with cadres of suicide bombers not deterred by the thought of their own deaths are interested in acquiring radioactive and 
fissile material or in attacking nuclear facilities; revelations of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, components and technology; unresolved security vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities in Russia and some other former Soviet republics; and several nuclear security 
incidents in recent times (see Box 3.1).
3.20 It is possible to interpret these in either of two contradictory ways. The first is to 
argue that the catalogue is unnecessarily alarmist and exaggerates and magnifies the importance of the incidents. After all, what is important is that none of them has actually led to anything consequential. Recalling them, therefore, is equivalent to crying wolf, alerting the international community to a non-existent danger. The alternative conclusion 
is that significant risks are inherent in this sphere and that the authorities have to be vigilant and succeed in preventing theft and attacks every single time.3.21 Like the list of incidents involving temporary loss of secure control over nuclear weapons in storage or during transport, accidental or false reports of incoming attacks, and the like, the truth is that so far, no such alarms have resulted in a major incident, let alone a catastrophe. Unfortunately, however, this is no guarantee of the good luck holding always and forever. After all, the boy who cried wolf did indeed get killed and eaten by a wolf.
3.22 The working definition of nuclear security used by the IAEA since 2003 is: “The 
prevention and detection of and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.”1  A comprehensive definition of nuclear security would include regimes and protection, control and enforcement measures:
 > To prevent, detect and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism using fissile material 
and radiological sources, illicit transfers or thefts of fissile material and radiological sources, and sabotage of nuclear and radiological facilities;
 > To promote a nuclear security culture; and
 > To strengthen a comprehensive, integrated and global regime as well as a suite of national laws, agreements, instruments and systems to this end.3.23 In his speech in Prague on 5 April 2009 in which he outlined his dream of a world free of nuclear weapons, US President Barack Obama also announced the start of “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.”2 The justification was to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism which the president described as both the most immediate and the most extreme threat to global security.
1. IAEA, Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013, document GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18 (17 August 2009), p. 1 n2. 
2. “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, 5 April 2009” (Washington DC: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-President-in-Prague#transcript.
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Box 3.1: Nuclear Security Incidents (1998–2012)
According to the IAEA, between 1993 and 2011, there were more than 2,000 cases of illegal trafficking, theft, or loss of nuclear and radiological materials around the world, of which only 40 per cent has been recovered.3 Some recent worrying incidents include:4 
 > In 1998, insiders at a Russian nuclear weapons facility were discovered trying to steal 18 kg of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU);
 > In 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia with 100 grams of HEU, attempting 
to find a buyer for several kilograms of HEU;
 > On 8 November 2007, two groups of armed men broke into South Africa’s Pelindaba nuclear research facility outside Pretoria from two different directions, deactivated several layers of security, penetrated into the control room for 45 minutes and escaped but without taking any nuclear material. The site is believed to store enough weapon-grade HEU for up to 25 nuclear bombs held in “locked-down” secure conditions;
 > In April 2012, another violation of protective measures at the Pelindaba facility was described as an act of “common” criminality. The national nuclear regulator spokesperson Gino Moonsamy was quoted as saying that thanks to “adequate physical protection, no nuclear or radioactive material was accessed, lost or stolen”;
 > In May 2008, nuclear bombs were despatched from a North Dakota base without proper controls; three US Defense Threat Reduction Agency staff were dismissed;
 > In 2009, about 100 grams of HEU, lodged inside a nuclear fission chamber that likely came from a decommissioned Soviet nuclear facility, was recovered from a scrap metal yard in Rotterdam;
 > In November 2010, Belgian activists evaded NATO guards to expose security weaknesses at a base in 
Kleine Brogel where nuclear weapons are kept;
 > In 2011, Moldavian authorities arrested six people for smuggling 4.4 grams of weapon-grade 
uranium. They had plotted to sell up to 9 kg for $31 million. The Russian ringleader is still at large;
 > Serial attacks have done little to dispel international fears over “the risk of terrorists breaching Pakistan’s defences.”5 Just before dawn on 16 August 2012, several gunmen wearing military 
uniforms and suicide vests attacked the Minhas base of the Pakistan Air Force in Kamra, about 60 km northwest of Islamabad.6 In September 2012, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) reportedly 
intercepted plans by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to attack one of the country’s largest 
nuclear facilities in Dera Ghazi Khan in what a military officer described as “the first-ever serious security threat” from the TTP.7 These incidents show the urgent need to raise international nuclear security standards. Terrorists need only to identify and exploit the weakest link in the chain of international nuclear security to acquire 
enough fissile material to make and detonate a bomb in a major city. And because the amount of fissile material required is as small as 5 kg of plutonium or 15 kg of HEU, the margin of accounting error for nuclear materials is dangerously small.8 
3. Kim Joong Keun (South Korea’s ambassador to India, writing on the eve of the Seoul NSS), “Beyond security, towards peace,” Times of India, 26 March 2012.
4. Peter Goodspeed, “Ongoing nuclear threat looms over Seoul summit,” National Post (Toronto), 24 March 2012; Jonathan Tirone, “Missing nukes fuel terror concern as Obama drawn to Seoul,” Bloomberg News,  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-22/missing-nukes-fuel-terror-concern-as-seoul-meeting-draws-obama.
html, 23 March 2012; “Another infiltration reported at South African atomic site,” Global Security Newswire,  
13 July 2012; http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/new-infiltration-reported-south-african-atomic-plant.
5. Banyan, “Nuclear profusion,” The Economist, 25 August 2012.
6. “Gunmen storm military air base in Pakistan,” BBC News, 16 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19278302.
7. Abdul Manan, “Taliban threat: Nuclear site in DG Khan cordoned off,” The Express Tribune, 6 September 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/432295/taliban-threat-nuclear-site-in-dg-khan-cordoned-off/.
8. That said, the risks are further reduced, because an essential part of safeguards at processing plants (for example, 
enrichment, reprocessing, fabrication) is containment and surveillance (for example, cameras, radiation monitors) to ensure material cannot be removed.
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3.24 Nuclear terrorism is defined in Article 2 of ICSANT9 as the making, demanding, possession, use, or threat of use of radioactive material or device by any person with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; cause substantial damage to property or 
the environment; or to compel a person, legal entity or international organization to do or refrain from doing an act.3.25 While “defense against terrorism must succeed every time… terrorists must succeed only once. This is true from plot to plot, but within each plot, the logic is reversed. Terrorists must succeed at every stage, but the defense needs to succeed only once.”10 
According to Harvard University’s Belfer Center in 2010, five terrorist groups “may be capable of acquiring and using nuclear weapons”; four are known to have “demonstrated an interest” in getting a nuclear weapon; and two are known to have tried to buy nuclear material on the international black market. In addition, al Qaeda is known to have been pursuing a nuclear weapon since the early to mid 1990s.11 Although a successful act of 
nuclear terrorism remains difficult for terrorists, the potential consequences are such that it must be treated as a serious threat.
3.26 Several regimes have been refined and additional ones promulgated to treat nuclear terrorism as a matter subject both to domestic and to international law, to outlaw it, to 
require states to use and, if necessary, strengthen domestic legal systems to fight nuclear terrorism, to use international law as a basis and the United Nations as a key forum for international collaboration and action to meet the threat of nuclear terrorism, and in other ways to encourage and facilitate interstate cooperation in meeting the challenge. However, the development and widespread adoption of international best practice in nuclear security culture is inhibited by concerns over national sovereignty if multilateral standards are made more stringent and international institutions are given an expanded remit to monitor compliance.3.27 As distilled from the sources described below, the objective of nuclear security is to 
ensure that nuclear weapons and materials are secure from unauthorized access and theft, the facilities in which nuclear weapons and radioactive material are manufactured and stored are secure from sabotage, and terrorists and criminals are prevented from acquiring, making and using nuclear explosive devices.3.28 The strategies for ensuring nuclear security may be described as:
 > To protect nuclear facilities, weapons and material against theft and sabotage by:
 -  minimizing the number of locations at which nuclear weapons and fissile materials are stored;
 - strengthening security at all locations;
 -  encouraging the switch from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched 
uranium (LEU);
 -  reducing the size of global nuclear weapons and fissile materials inventories; and
9. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icsant/icsant.html.
10. Michael Levi, quoted in International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) (Gareth 
Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi co-chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers (Canberra and Tokyo: ICNND, 2009), p. 47, paragraph 4.26.
11. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 
2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Nuclear-Security-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
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 -  bringing all remaining excess military and civilian stockpiles of fissile materials under international monitoring;
 > To prevent, detect and respond to the theft and sabotage of nuclear material during international transport;
 > To prevent, detect and respond to any illicit trafficking in nuclear material;
 > To prevent, detect and respond to acts of terrorism using nuclear material and radiological sources;
 > To promote the adoption of rigorous and reliable nuclear and radiological material and inventory control systems;
 > To strengthen the nuclear security regime of national laws and regulations, bilateral and multilateral agreements, UN resolutions and international guidelines in order to fully and effectively implement the above strategies.3.29 These descriptions are derived from the outcomes of the two Nuclear Security 
Summits (NSS) held in Washington (2010) and Seoul (2012); the outcomes document of 
the eighth NPT Review Conference (2010); and the ICNND report (2009). The NSS, a third and probably last of which is planned for 2014 in the Netherlands, have been 
convened to strengthen, consolidate, elevate and energize the many existing national, multilateral and cooperative institutions and structures to ensure nuclear security and 
prevent nuclear smuggling. They are important for having affirmed US presidential leadership on this critical area of the nuclear challenge and for elevating the issue to the level of a global leaders’ summit.
3.30 In January 2012 the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) published a benchmark study, 
The Nuclear Materials Security Index.12 Based on five categories (quantities and sites, security and control measures, global norms, domestic commitments and capability, and societal factors like political stability and corruption), subdivided further into 18 indicators that went beyond “guns, guards and gates” and also beyond nuclear materials control and accountancy practices, the study concluded that although governments have become more aware of the threat:
 > There is still no global consensus on the most important steps to achieve nuclear security;
 > State accountability is problematical because of a deliberate lack of transparency;
 > Stocks of weapon-useable materials continue to rise in some countries;
 > Almost a quarter of the states scored poorly on societal factors; and
 > Many lag on joining international agreements.3.31 The NTI Index was complemented by an assessment of national commitments carried out by a team for the Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security.13 Tracking the implementation of pledges made in Washington in April 2010 by 30 countries, the study concluded that of the more than 60 national commitments made 
12. NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action (Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2012).
13. Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Margaret Balza, The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National 
Commitments (Washington DC: Arms Control Association, March 2012).
Nuclear Security 151by the 2010 summit participants, 80 per cent had been completed by February 2012 
(the most recent publicly available data).
§3.3 Global Nuclear Security Architecture3.32 The three main elements of the nuclear security regime, addressed in sequence below, are international agreements, instruments and institutions; ad hoc and voluntary cooperative measures; and national laws and regulations. The two NSS to date have 
reaffirmed the international treaties, instruments and institutions (clustered into the “global nuclear security architecture” in Seoul) that backstop national efforts to strengthen nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism. But both summits took care 
to reaffirm the rights of states to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that measures to strengthen nuclear security must not hamper these rights.3.33 At the 2010 and 2012 NSS the leaders accepted that all states are responsible for ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities under their control, to seek assistance from others if necessary and to provide assistance to others if asked. The leaders have used the summits to renew their commitment to ensure that nuclear materials under their national control are not lost through theft or diversion, evaluate the threat and improve security as required on a continuing basis, and to share information and exchange best practices to these ends.3.34 The main global components of the nuclear security regime, discussed in detail in following sections, are:
 > The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) which applies primarily to the protection of nuclear material in international transport, together with the CPPNM Amendment which extends the convention’s application to protection of nuclear material in domestic use and of facilities against sabotage;
 > International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT);
 > United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540;
 > IAEA guidance documents like INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; the Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities; and INFCIRC/153; and
 > Various multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements and initiatives,14  in particular 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn-Lugar) program, the Global 
Partnership of the Group of Eight (G8) countries, and the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).3.35 All these various elements were the subject of close attention by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Noting “the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection,” the 2010 Final Document welcomed the 2005 CPPNM Amendment, 
affirmed the important role of the IAEA in promoting international cooperation by establishing “a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines” and in helping member
14. “Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities (Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 10 July 2012), p. 2.
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states, on request, enhance national security (paragraphs 27–28). It also acknowledged the need for international cooperation and coordination, with IAEA support, “in 
preventing, detecting and responding to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive 
material” (paragraph 29). Importantly, the conference noted that “While nuclear safety and nuclear security are national responsibilities, the IAEA should play the key role in the development of safety standards, nuclear security guidance and relevant conventions 
based on best practice” (paragraph 58). As well as endorsing the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, the conference 
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Nuclear Security 153encouraged all non-parties to the CPPNM to accede to it and to ratify the 2005 amendment 
“so that it may enter into force at an early date” (paragraphs 62–63). Finally, the 
conference took note of the first NSS held in Washington in April 2010, welcomed the 
voluntary efforts by states to minimize the use of HEU in the civilian sector, and encouraged states to promote the sharing of best practice in nuclear safety and security, 
including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector (paragraphs 65–69). These were translated into action points 40–46.
3.3.1. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 19803.36 The basic knowledge and skill to make a crude nuclear explosive device is readily 
available and acquired. But it is far more challenging to produce fissile material – weapon-
grade HEU (90 per cent U-235) or separated plutonium – on any substantial scale. Only states are likely to have the necessary level of infrastructure. But if their material, facilities and personnel have security vulnerabilities, then terrorists, criminals or other 
unauthorized actors could steal the nuclear material or even a nuclear bomb (see Box 3.1). They will raid not the facility or the country with the most nuclear material, but that which is the most vulnerable. Any country could be a target; all could feel the effects.3.37 This is why measures for the physical protection of all nuclear materials, facilities and activities are an essential and critical component of nuclear security. As well as guards, gates and fences at nuclear plants and facilities, this requires thorough background checks on personnel employed there and rigorous training after recruitment in order to inculcate a culture of nuclear security. In a ‘whole-of-nuclear-security-chain’, the amount of nuclear material could be reduced; the physical protection of materials and facilities could be reinforced; security measures could be strengthened for materials during transportation and transit; and export and border controls could be made more stringent. In sum, both HEU and separated plutonium, even for peaceful purposes, should be subject to security controls no less stringent than those prescribed for nuclear weapons, or what the US National Academy of Sciences describes as “the stored-weapon standard.”153.38 The CPPNM, adopted in Vienna on 26 October 1979 and signed in Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980, entered into force on 8 February 1987. It establishes measures related to the physical protection of nuclear material during international transport and a general framework for cooperation among states in the protection, recovery and return of stolen nuclear material. At the end of 2012, the CPPNM had 148 states parties.16 That is, about one-quarter of the world’s states have still not acceded to it. Countries which 
attended one or both of the NSS and have not ratified or acceded to the CPPNM are Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.3.39 A diplomatic conference was convened in 2005 to strengthen the convention in light of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and an amendment was adopted by 
15. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Arms (Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Secretariat, 2006), p. 84. However, while the “stored-weapon standard” 
would apply to plutonium metal, it would not necessarily apply to everything, for example plutonium in mixed oxide (MOX) powder or fuel assemblies.
16. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf.
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of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. The amendment was promoted and justified as a key measure of nuclear security. The obligations for physical protection under the original CPPNM covered nuclear material during international transport. The amendment requires states parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. In addition, it also provides for expanded cooperation among states on measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, and mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage. It will enter into force upon 
ratification by two-thirds of the states party to the convention. Countries which attended one or both of the NSS and which are party to the CPPNM but have not yet become party 
to the 2005 Amendment are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, 
Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, ROK, South Africa, Turkey, and the United States. By the end of 2012, it had only 61 of the 99 required number of accessions.17 
3.40 On 11 September 2001 (the day of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington), the IAEA Board of Governors approved twelve “Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities.” These were incorporated into the CPPNM 
Amendment (Article 3) and thus would apply to the 61 states that are party to the amendment.
3.41 Table 3.1 summarizes the current status of the CPPNM, CPPNM Amendment, and 
ICSANT. As can be seen, although the CPPNM was already adhered to quite widely (but 
not universally) before the first NSS in Washington in April 2010, the summit does seem to have injected fresh momentum into states becoming parties to the other two instruments. In the last two years, the number of states parties to the CPPNM Amendment has almost doubled, with 24 states becoming parties to it since the Washington NSS, and 
those acceding to ICSANT have increased by about one-quarter (14 additional states parties since April 2010).
Table 3.1: Status of CPPNM, CPPNM Amendment, and ICSANT (December 2012)
Date 
adopted
Entry into 
Force
Parties Signed but 
not Parties
Acceded 
since 
1.1.2010CPPNM 26.10.1979 8.2.1987 148 1a 2bCPPNM Amendment 8.7.2005 – 61 0 24cICSANT 13.4.2005 7.7.2007 83 32 15d
A. Haiti; b. Laos (29.7.2010), Lesotho (18.8.2010); C. Argentina (15.11.2011), Bahrain (9.6.2010), Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(21.6.2010), Czech Republic (30.12.2010), Denmark (29.5.2010), Finland (17.6.2011), Georgia (5.4.2012), Germany 
(21.10.2010), Greece (13.12.2011), Indonesia (27.5.2010), Israel (16.3.2012), Kazakhstan (26.4.2011), Latvia (23.11.2010), 
Luxembourg (24.2.2012), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (25.11.2011), Mali (27.1.2010), Mexico (1.8.2010), 
Nauru (14.6.2010), Netherlands (17.4.2011), Portugal (26.11.2010), Saudi Arabia (21.1.2011), Sweden (23.3.2012), Tunisia 
(7.6.2010), UK (8.4.2010); D. Algeria (3.3.2011), Armenia (22.9.2010), Australia (16.3.2012), Bahrain (4.5.2010), China 
(8.11.2010, Côte d’Ivoire (12.3.2012), Democratic Republic of Congo (23.9.2010), Georgia (23.4.2010), Lesotho (22.9.2010), 
Morocco (31.3.2010), Nauru (24.8.2010), Netherlands (30.6.2010), Poland (8.4.2010), St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
(8.7.2010), Tunisia (28.9.2010)Source: SIPRI   
17. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf.
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significant states have still not signed. France, for example, hesitated to sign, signalling several reservations: disagreement with the scope of Annex II of the convention; lack of international control to ensure compliance with the convention; and that France already frames its bilateral cooperation through agreements for the peaceful development of nuclear energy, stating in particular that the parties agree to implement measures consistent with the convention.18 Notwithstanding these reservations, France now plans to sign the amendment.3.43 Armenia, Canada, Belgium, France, Georgia, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, and Turkey, though they have not yet signed, made a commitment during the Seoul NSS to ratify the amendment.19 Canada, for one, 
has stated that the amendment overlaps with existing laws and that ratification can take place only once the necessary domestic implementing legislation is in force.20 In other words, in some cases not signing the amendment is not necessarily indicative of a weak nuclear security framework.
3.3.2. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (ICSANT) 200521 3.44 How can states prevent, investigate and punish acts of nuclear terrorism, and promote law enforcement and judicial cooperation with one another to do so? Drafted during seven years of negotiations by the ad hoc group based on a text presented by Russia, and its importance and interest in it increasing dramatically owing to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, ICSANT was adopted unanimously at the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005. It makes it a crime to possess or demand a radioactive device or material with the aim of causing death or serious injury or substantial damage to property. The convention came into effect in July 2007, 30 days after Bangladesh became the 22nd state to deposit its instrument of ratification with the United Nations secretary-general. As of December 2012, a total of 115 nations had signed, of whom 83 had also 
ratified the convention.22 3.45 The background to the heightened concern was the so-called problem of “loose nukes” in Russia after the end of the Cold War. There were many reports awash in the 
international media of substantial amounts of enriched fissile material that remained unaccounted for from the days of the former Soviet Union, leading to fears that some or much of the material might be being smuggled across international borders into and out 
18. Guy-Michel Chauveu, “La Convention pour la protection physique des matieres nucleaires,” Assemble National, 24 July 
2012, http://www.assembleenationale.fr/14/rapports/r0125.asp#P286_58156.
19. “The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Secretariat: Highlights of Achievements and Commitments by Participating States as stated in National Progress Reports and National Statements,” March 2012, http://
thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/userfiles/Highlights%20of%20the%20Seoul%20Nuclear%20Security%20
Summit%28120403%29.pdf.
20. “Nuclear Terror Legislation: Delivering on International Nuclear Terrorism Commitments,” Canadian Department of Justice, March 2012;
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2012/doc_32718.html.
21. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icsant/icsant.html.
22. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII~15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&l
ang=en,
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play156 of Central Asia.23 The CPPNM was limited to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, not covering nuclear material of a military nature.
3.46 ICSANT is closely linked to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (discussed below). The convention seeks to do three things: to protect against attacks on a broad range of 
nuclear targets, punish the perpetrators through domestic criminalization of acts of nuclear terrorism, and promote international cooperation in the prevention and investigation of acts of nuclear terrorism and the prosecution or extradition of the 
alleged terrorists. To this end, states parties are required to make the offences specified in the convention criminal offences under national law, and to provide stiff penalties appropriate to the gravity of the crimes.3.47 The convention’s scope extends to a range of acts and potential targets, including nuclear power plants and reactors, and attempts or threats to commit terrorist acts or participate in them as accomplices. To facilitate the “prosecute or extradite” regime, these offences are explicitly described as “non-political” so that the defence of any of these acts being a political offence is not available to anyone seeking to block extradition.3.48 In taking all necessary measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, states are enjoined to take into account the relevant recommendations and functions of 
the IAEA. Should states detect and find unauthorized radioactive material, device or facility, they must take steps to render it harmless, ensure that it is held in accordance with applicable IAEA safeguards, exercise due diligence with regard to IAEA physical 
protection and health and safety standards, and ensure its return to specified parties.3.49 ICSANT was deliberately designed to have the broadest possible coverage in order 
to fill perceived CPPNM gaps in scope and enforcement.24 However, ICSANT is limited to international offences involving more than one state, and does not apply where the offence is committed within a single state and the alleged offender and victims are nationals of that state.25 The convention is not subject to any particular monitoring mechanism and responsibility for its implementation lies with state parties.3.50 Nor does the convention take a position on the legality or otherwise of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Its focus is on individual criminal responsibility of 
persons for specific acts of a terrorist nature. Agreement on the text was delayed for several years because of the demand by some states that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must also be addressed and, therefore, acts of state actors too should be brought within the scope of the proposed convention. Others countered that the legal regime underlying the existing sectoral conventions is of a law-enforcement nature and 
exclusively focused on the individual criminal responsibility of persons for specific acts of a terrorist nature; questions of state responsibility are regulated by other principles of international law. The issue was resolved on the basis of a package, whereby the use 
23. Rohan Perera, “Historical context for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icsant/icsant.html.
24. “UN officials call for stronger global measures to counter nuclear terrorism,” 28 September 2012, http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43106&Cr=nuclear&Cr1=#.UG6uMVG2WZR.
25. O. Jankowitsch-Prevor, “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” OECD/NEA, 
Nuclear Law Bulletin 76 (2005).
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of a nuclear device by a state during an armed conflict is explicitly excluded from the scope of the convention but without conferring or implying impunity.
3.3.3. UN Security Council Resolutions3.51 Resolution 1540 (2004). On 28 April 2004, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1540, establishing for the first time binding obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to take and enforce effective 
measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials to non-state actors. Controversy arose over the authority of the Security Council to impose general obligations of a “legislative” kind for UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but after seven months of negotiations, the resolution was adopted by consensus.26 Since 2004, Resolution 1540 has gained legitimacy as the legal basis for a range of national and international counter- terrorism activities.3.52 The goal of Resolution 1540 is to ensure that no state or non-state actor is a source 
or beneficiary of WMD proliferation. Affirming WMD proliferation as a threat to international peace and security and expressing concern over the threat of WMD 
terrorism and of illicit trafficking in WMD material, weapons and delivery systems, UNSCR 1540 requires all states:
 > To enact and enforce laws to prohibit non-state actors to develop, acquire, transfer or use WMD;
 > To take and enforce effective domestic control, physical protection, accounting and border control measures to prevent proliferation to non-state actors and to prohibit 
assisting or financing such proliferation;
 > To control the provision of funds and services that contribute to non-state proliferation; and
 > To set up a committee of the whole to oversee implementation of the resolution.3.53 UNSCR 1977, adopted unanimously on 20 April 2011, extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee by ten years. To facilitate the work of the committee, an expert group 
consisting of eight members was set up to deal with technical issues. UNSCR 2055 (29 
June 2012) increased the size of the group of experts to nine.3.54 The implementation of UNSCR 1540 will mean that each state’s actions will 
significantly strengthen the international standards relating to the export of sensitive 
items and support for proliferators (including financing) and ensure that non-state actors, including terrorist and black-market networks, do not gain access to chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, their means of delivery, or related materials.27
26. C. Ahlström, “Appendix 11A. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: non-proliferation by means of international legislation,” SIPRI Yearbook 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 461.
27. See also the section on UNSCR 1540 in the previous chapter 2 on non-proliferation.
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Figure 3.2: UNSCR 1540 Reporting Mechanism
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Figure 3.4: Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, paragraph 3 (a) and (b) 
Figure 3.5: Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, paragraph 3 (c) and (d) 
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play160 3.55 All member states were requested to report on the progress of their implementation to the 1540 Committee six months after the adoption of the resolution, and by 28 October 
2004, 59 member states (and the European Union) had submitted their first reports.28 
UNSCR 1673 (27 April 2006) noted that not all member states had yet submitted their 
first national report, and that full implementation of the resolution is a long-term task. According to the UN 1540 Committee website, 176 states had submitted reports by December 2012.3.56 Other Security Council Resolutions. UNSCR 1373 (28 September 2001) called on 
all states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism and to criminalize the wilful 
provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, financial assets and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts, participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts, and of persons and entities acting on behalf of 
terrorists, were to be frozen without delay. To this end, the resolution imposed uniform legislative and reporting requirements and established the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC), made up of all fifteen members of the Security Council, to monitor implementation and increase state capacity.29 3.57 The scope of Resolution 1373 is quite broad, encompassing domestic legislation, national executive machinery and international cooperation. Operative paragraph IV links the resolution to nuclear security, noting the close connection between international terrorism and, among other things, the illegal movement of nuclear and other potentially 
deadly materials, and emphasizes the need for coordination from national to international level to strengthen the global response to this serious threat to international security.
3.58 Under Resolution 1535 (26 March 2004), the Security Council also established the 
Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to assist the work of the CTC and coordinate the monitoring of the resolution’s implementation.30 UNSCR 1624 (14 September 2005) pertains to the incitement to commit acts of terrorism. It targets terrorism in general, and refers to nuclear terrorism only when it calls on states to give priority consideration to the signing of ICSANT in one preamble paragraph. This resolution also guides the work of the CTC and requires states to report to the committee on their implementation of the resolution. The CTC is further directed to include Resolution 1624 in its dialogue with states to help build capacity through spreading best legal practices and promoting the exchange of information. In addition, the CTC helps with the capacity building of member states through dissemination of best practices; provision of technical, 
financial, regulatory and legislative expertise; and facilitating cooperation between 
national, regional and international organizations. But the CTC has neither the resources nor the capacity to monitor state compliance with UNSC-imposed obligations.
3.59 In accordance with Resolution 1624, the CTED prepared two reports summarizing the responses submitted by UN member states, acknowledging that fewer than half of 
28. Ahlström, “Appendix 11A. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,” p. 468.
29. Information on the CTC is available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373.
30. United Nations, “About the Counter-terrorism Committee,” http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/aboutus.html.
Nuclear Security 161them have reported to it on their steps to implement Resolution 1624.31 The mandate of 
the CTED was extended to the end of 2013 by UNSCR 1963 (20 December 2010).
3.3.4. Radioactive Sources3.60 The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003 with a supplement endorsed a year 
later, is meant to apply to the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the safety and security of radioactive sources from initial production to 
final disposal.32 Thus it applies also to radioactive wastes not covered by the CPPNM.33 More detailed and prescriptive than an international convention, the Code of Conduct includes provisions on national registers of high-activity sources, the international trade 
in radioactive sources, security requirements and prompt notification to potentially affected states of loss of control of sources, or incidents with potential cross-border effects. It prescribes the principles for states to ensure the security of radioactive sources within their territory, the training of personnel and the establishment of channels of information and communication. The 2004 supplement recommends that every state designate a point of contact. But it notably does not apply to radioactive sources within military or defence programs.3.61 By December 2012, 115 states had expressed support for the 2003 Code of Conduct, 73 countries supported all aspects of the supplementary guidance as well, and only 13 
(Colombia, Georgia, Ireland, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Oman, 
Paraguay, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe) had not designated a national point of contact. But several have failed to respond to the IAEA’s self-assessment questionnaire.34 
3.3.5. Global Cooperation Mechanisms3.62 US-Managed Threat Reduction Programs. Since the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War, the United States has implemented a series of programs and projects, mainly on the territory of the former Soviet Union, to reduce the risk that nuclear and radioactive materials would escape from safe custody.35  The Department of Defense 
managed implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn–Lugar) Program, begun in 1991, and named after the two US Senators who initiated it, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. 
31. Letter dated 18 January 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 
1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2008/29.
32. http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/radiation-safety/code-of-conduct.asp.
33. Radioactive waste is covered, however, by a 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
34. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/codeconduct_status.pdf. The list of national points of contact is published by the IAEA at http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/imp-export/import-export-contact-points.pdf; and the directory of national regulatory bodies is published at http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/code-conduct/reg-auth-directory.pdf.
35. See Amy F. Woolf, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 6 March 2012).
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play162 3.63 The CTR set of programs has been among the most successful and effective. It has helped the countries of the former Soviet Union to destroy nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and associated infrastructure under agreed procedures; to transport bomb-making materials to central and more secure storage sites; to upgrade security perimeters around sensitive sites and screening of personnel working there; and to install monitoring devices at border crossings. The programs have facilitated the 
elimination of significant quantities of nuclear materials, promoted habits of international cooperation and reinforced nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation norms. Since 2003 the CTR program has incorporated several new initiatives that are relevant to nuclear security. The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, a biosecurity effort, is intended to assist partners strengthen their border controls, including the installation of monitoring and detection equipment at border crossings and in other appropriate locations on the border.
3.64 In 2004 a number of projects (not including the CTR program) were consolidated 
into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) under the management of the 
Department of Energy (DOE). These were intended to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material worldwide by a combination of reactor conversion, removal of material and physical protection. In 2011 the Global Nuclear Lockdown program was initiated to support efforts to secure weapon-useable materials in Russia, among other things. In 2012 a number of the efforts noted above have been combined under the Global Nuclear Security program.3.65 By the end of 2012, the 21-year old CTR program had deactivated more than 7,600 warheads, dismantled and destroyed more than 900 intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) and 33 submarines (almost certainly a more substantial level of destruction of Russian nuclear assets than Washington could have achieved through war), secured 24 nuclear weapons storage sites, and overseen the shipment of nuclear weapons out of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.36 
3.66 The $500 million per annum program had been extended twice since inception in 1992. But in October 2012, Moscow announced that it would let the program expire in May 2013 because it no longer needs foreign assistance and has concerns about nuclear security information being leaked. While Russia has become visibly uncomfortable in recent years about receiving foreign aid, some conservative US politicians and commentators have expressed concerns about the money from the program permitting Moscow to divert other sources of money to spend on new armaments. But Moscow was careful to stress that it is not abandoning efforts to secure nuclear weapons; it wants to explore alternative frameworks to that end.37 3.67 In the meantime, other parts of the US government have also had important and active programs relevant to nuclear security. The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program is particularly noteworthy in this context. This is a DOE umbrella program whose First Line of Defense projects cover nuclear materials 
36. The Nunn–Lugar program also targeted chemical weapons, for example in Albania, and established monitoring facilities for the detection of biological weapons.
37. Will Englund, “Russia no longer wants U.S. aid on nuclear arms security,” Washington Post, 10 October 2012.
Nuclear Security 163protection and cooperation. The program is intended to prevent “the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction; detect the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide; provide for international 
nuclear safety; and eliminate inventories of surplus fissile materials useable for nuclear weapons.” The program thus addresses the danger of hostile nations or terrorist groups acquiring WMD weapons, material, expertise or technology.38 To achieve these ends the program has supported security upgrades at a large number of civilian and military sites of different kinds, predominantly in Russia. The program also supports projects to reduce the quantities of weapon-useable materials or make it less attractive to would-be nuclear terrorists.3.68 The DOE has also implemented the Second Line of Defense and Megaports 
Initiatives, under National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) management,39 that is intended to reduce the risk of smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials, and in particular to reduce the risk that such materials will enter the United States. The DOE programs have also included projects focused on radiological dispersal devices. In all, 35 
nuclear waste sites on the territory of the former Soviet Union were identified, including agricultural research institutes, research reactors and medical facilities. In 2006 this program was merged with others into an International Radiological Threat Reduction initiative that is no longer limited to working in the former Soviet space.3.69 G8 Global Partnership (G8–GP) 2002. The Global Partnership is an initiative of 
the Group of Eight (G8) countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United 
Kingdom, and United States) committed to preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons, missiles, or related equipment and technology. Launched at the 2002 G8 Summit in 
Kananaskis, Canada, the $20 billion G8 Global Partnership initially implemented projects in Russia and Ukraine but has expanded to deal with the spread of WMD weapons and materials worldwide. Non-G8 countries participating in the Global Partnership include 
Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine, and also the European Union. The G8 Global Partnership’s mandate was to expire in 2012 but has 
been extended indefinitely. Leaders have said that they would like to broaden the scope to include nuclear and radiological security, biosecurity, engagement of scientists and implementation of UNSCR 1540. Funding arrangements will be decided on a national, 
joint or multilateral basis. Unlike the first decade of the G8–GP, partners have not pledged 
any specific contributions going forward other than the United States which has planned 
to continue contributing up to $10 billion again.
38. Department of Energy, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request, Budget Highlights, DOE/ME-0023, February 2003, p. 25.
39. NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a semi-autonomous agency within DOE, responsible for the management and security of US nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play164 3.70 Achievements of the Global Partnership include:40 
 > Strengthened accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials in Russia and Ukraine;
 > Destruction of over 20,000 tons of chemical weapons;
 > Dismantling of nuclear submarines and safe storage of removed spent fuel – out of the 198 decommissioned nuclear submarines by the Russian navy, only 6 remain to be dismantled, and the dismantling work was scheduled to be completed in 2012;
 > Improved detection of nuclear and radiological materials and prevention of illicit 
trafficking by strengthening border security capabilities – the United States and Russia are partnering to place equipment for radiation detection at border crossings; and
 > Engagement of scientists, technicians and engineers with WMD and missile expertise to redirect their efforts towards peaceful purposes. The International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science Technology Centre of Ukraine, funded by the Global Partnership’s partners, provide economic support for scientists during a transition period. The future of the centre in Moscow is however under review, as Russia has decided to withdraw from it.3.71 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. GICNT is an international partnership working towards the individual and collective implementation of a set of shared nuclear security principles. It was set up by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on 15 July 2006. Its mission is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures and interoperability of partner nations. Its eight guiding principles are:41 
 > Improve accounting, control and protection of nuclear and radiological material;
 > Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities;
 > Detect and suppress illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material;
 > Improve ability to search for, confiscate and establish safe control of nuclear and radiological material;
 > Assure denial of safe haven and resources to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear and radiological material;
 > Ensure adequate legal frameworks to combat activity related to nuclear terrorism;
 > Respond to and mitigate the consequences of nuclear terrorism; and
 > Promote information sharing to prevent and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism.3.72 The United States and Russia serve as co-chairs of the GICNT and Spain serves as Coordinator of the Implementation and Assessment Group. The Global Initiative has made some effort to improve the global nuclear and radiological detection architecture, including the installation of radiation detection equipment at major sea and air ports. By 
December 2012 its membership included 85 countries plus four observers (IAEA, 
40. US Department of State, “G8 Global Partnership,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/184759.htm.
41. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145499.pdf.
Nuclear Security 165
European Union, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and INTERPOL).42 Argentina, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam joined GICNT in 2010; Singapore in 2011; 
and Algeria, Azerbaijan and Malaysia in 2012. The plenary meeting in 2010 noted 
nuclear detection (working group chaired by the Netherlands) and nuclear forensics 
(working group chaired by Australia) as the two priority functions; the 2011 plenary 
added response and mitigation (working group chaired by Morocco) as a third priority 
function. GICNT facilitates information sharing among partners and official observers through expert-level workshops, seminars, exercises and other activities. As of December 2012, it had held more than 50 multilateral activities and exercises to share best practices and lessons learned in order to strengthen individual and collective capabilities for preventing, detecting, deterring, and responding to nuclear terrorist incidents. The three 
working groups will present their findings and documents to the plenary meeting of GICNT scheduled to be held in Mexico in 2013.
§3.4 Role of the IAEA3.73 As discussed fully in Chapter 2, the IAEA carries the chief international institutional responsibility for marrying the NPT’s promise of assistance with peaceful uses of nuclear energy to non-nuclear weapon states to assurances of safety and non-diversion to weapons purposes. Because nuclear security is a much more recent concern, this has not been a priority item in the distribution of funding and agenda for the agency. Yet even here the IAEA has now taken on a lead role, if by default, because of its technical expertise, institutional credibility and legitimacy, and the lack of practical alternatives. This distinctive status quo – combining lack of mandated IAEA authority in nuclear security comparable to nuclear safeguards; technical capabilities to strengthen the global nuclear security regime through advisory services to member states on request; and the need to 
provide added resources to the IAEA in this field – is reflected in the decisions made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the 2010 and 2012 NSS.3.74 The 2010 NPT conference encouraged all states parties to “broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes” and apply IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities; and encouraged the agency to assist states 
to strengthen their national regulatory controls of nuclear material (Actions 41 and 46). The 2010 NSS in Washington welcomed IAEA activities in support of national efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide, commended the IAEA for the programs of assistance and advisory services and guidance to states on request, and acknowledged the importance of nuclear material accountancy. States participating in the NSS pledged “to work actively with the IAEA towards the completion and implementation” of the guidance series of documents and to incorporate the IAEA formulated principles into the planning, construction and operation of their nuclear facilities. The 2012 Seoul NSS 
reaffirmed “the essential responsibility and role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security framework” and participating states promised to “work to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed.”
42. US Department of State, “Partner Nations List” for the GICNT, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c37083.htm.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play166 3.75 For all the IAEA’s role, the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with 
individual states. In the near term, therefore, the main focus will be on universalization 
of the existing framework and its full implementation, plus identification and filling of any gaps in existing arrangements. The extent of voluntary reporting by states at the Seoul NSS in 2012, of the compliance of their nuclear security systems with commitments 
made at the first NSS in 2010, was encouraging. That is, the threshold of compliance of 
legally binding international commitments was raised significantly higher with voluntary promises of a heads of state/government involvement in summit diplomacy.43 
3.4.1 Setting Guidelines3.76 The IAEA publishes a Nuclear Security Series, providing detailed guidance “relating 
to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities.”44 They embrace such fields as nuclear security fundamentals, recommendations, implementing guides and technical guidance. From 2012, the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, established by the IAEA director general, is in charge of making recommendations to the agency on the development and review of the series. The committee is composed of representatives from all IAEA member states. Its objective is to improve the quality, increase transparency and encourage consensus and coherence among the member states while working on 
international publications in the field of nuclear security. Representatives of international 
organizations and non-governmental bodies can attend the committee meetings. New publications in the series provide guidance for states on new or developing issues in nuclear security, such as the latest 2012 publication, Nuclear Security Systems and 
Measures for Major Public Events.
3.77 In the Nuclear Security Series, Information Circular 225 (INFCIRC/225) is generally considered to be the cornerstone of the international physical protection regime for 
nuclear materials and facilities. First published in 1975 and revised five times since, INFCIRC/225 is a set of guidelines, not a treaty or binding resolution, and not requiring 
legal commitments, signature or ratification. This makes assessment of state compliance problematical.
3.78 The 2011 revision (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5) reflects the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to align the document with the changed security standards set forth in the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM. It introduced the concept of a physical protection “regime” and a graded approach to physical protection to take into account the nature, severity and likelihood of the threat, the relative attractiveness of the material, and the possible consequences of theft or sabotage. It included guidance for the rapid recovery of nuclear material found to be missing and for the mitigation of sabotage. And it included recommendations on physical protection for states embarking on the development of 
peaceful nuclear energy for the first time.
43. Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG), Improving Nuclear Security Regime Cohesion: Summary Report 
and Initial Policy Recommendations (Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, September 2012), p. 6.
44. IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.
Nuclear Security 1673.79 The IAEA guidelines serve as the international standard that has been incorporated into the domestic law of many states. But because the nuclear security series are guides for countries to use voluntarily, it is impossible to know how widely they are actually read or used by states. States have obligations written in their comprehensive safeguards 
agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA and in some cases, Additional Protocols, and some of those obligations overlap with what is written in the Nuclear Security Series. States, for example, can rely on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series for guidance in developing their own required nuclear material accounting systems, although it is not known how much they actually use that guidance.3.80 The IAEA guidelines have been incorporated also in some suppliers’ bilateral agreements as a condition of peaceful nuclear cooperation. The US “section 123”45 civil 
nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a good example of this. Inclusion of this requirement in bilateral agreements provides a means for making the application of INFCIRC/225 legally binding in particular states. The United States has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements that require partner countries to guarantee the physical protection of US-origin nuclear material. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and State and Energy departments visit partner countries to check on the physical protection measures.46 Australia, Canada and the EURATOM 
(European Atomic Energy Community) countries also have similar bilateral agreements. In addition, the Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free 
zones in Africa and Central Asia respectively (see chapter 2) also require member states to apply security measures comparable to IAEA recommendations.
3.4.2 Advisory and Peer Review Services3.81 The IAEA also offers advisory and peer review services in the realm of nuclear 
security to member states on request, specifically, by providing them with professional assistance such as Nuclear Security Advisory Assistance Service and nuclear security publications. The IAEA has helped states to develop integrated plans for nuclear security improvements and assistance. In consultation with the hosting state, the IAEA drafts an 
Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) which is tailored to the state’s specific 
needs on the basis of findings and recommendations from various technical services. A 
typical INSSP presents five components of work related to nuclear security: legislative and regulatory framework, prevention, detection, response, and sustainability. The 
INSSP identifies the needs of the state, responsible entities and organizations within the state, and the timeframe for the implementation of agreed activities.
45. The reference is to agreements pursuant to s.123 of the Atomic Energy Act that are commonly referred to as “123 agreements.”
46. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities 
(Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2 October 2012), p. 8; https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Options_for_
Strengthening_the_Global_Nuclear_Security_System_4.pdf?_=1353437739.
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Table 3.2: IAEA Nuclear Security Advisory Services
Nuclear Security Advisory Services ObjectiveInternational Nuclear Security Advisory Service INSServ Facilitate the identification of a state’s broad nuclear security requirements and measuresInternational Physical Protection Advisory Service IPPAS Evaluate existing physical protection arrangements in member statesSSAC Advisory Service ISSAS Provide recommendations and suggestions for the requesting states for improvements to their state systems for accountancy and controlInternational Team of Experts ITE Monitor states’ adherence to or implementation of international instruments for protection against nuclear terrorismIntegrated Regulatory Review  Service IRRS Support states to improve the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies and to implement national safety legislation and regulationsIntegrated Nuclear Security  Support Plan INSSP Provide a general approach for nuclear security capacity- buildingSource: SIPRI   
Table 3.3: IAEA Nuclear Security Publications
IAEA Publications ContentsINFCIRCs Texts of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
Nuclear Security SeriesNuclear Security Fundamentals Objectives, concepts and principles of nuclear securityRecommendations Best practices that should be adopted by Member States in the application of the Nuclear Security FundamentalsImplementing Guides Measures for the implementation of the Recommendations
Technical GuidanceReference Manuals Measures on how to apply the Implementing Guides in specific areasTraining Guides Syllabus/manuals for IAEA training courses in the domain  of nuclear securityService Guides Guidance on the conduct and scope of IAEA nuclear security  advisory missions
Nuclear Security Plan2002–2005 Nuclear Security Plan of Activities2006–2009 Nuclear Security - Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism2010–2013 Program Implementation to achieve worldwide effective nuclear securitySource: SIPRI   
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3.82 The establishment of the INSSP has enabled the IAEA, the states concerned and any 
donors financing the work to plan and coordinate activities from both a technical and a 
financial point of view. It also permits some states to prepare and implement the necessary nuclear security improvements internally and without external assistance. As of December 2012, 66 INSSPs were in varying stages of development and completion.47 
3.83 In 2002, the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (a voluntary funding 
mechanism) and for the first time elaborated the Nuclear Security Plan whose objective is to combat nuclear security risk and support member states in the implementation of nuclear security instruments. The second Nuclear Security Plan for 2006–09 was approved by the Board of Governors in 2005. It concerned three main areas: needs assessment, analysis and coordination; prevention; and detection and response. The goal of the third Nuclear Security Plan for 2010–13 is to “contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request… through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction.”48 3.84 At and since the Washington NSS, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, 
Norway, Netherlands, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have pledged contributions 
to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Belgium agreed to provide $300,000, Norway $3.3 
47. http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/inssp.asp?s=4&l=26.
48. Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18, 17 August 2009. http://www.
iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-18_en.pdf.
Figure 3.6: Resources required for implementing the Nuclear Security Plan 
2010–2013 (Regular Budget and NSF)
Source: “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” Global Dialogue on Nuclear 
Security Priorities (Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2 October 2012).
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million over four years, and the United Kingdom $6 million; Japan, New Zealand and Russia did not specify the amounts of their contributions. The IAEA’s €23 million 2010–
13 nuclear security plan identifies four core areas of work: needs assessment, information collation and analysis; contributing to the enhancement of a global nuclear security framework; providing nuclear security services; and risk reduction and security improvement.49 Nuclear safety and security accounts for approximately ten per cent of the IAEA’s annual €333 million budget.50  Funding is also provided by Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain and Sweden.
3.4.3 Filling the Gaps
3.85 Because nuclear security is a new “fourth” leg of the global nuclear regime (along with disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses), it suffers by comparison from lack of clear authority, resources and governance architecture. The advantage of a leaders’ summit is that it can help to break down political barriers and overcome bureaucratic inertia, and the NSS have generally been given good reviews. According to the study 
conducted by the Arms Control Association, significant progress had been made in ratifying international conventions, securing and removing HEU and plutonium stocks, developing new nuclear security centres of excellence, conferences, and training activities, providing new funding support for HEU conversion and material removals and the like.51 3.86 But the force of the 2010 and 2012 NSS communiqués was weakened by the fact that they were vague, non-binding and full of escape clauses like “as appropriate,” “where technically and economically feasible,” “taking into account the need for assured supplies of medical isotopes,” and “consistent with national security considerations and development objectives.” The NTI study concluded that although governments have become more aware of the threat, there is still no global consensus on the most important steps to achieve nuclear security; state accountability is problematical because of a deliberate lack of transparency; stocks of weapon-useable materials continue to rise in some countries; almost a quarter of the states scored poorly on societal factors; and many lag on joining international agreements.52 3.87 It is appropriate, accordingly, to include a brief discussion here of gaps in the nuclear security regime that need to be plugged. At present there are a plethora of initiatives. The IAEA adopts a nuclear security plan and the Board of Governors expects an annual report on nuclear security from the director general. However, nuclear security is still a peripheral part of the IAEA institutionally. Should initiatives be combined under the IAEA umbrella or is it better to keep the current arrangements but try to make them 
more efficient in coordination and cooperation?3.88 The IAEA’s work on nuclear security has been given much greater prominence, 
visibility and importance since the 2010 NSS. Its dedicated office on strengthening 
49. IAEA, Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 (Vienna: Report by the Director-General, GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18, 17 August 
2009), http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/nsf.asp?s=4.
50. “IAEA Regular Budget for 2012,” http://www.iaea.org/About/budget.html.
51. Cann, Davenport and Balza, The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments.
52. NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index.
Nuclear Security 171nuclear security provides global leadership as well as invaluable technical information, guidance, training and assistance. But it lacks authority to establish mandatory baseline standards for nuclear security and to monitor and enforce compliance with the standards. Regular, independent international review of safety, security and safeguards measures should be the international norm. As the UN’s – that is, the world’s – premier nuclear regulator, the IAEA must be mandated to negotiate binding agreements that establish global nuclear security standards. The IAEA must also be given the authority and the responsibility to certify compliance with these standards by monitoring national implementation. The IAEA should have the lead role in setting international standards, promoting cooperation, and providing on-request peer reviews. To be able to discharge the additional responsibility, the IAEA nuclear security funding should be set at an 
appropriate level. All nuclear suppliers should include the INFCIRC/225 condition (and a requirement that recipients be party to the CPPNM) in their nuclear supply agreements.3.89 The IAEA also lacks predictable and stable funding for its regular budget. An annual 
budget of 333 million euros (2012) is modest for such an ambitious enterprise. Consistent with trends in most areas of the UN system, the vast bulk of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund is funded through extra-budgetary support; that is, on a voluntary instead of an assessed basis. The net result is that the funding base is neither secure nor 
sufficient. It is highly desirable that nuclear security should be funded from an increased 
regular budget. As with most international organizations, the IAEA also faces the problem of tardy payments, and non-payments, by member states. In September 2010 
(the year of the first NSS), around 60 member states owed outstanding contributions totalling almost €90 million to the agency;53 almost 50 states still had outstanding dues of €15.6 million from previous years.54 In September 2012 (the year of the second NSS), about 70 states owed outstanding dues of over €100 million.55 There is no doubt that budgets are going to be cut in what have been the main donor states in the coming years, and this area is not going to be exempt unless there is a major incident that compels a response. There are going to be strong arguments for avoiding duplication in programs, and for looking for synergies, particularly on the technical side.3.90 Should the IAEA become the main focal point for nuclear security cooperation? That will be one of the important issues at the 2014 NSS, possibly even the main one. The NSS was always envisaged as an ad hoc and temporary mechanism, not a permanent institution. There is a serious issue of how to sustain the commitment needed. The summits produce diminishing returns. The existing documents already make the political commitment and it is neither practical nor desirable to keep bringing large numbers of world leaders together to announce minor incremental steps towards the already agreed goal. One option would be for the IAEA to take over the NSS agenda after 
the third and final summit in 2014.
53. That said, even if everyone paid all their dues, none of that money would go to nuclear security projects as of today because nuclear security is not part of the IAEA core budget. This again reinforces the importance of shifting the nuclear security fund into the IAEA core budget.
54. Report by the Director General, Statement of Financial Contributions to the Agency (Vienna: IAEA General Conference, GC(54)/
INF/9, 17 September 2010), http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/GC54InfDocuments/English/gc54inf-9_en.pdf.
55. Report by the Director General, Statement of Financial Contributions to the Agency (Vienna: IAEA General Conference, GC(56)/
INF/7, 14 September 2012, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-7_en.pdf.
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3.91 To institutionalize the response under the IAEA will call for a major task of persuasion, requiring as it would the IAEA mandate, authority and powers to be greatly strengthened. Many IAEA members are concerned that incorporating a nuclear security 
budget into the regular budget while simultaneously freezing the regular budget will 
displace activities they see as more important (with technical assistance probably being 
the first casualty). At present states seek voluntary help and assistance from the IAEA to help improve their domestic regulatory, protection, control and accounting systems through services, guidance and recommendations, without needing to provide mandatory reports on implementation back to the IAEA.3.92 Taken in conjunction with the effort to develop the so-called “state level approach” 
to safeguards (discussed in Chapter 2), this feeds into the wider complaint of some states 
that the IAEA is being re-configured as an instrument to implement Western priorities 
(non-proliferation, counter-terrorism) at the expense of global concerns (disarmament and development).
3.93 CNND believes that such complaints are not justified in this context and that the concerns that the IAEA is seeking to redress are genuinely global, and should be shared 
by all members of the international community. However, it is difficult within the 
foreseeable future to visualize enough states agreeing to give the IAEA mandatory and 
intrusive authority and powers, and the status quo − of IAEA services on request and 
non-binding recommendations as a de facto international nuclear security standard − is set to continue. One price of this is lack of uniformity in the interpretation and unevenness in the implementation of IAEA guidelines from one country to another.3.94 Another possibility is the negotiation of a framework convention on nuclear security,56 similar to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), that 
would bring together the existing disparate and loosely-defined nuclear security conventions, rules and standards. Such a convention would establish an agreed overarching framework, set out common principles, express political commitments, and 
create a periodic review mechanism (for example, meetings at regular intervals like two 
or five years). The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) believes that a framework convention would solve the present problem of a “patchwork of voluntary, nonbinding, non-transparent national commitments, ad hoc bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and 
vague legally binding measures” without specific standards. The IAEA, the group further argues, should be made the convention’s executive agent to monitor and assess national implementation of the international standards and requirements.57 However, given the continuing sensitivity of issues surrounding the UNFCC, an explicit parallel with that here may not be especially helpful.
3.95 A more mainstream view is that steps can only be taken nationally (since that is where the legal authority and resources are) and that it is not necessary to pursue either 
new legal instruments (we need to implement what we have) or a new coordination 
mechanism (if anything we already have too many). The IAEA is and will continue to be 
56. As argued by Kenneth C. Brill and Kenneth N. Luongo, “A security system commensurate with the risk of nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 April 2012.
57. FMWG, Preventing Nuclear Terror in the 21st Century: Policy Recommendations (Washington DC: January 2012), p. 8.
Nuclear Security 173an outstanding technical resource, but it may not help either the agency or the cause of nuclear security to introduce the question of a leading role in governance. An NTI-sponsored global dialogue on nuclear security has concluded that while legally binding mechanisms may be desirable in the future, the search for it now, when no consensus for it exists, is likely to delay urgently needed security upgrades that are feasible within voluntary mechanisms.58  Any lowering of ambition to pursue a legally binding IAEA mechanism should not, however, be seen as reducing the need for intense further international cooperation in a number of other nuclear security areas.
§3.5 International Cooperation
3.5.1. General3.96 Major nuclear reactor accidents – Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and, most recently, Fukushima – have triggered substantial reviews and produced major advances in nuclear safety governance. Because of the added gravity of the risks in the case of nuclear terrorism, advances in nuclear security governance to identify and plug vulnerabilities, both domestic and international, must precede and prevent major security crises, not follow one. Nuclear security is a sovereign responsibility. But because the economic and security consequences of a nuclear security breach or failure could be catastrophic for some or all others, “other governments and the global public have an equity in having some insight into how well the global nuclear security system is functioning.”59  A major nuclear security vulnerability or crisis anywhere would pose an unacceptable risk and threat everywhere. Individual state determination of adequate nuclear security standards and national implementation of the standards will not be enough by themselves. In addition, strengthened international standards and accountability are required on early detection, prevention of attacks, thefts and sabotage, as well as recovery of missing nuclear materials. Securing the world’s most dangerous materials is the universal responsibility of all states and a common responsibility to all humankind.3.97 Yet security lags well behind the other two nuclear “Ss” of safety and safeguards. The historical bias towards national secrecy and sovereignty must give way to international needs and standards of transparency and accountability. With safety, 
security and safeguards alike, states operating peaceful and/or weaponized nuclear programs must both manage the programs to international standards and be seen by the international community to be doing so.
3.5.2. Information Exchange3.98 States parties are not required to report on how they are observing the terms of the CPPNM, the CPPNM Amendment, or the IAEA nuclear security recommendations. In addition to the lack of any reporting mechanism, there is no review mechanism. Nuclear 
58. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” pp. 1–2.
59. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 7.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play174 safety has a mandatory peer review mechanism: the members of the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators (WANO) have accepted mandatory peer reviews. The CPPNM has no such peer review mechanism, nor an external review of any other type, nor any form of international inspection system or provision. Sharing and exchange of information,60 and external reviews of national performance and reporting establish international 
confidence, may act as a check against vulnerabilities that may have escaped detection by national authorities, enable states to provide support and assistance to one another, and facilitate the development of international best practices. But for all the heightened concerns and awareness of the risks and dangers of nuclear terrorism, nuclear security is lacking in minimum transparency, reporting and accountability mechanisms.61 
3.99 In 2005 INTERPOL started project GEIGER with a goal of collecting and analyzing 
information on illicit nuclear trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radiological materials.62 In 2010 the IAEA launched the Nuclear Security Information Portal available for all member states in order to provide an “interactive knowledge-based environment to enhance nuclear security cooperation, facilitate implementation of joint activities and share relevant information.”63 3.100 The Seoul NSS communiqué encouraged states to share best practices. Nuclear security standards and best practices play complementary and parallel roles in ensuring 
security. A “standard” is established by authority, custom or general practice. It defines 
objectives: performance requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics.64 It is static. It represents a consensus judgment – that is, a minimum level of agreement – on goals. It is politically or institutionally authoritative but can be slow to develop. The IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 is the primary nuclear security standards document.3.101 A “best practice,” by contrast, is a method or technique that produces results consistently superior to those obtained with other means. It describes a process, not a goal, and aims to reach an optimum level of performance. Best practices can help to implement standards and also to inform their creation. They develop from the experience of many individuals and groups in government and industry in many countries and are constantly evolving.
3.102 The only existing schemes are voluntary and operated by the IAEA (the 
recommendations) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). Modelled on WANO that was created after the Chernobyl nuclear accident as a forum for nuclear power plant operators to share best practices and exchange lessons learnt on reactor safety, WINS was founded in Vienna in September 2008. It facilitates the sharing of information and experience among security professionals in the nuclear industry, 
60. Some information will have to remain confidential for national security or commercial proprietary reasons. But some 
other information can be shared with other governments, the IAEA, or trusted friendly or allied states, on a confidential basis.
61. It should be noted that some of the reporting on these issues is done via the UNSCR 1540 national reports. Using the reports it is possible to discern to some extent how states are living up to certain commitments.
62. CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Unit, Interpol. http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism/CBRNE-Terrorism-Prevention-Programme/Radiological-and-Nuclear-Terrorism-Prevention-Unit.
63. IAEA, Nuclear Security Report 2011, GC(55)/21, 5 September 2011.
64. The descriptions of standards and best practices is summarized from “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” pp. 2–3.
Nuclear Security 175promotes training and best practices, and develops peer review systems. Much of its effort so far has concentrated on the preparation of a portfolio of best practice guides. In consultation with both industry and government stakeholders, WINS has developed more than 30 best practice guides.65 3.103 Both the IAEA and WINS have demonstrated that it is possible to develop and 
share best practices consistent with the confidentiality of commercially or militarily sensitive information. The best practice guides offered by WINS cover topics from nuclear security culture to threat assessment and effective security regulation and implementation. It offers a peer review mechanism for security management on a voluntary basis on request. It is creating training programs for professional managers and operators of nuclear security and is thus creating “a community of practice” in nuclear security.66 3.104 Canada and Japan have helped to host and fund nuclear security best practice 
workshops with WINS. Canada pledged $100 million for new bilateral security cooperation with Russia. Japan set up a new Integrated Comprehensive Regional Support Centre for Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in December 2010, and helped to fund 
R&D on nuclear detection and forensics techniques. Japan and the United States also set up a bilateral Nuclear Security Working Group to promote cooperation and collaboration. Nuclear security centres of excellence, training centres, workshops and conferences 
have been established or promised in China, India, Kazakhstan, France, Italy, Saudi 
Arabia and South Korea, often with US assistance.67 The meetings of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management and the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling have also become important information exchange and standard setting forums.
3.5.3. Information Security
3.105 Information security is defined as the preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.68 The past few years have witnessed new forms of nuclear security threats mirroring rapid changes in technology. In 2011, Iran experienced a high 
failure rate of its IR-1 centrifuges installed at a fuel enrichment facility in Natanz.69 A computer code named Stuxnet is believed to have been responsible, and while Iranian 
officials denied that it had caused significant damage, the incident marked the first international incident of this nature.70 The incident increased international awareness of threats to nuclear security due to gaps in information security. In light of the increased attention to the issue, in 2011 the IAEA published a reference text on computer security 
65. NSGEG, Improving Nuclear Security Regime Cohesion, p. 6.
66. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 4.
67. See Cann, Davenport and Balza, Nuclear Security Summit, pp. 8–11.
68.  “Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities.” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 17 (2011), http://www-pub.iaea.org/
MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1527_web.pdf.
69. D. Albright, P. Brannan, and C. Walrond, “Did Stuxnet take out 1,000 centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant? 
Preliminary assessment,” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), ISIS Reports, 22 December 2010, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/category/iran/.
70. “Iran says nuclear programme was hit by sabotage,” BBC News, 29 November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11868596.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play176 at nuclear facilities as part of its Nuclear Security Series. The publication highlights the 
specific situations where information security can be compromised to perpetrate an 
attack against a nuclear facility, viz:
 > Information gathering attacks aimed at planning and executing further malicious attacks on nuclear facilities;
 > Attacks disabling or compromising the attributes of one or several computers crucial to nuclear facility security;
 > Compromise of one or several computers combined with simultaneous methods of attack, such as physical intrusion.3.106 Owing to the highly sensitive nature of the information to be protected, little is 
known publicly about specific country measures taken in this context. Nevertheless, 
several countries and organizations have conducted workshops or other events to train employees of nuclear power plant facilities, and there are now more published resources to which states can refer for the implementation of information security measures, for example the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publication on information security.
3.5.4. Transportation Security3.107 In 2011, the IAEA released the “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” as part of its Nuclear Security Series.71  The 2011 text is the fifth revision of INFCIRC/225 (discussed above). The manual contains a set of guidelines concerning the transportation of nuclear material. At the 
same time, it reaffirms that “the responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State.”
3.5.5. Combating Illicit Trafficking
3.108 The IAEA has operated the Illicit Trafficking Database Program (ITDB) since 1995 
as an information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Additional 
activities include performing analyses of confiscated samples, assisting states with border controls, testing detection and monitoring equipment, and conducting training courses.72  The IAEA encourages all its member states to participate and a total of 116 states have joined the ITDB as of 2012. From January 1993 to December 2011, a total of 2,164 incidents were reported to the ITDB by participating states and some non-participating states. Of these, 588 incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other 
radioactive material, and 1,124 cases involved unauthorized activities like disposal of radioactive materials or discovery of uncontrolled sources. Another 399 incidents 
involved unauthorized possession, movement or attempts to illegally trade in or use nuclear material or radioactive sources. In turn, of these 399, there were 16 serious incidents involving HEU or plutonium.73 
71. “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.” IAEA Nuclear 
Security Series No. 13, 2011. http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf.
72. N. Zarimpas, “Appendix 6C: The Illicit Traffic in Nuclear and Radioactive Materials,” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 510.
73.  ITDB Fact Sheet, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp.
Nuclear Security 1773.109 The UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
noted that 20 cases of nuclear material having been diverted had been publicly confirmed by various states,74 and the IAEA’s ITDB Program cites 421 incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials between 1993 and 2008.75 The most notorious example (albeit for 
non-proliferation rather than nuclear security) is the underground nuclear arms bazaar 
run by Pakistan-based Abdul Qadeer Khan, which showed the urgent and compelling 
need to detect, interdict and criminalize the clandestine trade in nuclear and dual-use components, materials, technology and skills. The other side of that enterprise is to 
secure them against unauthorized and illicit acquisition and use.3.110 For obvious reasons, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are shy of 
publicizing their efforts to detect and thwart illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and 
components. But we know that significant cooperation is taking place. For example, the NNSA manages the Megaports Initiative within the US Second Line of Defense program to prevent and respond to incidents of nuclear and radioactive smuggling. It provides training, technical assistance and equipment to strengthen detection and interdiction capabilities in the maritime ports of partner countries. Italy, New Zealand, Norway and the United Arab Emirates have also contributed to the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach 
Initiative launched by the United States. Other donor partners include Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom; and the IAEA, European Union and UNODC.3.111 In December 2011 Russia hosted a meeting with American experts to cooperate in 
improving national capacities to combat trafficking in nuclear materials.76 Similar cooperation between the United States and China was established in January 2011.77 On 1 November 2012, British scientists at the Atomic Weapons Establishment announced the creation of a new machine that can detect attempts to smuggle nuclear material through airports and seaports, even if it has been shielded from giving off radiation.78 
§3.6. National Nuclear Security Regulations3.112 Several countries have strengthened their national regulatory framework and capacity as part of the global efforts to improve nuclear security, from stringent export 
control laws that incorporate international best practices (for example Armenia in 2009 and Malaysia in 2010), to regulating nuclear and radiological activities in conformity with 
regional and global norms and treaties (for example Egypt in 2010). Of course, there is a difference between creating the legal framework and implementation in actual practice.
74. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), paragraph 112.
75. ITDB, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp.
76. “Russian-US Expert Meeting on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear Material,” 2 December 2011, http://www.mid.ru/
brp_4.nsf/0/51790ADC3D6384F94425795D003B2002.
77. “USA and China Cooperate on Nuclear Security,” World Nuclear News, 20 January 2011.
78. Oliver Wright, “Dirty bomb terror threat breakthrough: British scientists build machine to detect smuggling of nuclear materials,” The Independent, 2 November 2012.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play178 3.113 For example in 2012, on the eve of the Seoul NSS, China released a report listing several points that were implemented between the two nuclear security summits in order to enhance nuclear security in the country.79 The report said that authorities had 
already finished assessing security systems at operational nuclear power plants all over the country. Since September 2010, China and the United States had worked together to convert Chinese miniature research reactors, allowing them to substitute HEU with LEU fuel. The two countries were about to establish a radiation detection training centre for 
Chinese and other Asia–Pacific customs officers in accordance with the January 2011 agreement. They had also jointly implemented a pilot program in Shanghai under the Megaports Initiative. Beijing claimed that it had created several laws and regulations to enhance security for radioactive storage facilities; upgraded security facilities for 
regional radioactive storage centres and centralized the storage of several dozen 
hazardous radioactive sources; and developed new high-tech devices to detect explosives and radioactive substances inside vehicles that had already been deployed at major 
international events, including the Shanghai World Expo and the Guangzhou Asian Games in 2010.3.114 A number of similar initiatives are occurring elsewhere. For instance, Indonesia has announced plans to install, with IAEA help, new mobile radiation portal monitors that will greatly increase nuclear and radioactive material detection capabilities at the country’s 
major seaports. It had already been successfully tested at one port, an official said.80 
3.115 In this context, UNSCR 1540 has played a significant role in terms of creating a legal obligation for states to implement measures related to nuclear security and to report on the measures they have taken to the 1540 Committee. “[A]t least 140 States have now adopted legislative measures to prohibit proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as compared to 65 States in 2006. The number of countries reporting national legal frameworks regarding the manufacture and production of nuclear materials has risen from 32 in 2006 to 71 in 2009 and to more than 120 in 2011.”81 
However, as noted in the 2011 report of the committee, significant work remains to be done in the national implementation of nuclear security measures and many states continue to ask for its assistance.
§3.7. Sensitive Nuclear Materials3.116 “Sensitive nuclear materials” are HEU and separated plutonium. The bulk of HEU 
in the world is used for military purposes, but significant amounts are also used in civilian programs and the same is true for separated plutonium. HEU has a threefold 
attraction for terrorists: it can be used in the simple “gun-type” fission weapon with no need for sophisticated detonation equipment; it is smuggler-friendly because it emits 
79.  Xinhua, “China makes progress on nuclear security: report,” China Daily, 27 March 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2012-03/27/content_14922661.htm.
80. Bagus B.T. Saragih, “Govt expands nuclear monitoring at major ports,” Jakarta Post, 3 April 2012, http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/03/govt-expands-nuclear-monitoring-major-ports.html.
81. United Nations, Report of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), S/2011/579, 
14 September 2011, p. 2, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/579. The list of the 168 states that had provided national reports or additional information by 24 April 2011 is given in Annex III.A, while Annex III.B gives the list of those 24 states who had not done so by 30 April 2011.
Nuclear Security 179only faint radiation signals that make it hard to detect; and, being less radiotoxic than 
plutonium, it is safer to handle. HEU remains “the most accessible fissile material for a terrorist nuclear device.”82 Making a successful explosive device from plutonium would present greater challenges for terrorists, compared with using HEU, but the risk is real, especially given the possibility that terrorists might succeed in recruiting one or more experts from a national nuclear weapon program.
3.117 Almost 1,700 tonnes of weapon-grade nuclear materials in the world – enough for 
around 100,000 bombs additional to present stockpiles of just under 18,000 (see Table 1.2)83 – are stored in hundreds of sites in 32 countries. This is in addition to an estimated 111 sites spread across 14 countries in which nuclear weapons are stored.84  While some of the sites are well-secured, many are not.85 Hence the risk of sabotage and theft by or 
82. FMWG, Preventing Nuclear Terror in the 21st Century, p. 6.
83. As an additional complication, not all the HEU will be weapon-grade. A break-down does not seem to be publicly available.
84. Belfer Center, Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet.
85. Sometimes even a well-secured facility is vulnerable; for an account of what may have been “the biggest security breach in the history of the nation’s atomic complex,” see William J. Broad, “The nun who broke into the nuclear sanctum,” New 
York Times, 10 August 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/science/behind-nuclear-breach-a-nuns-bold-fervor.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Table 3.4: Fissile Material Stocks, Military and Civil Material  
(tonnes, January 2012)
Highly-enriched Separated Plutonium Total
Uranium Weapon-grade Reactor-gradeaRussia 737 128 48.4 913.4USA 610 80.7 7.1 697.8France 30.6 6 56.0 92.6China 16 1.8 0.01 17.8
UK 21.2 3.2 92.1 116.5Pakistan 2.75 0.14 0 2.9India 2.0 0.52 4.44b 7.0Israel 0.3 0.82 – 1.1
North Korea 0.03 –Germany – 7.6 7.6Japan – 44.9 44.9Others 20.0 – 10.7 30.7
TOTAL (rounded) 1440 221 271 1932a. Includes “fuel-grade,” an intermediate category between weapon-grade and reactor-grade.  b. Includes 4.2 tonnes of plutonium in India’s strategic reserve, not under IAEA safeguards.
A number of the figures are IPFM estimates, with varying degrees of uncertainty. Nineteen countries, plus Taiwan, had eliminated nuclear weapon-useable materials as of January 2012.
Source: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), http://www.fissilematerials.org. Also “The United States Plutonium Balance 1944-2009”, DOE, June 2012.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play180 illicit sales to terrorists, criminals and others.86 Materials used in the nuclear fuel cycle can be lost, abandoned or removed from decommissioned and inactivated facilities 
without proper authorization. The risks are multiplied in conditions of fragile and failing states, of fragmented authority structures, of a pervasive culture of corruption among 
public officials, or when widespread unemployment, underemployment and poverty can weaken resistance to inducements offered by various groups. There are no precise and 
reliable figures on how much HEU or separated plutonium is missing.3.118 The elements of a perfect nuclear security storm are the abundant supply of weapon-useable nuclear materials, all of which must be secured to ensure non-
availability to unauthorized individuals or groups; the explosion of knowledge and technical expertise, much of it relatively easily accessed through the Internet; the determination of terrorists to get it; and the known ruthlessness of terrorists to use it. For all these reasons, effective nuclear security demands that weapon-useable HEU and plutonium stocks should be eliminated where feasible, and where this is not feasible, 
they should be minimized and consolidated into fewer sites.3.119 In order to limit opportunities for theft and sabotage, states must limit access to 
nuclear material and facilities only to authorized personnel, and to the minimum number of personnel consistent with safe operational requirements; keep material that is not in use in secure vaults; and monitor all storage and access of materials. Physical protection systems should be subject to periodic inspection and testing. Accountability mechanisms include an appropriate legislative and regulatory framework, a competent and independent oversight authority or nuclear regulator, and a clear assignment of responsibilities for nuclear security as well as nuclear safety.3.120 Sensitive Nuclear Materials for Civil Use. Progress has been made in the global efforts to eliminate excess weapon-grade plutonium and to shift from HEU to LEU. Under the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program initiated by the DOE in 1978, 62 HEU-fuelled research reactors have been converted to LEU fuel, another 17 have been shut down, and 11 Russian reactors have downshifted to a lower level of 36 
per cent enrichment (which is still HEU).87 The Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement (PMDA) between Russia and the United States entered into force in July 2011, setting the stage for the United States and Russia to each eliminate 34 tonnes of 
excess weapon-grade plutonium, enough for 17,000 nuclear weapons (see Chapter 2.10).88 In addition, Russia shut down its last plutonium production reactor, in 
Zheleznogorsk, in 2010, with Kazakhstan, Mexico, the United States and Vietnam also committing either to shut down or to convert reactors that use or produce weapon-grade nuclear materials.
86. For an indication of the scale of damage that can be caused by such an eventuality, see http://www-pub.iaea.org/
MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub815_web.pdf, regarding what happened in Goiania, Brazil.
87. Corey Hinderstein, Andrew Newman and Ole Reistad, “From HEU minimization to elimination: time to change the vocabulary,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68:4 (2012), p. 85.
88. US Department of State, “Nuclear Security Summit National Progress Report,” 16 November 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/200633.htm.
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3.121 The United States, the first country to enrich uranium, ended all HEU production in 1992. But it continues to use HEU for military and civilian purposes and to engage in HEU commerce.89 Noting that it had completed the conversion of 20 HEU reactors that can use existing LEU fuels, Washington has pledged to convert its six remaining HEU-fuelled reactors to LEU as soon as suitable fuel can be developed. It is also assisting – 
sometimes in cooperation with the IAEA – several other countries, among them Kazakh-
stan, Mexico and Vietnam, to fulfil their NSS pledges and meet their targets. 
3.122 The most significant theatre of operations in this area of work is Russia and the former Soviet republics and Eastern Bloc countries. In July 2012, the NNSA announced that it had monitored the elimination of more than 450 tonnes of Russian HEU under the 1993 US–Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, otherwise known as the “Megatons-to-Megawatts” program. This program, which is a government–industry program additional to the CTR and GTRI programs, is now 90 per cent complete and on track for the conversion of the total of 500 tonnes of Russian nuclear weapons HEU to LEU by the end 
of 2013 (see Chapter 2).90 As part of monitoring the Megatons-to-Megawatts program, since 1995 NNSA has conducted 335 monitoring visits to Russian HEU processing facilities, and since 2000 the elimination of 30 tonnes of Russian HEU has been monitored each year. By the end of 2013, the NNSA will have monitored the elimination of HEU 
89. Unattributed, “Civilian HEU: United States,” NTI, 2 August 2012, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/civilian-heu-united-states/.
90. “NNSA announces elimination of 450 metric tons of Russian weapons highly enriched uranium,” 9 July 2012, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/print/mediaroom/pressreleases/450tons070912.
NoteThe shutting down or conversion of the reactors shown has been pursuant to the NNSA Global Threat Reduction InitiativeSource: SIPRI
Map 3.1: Nuclear Research Reactors (2012)
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play182 equivalent to about 20,000 nuclear weapons. In addition to the Megatons-to-Megawatts program, from the Washington NSS in April 2010 to mid-November 2012, the United States down-blended 10.5 tonnes of its own HEU, supported Russian down-blending of about 2 tonnes of HEU, and supported the removal and elimination of over 400 kg of HEU from ten countries – in aggregate enough for about 500 nuclear weapons.91 3.123 In 2010, Ukraine removed 56 kg of spent HEU fuel to Russia and another 50 kg of fresh HEU fuel to the United States. It completed the elimination of its HEU stock on 25 
March 2012, when the final shipment of 19 kg of HEU was sent to Russia.92 Ukraine signed 
an MOU with the United States on 26 September 2011 for $60 million in assistance for LEU reactor conversion and a new neutron source medical isotope production facility to be 
operational by 2014. On 22 March 2012, Ukraine announced that it had fulfilled its pledge to remove all HEU material from its territory that was made in advance of the 2010 NSS.93
3.124 Kazakhstan returned more than 70 kg of spent HEU fuel to Russia in 2009 and down-blended 33 kg of fresh HEU fuel in 2011. It also signed an agreement with the United States in November 2010 for a fuel security project to secure three tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium and ten tonnes of HEU. Belarus pledged to return all of its HEU to Russia and had removed approximately 85 kg of HEU.94 However, the project was suspended by Belarus in 2011 in protest at sanctions placed on it by the European Union. Poland worked with the NNSA to remove 450 kg of spent Russian-origin HEU fuel in 2010. In 2012 a further 90 kg of HEU fuel was returned to Russia from Poland’s only operational research reactor.95 The Maria reactor in Poland was converted to LEU as of September 2012.96 3.125 Canada agreed to remove its spent HEU fuel to the United States by 2018 and to provide funding for HEU removals from Mexico and Vietnam. The United States and Canada have been active also in the Americas. The Colombian research reactor IAN-R1 was converted to run on LEU instead of HEU in 1996.97 This was the start of the project to remove US-origin nuclear material from sites and countries where it was considered surplus, an effort that later became part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Since then, 19 countries have removed HEU fuel from research reactors and critical assemblies, and more than 400 kg of HEU has been removed from civilian sites for safe storage in 
Russia and the United States since the first NSS in 2010.98 
91. US Department of State, “Nuclear Security Summit National Progress Report,” 16 November 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/200633.htm.
92. Richard Balmforth, “Last enriched uranium rumbles out of Ukraine,” Reuters, 25 March 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/25/us-nuclear-ukraine-idUSBRE82O06G20120325.
93. Pavel Podvig, “Ukraine removed all HEU from its territory,” IPFM Blog, 22 March 2012, http://fissilematerials.org/
blog/2012/03/ukraine_removed_all_heu_f.html.
94. Pavel Podvig, “Belarus suspends HEU removal talks with the United States,” IPFM Blog, 19 August 2011, http://
fissilematerials.org/blog/2011/08/belarus_suspends_heu_remo.html.
95. Rosatom, “Non-proliferation milestone for Polish reactor,” World Nuclear News, 28 September 2012, http://www.
rosatom.ru/en/presscentre/nuclear_industry/4386c7804ce1faa086feefb60f1aecb4.
96.  Pavel Podvig, “Maria reactor in Poland converted to LEU,” IPFM Blog, 25 September 2012, http://fissilematerials.org/
blog/2012/09/heu_fuel_removed_from_pol.html.
97. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/1996/secy1996-114/1996-114scy.pdf.
98. Hinderstein, Newman and Reistad, “From HEU minimization to elimination,” p. 84.
Nuclear Security 1833.126 Working with the NNSA, Chile completed the elimination of its stock of 18 kg of 
HEU and its removal to the United States ahead of the first NSS in 2010. At the 2012 Seoul NSS, Canada, the United States and Mexico announced the successful removal of HEU from Mexico and conversion of the Triga II Research Reactor to LEU. The HEU 
removal and reactor conversion were completed with IAEA support. The first shipment of LEU took place in December 2011 and the shipment of fuel exchanges was completed in February–March 2012. The HEU removal and upgrades to the Triga II Research 
Reactor were made possible with more than $5 million in funding from Canada. These upgrades, along with the LEU shipments, will allow Mexico to expand its capability to produce a variety of medical isotopes for domestic use.99 3.127 Between 2004 and 2012, 39 research reactors were converted from HEU to LEU fuel, 9 in the United States and 30 in other countries, with NNSA collaboration.100 Overall, the NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative has eliminated all HEU from eight countries: Chile, Libya, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, Taiwan, Turkey and Ukraine. As of February 2012, the United States had removed 400 kg of HEU and plutonium and down-blended 700 kg from civil nuclear programs around the world since the Washington NSS.101 3.128 The reactors yet to be converted may pose the biggest technical challenges. Russia has devoted more effort and resources to converting and shutting down the facilities of others than its own, on the argument that its stockpiles are well secured. Indeed Russia 
was slated to open a new HEU-fuelled reactor in 2012 near St. Petersburg (now expected to begin operations after 2014),102 and is also scaling up the production of HEU-based medical isotopes.103 3.129 New technologies have enabled the production of reactor fuel and medical isotopes using LEU fuel. More than 700 kg of HEU – or about half the world’s consumption – is used in civilian research reactors annually, of which 40-50 kg is used for civilian isotope 
production. Just five countries – Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and South Africa – produce most of the world’s radioactive isotope molybdenum 99 that is the source for more than 20 million diagnostic imaging procedures globally. The Canadian producer has announced the intention to close its business entirely; in December 2010 South Africa switched to LEU-sourced molybdenum 99; and the other producers have promised to follow suit by 2016.104 At the Seoul NSS in 2012, Belgium, France and the Netherlands pledged to convert existing HEU-fuelled facilities by 2014 and to recycle or dispose of accumulated HEU.
99. NNSA, “Mexico HEU Removal: Fact Sheet,” 26 March 2012, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/mexico.
100. Jeff Chamberlin, NNSA, “Overview of the Global Threat Reduction’s Reactor Conversion and Mo-99 Programs,” presentation at the National Academy of Sciences, May 2012, www.nas.edu.
101. All the information in this paragraph is from Cann, Davenport and Balza, Nuclear Security Summit, pp. 4–8.
102. Pavel Podvig, “Russia is set to produce new highly-enriched uranium,” IPFM Blog, 1 June 2012,
http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2012/06/russia_to_resume_producti.html.
103. Matthew Bunn, “HEU Consolidation: The U.S. and Russian Pictures,” unpublished conference paper, 24 January 2012, 
https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Bunn_-_HEU_Symposium_-_Vienna_24_jan_2012.pdf?_=1328045409.
104.  Hinderstein, Newman and Reistad, “From HEU minimization to elimination,” pp. 85–87.
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3.130 Although significant progress has been made on reducing the number of and 
securing fissile materials storage sites, and in conversion of HEU to LEU, states have been reluctant to ban HEU use in civilian applications. Hinderstein, Newman and Reistad 
have argued that the time has come to move from HEU minimization to elimination.105 As part of this, they call for a new global norm that requires LEU to be used in any new facility, process or vessel under development, design or construction, an end to subsidies for HEU production that prices LEU alternatives out of the market, voluntary declarations of HEU holdings, and an assessment of the inventory needs for HEU use in military 
vessels. The more ambitious steps, including fissile-material-free zones, could follow.3.131 Sensitive Nuclear Materials for Non-Civilian Use. The progress made in reducing the availability of sensitive nuclear materials, and HEU in particular, for civilian use, has not been matched in relation to stocks held for non-civilian purposes. The IAEA safeguards agreements require each state to create a national system for accounting for and control of nuclear material. But most of the world’s weapon-useable nuclear material is in nuclear-armed states. Consequently, only a small fraction of the world’s HEU and less than half of the world’s separated plutonium, is subject to international discipline with respect to nuclear material accountancy. As shown in Table 3.4, 98 per cent of the world’s 
HEU stock is held by the five NPT nuclear weapon states (NWS), with even the other four 
nuclear-armed states being only marginal players in this respect. The minimization by non-NWS of the use of HEU, including through the conversion of reactors from HEU to low enriched fuel, is therefore not enough to solve the problem in its totality.
3.132 In order for the international community to have confidence in it, an effective nuclear security regime must be comprehensive. That is, it must cover all weapon-
useable nuclear material. As noted earlier, there have been significant reductions in non-civilian HEU stocks under the Russia–US Megatons-to-Megawatts agreement. “Yet today, the vast majority of weapon-useable material is not subject to international standards, guidelines, best practices, or mechanisms for international assurance.”106 Bunn points out that between them, Russia and the United States possess over 90 per cent of the world’s HEU stockpile, operate more than half the world’s HEU-fuelled research reactors and about two-thirds of the reactors with the most dangerous material, provide most of the HEU-fuelled reactors and the HEU fuel for them to the rest of the world, and yet co-
chair the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which has identified HEU (and 
plutonium) minimization as a key priority.107 3.133 A comprehensive, universal and enforceable nuclear materials control system would be invaluable. The national commitments made by states at the Nuclear Security Summits are minimal, not ambitious, and there is no common rigorous methodology to assess progress against agreed benchmarks. In addition to funding problems, lack of 
technically qualified personnel and technological capabilities, most developing countries simply put higher priority on their more pressing concerns of poverty alleviation and economic development. And they quickly revert to the illegitimacy-of-the-NPT-regime 
105. Hinderstein, Newman and Reistad, “From HEU minimization to elimination,” pp. 83–95.
106. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 9.
107. Bunn, “HEU Consolidation: The U.S. and Russian Pictures.”
Nuclear Security 185argument to note that the US emphasis on nuclear security distracts attention from the lack of major progress on nuclear disarmament. Some developing countries fear that 
this is a trap by the industrialized countries to deny them scientific and technological 
advances. They provide confidential reporting on HEU stocks under IAEA safeguards agreements. But there is no binding transparency or public declarations regime of HEU holdings, military non-explosive stockpiles, inventories of material resulting from nuclear disarmament, material in excess of defence needs, and material in active and reserve stockpiles for military and naval propulsion.
Figure 3.7: Categories of Weapon-Useable Nuclear Materials Globally (2012) 
Source: “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” Global Dialogue on Nuclear 
Security Priorities (Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2 October 2012).
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3.134 The challenge is to devise systems and procedures that secure non-civilian nuclear materials and facilities to international standards and best practices while maintaining 
the necessary confidentiality for commercial or national security reasons. In the global stockpile of weapon-useable materials comprising  1,440 tonnes of HEU and 492 tonnes 
of separated plutonium, almost all HEU (1,400 tonnes) and about half of the plutonium remain outside civilian programs. No nuclear security system will be effective, therefore, “without somehow ensuring that these large quantities of materials are under effective security.” 108 A modest and cautious start could be made by voluntarily bringing some of the non-civilian nuclear material that is not being used in nuclear weapons under international standards and best practices, for example through UNSCR 1540 reporting, 
certifications, and unilateral declarations.
108. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 10.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play186 3.135 It could be argued that military-relevant material, like nuclear weapons themselves, already has a much higher level of protection: hence the point of the earlier comment that HEU and plutonium stocks for civilian purposes must have weapon-standard protection in order for them to be secure. But while non-civilian nuclear material under military protection is generally better protected than civilian material, not all material – even weapons themselves – and facilities under military protection can be assumed to 
be totally safe, as exemplified in the unauthorized transfer of six nuclear weapons across the United States in 2007.3.136 Moreover, not all nuclear material for non-civilian use is under military protection. Warhead components, warheads undergoing maintenance, warheads awaiting dismantlement, and the large stockpiles of US legacy materials, for example, are in the custody of the DOE and under the protection of civilian contractors. On 28 July 2012 three activists – including an 82-year old nun – breached for a few minutes a heavily guarded section of the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee that houses several hundred tonnes of weapon-grade HEU and had been assumed to be secure against armed terrorists. This is a government but not a military facility.109 3.137 A remaining particular challenge is HEU-fuel use in the navies of the world for 
powering submarines and aircraft carriers. France finished converting to LEU for its 
small submarine fleet in 2008. But the naval giants Russia and the United States have declined so far even to publicly assess the feasibility of conversion to LEU-fuelled naval 
reactors for their fleets and they require about one and two tonnes respectively of HEU each year for this purpose.110 
§3.8. Nuclear Forensics
3.138 Nuclear forensic analysis is a key technical capability that utilizes signatures inherent to nuclear or other radioactive material to provide information on its source, production and history. It can prove to be useful both before and after a nuclear security event, and also has the potential to be useful in certain contexts in tracing breaches of the non-proliferation regime. As one would expect, the technical capability to detect current, and just as importantly past, suspect activity continues to develop and advance in sophistication.3.139 When nuclear or radioactive material is found outside and beyond any regulatory 
control, nuclear forensics becomes relevant. The first task for nuclear forensic experts is to determine the location of the material and make sure that it is secured against loss or theft. Subsequent but just as vital requirements are to identify the source and place of origin of the material, plug the vulnerabilities that allowed it to escape regulatory control, and assist the lax or negligent authorities to enact and enforce laws to prevent recurrence of such incidents.
3.140 Experts in the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security trace the “signatures” of each of the production processes in the manufacture of the nuclear material by examining the 
109. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 10.
110. Hinderstein, Newman and Reistad, “From HEU minimization to elimination,” p. 89.
Nuclear Security 187isotope content, chemical constituents and physical shape to determine the geological features of the place from which the uranium ore might have been extracted, or the process by which the ore was concentrated into yellowcake, made into nuclear fuel 
pellets and burned in a reactor. With the help of such specialized forensic techniques, the investigators can usually tell the story of where the material came from, or at least narrow it down to a few places, and retrace its manufacture and use.
3.141 The nuclear forensic analysis of signatures introduced into the material by specific production processes can in some cases determine if the material has been removed from sites or facilities previously deemed secure. By doing so, nuclear forensics can help identify 
previously unknown nuclear security gaps, deficiencies in materials accounting, control and physical protection systems, at the level of individual facilities as well as states. By determining that an intercepted material originates from a particular state, nuclear forensics can help to highlight the need to improve the nuclear security regime in that 
state. Identification of a particular facility or state being the source of material in multiple 
illicit trafficking cases would emphasize issues with existing nuclear security even more.3.142 Nuclear forensics can also be used before a nuclear security event has taken place, 
to help prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material. It can exercise a deterrent function on states as well as individuals. At the state level, the credible attribution potential of nuclear forensics combined with credible assurance of measured response can deter national authorities from actively supporting or 
contributing in any way to illicit trafficking. The same combination of factors is also likely to encourage governments to introduce improvements into the existing nuclear security regime in their own states, as well as to contribute better to international regulatory and policy measures aimed at advancing nuclear security. The individuals working within states in areas with access to nuclear or other radioactive material may be dissuaded from diverting it if they are made aware that the likelihood of attribution and prosecution is increased by an advanced nuclear forensic capability.3.143 In order to function as a deterrent for states or individuals, the discipline of nuclear forensic analysis, working in concert with other means of investigation, has to demonstrate 
the potential to attribute material outside regulatory control to the specific source, and 
possibly to collect information on a history of unauthorized removal. The success of the deterrent function will depend on the credibility and speed of the attribution process, as well as the degree of certainty of the threatened response measures. Since the nuclear forensic evidence might be less than unequivocal, the investigation process must be at least as accurate, reliable and transparent as deemed acceptable by involved states or stakeholders to justify an appropriate response. The current lack of pre-established clarity concerning certainty and form of response may undermine international and local cooperation required for successful attribution. A number of unresolved technical, legal and policy issues in this area are addressed by international mechanisms such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group; as well as by activities within the NSS framework.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play188 3.144 An IAEA Nuclear Security Series publication on nuclear forensics in 2006 brought 
together for the first time a concise but comprehensive description of the various tools 
and procedures of nuclear forensics investigations from the existing scientific literature. It also incorporated the experience accumulated over the preceding decade by law enforcement agencies and nuclear forensics laboratories confronted with cases of illicit events involving nuclear or other radioactive materials.1113.145 In addition, the IAEA helps to build capacity in member states by coordinating research and development, training experts in nuclear forensic methodologies, and providing guidance on the design of a nuclear forensic library. In March 2012, the US 
NNSA teamed up with the IAEA to organize a workshop in the United States with 24 participants from 12 countries.112 Another IAEA regional training course on introductory nuclear forensics for 24 participants from 10 Asian countries was hosted by the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security in Tokai, 
Japan. In the three-day (22–24 May 2012) course, the participants were given short overviews of nuclear security threats, the role of nuclear forensics, the IAEA’s ITDB resource, nuclear forensics core and advanced capabilities, national nuclear forensics libraries, requirements of a nuclear forensic investigation and legal considerations, and international cooperation in nuclear forensics as well as national response plans for nuclear security events.113 
§3.9. Role of Nuclear Industry3.146 As with global governance in general, global nuclear governance is being 
increasingly shared between state, intergovernmental (for example the IAEA) and non-
state (for example WANO and WINS, already mentioned earlier in this chapter) actors. 
This is especially true of the nuclear industry, where there exists significant public–private cross-ownership, not just partnership. Commercial, non-proliferation and nuclear security interests can overlap or collide between industry and government stakeholders, and accountabilities in managing nuclear risks have to be shared between 
parliaments and boardrooms. Just as nuclear security events will add to the financial and commercial costs of the nuclear industry, so industry can help governments to raise the costs of proliferation.3.147 Providing nuclear security must be a shared responsibility between state authorities and the nuclear industry. Industry’s “comparative advantage includes its knowledge of increasingly complex supply chains for hardware and technology exports and its ability to deploy such knowledge to prevent proliferation.”114 In the changing global nuclear energy landscape, the integrated nature of the nuclear industry both 
vertically (across the different levels of the global supply chain) and horizontally (across 
111. IAEA, Nuclear Forensics Support (Vienna: Nuclear Security Series No. 2, 2006), http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/iaeabooks/7401/Nuclear-Forensics-Support.
112. “NNSA, IAEA Offer Nuclear Forensics Training,” Global Security Newswire, 9 March 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/nnsa-iaea-offer-nuclear-forensics-training/.
113. http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/event/20120522/20120522_en.html.
114. Martine Letts, “Nuclear security: Partner with industry,” The Interpreter (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 28 March 2012), http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/03/28/Nuclear-security-The-case-for-a-PPP.aspx.
Nuclear Security 189the different political jurisdictions) puts a premium on active government–industry collaboration to manage the risks and dangers of the three nuclear “Ss” of safety, safeguards and security.3.148 The cooperation between state authorities and the operators is probably the main determining factor in the effectiveness of a nuclear security system, because legislation and regulations cannot compensate if industry fails to implement the necessary measures. While the state authorities can identify current and anticipated threats, it is the industry that must translate those assessments into practical measures at facility level. The operator understands the vulnerabilities of a facility, knows the vital areas that need to be protected and probably owns the equipment and employs the manpower 
needed to perform security tasks. If an incident does occur, it will first and foremost be the operators in charge of nuclear facilities who will have to deal with nuclear and radiological risks associated with it. This was the case, for example, with TEPCO in 
Fukushima in March 2011. At the same time, confidentiality must be maintained of any information that is sensitive from a commercial competition point of view, or the industry sector will withhold cooperation.3.149 Some survey work was done by the Lowy Institute in Sydney on behalf of ICNND. Overall, the nuclear industry took the view that nuclear non-proliferation and security were primarily the responsibility of governments and not of the nuclear energy industry. That said, they subscribed to the same broad goals, believed it to be part of their social responsibility and were prepared to work with governments to prevent, limit or place conditions on the spread of developing dual-use technology to stop it from being abused by rogue regimes and associated networks. While only governments can put in place regulatory regimes, industry can play a critical role in reporting suspicious activities or patterns. But there is some industry scepticism on the value of more restrictive measures.115 Sharing information on best practice among industry can be done while 
respecting the confidentiality surrounding the specific aspects of security measures at facility level.
3.150 The importance of the industry was recognized in the Nuclear Security Summits, where special events and sessions were devoted to exploring how state authorities and industry can work more effectively together. Yet, at the Seoul NSS, even though Australia’s 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard noted that “we should find mechanisms to foster co-operation between governments and the private sector,” industry was given only a side-event.116 The Nuclear Security Summit initiated the discussion of how to ensure that operators are using the highest standards while taking these issues into account. This issue will be explored more fully at the 2014 NSS in the Netherlands.
115. Martine Letts, “Companies ponder their role in non-proliferation and nuclear safety,” Australian Uranium: A Quarterly 
Bulletin from the Australian Uranium Association 12 (2010), pp 5–6, http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/pubfiles/
Letts%2C_Companies_ponder_their_role.pdf.
116. Quoted in Letts, “Nuclear security: Partner with industry.”
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§3.10. Nuclear Security and Safety Interface3.151 Both nuclear safety and security are concerned with public safety and health, but they differ with respect to the events that are to be prevented. Nuclear safety aims at unintended events, such as natural disasters, human mistakes or interruptions; and 
nuclear security aims to prevent intended malicious acts. In contrast to the definition of 
nuclear security given at the start of this chapter, the IAEA defines nuclear safety as “The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment 
from undue radiation hazards.”117 
3.152 Useful progress has now been made in recognizing the synergy between the two concepts. Meeting shortly after the anniversary of the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima, the Seoul NSS highlighted “the nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety,” and it did so with a starkness that was absent in Washington:7. Acknowledging that safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of 
protecting human life and health and the environment, we affirm that nuclear security and nuclear safety measures should be designed, implemented and managed in nuclear facilities in 
a coherent and synergistic manner. We also affirm the need to maintain effective emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities in a manner that addresses both nuclear 
security and nuclear safety. In this regard, we welcome the efforts of the IAEA to organize meetings to provide relevant recommendations on the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety so that neither security nor safety is compromised.118 3.153 The common goal of the interface between nuclear safety and security is the protection of people, society and the environment by preventing any large release of radioactive material.119 The threshold of unacceptable risk may be presumed to be the same for both and both adopt the strategy of defence in depth based on layers of protection that begin with prevention and move to detection and response. Accordingly, many elements and actions enhance both security and safety simultaneously. For example, the containment structure at a nuclear power plant not only prevents the 
significant release of nuclear material in case of an accident, but also provides a robust shield in the event of a terrorist attack.120 
3.154 It appears to be generally recognized now that safety-security overlaps are to be found in:
 > Regulation. It is a good idea to have a single site licence that incorporates safety and security issues rather than two separate licensing systems, one each for safety and security.
 > Design. The planning of a nuclear facility should be done with both safety and security as integral elements, rather than a focus on the safety aspect with security “bolted on” later.
117. IAEA,“The Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” INSAG-24. A report by the International 
Nuclear Safety Group (Vienna: IAEA, 2010), p. 3, paragraph 7; http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/iaeabooks/8457/The-Interface-Between-Safety-and-Security-at-Nuclear-Power-Plants.
118. 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, “Seoul Communiqué,” http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/userfiles/
Seoul%20Communique_FINAL.pdf.
119. IAEA, “Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” p. 3, paragraph 9.
120. IAEA, “Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” p. 1, paragraph 3.
Nuclear Security 191
 > Risk assessment. It is better to have an integrated approach to risk assessment, rather than two separate assessments, one for safety and one for security.
 > Training. Personnel should be sensitized to both safety and security issues as part of their training.
§3.11. Nuclear Security Culture3.155 There are six groups of actors responsible for the proper development of security 
culture. States, organizations, managers in organizations, personnel, public and the 
international community fulfil the different tasks relevant for the realization of nuclear security culture through dialogue and coordination.121 The role played by WINS, as already mentioned earlier in this chapter, is especially important in this regard. There are also additional bilateral and other collaborative arrangements and practices. In a report released during the Seoul 2012 NSS, for example, China said that in the two years 
since the first NSS in April 2010, it had cooperated with the IAEA, the United States and other countries in conducting 20 training courses and seminars for more than 500 nuclear security workers. The IAEA, United States, Canada and “several other countries” had partnered with China to construct a Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security in 
Beijing that will in time provide security training to other Asia–Pacific countries.122 3.156 Similarly, the approach taken by India’s Global Centre for Nuclear Energy 
Partnership – like the Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII), and the European Project to offer nuclear security courses at the European Nuclear Safety 
Training and Tutoring Institute in France – recognizes the importance of an integrated approach to security, safety, and safeguards in the design of these “centres of excellence.” Other existing and proposed centres “should develop appropriate links and collaborations 
with nuclear safety organizations to foster close working relations and the sharing of 
best practices and lessons learned, especially in the field of human resource development and threat assessment exercises.”123 There should also be a standardization of training at the different centres to common norms and benchmarks. All such efforts will help to instil a culture of nuclear security among all stakeholders.3.157 Nuclear security culture is discussed in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 Implementing Guide, and described there as the “assembly of characteristics, attitudes 
and behaviour of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security.”124 Each characteristic is made up of various components, including beliefs and management systems, which together contribute to greater nuclear security. The publication consists of four main chapters: an introduction to the topic, nuclear security and nuclear security culture, roles and responsibilities of institutions and individuals, and characteristics of the nuclear security culture.
121. IAEA, Nuclear Security Culture, p. 7.
122. Xinhua, “China makes progress on nuclear security: report,” People’s Daily Online, 27 March 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7770383.html.
123. Alan Heyes, “An Assessment of the Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence,” Policy Analysis Brief (Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, May 2012), pp. 6–7.
124. IAEA, Nuclear Security Culture, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7, Implementing Guide (Vienna: IAEA, 2008), p. 3; 
<http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1347_web.pdf>.
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3.158 The IAEA organizes a variety of training activities and workshops that are based 
on findings from the work of advisory missions. One of the IAEA programs relevant to 
security culture is the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) whose objective is to support states to develop and improve their national nuclear security. 
Four countries – France, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom – have received a review mission of the IAEA’s IPPAS since the Washington Summit, and Australia, 
Finland, the Republic of Korea, Romania and the United States have presented plans in this regard.
3.159 “International assurances” refer to activities undertaken, information shared, or 
measures implemented voluntarily by one party to provide confidence to others of the 
effectiveness of nuclear security within the jurisdiction of the first party.125 They can 
include “conformity assessments,” as used for example by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) to show that a product, service or system meets the 
requirements specified in an ISO standard; information sharing and annual reports on 
nuclear security regulations and issues; physical protection assessments; certification of 
nuclear security personnel to agreed baseline qualifications and training; bilateral cooperation programs; and peer review mechanisms.3.160 IAEA IPPAS missions offer one example of a peer review mechanism that helps to 
provide international assurance. Since the first such mission in 1996, 56 IPPAS missions in 37 countries have been performed.126 The IAEA IPPAS checks if a country’s laws and regulations conform to IAEA guidance, but not the effectiveness of the implementation 
of the guidelines. Others gain confidence from the very fact that a state agrees to host an 
125. Adapted from “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 6.
126. http://www.nrcsecurityconference.org/slides/Dec5/IPPAS.pdf.
Figure 3.8: Characteristics of Nuclear Security Culture
Source: IAEA, Nuclear Security Culture, p.18.
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Nuclear Security 193IPPAS mission, as Australia will in 2013, for it indicates a national commitment to evaluate and strengthen nuclear security. But the state has no obligation to implement the recommendations and report on them. According to the NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, 17 countries published either regulations or an annual report, and 13 countries published both, on nuclear security issues as of 2011.127 3.161 In addition to acknowledging the nuclear security and safety interface, it is worth noting also that there is a close relationship between nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. While the non-proliferation regime was designed to defend against state 
level proliferation it also provides an important, if by itself insufficient, line of defence against terrorists acquiring nuclear materials, equipment and technologies. Application of safeguards [particularly an effective state system of accounting for and control of 
nuclear material (SSAC)], export controls and the like are all fundamental to the security 
of nuclear material, technology and equipment and to preventing illicit trafficking. Similarly, agreement on measures to limit the spread of uranium enrichment and reprocessing would reduce the risk of both state and non-state misuse of these materials. All of this also can be described as developing a robust nuclear security culture.3.162 If a robust nuclear security culture is to be created, some existing gaps will have to 
be filled. The catalogue of incidents listed in Box 3.1 is suggestive of gaps in the existing national and multilateral machinery of nuclear security. These include lack of universality, binding standards, transparency and accountability mechanisms, compulsory IAEA 
oversight, and insufficient attention to nuclear weapons. The measures adopted by the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 are said to suffer 
from three serious flaws: they are recommendations for voluntary action by states; they are uneven and inconsistent between different states; and they lack built-in accountability requirements and mechanisms. Given the gravity of the threat, a credible and effective nuclear security regime requires the opposite three attributes: mandatory, legally 
binding, and globally uniform standards and monitoring-cum-verification systems. It is not enough to “encourage” states to share best practices and to cooperate with the IAEA in securing the essential and disposing of surplus nuclear material. A nuclear terrorist attack would unleash profound security, political, economic and social consequences.3.163 That said, the international community must weigh in the balance whether an instrument capable of attracting strong political support like the Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources is, for the present, a better outcome than a poorly supported legally binding instrument. David Santoro recommends the cultivation of “nuclear security champions” with in-depth understanding of the political, legal, economic, social and technological aspects of the subject as an effective means of fostering a culture of nuclear security at the state level.128  This would add to the current efforts, for example of the IAEA with its International Nuclear Security Education Network,129 and of the MacArthur Foundation’s initiative on support for graduate and post-doctoral interdisciplinary training in nuclear security.130 
127. “Options for Strengthening the Global Nuclear Security System,” p. 7.
128. David Santoro, “Championing Nuclear Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 September 2012, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/10/championing-nuclear-security/dsz1.
129. http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/workshops/insen-wshop.asp.
130. http://www.macfound.org/info-grantseekers/grantmaking-guidelines/ips-grant-guidelines/.
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4. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
§4.1 Overview§4.2 Objectives and General Strategy§4.3 Nuclear Cooperation§4.4 Mitigating Proliferation Risks§4.5 Nuclear Safety and Security Commitments
§4.1 Overview4.1 The overarching international objective in relation to peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
is to ensure that the benefits of nuclear energy are available to all states that choose to use it, on equitable terms and through international cooperation, while also ensuring that the use of nuclear energy does not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and does not endanger human and environmental health and safety.4.2 The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is one of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT, along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The treaty sets out general peaceful use rights and obligations but does not detail approaches for determining compliance with such rights and obligations. This has resulted in a long-standing debate over compliance with NPT peaceful use rights and obligations. In recent years, a focus of this debate has been the extent to which the NPT mandates development of the most proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies – enrichment and reprocessing.4.3 The renewed interest in nuclear energy for power generation underscores the importance of timely resolution of differences within the international community on peaceful uses of nuclear energy issues. Politicization of peaceful uses issues, to the extent that it exists, is against the interests of the vast majority of states, be they holders of advanced nuclear technology, countries that aspire to a peaceful nuclear power program or countries unlikely ever to want to develop nuclear power.4.4 Nuclear Cooperation. NPT parties at successive treaty review conferences have elaborated the basic NPT peaceful use provisions with respect to nuclear cooperation. For example, Action 51 from the 2010 NPT Review Conference called upon states parties to “Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.”
No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Significant Progress Fully implemented
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Overall Evaluation of Nuclear Cooperation: Significant Progress. NPT 2010 commitments and ICNND 2009 recommendations are generally being met. There are grounds for criticism that technical cooperation assessed funding has not increased more – though it has increased substantially over the years – but the additional funding provided by a number of states is consistent with the increase called for in the NPT 2010 Action Plan.
4.5 The wide uptake of nuclear power and nuclear applications, and the fact that many developing countries have been able to conclude nuclear supply agreements with supplier countries, suggest that national status and supplier non-proliferation practices are not a practical impediment to legitimate nuclear trade and cooperation. Of the 30 states, plus Taiwan, operating nuclear power programs, almost 40 per cent are developing countries. The majority of the 29 states planning or proposing nuclear power programs are developing countries, and of the seven of those states most likely to proceed with nuclear power in the near term, six are developing countries. Looking ahead, the lower 
capital costs and simplified operational requirements of the innovative small power reactor designs currently being developed could make nuclear power more accessible to additional developing countries.4.6 Non-power applications of nuclear technology are also spread widely. Of the 54 states (plus Taiwan) operating research reactors, well over half are developing countries. In terms of the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, which covers nuclear power-related and non-power applications, projects are being undertaken in 123 states and territories, the great majority of which are developing countries. Funding available for this program has increased over the years but debate on its adequacy continues, including the degree of reliance on extra-budgetary and in-kind contributions. This debate should 
continue within the discussion of the IAEA’s system wide budgetary difficulties.
4.7 Mitigating Proliferation Risks. The nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use pillars of the NPT are closely related and mutually reinforcing. Effective 
nuclear non-proliferation measures provide confidence that peaceful nuclear trade and cooperation can proceed without contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation. Also 
vital is confidence that effective nuclear safety and security measures will apply.4.8 National export controls coordinated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are the principal means by which nuclear suppliers give effect to the requirement that exports be consistent with their non-proliferation obligations [see Chapter 2 for detailed discussion]. With export controls now established as an international norm, including through UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the NSG and its members have an important contribution to make through assisting non-members develop and apply effective nuclear export controls.
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Overall Evaluation of Mitigating Proliferation Risks: Some Progress. Most states are meeting their NPT peaceful use commitments, but non-compliance cases – especially Iran and North Korea – are cause for concern. Issues of nuclear latency and hedging are not being addressed. The spread of sensitive nuclear technology and the prospective spread of fast reactors and plutonium fuels in the future will present serious challenges unless addressed. HEU minimization is proceeding, though large quantities of HEU remain in the civil cycle; but no effort has been made to minimize plutonium (as MOX). The establishment of two fuel banks and the work of the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) are positive developments, but further elaboration of multilateral approaches, and the uptake of these approaches, have a long way to go.
4.9 However, little progress has been made in a number of areas with important implications for peaceful nuclear cooperation. An inclusive approach which respects state sovereignty and rights to development is critical. The international community is broadly agreed that limiting the spread of sensitive nuclear technology is in the interests 
of all states and making this choice will involve substantial practical benefits to countries looking to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs. But the need remains to reach a shared understanding on how to translate this general principle into practical steps and concrete actions.4.10 There has been no progress on addressing the potential problems of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in non-nuclear-weapon states. These capacities inadvertently or deliberately provide such states with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short time. Likewise, the prospective spread of fast breeder reactors and plutonium fuels in the future will present serious challenges unless addressed. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) minimization is proceeding, though large quantities of HEU remain in the civil cycle; no effort has been made to minimize the use of plutonium in the civil nuclear power sector (as mixed oxide – MOX – fuel).
4.11 Safety and Security Commitments. Nuclear safety and security have global 
ramifications for peaceful nuclear use but continue to be seen mainly as national concerns. A more appropriate balance is needed between national and international interests and responsibilities. This should include increased focus on the development of and adherence to international standards, as well as greater transparency and accountability.4.12 Participation rates in existing nuclear safety and security treaties and other 
instruments remain inconsistent with the consequences significant nuclear safety or 
security incidents have for global confidence in peaceful nuclear energy. One state, Iran, operating a nuclear power reactor, is yet to join the principal treaty on nuclear safety – the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). A number of states operating power reactors 
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Overall Evaluation of Safety and Security Commitments: Some Progress. Not 
all states with significant nuclear activities have joined the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), and there is a lack of international standards, transparency and accountability. Many states with power reactors remain outside the liability regimes. On nuclear security, many states remain outside the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM), and there are insufficient ratifications/accessions for the Amended CPPNM to enter force. Again there is a lack of international standards, transparency and accountability.
§4.2 Objectives and General Strategy4.13 The right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the NPT, the other two being non-proliferation and disarmament. A key objective of the NPT is to ensure that nuclear energy is indeed used only for peaceful purposes and does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Article IV of the NPT 
affirms the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided this is in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations of the treaty and IAEA safeguards are 
applied to verify fulfilment of these obligations. 4.14 The need for effective control of nuclear energy to ensure that it is used only for 
peaceful purposes was one of the first issues addressed by the United Nations when it was established in 1946. A number of proposals were examined, including placing all nuclear materials under the control of an international agency, but the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to reach agreement on these.
4.15 Following the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test in 1949, attention turned to preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Recognizing the right of countries to exploit nuclear energy, the United States proposed a policy of cooperation under peaceful use guarantees in President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1953. This initiative led to the establishment of the IAEA in 1957, and subsequently to the negotiation of the NPT in 1968 and its entry into force in 1970.
are yet to join the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Treaty participation in the area of nuclear security is similarly inadequate. The principal convention on nuclear security, the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) has 148 parties, well short of universality. Seven years after the 2005 Amendment extending application 
of the CPPNM was opened for signature, less than two thirds of the ratifications required for its entry into force have been obtained.
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4.16 The NPT does not in fact specifically define peaceful purposes and peaceful uses. What is encompassed, in effect, is anything not within two other categories of nuclear activity contemplated by the treaty, viz:
 > The manufacture or other acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, which activities are 
proscribed for all but the five countries recognized by the NPT as nuclear-weapon states (NWS); and
 > Non-peaceful purposes that are not proscribed – that is, non-explosive military purposes such as naval propulsion reactors. It is clear from the wording of Article III and international practice1  that these activities are not peaceful purposes. Accordingly their status is ambiguous in terms of the “inalienable right” referred to in paragraph 1 of Article IV, and they are outside the scope of the cooperation envisaged under paragraph 2 of Article IV.
4.17 The lack of a clear definition of peaceful purposes leaves a grey area with respect to nuclear latency and nuclear hedging, problems which were neither adequately foreseen nor appropriately addressed at the time the NPT was negotiated. These are discussed further in section 4.4.4.18 For present purposes, the overarching international objective in relation to peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy may be described as being to ensure that the benefits of nuclear energy are available to all states that choose to use it, on equitable terms and through international cooperation; while also ensuring that the use of nuclear energy does not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and does not endanger human and environmental health and safety. The strategies to advance this objective are discussed in the remainder of this chapter, under three headings as follows:4.19 Cooperation in developing peaceful applications. The main NPT provision is Article IV.2, and the principal 2010 NPT Review Recommendations are Actions 48 to 51. Key questions here include: are states meeting the commitment to cooperate in developing peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and is due consideration being given to the needs of developing countries?4.20 Mitigation of proliferation risks associated with peaceful purposes. The main NPT provision is Article II, and the principal 2010 NPT Review Conference recommendation is Action 61 on minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium. ICNND 
recommendations 34 to 38 are more specific. Key questions here include: do IAEA 
safeguards provide sufficient assurance against possible misuse of nuclear programs for non-peaceful purposes, are further institutional and technical measures needed to mitigate proliferation risk, and can states exercise effectively the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without needing to develop proliferation-sensitive stages of the fuel cycle? Proliferation risk issues are addressed in more detail in Chapter 2.
1. As reflected for example in paragraph 14 of the IAEA model NPT safeguards agreement, INFCIRC/153.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play200 4.21 Ensuring peaceful nuclear programs are conducted safely and securely. Safety 
and security are not specifically referred to in the NPT, but they are covered by other treaties and in Actions 57, 59, 60, 62 and 63 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The key question here is: are states, in conducting their nuclear programs, applying standards 
of nuclear safety and security sufficient to ensure protection of other states from the consequences of nuclear accidents or terrorist acts? Nuclear security issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
§4.3 Nuclear Cooperation
4.3.1 Among States4.22 An essential aspect of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT is the commitment to international cooperation, set out in Article IV.2. Prior to the treaty, nuclear cooperation, including supply of nuclear facilities, equipment and nuclear materials, took place under bilateral agreements between supplier and recipient states. In economic terms bilateral cooperation remains the most substantial form of nuclear cooperation, through supply of reactors, nuclear fuel and nuclear services. At the multilateral level, the main vehicle for nuclear cooperation is the IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme, discussed in the next section.4.23 Nuclear Power. The NPT established a much broader basis for peaceful use 
commitments and verification, extending beyond supplied items and materials to all of the nuclear material and activities in a state. In so doing, the NPT has established the conditions under which nuclear trade has been able to grow to its current global scale. 
The NPT and the IAEA safeguards system have provided confidence to states that they are able to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.4.24 Nuclear energy provides just over 12 per cent of global electricity.2 There are 30 states, plus Taiwan, operating nuclear power programs (Table 4.1). Almost 40 per cent of these (12 out of 31) are developing countries.3 The IAEA reports that there are 29 states planning or proposing nuclear power programs. The IAEA does not identify these but indicates that most are developing countries.4 Using a conservative figure of seven for those states most likely to proceed with nuclear power in the near term,5 six of these are developing countries.
2. IAEA, International Status and Prospects for Nuclear Power 2012. GOV/INF/2012/12-GC(56)/INF/6 (Vienna: IAEA, 15 August 2012), Table B.1, p. 3.
3. States with nuclear power that are defined by the World Bank (2012) as “developing countries” (http://data.worldbank.
org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups) are: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, India, 
Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa and Ukraine. The World Bank definition also includes Russia, but Russia is not counted as a developing country in this report on the basis that it is a leading nuclear power.
4. IAEA, International Status and Prospects for Nuclear Power 2012.
5. The seven are Bangladesh, Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey, UAE and Vietnam. All but Poland are categorized as developing countries by the World Bank.
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Table 4.1: World Nuclear Energy (January 2013)
Operating reactors Reactors under construction
Number Total Capacity (GWe) Number Total Capacity (GWe)Argentina 2 0.9 1 0.7Armenia 1 0.4Belgium 7 5.9Brazil 2 1.9 1 1.2Bulgaria 2 1.9Canada 19 13.7China 17 12.8 29 28.8Czech Republic 6 3.8Finland 4 2.7 1 1.6France 58 63.1 1 1.6Germany 9 12.1Hungary 4 1.9India 20 4.4 7 4.8Iran 1 0.9Japan 3 3.1 3 4.0Korea, Republic of 23 20.8 4 5.0Mexico 2 1.3Netherlands 1 0.5Pakistan 3 0.7 2 0.6Romania 2 1.3Russia 33 23.6 11 9.3Slovak Republic 4 1.8 2 0.8Slovenia 1 0.7South Africa 2 1.8Spain 8 7.6Sweden 10 9.4Switzerland 5 3.3Taiwan, China 6 5.0 2 2.6Ukraine 15 13.1 2 1.9UAE 1 1.3United Kingdom 16 9.2United States 104 101.5 1 1.2
390 331.1 68 65.4Japan - shutdown reactors 48 41.3
Source: IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play202 4.25 The long-term impact of the Fukushima accident on planned nuclear programs is not yet clear. The accident is likely to make nuclear power more expensive through 
higher capital costs, due to more rigorous safety requirements, and higher finance costs, 
reflecting lenders’ reappraisal of commercial risk. The World Energy Council has 
reported that the Fukushima accident has not so far led to a significant retraction in nuclear power programs outside Europe, except in Japan. While progress in many national programs has been delayed, there is no indication that these countries’ pursuit of nuclear power has declined in response to Fukushima.6 The German and Japanese governments announced the phase-out of nuclear power, but it appears (January 2013) that the new Japanese government will re-examine its predecessor’s decision. The Chinese government decided to cancel planned Generation II reactors and replace them 
by Generation III models, a move that will bring safety benefits but will increase costs and slow down China’s nuclear expansion in the near term. Also in the Asian region, 
India has affirmed its plans to boost its nuclear capacity up to 15-fold by 2032, and Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam are proceeding with announced plans. Indonesia and Thailand have delayed nuclear power until after 2020. However Malaysia announced 
after Fukushima that it is considering the option of nuclear power.4.26 Of the 54 states (plus Taiwan) currently operating research reactors, well over half (31) are developing countries.7 Apart from research reactors, statistics are not readily available on the number of states in which non-power nuclear applications are used, but this would include most if not all the world’s states. In terms of the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, which covers nuclear power-related and non-power applications, projects are being undertaken in 123 states and territories,8 the great majority of which are developing countries.4.27 The Action Plan from the 2010 NPT Review Conference elaborated on the implementation of nuclear cooperation, inter alia calling on parties to give preferential treatment to the non-NWS, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries, and to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and cooperation among states parties, eliminating any undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty.9 
4.28 The figures cited above demonstrate that nuclear energy has brought benefits to a great many states, including many developing countries. The fact that the uptake of nuclear 
power by developing countries has not been greater reflects practical constraints, such as the high capital costs of power reactors, human and technical infrastructure requirements, and electricity grid capacity. In the near term, the main growth in nuclear power in developing countries will be where the technology is already well established – particularly China and India. Looking ahead, a number of innovative small power reactor designs10 are under development, with features more suited to conditions in developing countries, including lower power levels, life-time or long-life fuel cores and modular construction 
and operation. The lower capital costs and simplified operational requirements of these reactors could make nuclear power more accessible to a number of developing countries.
6. World Energy Council, Nuclear Energy One Year After Fukushima, 2012, http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/world_energy_perspective__nuclear_energy_one_year_after_fukushima_world_energy_council_march_2012_1.pdf
7. IAEA, Research Reactor Database, 2012, http://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx?rf=1.
8. IAEA, Annual Report 2011 (Vienna: IAEA, 2012), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2011/index.html.
9. Actions 50 and 51 respectively – see section 4.3.1 below.
10. Small reactors are defined by the IAEA as less than 300 MWe.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2034.29 Few states have developed indigenous nuclear technology and few produce nuclear materials. The uptake of nuclear power and other nuclear applications has been enabled by nuclear cooperation among states. Today no state has a wholly self-reliant nuclear energy program; there is a global market in nuclear equipment, technology, materials and services. The nuclear market operates on a commercial basis – there is no known case of a state being excluded, other than on grounds of proliferation concern.4.30 The commitment to cooperate applies only to peaceful uses, and is subject to the other provisions of the NPT, for example Article IV.1 (which in turn refers to Articles I 
and II) and Article III. This is reflected in the wording of Action 51 from the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A state party considering cooperation, or asked for cooperation, may take into account the other party’s performance with respect to NPT obligations, for example whether there have been safeguards violations (Article III) or whether there are grounds for concern regarding Article II (the commitment not to seek nuclear 
weapons). These considerations are reflected in national export controls (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2).4.31 National export controls on nuclear equipment, nuclear-related materials and 
technology, and specified dual-use items are coordinated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These controls are fully consistent with the NPT, giving effect to the requirements of Articles I and II of the treaty. The NSG membership includes several major developing countries, for example Argentina, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey.11 4.32 Apart from export controls applied by states, the technology holders (for example URENCO, TENEX, BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels Limited) and AREVA) themselves are very cautious about the states to whom they supply. In enrichment, URENCO and TENEX supply only on a black box basis, so that technology is not transferred. These issues are discussed further in section 4.4.4.33 The fact that non-proliferation practices have not been a practical impediment to legitimate nuclear trade is demonstrated by the uptake of nuclear power and nuclear applications, discussed above, and by the many developing countries that have been able to conclude nuclear cooperation agreements with supplier countries. For example, states with nuclear supply agreements with the United States include Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand and the UAE. Further US agreements are being negotiated with Jordan and Vietnam.4.34 Other Forms of Nuclear Cooperation. While nuclear energy is usually thought of in terms of nuclear power, non-power nuclear applications are also very important. These include the use of nuclear techniques in areas such as human health, food and 
agriculture, and physical and chemical sciences. Developing countries have benefitted particularly in these areas. Nuclear cooperation among states is not limited to nuclear trade, but includes non-power nuclear applications and also training, capacity-building, 
11. Other NSG members categorized by the World Bank as developing countries are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play204 sharing of experience, and so on, in areas including facility operations and the “3 Ss” – safeguards, safety and security.4.35 Statistics are not readily available on the number of states in which non-power nuclear applications are used, but this would include most if not all the world’s states. Mostly cooperation in non-power applications is provided through the IAEA. Under the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, which covers nuclear power-related and as well as non-power applications, projects are being undertaken in 123 states and territories,12 the great majority of which are developing countries, including 30 Least Developed Countries. The IAEA’s program is discussed further in section 4.3.2.4.36 In addition to cooperation provided through the IAEA, there are many bilateral and regional projects and programs. There are too many examples to list here, but mention 
can be made of a few: IAEA Regional Cooperative Agreements – in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Arab states, and Latin America; the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC – see further below); global and regional cooperation and assistance programs operated by the European Union (EU) and many governments, particularly (because of its scale) the United States; establishment of regional training centres and centres of excellence on nuclear safeguards and nuclear security, for example by China, India, Japan and South Korea; the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN); and the Asia–
Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN). A recent initiative is the Gulf Nuclear Energy 
Infrastructure Institute (GNEII), opened in Abu Dhabi in 2011: this is a joint US/UAE venture aimed at strengthening nuclear energy security, safeguards and safety infrastructure development throughout the Gulf region. There are also the industry-based World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), dealing with nuclear safety, and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS).
4.3.2 Role of the IAEA in Nuclear Cooperation 4.37 All of the IAEA’s program areas (safeguards, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear energy, and nuclear sciences and applications), include elements of cooperation, training and capacity-building for IAEA member states. The IAEA’s main vehicle for nuclear cooperation, however, is the Technical Cooperation Programme. While all IAEA member states are eligible for technical support, “in practice technical cooperation activities tend to focus on the needs and priorities of less developed countries.”134.38 Because the IAEA’s statute does not expressly refer to a Technical Cooperation Programme, this program is not funded as part of the agency’s regular budget, but primarily through voluntary contributions from member states to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). Contributions are based on an assessed share of a target amount set by the member states in consultation with the IAEA secretariat. These extra-budgetary funds are supplemented by other resources and in-kind contributions provided by a number of states.
12. IAEA, Annual Report 2011, p. 14.
13. IAEA, Our Work, Technical Cooperation, http://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/programme/index.html.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2054.39 The Technical Cooperation report for 2011 indicates that the IAEA was able “to expand its role in contributing to the global development agenda through its technical cooperation (TC) programme.” The report notes the comparative advantages of nuclear technologies, applications and techniques for contributing to sustainable development within the framework of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011–2020 and the concept of a “green economy.”14 The 2011 TCF expenditures by technical field are set out in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: 2011 IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund Expenditure  
by Technical Field
Field Expenditure €million Per Cent of totalNuclear fuel cycle 22.544 27.0Human health 15.200 18.3Nuclear safety 13.412 16.1Human capacity development 7.994 9.6Radioisotope production  & radiation technology 6.935 8.3Food and agriculture 6.312 7.6Nuclear power 3.520 4.2Environment 2.481 3.0Water resources 1.270 1.5Source: IAEA, Technical Cooperation Report for 2011, Supplement, p. 36.
4.40 The IAEA provides the foundation for international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure, offering a wide range of services, publications and meetings to assist member states intending to develop nuclear power. In 2009, the IAEA began providing Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review missions to member states. These cover the comprehensive infrastructure required for building a nuclear power program including safeguards, security and safety. The missions, shown in Table 4.3, have been carried out in seven states – Bangladesh, Belarus, Indonesia, Jordan, Thailand, UAE and Vietnam – and a mission is being planned for Turkey.4.41 The IAEA also offers the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), designed to enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory infrastructure of states for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport, safety and security of radioactive sources, by reviewing both regulatory technical and policy issues against IAEA safety standards and good practice in other states. The Technical Cooperation Programme also delivers substantial assistance to IAEA member states on developing the infrastructure necessary for a nuclear power program.
14. Report of the Director General, Technical Cooperation Report for 2011, GC(56)/INF/4 (Vienna: IAEA, July 2012), p. 5; 
http://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Pub/Ann-Reports/index.html.
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Table 4.3: IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Missions
INIR Missions Conducted in or 
Planned for
Review Status Other Information
Bangladesh 2011 Phases I & IIIndonesia 2009 Phase IJordan 2009 Phase IThailand 2010 Phase IUAEa 2011 Phase IIVietnam 2009 Phase IJordanb 2011 Follow-up Follow-up mission to 2009 missionBelarus 2012 Phase I & IIcPoland 2012 Phase IVietnam 2012 Phase II On-goingJordan 2013 Phase II Tentatively plannedSouth Africad 2013 Self-evaluation Tentatively plannedTurkeye 2013 Self-evaluation Tentatively planned
a. http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Infrastructure/files/UAE-INIR-Mission-January-2011-Report.pdf. 
b. First follow- up mission ever conducted (source: http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/News/2012/2012-04-10-INIG.html). 
c. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2012/belarusnp.html. 
d. http://www.necsa.co.za/Article/e23147b1-e19c-4a26-ae7d-38dd2528155d/6/Iaea-to-conduct-nuclear-infrastructure-mission-to-sa- october-.aspx. 
e. http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/News/2012/2012-11-14-INIG.html. 
Source: IAEA’s INIR website: http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Infrastructure/home.html4.42 In non-power applications, the IAEA collaborates closely with other relevant international agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to ensure that TC projects are conducted in priority areas.4.43 In 2011 member states’ contributions to the TCF were €60.5 million. Additional resources – other income, further extra-budgetary and in-kind contributions – amounted to €21.4 million, making an overall total of €81.9 million (approximately USD 114 million).15 Resources available to the TCF in 2011 represented an increase of almost 60 per cent over the resources available a decade earlier, in 2002 (€51.5 million) – even 
allowing for inflation, a substantial increase. Active projects at the end of 2011 totalled 681, with an additional 80 projects in the process of being closed.16 In addition, the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, launched in 2010, “has become an important vehicle to raise extra-budgetary contributions for IAEA activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.”174.44 There are regular calls for the resources to the TCF to be increased. In this regard, the additional resources of €21.4 million contributed to the TCF in 2011 are consistent 
with the additional contributions of $100 million over five years called for in NPT 2010 
15. IAEA, Technical Cooperation Report for 2011, Supplement, p. 3.
16. IAEA, Annual Report 2011, p. 97.
17. Understanding the Peaceful Uses Initiative (Vienna: IAEA 2012), 
 http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2012/pui.html.
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Action 55. The suggestion that developing countries would benefit by increasing the funding of the TCF needs careful analysis. Typically each year the TCF underspends available funding, for example for 2011 the IAEA reported that the implementation rate for the TCF was 74 per cent.18 Making better use of the available funds would bring 
increased benefit without increased funding levels. The TC Programme has been criticized on a number of grounds, including that recipients include a number of high- or relatively high-income states that can well afford to pay for IAEA services,19 and that there is inadequate review and follow-up of project completion and outcomes.20
4.45 On the first point, it is noted that in 2011 the Europe region received some 48 per 
cent of TCF assistance, compared with Africa and Asia/Pacific, each around 18 per cent, and Latin America 12 per cent. As shown in Table 4.2, over 31 per cent of TCF expenditure was for projects relating to the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear power, and 16 per cent for nuclear safety – all very important areas, but it could be asked whether those states active in these areas, certainly states operating or building nuclear facilities, should be able to afford to pay for IAEA services. These costs would be marginal compared with the costs of a nuclear power program.4.46 Regarding the second point, the IAEA’s TC review processes are undergoing improvement. For further increases to TCF funding to be warranted, it should be 
demonstrated that the current program is fully efficient, current funding is being fully utilized, planned outcomes are being achieved, including in subsequent years, and that funding is targeted at those in genuine need.
§4.4 Mitigating Proliferation Risks
4.4.1 Safeguards, Technology and National Supply Policies4.47 Uranium enrichment and reprocessing, the key processes required for producing nuclear fuel at the front end and the back end of the fuel cycle, can also be used for 
producing fissile material21 for nuclear weapons – indeed, they were first developed for this purpose. Accordingly, mitigating proliferation risk is largely concerned with ensuring that these technologies are used only for peaceful purposes. 4.48 The international community is broadly agreed that limiting the spread of these sensitive nuclear technologies is in the interests of all states and making this choice will 
involve substantial practical benefits to countries looking to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs. But an inclusive approach which respects state sovereignty and rights to development is critical. There is a need to reach a shared understanding on how to translate this general principle into practical steps and concrete actions.
18. IAEA, Technical Cooperation Report for 2011, p. vii.
19. Trevor Findlay, Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog (Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovations, 2012), p. 87.
20. Findlay, Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog, p. 87, citing reviews by the IAEA’s Office of Internal Oversight and the US 
General Accounting Office.
21. HEU (highly enriched uranium) and separated plutonium.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play208 4.49 The need for special arrangements for these technologies was recognized at the very beginning of the nuclear era, and proposals were advanced for the inter-nationalization of nuclear programs.22 Agreement could not be reached, however, and nuclear programs have proceeded since on a national basis. Consequently, efforts to mitigate proliferation risk have a major place in the international agenda. There is no magic bullet to eliminate all proliferation risk – no current nuclear fuel cycle is completely proliferation proof. But a combination of institutional and technical measures can give needed robustness to non-proliferation efforts, and also to counter-terrorism efforts.
4.50 Central to these efforts is the NPT. This, however, does not specifically address the use of any particular nuclear technology and requires only that non-NWS conduct 
nuclear activities only for peaceful purposes under verification by IAEA safeguards. It has now become apparent that the NPT does not deal adequately with the issue of proliferation-sensitive technology.4.51 When the NPT was negotiated it was thought that in practice enrichment and reprocessing programs would be limited to the NWS and a small number of other 
advanced industrialized states. Today, in addition to the five recognized NWS and the other four nuclear-armed states, there are at least eight states that have demonstrated 
enrichment capability, and five that have demonstrated reprocessing capability, ten states in all, with some states having both (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: States with Demonstrated Enrichment  
and/or Reprocessing Capability
NWS Nuclear-Armed 
States
Other States
These states have both 
enrichment and reprocessing  
capabilities
Enrichment 
capability
Reprocessing 
capability
Enrichment and 
reprocessing 
capabilitiesUnited States India Argentina Belgium BrazilRussia Pakistan Australia Italy GermanyUK North Korea Iran JapanFrance Israel* NetherlandsChina South Africa
* Israel has neither confirmed nor denied nuclear- -armed status. Source: Centre for Nuclear Non- -proliferation and Disarmament.4.52 An issue neither clearly foreseen nor adequately addressed in the NPT is the distinction between nuclear latency and nuclear hedging. “Nuclear latency” refers to the situation where a state has established, under an apparently peaceful nuclear program, 
dual-use capabilities – uranium enrichment and/or reprocessing. Nuclear latency might be considered inadvertent: a state with enrichment or reprocessing capabilities thereby 
has the basic capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, though it may well have – at least in foreseeable circumstances – no intention of doing so.
22. The Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch plans considered by the UN Atomic Energy Commission in the 1940s.
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4.53 It is not impossible that even a state as firmly committed to non-proliferation as Japan could change its position in the future. Some commentators refer to such a state as a virtual nuclear-weapon state. However, as well as weapons-useable fissile material, other capabilities would be required for weaponization, including suitable delivery systems, and Japan does have a longstanding and strongly held commitment against pursuing nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it does illustrate the problem of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities being in national hands.23 4.54 If nuclear latency is supposedly inadvertent, nuclear hedging refers to a deliberate national strategy of establishing the option of relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a relatively short time frame – ranging from several weeks to a few years.24 Nuclear hedging could result in virtual arms races, with the risk of degenerating very quickly into real arms races, break-out from the NPT, and even nuclear war. The existence of suspected nuclear 
hedging programs undermines the confidence and stability that the NPT is intended to promote. There is no doubt that the larger the number of states perceived as virtual nuclear-armed states, the greater the potential destabilizing effect on the non-proliferation regime.4.55 Safeguards. When the NPT was concluded, it was assumed that IAEA comprehensive safeguards would provide timely warning of any misuse of nuclear facilities, giving the international community opportunity to intervene before a proliferator has time to turn diverted nuclear material into nuclear weapons. However, centrifuge enrichment 
technology presents a serious challenge to this objective − the relative ease  of  concealing centrifuge plants and the potential speed of break-out mean that in certain circumstances,25 adequate warning time cannot be guaranteed. Even if removal of enriched uranium from safeguards, or use of a safeguarded facility for high enrichment,26 is detected immediately, the time required for international deliberations could mean that practical intervention is not possible within the necessary timeframe.4.56 Similar timeliness issues are raised where stocks of separated plutonium are held. 
The risks are exacerbated where high-fissile (weapon-grade) plutonium is involved, for example with fast breeder reactors or large “research” reactors.27 There is a real concern that if plutonium is diverted, and the state has been able to make the necessary preparations in advance, the plutonium could be turned into nuclear weapons before effective intervention is possible.4.57 Where proliferation-sensitive facilities and materials are involved, it is essential to have the most effective form of safeguards. Today this includes measures under the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, together with the most advanced safeguards technologies – 
23. This concern is reinforced by the occasional comments by some Japanese political figures about the need to maintain fuel cycle capabilities in order to ensure a nuclear weapon option, or “strategic deterrence.”
24. Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27:3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59–88.
25. For example a state that has an industrial-scale enrichment facility, or the capability to establish undeclared enrichment facilities for upgrading LEU diverted from safeguards.
26. One problem here is that production of HEU is not prohibited – if a state started to do this, vital time could be lost on legalistic arguments.
27. Such as Iran’s Arak reactor.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play210 remote monitoring, a “safeguards by design” approach for facilities, and so on. Although the number of states that have concluded Additional Protocols continues to grow – by 18 since the 2010 NPT Review Conference – several states with sensitive nuclear programs still remain outside this most effective form of safeguards (see Chapter 2). As important as universalization of the Additional Protocol is, however, the practical limitations to safeguards outlined here indicate the case against over-reliance on safeguards – non-proliferation is also dependent on other technical countermeasures and on institutional measures, especially establishing multilateral rather than national control of proliferation-sensitive nuclear facilities.4.58 Technology. Technical approaches to mitigating proliferation risk involve avoiding or minimizing the production and use of proliferation-sensitive materials, and building proliferation resistance into facilities and technology. While the focus of proliferation resistance is on possible misuse by states, measures taken for proliferation resistance can also contribute to nuclear security through protecting nuclear materials and facilities 
against access and misuse by non-state actors. For example, avoidance/elimination of weapon-grade materials in civil nuclear programs reduces the risk of terrorists being able to produce a workable nuclear explosive device.4.59 Technical measures for proliferation resistance include avoiding production of weapon-grade material and introducing technical barriers to producing such material; 
ensuring nuclear material is difficult to access (for example through high radiation levels) 
in order to increase the difficulties of diversion by states or theft/seizure by terrorists; and avoiding separation of plutonium from spent fuel, at least as a pure product.4.60 International efforts to minimize production and use of proliferation-sensitive materials have been focused on highly enriched uranium (HEU). The principal use of HEU in civil programs has been as fuel for research reactors. HEU is also used as an irradiation target material for production of medical isotopes. These efforts have had considerable success: since 1978, 62 HEU-fueled research reactors have been converted to use LEU fuel and 17 HEU reactors have been shut down in 36 states. In the medical-isotope industry, most producers have committed to convert their reactors and targets to use LEU by 2015. However, some 70 tons of HEU remain in the civil sector28, and remaining reactor conversions are expected to take another decade or more.4.61 Similar attention has not been given to use of plutonium fuels. Plutonium obtained through reprocessing spent fuel has been in commercial use as reactor fuel, mainly in the form of MOX – a mix of plutonium and uranium oxides – since the 1980s. Currently MOX is used in over 30 power reactors, mostly in Europe. The plutonium currently used in MOX fuel is reactor grade, having an isotopic composition well outside the weapon-
grade range. It would be difficult for a sub-state group to successfully explode a device made from this material, and the yield would be uncertain. A much higher risk would be presented if MOX was produced from weapon-grade plutonium – from the terrorism as well as the proliferation perspective, production of weapon-grade plutonium in civil programs should be avoided.
28. NTI, Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination Resource Collection, http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/civilian-heu-
reduction-and-elimination/.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2114.62 The main risk of weapon-grade plutonium being produced and used in the civil cycle comes from the prospective use of fast breeder reactors. In the established fast breeder reactor design, the reactor core, containing the fuel, is surrounded by a uranium “blanket” in which neutrons are captured to produce further plutonium. A major issue from the non-proliferation perspective, however, is that plutonium produced in fast breeder reactor blankets has a very high proportion of the isotope Pu-239, well within the weapon-grade range. This combination of producing weapon-grade plutonium and reprocessing presents obvious proliferation concerns. Moreover, use of separated weapon-grade plutonium on a commercial scale could present a major terrorism risk.4.63 This problem is recognized at the technical level and reactor designs are being considered in which plutonium would be produced outside the weapon-grade range. The international programs coordinating research in this area - INPRO29 and GIF30 - include proliferation-resistance amongst the major development criteria. Of particular importance is the development of advanced spent fuel treatments – such as electro-metallurgical processing (otherwise known as pyro-processing) – which will enable 
plutonium recycle without separation. Plutonium will not be produced as a purified 
material, but will remain in a highly radioactive mix with fission products and other spent fuel materials. This highly radioactive mix will be made into new fuel using robotic equipment. In 2010 the US and South Korea agreed to a joint study of pyro-processing, particularly proliferation resistance aspects.4.64 Another approach promoted by some is the thorium fuel cycle, which avoids the production of plutonium. India has a long-standing interest in developing the thorium fuel cycle, and more recently China has commenced a substantial research program in this area. 4.65 India has major thorium reserves, and the possible use of thorium reactors has been under discussion there for decades. In June 2012 R. K. Sinha, Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, announced plans for a thorium power plant. About two decades would be needed to assess the performance of the thorium reactor before 
replicating the initial prototype in significant numbers.31 The current Indian vision for the thorium fuel cycle, however, raises proliferation and terrorism concerns: use of plutonium “driver fuel” is an essential aspect, and this would be weapon-grade plutonium produced in fast breeder reactors.4.66 In China, it is reported that Jiang Mianheng (son of former President Jiang Zemin) has been given a start-up budget of USD 350 million to lead a project at China’s prestigious National Academy of Sciences. By January 2013, he had already recruited 140 PhD scientists to work full-time on thorium power at the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear and Applied Physics and planned to increase the number to 750 staff by 2015. The Chinese believe they have enough thorium to power their electricity needs for 20,000 years.32
29. INPRO is the IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles – see http://www.iaea.org/
INPRO/about.html
30. GIF is the Generation IV International Forum, a collaboration amongst 12 countries and the EU – see www.gen-4.org
31. Ashok Pradhan, “India to establish nuclear reactor that uses thorium as fuel: Atomic Energy Commission,” Times of 
India, 27 June 2012.
32. Quoted in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “China blazes trail for ‘clean’ nuclear power from thorium,” The Telegraph 
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4.67 The chief scientific adviser to the United Kingdom government, Sir John Beddington, 
conceded in September 2012 that although the benefits of thorium are “often overstated,” it does have some “theoretical advantages regarding sustainability, reducing radiotoxicity and reducing proliferation risk.”33 That said, the thorium fuel cycle is not entirely proliferation resistant: uranium (or plutonium) fuels are required for initial reactor fuelling cycles, and possibly thereafter as driver fuel, and uranium-233, which is produced through irradiation of thorium, can be used in nuclear weapons. U-233 is 
difficult to produce as a pure material (in the reactor it is produced in association with U-232, which makes weapons use impracticable). However, there are certain reactor concepts in which U-233 can be recovered without U-232 – it is essential for proliferation risk analysis to take this into account.4.68 Progress in the development of technical approaches can be hard to demonstrate, given the long lead times with some of the technologies involved, but adoption of proliferation resistance as an important criterion in INPRO and GIF is encouraging. The 
non-proliferation regime benefits from the fact that, to date, enrichment and reprocessing – which provide the capabilities to produce the materials required for nuclear weapons 
– are not more widespread. The regime also benefits from HEU and separated plutonium not being widespread in civil programs. It is essential for the international community to take the steps necessary not only to maintain this situation, but to reduce the availability of proliferation-sensitive technologies and materials. (See Chapter 2 for further discussion of this issue, and non-proliferation policy generally.)4.69 National Supply Policies. National policies on the supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology subject to non-proliferation conditions are one of the earliest forms of risk mitigation. Nuclear suppliers reserve the right to decide what they will supply, who to, and under what terms. Supplier conditions were the basis for the earliest form of safeguards, under which suppliers required the right to verify that supplied items remained in peaceful use. Today supply policies coordinated by the NSG remain an important part of the non-proliferation regime.
4.4.2 Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle4.70 The needs of states with nuclear power programs, or planning such programs, can be outlined as follows: reliable access to reactors and fuel on secure, non-discriminatory and equitable terms; reliable access, also on such terms, to fuel cycle services, especially for used fuel management; support in establishing regulatory systems; support through training and capacity building; and sharing of expertise in reactor operations, nuclear safety and nuclear security. These needs can, and arguably should, be met through development of a new international framework for the nuclear fuel cycle – a framework based on international cooperation rather than an emphasis on national programs in proliferation-sensitive areas.
(London), 6 January 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9784044/China-blazes-trail-for-clean-nuclear-power-from-thorium.html. See also the critical analysis by Andrew T Nelson of the US Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Thorium: Not a near-term commercial nuclear fuel,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
September 2012, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/5/33.
33. Evans-Pritchard, “China blazes trail for ‘clean’ nuclear power from thorium.”
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2134.71 Every state has a legitimate interest in security of energy supply, but it is neither necessary nor cost effective for every state with a nuclear power program to develop uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. In principle, national enrichment programs are not viable except for states with large power programs operating twenty 
or more reactors. Viability is even more difficult in current circumstances where global enrichment capacity is adequate and increased demand can be readily met by existing enrichers. Most analysts conclude that reprocessing is not economic in current circumstances. Because possession of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities could 
increase international tensions − potentially leading to “virtual” arms races − and also because of the technical complexity and high costs, most states have not sought to establish these capabilities.
4.72 While energy independence may be cited as justification for a national fuel cycle, few states are in a position to achieve real independence. Apart from technological 
capabilities, not many states have uranium resources sufficient to maintain a nuclear power program independent of external supply. For most states international cooperation is likely to be a necessity, and for all states such cooperation will offer major advantages. Participation in international fuel cycle arrangements will lead to better outcomes than pursuing national independence.4.73 Consideration of these issues internationally took a negative turn when the George W Bush Administration proposed that states not currently operating commercial enrichment or reprocessing facilities should permanently renounce these technologies. Many states, particularly in the Non-Aligned Movement, saw this as an attempt to entrench existing technology holders in a monopoly position. As a consequence, even international fuel bank proposals have been opposed as in some way furthering an agenda of denial. To counter these negative sentiments it will be necessary to demonstrate that alternatives to national fuel cycle programs offer security of supply on non-discriminatory and equitable terms, with advantages through collaborative approaches (for example in used fuel management), as well as the obvious advantages of mitigating proliferation risk.4.74 IFNEC and International Fuel Banks. Much work is underway on proposals for practical and attractive alternatives to national programs in proliferation-sensitive 
areas. A number of proposals have been made to reflect these ideas. The proposal showing most progress is the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), the successor to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). GNEP started as a US initiative, but IFNEC now has a substantial international character, having grown to 32 participating states – including 17 developing countries – and 31 observer states, many of which can be expected to become full members.344.75 A key feature of IFNEC is that participating states are not asked to renounce any 
rights. IFNEC has adopted a pragmatic approach − to set aside unproductive political arguments about national “rights” and instead focus on practical problems and solutions. 
34. IFNEC members as of December 2012 were: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Estonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, Oman, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, South Korea, UAE, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. See www.ifnec.org.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play214 IFNEC has two Working Groups, on Infrastructure Development and Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services, and has also convened a Finance Workshop. IFNEC has made good progress in developing the concept of comprehensive fuel service arrangements, including fuel leasing, to meet the need for reliable fuel supply and to provide used fuel disposition options. The basic idea is that nuclear suppliers would commit to provide nuclear consumers with long-term whole-of-life fuel service assurances – suppliers would provide fresh fuel and take back used fuel, or otherwise assist with used fuel 
management. The practical and economic benefits of this international cooperation would be such that nuclear consumers have no legitimate reason for pursuing national programs in proliferation-sensitive technologies.4.76 The IFNEC approach of establishing strong practical and economic advantages for states not to pursue sensitive technologies has considerable merit, but in itself it is not 
sufficient. First, it does not address the problem cases, except indirectly in the longer term. If IFNEC succeeds in establishing an international norm of behaviour against new national enrichment and reprocessing programs, this would be helpful in isolating those who act against this norm, but this is a long way off. The need to deal with Iran, and others that may insist on establishing fuel cycle programs in dubious circumstances, is more immediate (see further the section on Iran in Chapter 2).4.77 Second, arrangements that are mostly commercial in nature might not offer 
sufficient assurance to states concerned about long-term security of supply. States are 
likely to have greater confidence in arrangements where assurances are legally binding in international law, that is, are based on a treaty-level umbrella. It would provide 
additional confidence if the IAEA were given an oversight role in these arrangements, to ensure that decisions are taken on an objective non-discriminatory basis.4.78 Third, the IFNEC concept does not address existing enrichment and reprocessing programs. Some of these programs are of potential strategic concern, and all of them provide the operating state with nuclear latency. This is not only a non-proliferation issue, it is also an issue for disarmament. As nuclear disarmament progresses, the potential for rapid break-out from disarmament commitments will be just as great a concern as the potential for break-out from non-proliferation commitments. Furthermore, non-NWS being asked to accept restrictions on national nuclear programs are likely to argue that the new approaches should be non-discriminatory and apply also to the nuclear-armed states. Accordingly, concepts are needed for the transitioning of all nationally controlled enrichment and reprocessing programs to an appropriate alternative model within a realistic timeframe.4.79 An important complement for international approaches such as those being developed in IFNEC is the establishment of international fuel banks as a fuel provider of last resort in case supply arrangements fail. There are now two such fuel banks – one established by Russia at the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) at Angarsk, and one being established in Kazakhstan, under IAEA auspices and with funding assistance by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and a number of IAEA member states.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2154.80 Multinational Control. The most practical alternative to national control of sensitive nuclear programs is some form of multinational control, of the kind referred to in the NSG Guidelines:If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier 
involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centres.35 As already noted, international operation of the nuclear fuel cycle was proposed unsuccessfully in the 1940s. This was looked at again by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) in the 1970s36, and by the IAEA’s study of proposals for multilateral approaches in 2005.37 4.81 A key objective of the multinational approach is to establish technical and institutional barriers against a state attempting to misuse enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The less control an individual state has over such capabilities, the harder it will be to misuse them. Of course no barrier can be totally effective – a state can always seize facilities regardless of who owns and operates them – but arrangements such as black box38 
technology can be important in making misuse more difficult, providing more time for international intervention. Multinational approaches will also help ensure best practice standards of nuclear safety and security in the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle.
4.82 Multinational approaches are not an unrealistic aspiration − examples already exist, like the European enrichment group URENCO and the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) at Angarsk, Siberia. The IUEC was established by Russia in 2007, with the mission To ensure equal and assured access for all countries to the benefits 
of atomic energy.39 Russia invites other states to join the IUEC as shareholders. The 
benefits include a guaranteed supply of fuel and services. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Armenia have joined, and several others have indicated interest.4.83 The precedents of URENCO and IUEC have important characteristics that can be built upon in future models, for example: a treaty providing for mutual oversight of facility operations (URENCO); consumers having product supply guarantees and equity participation (IUEC); or supply of sensitive technology only on a black box basis (URENCO, also Russian practice).4.84 Drawing all this together, a possible model for future fuel cycle arrangements could be along the following lines.
 > Fuel suppliers and fuel consumers form comprehensive partnerships covering all aspects of the fuel cycle, including fuel supply guarantees and cooperation in safety 
35. NSG Guidelines, INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1, paragraph 6(e).
36. IAEA, Report of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, 1980.
37. IAEA, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 2005, http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7281/Multilateral-Approaches-to-the-Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle
38. The “black box” concept implies transfer of complete turnkey systems and facilities, without transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology, under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.
39. See http://eng.iuec.ru.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play216 and security, fuel fabrication, and management of used fuel and high level waste:
 −  partnership arrangements, including fuel guarantees, are covered by treaty, with provisions binding in international law and under IAEA oversight;
 − these include fallback arrangements in case of supplier default.
 > Sensitive facilities – enrichment and reprocessing – are operated by fuel suppliers under multination arrangements
 −  where possible, technology is provided to the operator on a black box basis, as is currently the case with URENCO supplying the United States and France, and TENEX supplying China;
 −  fuel consumers have the opportunity for equity participation in the facilities, 
including profit-sharing;
 −  fuel consumers are involved in facility operations (without accessing sensitive technology) as an additional measure to assure against misuse of the facility.4.85 Gaining support for multilateralization of proliferation-sensitive stages of the fuel cycle will be a challenge, but already there are practical precedents, for example Russia’s IUEC and the URENCO enrichment group. What is needed now is to change the focus from national fuel cycle programs to the common interests of non-proliferation, energy security and strengthened international cooperation.
§4.5 Nuclear Safety and Security Commitments4.86 The primary focus of this section is on nuclear safety: nuclear security is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this report. But it is increasingly being acknowledged, for 
example at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, that there is a significant connection between these issues, not least in that failures in safety protection may create opportunities for sabotage. The close connection between nuclear security and nuclear safety is recognized by the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) which, when it enters into force, will extend the convention to include protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage.
4.87 Sometimes, existing gaps can be detected and identified by national oversight authorities. For example, on 23 August 2012, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India tabled a highly critical report in parliament on the Atomic Energy Regulatory 
Board (AERB) that pointed to several deficiencies in India’s nuclear regulatory authority.40 The AERB has failed to prepare a nuclear and radiation safety policy despite being mandated to do so when constituted in 1983. It has no direct role in conducting independent assessments and monitoring to ensure the safety of personnel working in nuclear power plants. It does not have a detailed inventory of all radiation sources to ensure effective compliance with regulations for the safe disposal of spent sources, so 
that it could not be verified whether or not radioactive waste had actually been disposed of. India lacks a legislative framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
40. P. Sunderarajan, “CAG pulls up AERB for not preparing nuclear safety policy,” The Hindu, 24 August 2012, http://www.
thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/article3814528.ece.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2174.88 The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 underscores the connection between safety and security. Terrorists might well attempt to replicate an accident of this kind, for example by sabotaging a reactor’s cooling system and emergency power supply or by sabotaging spent fuel ponds.4.89 The international concerns have been reinforced by the conclusions of the Kurokawa 
panel’s findings for the Japanese parliament, that:The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly “manmade.” We believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions…41 It was reported, for example, that workers at the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant were ordered to cover their dosimeters – pocket-sized devices that emit an alarm when high radiation levels are detected – with lead plates in order to keep the radiation level readings low enough to keep working. Those who demurred because of safety or legal 
considerations were told by a senior TEPCO official that they would lose their jobs and be blacklisted from employment at other nuclear plants.42 4.90 For reasons of both safety and security concerns, the principal lesson of the Fukushima accident is that nuclear activities cannot be regarded as the exclusive 
province of individual states − nuclear activities have potential consequences well beyond the borders of any one state. While the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and security rests with each state, every state is a stakeholder in how well other states meet this responsibility. A major nuclear accident will have global consequences. Even if 
an accident does not result in significant trans-boundary contamination, there will be an 
impact on confidence in and support for nuclear energy. Likewise, a nuclear detonation or major nuclear sabotage by terrorists will have global repercussions.4.91 Fukushima demonstrated that neither individual states nor the international community as a whole are well served by relying exclusively on national oversight of 
nuclear activities. If a leading state such as Japan has difficulties with nuclear regulation and emergency management, what can be expected with smaller states, and those 
planning new nuclear programs? Fukushima shows the need to find a more appropriate balance between national and international interests and responsibilities in the conduct of nuclear energy. There is a need for greater international cooperation and collaboration, together with international transparency and accountability.
41. The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission - Executive summary (Tokyo: National Diet of Japan, 2012), p. 16.
42. Jun Sato, Chiaki Fujimori, Miki Aoki, Tamiyuki Kihara and Takayuki Kihara, “TEPCO subcontractor used lead to fake dosimeter readings at Fukushima plant,” Asahi Shimbun, 21 July 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/
fukushima/AJ201207210069.
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4.92 Participation in treaties. The international interest in non-proliferation is long-recognized, through a number of treaties and institutions, notably the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. The international interest in nuclear safety and nuclear security is 
also of fundamental importance, but regrettably less well reflected both in uptake of the relevant treaties, and in the comparatively weak commitments under those treaties. Too much of the international governance arrangements in these areas is voluntary. There is nothing remotely equivalent to IAEA safeguards inspections. Participation in relevant treaties is uneven, a key nuclear security treaty – the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM – 
still has insufficient parties to enter into force, and there is an absence of international transparency and accountability mechanisms.4.93 Participation in the key nuclear safety and security conventions is shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. While universalization of these conventions is a major goal, it is 
especially important to have the participation of all the states with significant nuclear activities43  – in the interest of space the tables focus on these states.
43. As defined by the IAEA – primarily applies to states with nuclear facilities.
Box 4.1. The Fukushima Nuclear Meltdown 2011The meltdown of three nuclear reactors at Fukushima in March 2011 was caused as a consequence of the massive earthquake and tsunami to hit eastern Japan that month, through loss of emergency electrical supply needed to maintain systems 
vital to safety. But the tragedy also showed up major deficiencies in Japan’s nuclear disaster preparedness arrangements and vulnerabilities in Japan’s nuclear security governance. Not only had neither the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) nor the government failed to construct a protection wall high enough to withstand a tsunami after a major earthquake, they had failed to adopt a multi-redundancy approach to secure power supplies at Fukushima No. 1 plant, and therefore were unable to mitigate the severity of the crisis as the critical cooling systems shut down. The system vulnerability shown up in March 2011 was foreseeable and had been 
imagined. American specialists had in fact identified the very elements worst affected as the possible targets of terrorist attack: spent fuel pools, cooling systems, and backup electricity (see Associated Press, “Following U.S. antiterrorism advice might have prevented meltdowns,” Japan Times, 4 April 2012). Since 9/11 the US has adopted a multi-redundancy approach to power supply to reactors as a precaution against a possible nuclear terrorist attack. But in Japan the risk was ignored – apparently because it was modelled against nuclear terrorists, not natural disasters. The lesson of Fukushima is that both existing and planned nuclear reactor plants must pay full attention to the safety–security interface, including access control mechanisms, at the plant design stage. There should be common, mandatory standards for the siting, construction and operation of nuclear power plants, and for treatment of spent fuel and nuclear waste.
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Table 4.5: States with Significant Nuclear Activities: Participation in Nuclear 
Safety Conventions (indicated by shaded squares) (2011/2012)
Nuclear Safety 
Convention
Joint Convention 
on Spent Fuel 
and Radwaste
Early  
Notification 
Convention
Nuclear 
Assistance 
ConventionAlgeria signedArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBrazilBulgariaCanadaChileChinaColombiaCongo, DR signed signedCzech RepDenmarkEgypt signedEstoniaFinlandFranceGeorgiaGermanyGhanaGreeceHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIraqIsrael signedItalyJamaicaJapanKazakhstanLatviaLibyaLithuaniaMalaysiaMexico
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Morocco signedNetherlandsNigeriaNorth Korea signed signedNorwayPakistanPeru signedPhilippines signed signedPolandPortugalRomaniaRussiaSerbiaSlovakiaSloveniaSouthAfricaSouthKoreaSpainSwedenSwitzerlandSyria signed signed signedTajikistanThailandTurkeyUkraineUKUnited StatesUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamSource: IAEA
4.94 After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, governments and industry realized that 
substantial steps were needed to regain public confidence in nuclear energy. This 
prompted a series of new agreements − particularly the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
(CNS), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident. In contrast, after the Fukushima accident the international response has been surprisingly muted. With some notable exceptions, 
governments and industry do not seem to understand the damage to public confidence 
Table 4.5 continued
Nuclear Safety 
Convention
Joint Convention 
on Spent Fuel 
and Radwaste
Early  
Notification 
Convention
Nuclear 
Assistance 
Convention
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 221and the need for change, to move from state primacy to greater international cooperation and accountability.4.95 The 1994 CNS is the principal treaty on nuclear safety. The Convention applies to power reactors, but many states without power reactors have joined to show their support for safety principles. The convention has 75 parties.44 States that have not become 
parties include Iran − the only state with a power reactor not a party − and Egypt (which 
has signed but not yet ratified), which plans to establish a nuclear power program.4.96 Another major treaty on nuclear safety is the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. This applies primarily to spent fuel and radioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear reactors and applications, and to planned and controlled releases into the environment of liquid or gaseous radioactive materials from regulated nuclear facilities. The joint convention also imposes obligations in relation to the trans-boundary movement of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and the safe management of disused sealed sources. It has 64 parties.45 It is of concern that a number of states operating power reactors are not party to this Convention, namely Armenia, India, Iran, Mexico and Pakistan.
4.97 The 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident each has 114 parties, 
including all of the states with power reactors and most of the states with significant nuclear activities. Exceptions include North Korea and Syria (each of which has signed) and Uzbekistan and Venezuela.4.98 As noted in the preceding chapter on nuclear security (section 3.3.1), the principal convention on nuclear security – and currently the only legally binding multilateral instrument dealing with nuclear security – is the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). As noted in the last chapter, the CPPNM is some way from achieving universality, and by mid-December 2012 the 2005 Amendment to 
the CPPNM had received only 61 of the 99 ratifications required for it to enter into force. 
Similarly, it was noted in section 3.3.2 of the last chapter that significant states are yet to become party to the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).4.99 Standards and accountability. Compared to non-proliferation and safeguards, international governance in nuclear safety and nuclear security is weak. The IAEA has only a recommendatory role. By its statute, the IAEA is authorized to develop and promulgate nuclear safety standards.46 As with safeguards, the statute provides that states may conclude arrangements giving the IAEA authority to apply safety standards. To date however no such arrangements have been concluded by any state.
44. As at 5 April 2012.
45. As at 2 August 2012.
46. IAEA Statute Article III.A.6.
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Table 4.6: States with Significant Nuclear Activities: Participation in  
Nuclear Security Conventions (indicated by shaded squares)
CPPNM CPPNM Amendment ICSANTAlgeriaArgentina signedArmeniaAustraliaAustriaBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBrazilBulgaria signedCanada signedChileChinaColombia signedCongo, DRCzech RepDenmarkEgypt signedEstonia signedFinlandFrance signedGeorgiaGermanyGhana signedGreece signedHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIraqIsrael signedItaly signedJamaica signedJapanKazakhstanLatviaLibyaLithuaniaMalaysia signedMexicoMoroccoNetherlands
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NigeriaNorth KoreaNorway signedPakistanPeruPhilippines signedPolandPortugal signedRomaniaRussiaSerbiaSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSouth Korea signedSpainSweden signedSwitzerlandSyria signedTajikistan signedThailand signedTurkeyUkraineUKUnited States signedUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamSources: CPPNM
A/CPPNMICSANT
IAEA, 17 Oct. 2012 IAEA, 12 Dec. 2012UN Treaties Collection Database, 20 Jan. 20134.100 The statute, which was concluded in 1956 before awareness of nuclear security 
issues had developed, makes no specific reference to nuclear security. This has led some states to question whether the IAEA should have any role in nuclear security – though the reference in the statute to “standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property”47 can certainly be interpreted to encompass nuclear 
security. Reflecting this lack of specific reference to nuclear security, much of the IAEA’s work in this area is funded by voluntary contributions rather than through its regular budget. In nuclear security the IAEA’s role is limited to recommendations and advice.4.101 The CNS is described as an “incentive instrument.” Parties are committed to apply fundamental safety principles but there are no detailed or binding standards. The IAEA promulgates nuclear safety standards, but the application of these is voluntary. When the convention was negotiated some states proposed an active monitoring role for the IAEA, but this was not agreed.
47. IAEA Statute Article III.A.6.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play224 4.102 The CPPNM sets out broad security standards and the 2005 CPPNM Amendment (not yet in force) sets out fundamental principles, but there are no detailed or binding security standards. The IAEA promulgates nuclear security guidelines, but as with nuclear safety standards, application of these guidelines is voluntary.4.103 The CNS has a broad peer review process, which requires each party to report on its national implementation of the convention. These national reports are discussed at meetings held every three years. While many parties publish their reports, formally 
these reports and the discussion of them are confidential to the parties. By contrast, the CPPNM has neither any mechanism for reporting national implementation, nor even any mechanism for the parties to convene meetings.4.104 The absence of binding standards makes it all the more important to have mechanisms for external review of nuclear safety and security implementation, and sharing of best practices in these areas. External review is not just about compliance, but helps share best practice and can be vital in identifying overlooked vulnerabilities. At present peer review is the only mechanism for external review.4.105 As noted above, the CNS has a mandatory peer review process at the level of 
national implementation. More specific peer reviews, including at the facility level, are offered by the IAEA and by the non-government World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO). IAEA reviews are entirely voluntary − there is no obligation to invite a review or to follow its recommendations. In October 2011 the members of WANO, which include nearly all the world’s nuclear power reactor operators, agreed to regular mandatory 
peer review of nuclear safety at power reactors. This is a welcome development − but the WANO process, like the IAEA review process, lacks transparency. Outsiders have no way of knowing how well the process works in practice.4.106 Unlike nuclear safety, in nuclear security there is no form of mandated peer review process. The need to avoid compromising security should not be used as an excuse for avoiding external review. The managed access concept is well established, and states can readily establish appropriate procedures. The members of WANO have endorsed 
mandatory peer review − it is to be hoped that the members of WINS (which in many cases are the same entities as in WANO) will do the same.4.107 The Fukushima accident led to the calling of two high-level nuclear safety meetings 
in 2011, the first by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano on 20–24 June and the second by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 22 September. The IAEA meeting resulted in the adoption of an action plan on nuclear safety. However, this plan is seen by a number of states as failing to meet international expectations, containing few new commitments and little in the way of increased transparency or safety peer reviews.48 A number of states, notably France, proposed mandatory, regular and transparent external safety inspections. This was resisted by the United States, India, China and Pakistan, among others.4.108 At the September 2011 meeting, Secretary-General Ban called for “greater 
48. Reuters, “IAEA states divided on how to best to boost nuclear safety,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/nuclear-safety-iaea-idUSL5E7KD1IY20110913.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 225transparency and open accountability,” and for stronger international safety standards. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France said that while the IAEA plan was a step in the right direction, the world could not accept different states having different standards. “The highest requirements must be applied to everybody on all continents,” he said. “This must go through a harmonization of technical safety standards.”4.109 Despite the position taken by France and several others, at this stage nuclear safety remains very much a matter of national prerogative. Fukushima shows the risks 
in this. For example, the IAEA and others had identified the issue of inadequate regulatory independence in Japan over a number of years, but only after Fukushima did the Japanese government accept this criticism and introduce more effective arrangements.4.110 Most recently, the IAEA and the Japanese government convened the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Koriyama, Fukushima Prefecture, 15–17 December 2012. According to the Chairpersons’ Summaries from this conference, participants noted the importance of peer review missions and transparency of the results of these, as well as ensuring that regulatory bodies operate in an open and transparent manner. The Summaries note that “there has been considerable focus on enhancing the international peer review mechanisms for nuclear operators and regulators worldwide, as well as on promoting openness and transparency to ensure that stakeholders – in particular the public – can hold industry and regulators properly 
to account, thereby enhancing trust and confidence.” The Chairpersons’ Summaries also note that “One of the most effective actions to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide is for member states to utilize the IAEA safety standards as broadly and effectively as possible in a consistent manner.”4.111 While the discussion at the Fukushima Conference is encouraging, serious consideration of binding safety standards and international inspections seems to be as far away as ever. Currently there is resistance from key states to the idea of binding nuclear safety standards and international safety inspections. Until governments are prepared to give the IAEA an active monitoring role in nuclear safety, for example through concluding bilateral agreements with the agency as is done with safeguards, their commitment to substantial reform of nuclear safety governance will be open to question.4.112 Today the idea of an international nuclear security inspectorate is anathema to 
most national security officials. For the future, states should seriously consider how an international security inspection process could be developed so as to operate to 
mutual benefit.4.113 The importance of international accountability needs to be recognized. In nuclear safety at least there is the reporting process under the CNS. There is no similar process in nuclear security for national reporting on adherence to the conventions, IAEA recommendations, and so on. The only current mechanism is reporting under Security Council Resolution 1540 – this contains some reporting requirements for nuclear security, but to date there has been no substantial follow-up on this particular aspect.
Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play226 4.114 Liability for Nuclear Damage. Recognition of the possibility of transboundary damage from a nuclear accident led to the conclusion of several international conventions dealing with international compensation issues. The principal conventions are the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (the Paris Convention) – open only to members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); the 1963 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (the Vienna Convention); and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) – developed as an umbrella for the other conventions.49   Participation in these conventions is shown in Table 4.7.
4.115 The Convention on Supplementary Compensation is not yet in force – entry into 
force requires ratification by five states with a minimum installed nuclear capacity of 400,000 megawatts thermal, roughly equivalent to 120,000 megawatts electrical (MWe). 
To date four states (Argentina, Morocco, Romania and the United States) have ratified, with a total installed capacity of 103,700 MWe. Eleven other states have signed, including three with nuclear power programs (Czech Republic, India and Ukraine). If and when 
these three ratified, this would be sufficient for the convention to enter into force.
49. In addition to these conventions there is the Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 1963 (Brussels Supplementary Convention) and a number of protocols amending the Paris and Vienna Conventions, and the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention.
Table 4.7: Participation in Liability Conventions by States with Nuclear Power
State Convention State ConventionArgentina Vienna, CSC Mexico ViennaArmenia Vienna Netherlands ParisBelgium Paris PakistanBrazil Vienna Romania Vienna, CSCBulgaria Vienna Russia ViennaCanada Slovak Republic ViennaChina Slovenia ParisCzech Republic Vienna South AfricaFinland Paris South KoreaFrance Paris Spain ParisGermany Paris Sweden ParisHungary Vienna Switzerland ParisIndia CSC signed Ukraine ViennaIran UK ParisJapan United States CSCSource: Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 2274.116 With some variations, these conventions set out the following basic principles:
 > Strict liability of the nuclear operator (that is, claimants do not have to prove fault);
 > Exclusive liability of the operator – all claims are brought against the operator;
 > Exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the state in which the accident occurs;
 > Mandatory insurance cover – the operator must insure to the liability limit;
 > Limitation of the operator’s liability in amount and in time. Beyond the limit the 
state and/or operators collectively take responsibility for paying compensation. The liability limit differs depending on the convention.4.117 Over half the world’s reactors are in states that are outside the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions. Some have ratified or signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (for example United States, India), which is not yet in force. A number 
of significant nuclear power states, including Canada, China, Japan and South Korea, have not joined any of the conventions. The situation is exacerbated by the two major nuclear power states, France and the United States, supporting different conventions – France the Paris Convention and the United States the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. Those outside these two conventions are waiting to see which prevails. The IAEA has been seeking to establish a single liability regime – the Convention on Supplementary Compensation is considered a possible basis for such a regime – but so far without success.4.118 If a major nuclear accident occurs in a state outside the Paris or Vienna Conventions, claimants will be dependent on the domestic legislation of the state concerned. This would result in uncertainty not only for the victims of an accident, but for other parties that rightly or wrongly might become the subject of litigation, such as reactor vendors and fuel fabricators (the latter concern has been raised about India’s liability legislation). Every effort should be made to establish a single international liability regime and to universalize it with all states that have nuclear reactors joining it.
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IN STATE OF 
PLAY REPORT
STATE OF PLAY AS 
AT DECEMBER 
2012
I. Nuclear Disarmament   
A. Principles and objecƟ ves
AcƟ on 1: All States parƟ es commit to pursue policies that are fully 
compaƟ ble with the Treaty and the objecƟ ve of achieving a world 
without nuclear weapons.
1.18–31
AcƟ on 2: All States parƟ es commit to apply the principles of 
irreversibility, verifi ability and transparency in relaƟ on to the 
implementaƟ on of their treaty obligaƟ ons.
1.32–53              
B. Disarmament of nuclear weapons
AcƟ on 3: In implemenƟ ng the unequivocal undertaking by the 
nuclear–weapon States to accomplish the total eliminaƟ on of their 
nuclear arsenals, the nuclear weapon States commit to undertake 
further eff orts to reduce and ulƟ mately eliminate all types of nuclear 
weapons, deployed and non–deployed, including through unilateral, 
bilateral, regional and mulƟ lateral measures.
1.18–31              
1.54–94
AcƟ on 4: The Russian FederaƟ on and the United States of America 
commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementaƟ on of 
the Treaty on Measures for the Further ReducƟ on and LimitaƟ on of 
Strategic Off ensive Arms and are encouraged to conƟ nue discussions 
on follow–on measures in order to achieve deeper reducƟ ons in their 
nuclear arsenals.
1.21                                    
1.30                            
1.79–86          
AcƟ on 5: The nuclear–weapon States commit to accelerate concrete 
progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in 
the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that 
promotes internaƟ onal stability, peace and undiminished and 
increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly 
engage with a view to, inter alia:
1.18–31
1.233–36 
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No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Signiϐicant Progress Fully implemented
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a.  Rapidly moving towards an overall reducƟ on in the global 
stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as idenƟ fi ed in 
acƟ on 3;
1.54–94           
b.  Address the quesƟ on of all nuclear weapons regardless of 
their type or their locaƟ on as an integral part of the 
general nuclear disarmament process;
1.54–94              
c.  To further diminish the role and signifi cance of nuclear 
weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines 
and policies;
1.104–46
d.  Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear 
weapons and eventually lead to their eliminaƟ on, lessen 
the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non–
proliferaƟ on and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
1.88–94                
e.  Consider the legiƟ mate interest of non–nuclear–weapon 
States in further reducing the operaƟ onal status of nuclear 
weapons systems in ways that promote internaƟ onal 
stability and security;
1.153–74
f.  Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and 1.165–74
g.  Further enhance transparency and increase mutual 
confi dence.
1.36–45
AcƟ on 6: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should 
immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear 
disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and 
balanced programme of work.
1.87
C. Security assurances
AcƟ on 7: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament 
should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced 
programme of work, immediately begin discussion of eff ecƟ ve 
internaƟ onal arrangements to assure non–nuclear–weapon States 
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss 
substanƟ vely, without limitaƟ on, with a view to elaboraƟ ng 
recommendaƟ ons dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding 
an internaƟ onally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference 
invites the Secretary–General of the United NaƟ ons to convene a 
high–level meeƟ ng in September 2010 in support of the work of the 
Conference on Disarmament.
1.136–46            
AcƟ on 8: All nuclear–weapon States commit to fully respect their 
exisƟ ng commitments with regard to security assurances. Those 
nuclear–weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to 
extend security assurances to non–nuclear–weapon States parƟ es to 
the Treaty.
1.136–46            
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AcƟ on 9: The establishment of further nuclear–weapon–free zones, 
where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at 
among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 
1999 Guidelines of the United NaƟ ons Disarmament Commission, is 
encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to raƟ fy the 
nuclear–weapon–free zone treaƟ es and their relevant protocols, and 
to construcƟ vely consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into 
force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear–
weapon–free zones treaƟ es, which include negaƟ ve security 
assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any 
related reservaƟ ons.
1.143                 
2.124–53
D. Nuclear tesƟ ng
AcƟ on 10: All nuclear–weapon States undertake to raƟ fy the 
Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty with all expediency, noƟ ng 
that posiƟ ve decisions by nuclear–weapon States would have the 
benefi cial impact towards the raƟ fi caƟ on of that Treaty, and that 
nuclear–weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage 
Annex 2 countries, in parƟ cular those which have not acceded to the 
Treaty on the Non–ProliferaƟ on of Nuclear Weapons and conƟ nue to 
operate unsafeguarded nuclear faciliƟ es, to sign and raƟ fy.
2.170                       
AcƟ on 11: Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear–Test– Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear–
weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of 
new nuclear weapons technologies and from any acƟ on that would 
defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all exisƟ ng 
moratoriums on nuclear–weapon test explosions should be 
maintained.
2.170                        
2.175
AcƟ on 12: All States that have raƟ fi ed the Comprehensive Nuclear–
Test–Ban Treaty recognize the contribuƟ on of the conferences on 
facilitaƟ ng the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures 
adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on FacilitaƟ ng the 
Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty, held 
in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on 
progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.
2.176–77           
AcƟ on 13: All States that have raƟ fi ed the Comprehensive Nuclear–
Test–Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and 
implementaƟ on of that Treaty at the naƟ onal, regional and global 
levels.
2.176–77           
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AcƟ on 14: The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty OrganizaƟ on is to be encouraged to fully 
develop the verifi caƟ on regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–
Ban Treaty, including early compleƟ on and provisional 
operaƟ onalizaƟ on of the internaƟ onal monitoring system in 
accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which 
should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an eff ecƟ ve, 
reliable, parƟ cipatory and non–discriminatory verifi caƟ on system 
with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that 
Treaty.
2.179                       
E. Fissile materials
AcƟ on 15: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament 
should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced 
programme of work, immediately begin negoƟ aƟ on of a treaty 
banning the producƟ on of fi ssile material for use in nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of 
the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained 
therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the 
Secretary–General of the United NaƟ ons to convene a high–level 
meeƟ ng in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference 
on Disarmament.
2.182–97
AcƟ on 16: The nuclear–weapon States are encouraged to commit to 
declare, as appropriate, to the InternaƟ onal Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) all fi ssile material designated by each of them as no longer 
required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as 
pracƟ cable under IAEA or other relevant internaƟ onal verifi caƟ on and 
arrangements for the disposiƟ on of such material for peaceful 
purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside 
military programmes.
2.198–217
AcƟ on 17: In the context of acƟ on 16, all States are encouraged to 
support the development of appropriate legally binding verifi caƟ on 
arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible 
removal of fi ssile material designated by each nuclear–weapon State 
as no longer required for military purposes.
2.198–217      
AcƟ on 18: All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to 
iniƟ ate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful 
uses of faciliƟ es for the producƟ on of fi ssile material for use in nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
2.218–31           
F. Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament
AcƟ on 19: All States agree on the importance of supporƟ ng 
cooperaƟ on among Governments, the United NaƟ ons, other 
internaƟ onal and regional organizaƟ ons and civil society aimed at 
increasing confi dence, improving transparency and developing 
effi  cient verifi caƟ on capabiliƟ es related to nuclear disarmament.
1.36–53              
Commitments and Recommendations
No Progress Some ProgressMinimal Progress Signiϐicant Progress Fully implemented
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AcƟ on 20: States parƟ es should submit regular reports, within the 
framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the 
implementaƟ on of the present acƟ on plan, as well as of arƟ cle VI, 
paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision enƟ tled “Principles and 
objecƟ ves for nuclear non–proliferaƟ on and disarmament,” and the 
pracƟ cal steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review 
Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the InternaƟ onal 
Court of JusƟ ce of 8 July 1996.
1.43–45              
AcƟ on 21: As a confi dence–building measure, all the nuclear–weapon 
States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard 
reporƟ ng form and to determine appropriate reporƟ ng intervals for 
the purpose of voluntarily providing standard informaƟ on without 
prejudice to naƟ onal security. The Secretary–General of the United 
NaƟ ons is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which 
shall include the informaƟ on provided by the nuclear–weapon States.
1.43–45              
AcƟ on 22: All States are encouraged to implement the 
recommendaƟ ons contained in the report of the Secretary–General 
of the United NaƟ ons (A/57/124) regarding the United NaƟ ons study 
on disarmament and non–proliferaƟ on educaƟ on, in order to advance 
the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear 
weapons.
1.215–18            
II. Nuclear Non–proliferaƟ on                                                                           
AcƟ on 23: The Conference calls upon all States parƟ es to exert all 
eff orts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to 
undertake any acƟ ons that can negaƟ vely aff ect prospects for the 
universality of the Treaty.
2.22–35              
AcƟ on 24: The Conference re–endorses the call by previous review 
conferences for the applicaƟ on of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to 
all source or special fi ssionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
acƟ viƟ es in the States parƟ es in accordance with the provisions of 
arƟ cle III of the Treaty.
2.36–45              
AcƟ on 25: The Conference, noƟ ng that 18 States parƟ es to the Treaty 
have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, 
urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.
2.38–39              
AcƟ on 26: The Conference underscores the importance in complying 
with the non–proliferaƟ on obligaƟ ons, addressing all compliance 
maƩ ers in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of 
the safeguards system.
2.67–87
AcƟ on 27: The Conference underscores the importance of resolving 
all cases of non–compliance with safeguards obligaƟ ons in full 
conformity with the IAEA statute and the respecƟ ve legal obligaƟ ons 
of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member 
States to extend their cooperaƟ on to the Agency.
2.67–87
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AcƟ on 28: The Conference encourages all States parƟ es which have 
not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force addiƟ onal 
protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally 
pending their entry into force.
2.46–50              
AcƟ on 29: The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and 
assist the States parƟ es in the conclusion and entry into force of 
comprehensive safeguards agreements and addiƟ onal protocols. The 
Conference calls on States parƟ es to consider specifi c measures that 
would promote the universalizaƟ on of the comprehensive safeguards 
agreements.
2.61–66              
AcƟ on 30: The Conference calls for the wider applicaƟ on of safeguards 
to peaceful nuclear faciliƟ es in the nuclear–weapon States, under the 
relevant voluntary off er safeguards agreements, in the most economic 
and pracƟ cal way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA 
resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and addiƟ onal 
protocols should be universally applied once the complete eliminaƟ on 
of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
2.42–45              
AcƟ on 31: The Conference encourages all States parƟ es with small 
quanƟ Ɵ es protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind 
them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.
2.40–41             
AcƟ on 32: The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should 
be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA 
policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the eff ecƟ veness and 
improving the effi  ciency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and 
implemented.
2.51–60              
AcƟ on 33: The Conference calls upon all States parƟ es to ensure that 
IAEA conƟ nues to have all poliƟ cal, technical and fi nancial support so 
that it is able to eff ecƟ vely meet its responsibility to apply safeguards 
as required by arƟ cle III of the Treaty.
2.88–96              
AcƟ on 34: The Conference encourages States parƟ es, within the 
framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, fl exible, 
adapƟ ve and cost–eff ecƟ ve internaƟ onal technology base for 
advanced safeguards through cooperaƟ on among Member States and 
with IAEA.
2.58–60              
AcƟ on 35: The Conference urges all States parƟ es to ensure that their 
nuclear–related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the 
development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
and that such exports are in full conformity with the objecƟ ves and 
purposes of the Treaty as sƟ pulated, parƟ cularly, in arƟ cles I, II and III 
of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objecƟ ves of 
nuclear non–proliferaƟ on and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the 
Review and Extension Conference.
2.97–105             
AcƟ on 36: The Conference encourages States parƟ es to make use of 
mulƟ laterally negoƟ ated and agreed guidelines and understandings in 
developing their own naƟ onal export controls.
2.103                        
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AcƟ on 37: The Conference encourages States parƟ es to consider 
whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards 
obligaƟ ons in making nuclear export decisions.
2.107–10            
AcƟ on 38: The Conference calls upon all States parƟ es, in acƟ ng in 
pursuance of the objecƟ ves of the Treaty, to observe the legiƟ mate 
right of all States parƟ es, in parƟ cular developing States, to full access 
to nuclear material, equipment and technological informaƟ on for 
peaceful purposes.
2.104                 
4.22–36
AcƟ on 39: States parƟ es are encouraged to facilitate transfers of 
nuclear technology and materials and internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on 
among States parƟ es, in conformity with arƟ cles I, II, III and IV of the 
Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints 
inconsistent with the Treaty.
2.97–104         
4.22–36
AcƟ on 40: The Conference encourages all States to maintain the 
highest possible standards of security and physical protecƟ on of 
nuclear materials and faciliƟ es.
3.1–163
AcƟ on 41: The Conference encourages all States parƟ es to apply, as 
appropriate, the IAEA recommendaƟ ons on the physical protecƟ on of 
nuclear material and nuclear faciliƟ es (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) 
and other relevant internaƟ onal instruments at the earliest possible 
date.
3.32–34               
3.77–80
AcƟ on 42: The Conference calls on all States parƟ es to the ConvenƟ on 
on the Physical ProtecƟ on of Nuclear Material to raƟ fy the amendment 
to the ConvenƟ on as soon as possible and encourages them to act in 
accordance with the objecƟ ves and the purpose of the amendment 
unƟ l such Ɵ me as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages 
all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the ConvenƟ on and 
adopt the amendment as soon as possible.
3.36–43              
AcƟ on 43: The Conference urges all States parƟ es to implement the 
principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and 
Security of RadioacƟ ve Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import 
and Export of RadioacƟ ve Sources approved by the IAEA Board of 
Governors in 2004.
3.60-61            
AcƟ on 44: The Conference calls upon all States parƟ es to improve 
their naƟ onal capabiliƟ es to detect, deter and disrupt illicit traffi  cking 
in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with 
their relevant internaƟ onal legal obligaƟ ons, and calls upon those 
States parƟ es in a posiƟ on to do so to work to enhance internaƟ onal 
partnerships and capacity–building in this regard. The Conference 
also calls upon States parƟ es to establish and enforce eff ecƟ ve 
domesƟ c controls to prevent the proliferaƟ on of nuclear weapons in 
accordance with their relevant internaƟ onal legal obligaƟ ons.
2.97–105         
2.154–56 
3.108–11      
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AcƟ on 45: The Conference encourages all States parƟ es that have not 
yet done so to become party to the InternaƟ onal ConvenƟ on for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.
3.44–50              
AcƟ on 46: The Conference encourages IAEA to conƟ nue to assist the 
States parƟ es in strengthening their naƟ onal regulatory controls of 
nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the 
State systems of accounƟ ng for and control of nuclear material, as 
well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA 
Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA 
programmes.
3.73–95               
3.112–15
III. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
AcƟ on 47: Respect each country’s choices and decisions in the fi eld of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or 
internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on agreements and arrangements for peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.
4.22–36              
AcƟ on 48: Undertake to facilitate, and reaffi  rm the right of States 
parƟ es to parƟ cipate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and scienƟ fi c and technological informaƟ on for the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy.
4.13–21              
AcƟ on 49: Cooperate with other States parƟ es or internaƟ onal 
organizaƟ ons in the further development of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, with due consideraƟ on for the needs of the 
developing areas of the world.
4.22–46             
AcƟ on 50: Give preferenƟ al treatment to the non–nuclear–weapon 
States parƟ es to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, 
in parƟ cular, into account.
4.24–46             
AcƟ on 51: Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and internaƟ onal 
cooperaƟ on among States parƟ es in conformity with arƟ cles I, II, III, 
and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints 
inconsistent with the Treaty.
4.24–36             
AcƟ on 52: ConƟ nue eff orts, within IAEA, to enhance the eff ecƟ veness 
and effi  ciency of its technical cooperaƟ on programme.
4.37–46             
AcƟ on 53: Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperaƟ on programme in 
assisƟ ng developing States parƟ es in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.
4.37–46             
AcƟ on 54: Make every eff ort and to take pracƟ cal steps to ensure that 
IAEA resources for technical cooperaƟ on acƟ viƟ es are suffi  cient, 
assured and predictable.
4.43–46              
AcƟ on 55: Encourage all States in a posiƟ on to do so to make 
addiƟ onal contribuƟ ons to the iniƟ aƟ ve designed to raise 100 million 
dollars over the next fi ve years as extra–budgetary contribuƟ ons to 
IAEA acƟ viƟ es, while welcoming the contribuƟ ons already pledged by 
countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA acƟ viƟ es.
4.44                                  
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AcƟ on 56: Encourage naƟ onal, bilateral and internaƟ onal eff orts to 
train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy.
4.34–46              
AcƟ on 57: Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including 
nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by 
commitments to and ongoing implementaƟ on of safeguards as well 
as appropriate and eff ecƟ ve levels of safety and security, consistent 
with States’ naƟ onal legislaƟ on and respecƟ ve internaƟ onal 
obligaƟ ons.
3.151–54            
4.55–57
4.86–113
AcƟ on 58: ConƟ nue to discuss further, in a non–discriminatory and 
transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, 
the development of mulƟ lateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
including the possibiliƟ es of creaƟ ng mechanisms for assurance of 
nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the 
back–end of the fuel cycle without aff ecƟ ng rights under the Treaty 
and without prejudice to naƟ onal fuel cycle policies, while tackling 
the technical, legal and economic complexiƟ es surrounding these 
issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope 
safeguards.
4.80–85              
AcƟ on 59: Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to 
the ConvenƟ on on Nuclear Safety, the ConvenƟ on on Early NoƟ fi caƟ on 
of a Nuclear Accident, the ConvenƟ on on Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint ConvenƟ on on 
the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of RadioacƟ ve 
Waste Management, the InternaƟ onal ConvenƟ on for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the ConvenƟ on on the Physical ProtecƟ on 
of Nuclear Material, and to raƟ fy its amendment so that it may enter 
into force at an early date.
4.92–98              
AcƟ on 60: Promote the sharing of best pracƟ ces in the area of nuclear 
safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear 
industry and the private sector, as appropriate.
3.146–54          
4.99–113
AcƟ on 61: Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to 
further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, 
where technically and economically feasible.
4.60                                   
AcƟ on 62: Transport radioacƟ ve materials consistent with relevant 
internaƟ onal standards of safety, security and environmental 
protecƟ on, and to conƟ nue communicaƟ on between shipping and 
coastal States for the purpose of confi dence–building and addressing 
concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency 
preparedness.
3.107                 
4.86–113  
AcƟ on 63: Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming 
party to relevant internaƟ onal instruments or adopƟ ng suitable 
naƟ onal legislaƟ on, based upon the principles established by the 
main perƟ nent internaƟ onal instruments.
4.114–18           
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AcƟ on 64: The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the 
decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 
September 2009 on prohibiƟ on of armed aƩ ack or threat of aƩ ack 
against nuclear installaƟ ons, during operaƟ on or under construcƟ on.
-
IV. The Middle East, parƟ cularly implementaƟ on of the 1995 
ResoluƟ on on the Middle East
… 7. The Conference emphasizes the importance of a process leading 
to full implementaƟ on of the 1995 ResoluƟ on on the Middle East. To 
that end, the Conference endorses the following pracƟ cal steps:
(a)  The Secretary–General of the United NaƟ ons and the co–
sponsors of the 1995 ResoluƟ on, in consultaƟ on with the States 
of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be aƩ ended 
by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle 
East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of 
mass destrucƟ on, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at 
by the States of the region, and with the full support and 
engagement of the nuclear–weapon States. The 2012 Conference 
shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 ResoluƟ on;
2.146-53           
(b)  Appointment by the Secretary–General of the United NaƟ ons 
and the co–sponsors of the 1995 ResoluƟ on, in consultaƟ on 
with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to 
support implementaƟ on of the 1995 ResoluƟ on by conducƟ ng 
consultaƟ ons with the States of the region in that regard and 
undertaking preparaƟ ons for the convening of the 2012 
Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementaƟ on of 
follow–on steps agreed by the parƟ cipaƟ ng regional States at 
the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 
Review Conference and its Preparatory CommiƩ ee meeƟ ngs;
2.147                                
(c)  DesignaƟ on by the Secretary–General of the United NaƟ ons and 
the co–sponsors of the 1995 ResoluƟ on, in consultaƟ on with the 
States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 
Conference;
2.147
2.151
(d)  AddiƟ onal steps aimed at supporƟ ng the implementaƟ on of the 
1995 ResoluƟ on, including that IAEA, the OrganisaƟ on for the 
ProhibiƟ on of Chemical Weapons and other relevant 
internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons be requested to prepare background 
documentaƟ on for the 2012 Conference regarding modaliƟ es 
for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destrucƟ on and their delivery systems, taking into account work 
previously undertaken and experience gained;
2.148–51            
(e)       ConsideraƟ on of all off ers aimed at supporƟ ng the 
implementaƟ on of the 1995 ResoluƟ on, including the off er of 
the European Union to host a follow–on seminar to that organized 
in June 2008.
2.148                                
Commitments and Recommendations
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Other regional issue [DPRK]
The Conference strongly urges the DemocraƟ c People’s Republic of 
Korea to fulfi l the commitments under the Six–Party Talks, including 
the complete and verifi able abandonment of all nuclear weapons and 
exisƟ ng nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 
joint statement, and urges the DemocraƟ c People’s Republic of Korea 
to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its 
IAEA safeguards agreement. The Conference also calls on the 
DemocraƟ c People’s Republic of Korea and all States parƟ es to fully 
implement all relevant nuclear non–proliferaƟ on and disarmament 
obligaƟ ons. The Conference reaffi  rms its fi rm support for the Six–
Party Talks and remains determined to achieve the saƟ sfactory and 
comprehensive resoluƟ on to the issues involved through diplomaƟ c 
means.
1.95–103            
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B. NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMITS 2010 & 2012:  COMMITMENTS
COMMITMENT PARAGRAPHS 
WHERE 
DISCUSSED IN 
STATE OF PLAY 
REPORT
STATE OF PLAY AS 
AT DECEMBER 2012
Washington Summit 2010
[A. Global Nuclear Security Architecture] 
[ICSANT] Recognizing the importance of the InternaƟ onal ConvenƟ on 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as an important 
legally binding mulƟ lateral instrument addressing threats posed by 
acts of nuclear terrorism:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States ParƟ es to the ConvenƟ on will work together to 
achieve universality of the ConvenƟ on, as soon as possible;
3.41                            
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States ParƟ es to the ConvenƟ on will assist States, as 
appropriate and upon their request, to implement the ConvenƟ on; 
and
3.44–50              
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States ParƟ es to the ConvenƟ on encourage discussions 
among States ParƟ es to consider measures to ensure its eff ecƟ ve 
implementaƟ on, as called for in ArƟ cle 20 of the ConvenƟ on.
3.44–50              
[CPPNM] Recognizing the importance of the ConvenƟ on on the Physical 
ProtecƟ on of Nuclear Material, as the only mulƟ lateral legally binding 
agreement dealing with the physical protecƟ on of nuclear material in 
peaceful uses, and the value of the 2005 Amendment to the ConvenƟ on 
in strengthening global security:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States ParƟ es to the ConvenƟ on will work towards its 
universal adherence and where applicable, to accelerate the 
raƟ fi caƟ on processes of the Amendment to the ConvenƟ on and to 
act for early implementaƟ on of that Amendment;
3.36–43
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States ParƟ es to the ConvenƟ on call on all States to 
act in accordance with the object and purpose of the Amendment 
unƟ l such Ɵ me as it enters into force; and
3.39                            
[UNSCR 1540] NoƟ ng the need to fully implement United NaƟ ons 
Security Council ResoluƟ on (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) on prevenƟ ng non–
State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destrucƟ on (WMD), their 
means of delivery and related materials, in parƟ cular as it relates to 
nuclear material:
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1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States support the conƟ nued dialogue between the 
Security Council commiƩ ee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 
and States and support strengthened internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on in 
this regard, in accordance with relevant United NaƟ ons resoluƟ ons 
and within the framework of the United NaƟ ons Global 
Counterterrorism Strategy;
3.51–55              
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States support the acƟ viƟ es of the Security Council 
commiƩ ee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 to promote full 
implementaƟ on;
3.53–55                  
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States recognize the importance of complete and 
Ɵ mely reporƟ ng as called for by UNSCR 1540, and will work with 
other States to do so, including by providing technical support or 
assistance, as requested;
3.55                                   
4 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States note the outcome of Comprehensive Review by 
the Security Council commiƩ ee established pursuant to UNSCR 
1540, including the consideraƟ on of the establishment of a 
voluntary fund, and express their support for ensuring the eff ecƟ ve 
and sustainable support for the acƟ viƟ es of the 1540 CommiƩ ee;
3.51–55              
5 With respect to the nuclear security–related aspects of Paragraph 
3, secƟ ons (a) and (b) of UNSCR 1540, ParƟ cipaƟ ng States recognize 
the importance of evaluaƟ ng and improving their physical 
protecƟ on systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the 
objecƟ ves set out in relevant InternaƟ onal Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) Nuclear Security Series documents and as contained in the 
document “Physical ProtecƟ on of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 
FaciliƟ es,” (INFCIRC/225); and
3.52 –54            
6 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States in a posiƟ on to do so are encouraged to provide 
technical assistance to those States that request it through 
appropriate mechanisms, including through the CommiƩ ee’s 
eff orts to match needs with available resources.
3.51–55              
[B. Role of the IAEA]
Welcoming IAEA acƟ viƟ es in support of naƟ onal eff orts to enhance 
nuclear security worldwide and commending the work of the IAEA for 
the provision of assistance, upon request, through its Nuclear Security 
Programme and for the implementaƟ on of the Nuclear Security Plan 
2010 – 2013, approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009 
and noted by the IAEA General Conference, and welcoming IAEA 
programs to advance new technologies to improve nuclear security 
and nuclear materials accountancy.
Commitments and Recommendations
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Recognizing that the IAEA is facilitaƟ ng the development by member 
states, in the framework of the Nuclear Security Series, of guidance 
and recommendaƟ ons relaƟ ng to the prevenƟ on and detecƟ on of, 
and response to, theŌ , sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal 
transfer, or other malicious acts involving, inter alia, nuclear material, 
and associated faciliƟ es, and is providing guidance in developing and 
implemenƟ ng eff ecƟ ve nuclear security measures.
NoƟ ng that pursuit of the objecƟ ves of this Work Plan will not be 
interpreted so as to alter the mandate or responsibiliƟ es of the IAEA:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States note that the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series of 
documents provides recommendaƟ ons and guidance to assist 
States in a wide range of aspects of nuclear security, and encourage 
the widest possible parƟ cipaƟ on by all its member states in the 
process;
3.76–80             
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States in a posiƟ on to do so, will work acƟ vely with 
the IAEA towards the compleƟ on and implementaƟ on, as 
appropriate, of the guidance provided by the Nuclear Security 
Series, and to assist, upon request, other States in doing so;
3.76–80              
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States in parƟ cular welcome and support the IAEA’s 
eff orts to fi nalize the fi Ō h revision of the recommendaƟ ons 
contained in INFCIRC/225, which will be published in the Nuclear 
Security Series;
3.77–78              
4 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States recognize the importance of nuclear material 
accountancy in support of nuclear security and look forward to the 
compleƟ on of the technical guidance document on “Nuclear 
Material Accountancy Systems at FaciliƟ es”;
3.79                         
5 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will endeavor to incorporate, as appropriate, 
the relevant principles set out in the Nuclear Security Series 
documents, into the planning, construcƟ on, and operaƟ on of 
nuclear faciliƟ es;
3.81–82             
6 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States, when implemenƟ ng their naƟ onal nuclear 
security measures, will support the use of the IAEA ImplemenƟ ng 
Guide on the Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design 
Basis Threat to elaborate their naƟ onal design basis threat as 
appropriate, to include the consideraƟ on of outsider and insider 
threats;
3.81–82              
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7 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States welcome the IAEA’s eff orts to assist States to 
develop, upon request, Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans 
to consolidate their nuclear security needs into integrated plans for 
nuclear security improvements and assistance;
3.81–82             
8 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States recognize the value of IAEA support mechanisms 
such as the InternaƟ onal Physical ProtecƟ on Advisory Service 
missions to review, as requested, their physical protecƟ on systems 
for civilian nuclear material and faciliƟ es; and
3.81–82
3.158–60          
9 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States call upon all member states of the IAEA in a 
posiƟ on to do so to provide the necessary support to enable the 
IAEA to implement these important acƟ viƟ es.
3.83–84
3.89                             
[C. InternaƟ onal CooperaƟ on]
NoƟ ng the contribuƟ ons to the promoƟ on of nuclear security by the 
U.N. and iniƟ aƟ ves such as the Global IniƟ aƟ ve to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, the G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass DestrucƟ on, as well as other bilateral, regional, 
mulƟ lateral, and nongovernmental acƟ viƟ es within their respecƟ ve 
mandates and memberships:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will work together, as appropriate, to ensure 
that nuclear security cooperaƟ on mechanisms are complementary, 
reinforcing, effi  cient, consistent with related IAEA acƟ viƟ es, and 
appropriately matched to idenƟ fi ed needs in those States 
requesƟ ng assistance;
3.96–111         
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States encourage, where appropriate, expanded 
parƟ cipaƟ on in and commitment to internaƟ onal iniƟ aƟ ves and 
voluntary cooperaƟ ve mechanisms aimed at improving nuclear 
security and prevenƟ ng nuclear terrorism; and
3.100–11         
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States welcome the intent of the members of the G–8 
Global Partnership, in a posiƟ on to do so, to undertake addiƟ onal 
programming to enhance nuclear security.
3.100–11         
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[D. Nuclear Materials]
Recognizing States’ rights to develop and use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, and noƟ ng the responsibility of each State for the 
use and management of all nuclear materials and faciliƟ es under its 
jurisdicƟ on and recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated 
plutonium are parƟ cularly sensiƟ ve and require special precauƟ ons:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will consider, where appropriate, the 
consolidaƟ on of naƟ onal sites where nuclear material is held;
3.130                      
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will conƟ nue to exercise parƟ cular care in 
ensuring the safe and secure transport of nuclear materials, both in 
domesƟ c and internaƟ onal transport;
3.34–35
3.107
3.119
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States, where appropriate, will consider on a naƟ onal 
basis the safe, secure and Ɵ mely removal and disposiƟ on of nuclear 
materials from faciliƟ es no longer using them;
3.120–30           
4 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will conƟ nue to exercise parƟ cular care in 
securing and accounƟ ng for separated plutonium, taking into 
consideraƟ on the potenƟ al of various forms for use in a nuclear 
explosive device;
3.120–24
4.60–68
5 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will consider, where appropriate, converƟ ng 
highly–enriched–uranium fuelled research reactors, and other 
nuclear faciliƟ es using highly enriched uranium, to use low enriched 
uranium, where it is technically and economically feasible;
3.120–30          
6 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States, as appropriate, will collaborate to research 
and develop new technologies that require neither highly enriched 
uranium fuels for reactor operaƟ on nor highly enriched uranium 
targets for producing medical or other isotopes, and will encourage 
the use of low enriched uranium and other proliferaƟ on–resistant 
technologies and fuels in various commercial applicaƟ ons such as 
isotope producƟ on;
3.128–29
4.58–68                  
7 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States in a posiƟ on to do so will provide assistance to 
those States requesƟ ng assistance to secure, account for, 
consolidate, and convert nuclear materials; and
3.121–30           
8 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will consider how to best address the security 
of radioacƟ ve sources, as well as consider further steps as 
appropriate.
3.60–61
3.129                    
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[E. NaƟ onal Nuclear Security RegulaƟ ons]
Mindful of the responsibiliƟ es of every ParƟ cipaƟ ng State to maintain 
eff ecƟ ve nuclear security and a robust domesƟ c regulatory capacity:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will establish and maintain eff ecƟ ve naƟ onal 
nuclear security regulaƟ ons, including the periodic review and 
adjustment of the regulaƟ ons as the State considers appropriate;
3.112–15        
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States undertake to maximize regulatory 
independence, consistent with each State’s parƟ cular legal and 
insƟ tuƟ onal structures;
3.112–15        
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will undertake to build regulatory capacity and 
ensure suffi  ciently trained and fully veƩ ed professional nuclear 
security staff  and adequate resources, taking into account current 
needs and future expansion of their respecƟ ve nuclear programs; 
and
3.112–15         
4 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will pursue the review and enforcement of 
compliance with naƟ onal nuclear security regulaƟ ons as a maƩ er 
of priority.
3.112–15          
[F. Nuclear Industry]
Understanding the role of the nuclear industry, including the private 
sector, in nuclear security and recognizing that naƟ onal governments 
are responsible for standard seƫ  ng within each State:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will work, in guiding the nuclear industry, to 
promote and sustain strong nuclear security culture and corporate 
commitment to implement robust security pracƟ ces, including 
regular exercises and performance tesƟ ng of nuclear security 
features, consistent with naƟ onal regulaƟ ons;
3.146–50           
2 Consistent with State requirements, ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will 
facilitate exchange of best pracƟ ces, where legally and pracƟ cally 
feasible, in nuclear security in the nuclear industry, and in this 
respect, will uƟ lize relevant insƟ tuƟ ons to support such exchanges; 
not only strategic but all classes of weapons, and not only deployed 
weapons but those in storage and those awaiƟ ng destrucƟ on (but 
sƟ ll capable of reconsƟ tuƟ on and deployment) as well. [7.8; 18.1–3]
3.146–50            
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States encourage nuclear operators and architect/
engineering fi rms to take into account and incorporate, where 
appropriate, eff ecƟ ve measures of physical protecƟ on and security 
culture into the planning, construcƟ on, and operaƟ on of civilian 
nuclear faciliƟ es and provide technical assistance, upon request, to 
other States in doing so.
3.146–50            
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[G. Nuclear Security Culture]
Emphasizing the importance of the human dimension of nuclear 
security, the need to enhance security culture, and the need to maintain 
a well–trained cadre of technical experts:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will promote cooperaƟ on, as appropriate, 
among internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons, governments, industries, other 
stakeholders, and academia for eff ecƟ ve capacity building, 
including human resources development in nuclear security 
programs;
3.155–63           
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will encourage the creaƟ on of and networking 
among nuclear security support centres for capacity building to 
disseminate and share best pracƟ ces and will support IAEA 
acƟ viƟ es in this area;
3.155–63            
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States encourage the creaƟ on of adequate naƟ onal 
nuclear security capaciƟ es, and encourage supplier countries and 
technology suppliers to support those capaciƟ es in the recipient 
countries, including human resources development through 
educaƟ on and training, upon request and consistent with each 
State’s parƟ cular legal and insƟ tuƟ onal structures;
3.155-63
4 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will encourage an integrated approach to 
educaƟ on and training and insƟ tuƟ onal capacity building by all 
stakeholders having a key role in establishing and maintaining 
adequate security infrastructure; and
3.155–60          
5 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will encourage the implementaƟ on of naƟ onal 
measures to ensure the proper management of sensiƟ ve 
informaƟ on in order to prevent illicit acquisiƟ on or use of nuclear 
material, and, where appropriate, will support bilateral and 
mulƟ lateral capacity building projects, upon request.
3.155–63            
[H. InformaƟ on Exchange]
Underscoring the value of exchanging accurate and verifi ed informaƟ on, 
without prejudice to confi denƟ ality provisions, to detect, prevent, 
suppress, invesƟ gate, and prosecute acts or aƩ empted acts of illicit 
nuclear traffi  cking and nuclear terrorism:
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1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will strive to improve their naƟ onal criminal 
laws, as needed, to ensure that they have the adequate authority 
to prosecute all types of cases of illicit nuclear traffi  cking and 
nuclear terrorism and commit to prosecuƟ ng these crimes to the 
full extent of the law;
3.98–104             
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States are encouraged to develop and apply 
mechanisms to expand sharing of informaƟ on on issues, challenges, 
risks and soluƟ ons related to nuclear security, nuclear terrorism 
and illicit nuclear traffi  cking in a comprehensive and Ɵ mely manner; 
and
3.98–104            
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States are encouraged to develop methods and 
mechanisms, where appropriate, to enhance bilateral and 
mulƟ lateral collaboraƟ on in sharing urgent and relevant 
informaƟ on on nuclear security and incidents involving illicit 
nuclear traffi  cking.
3.98–104            
[I. Nuclear Forensics]
NoƟ ng the IAEA’s and ParƟ cipaƟ ng States’ work in the fi eld of nuclear 
detecƟ on and nuclear forensics, aimed at assisƟ ng States in connecƟ on 
with the detecƟ on of and response to illicitly traffi  cked nuclear 
material, and determinaƟ on of its origin, and recognizing the 
importance of respecƟ ng provisions on confi denƟ ality of informaƟ on:
1 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will consider taking further steps, naƟ onally, 
bilaterally or mulƟ laterally, to enhance their technical capabiliƟ es, 
including the appropriate use of new and innovaƟ ve technologies, 
to prevent and combat illicit nuclear traffi  cking;
3.143–45            
2 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will explore ways to work together to develop 
naƟ onal capaciƟ es for nuclear forensics, such as the creaƟ on of 
naƟ onal libraries and an internaƟ onal directory of points of contact, 
to facilitate and encourage cooperaƟ on between States in 
combaƟ ng illicit nuclear traffi  cking , including relevant IAEA 
acƟ viƟ es in this area; and
3.143–45            
3 ParƟ cipaƟ ng States will explore ways to enhance broader 
cooperaƟ on among local, naƟ onal and internaƟ onal customs and 
law enforcement bodies to prevent illicit nuclear traffi  cking and 
acts of nuclear terrorism, including through joint exercises and 
sharing of best pracƟ ces.
3.144–45            
Commitments and Recommendations
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Seoul Summit 2012
We will conƟ nue to use the Washington Communiqué and Work Plan 
as a basis for our future work in advancing our nuclear security 
objecƟ ves. At this Seoul Summit, we agree that we will make every 
possible eff ort to achieve further progress in the following important 
areas:
Global Nuclear Security Architecture
1 We recognize the importance of mulƟ lateral instruments that 
address nuclear security, such as the ConvenƟ on on the Physical 
ProtecƟ on of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended, and the 
InternaƟ onal ConvenƟ on for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (ICSANT). We therefore encourage the universal 
adherence to these ConvenƟ ons. We urge states in a posiƟ on to do 
so to accelerate their domesƟ c approval of the 2005 Amendment 
to the CPPNM, seeking to bring the Amendment into force by 2014. 
We acknowledge the important role of the United NaƟ ons (UN) in 
promoƟ ng nuclear security, support the UN Security Council 
ResoluƟ ons 1540 and 1977 in strengthening global nuclear security, 
and welcome the extension of its mandate. We will strive to use 
the IAEA Physical ProtecƟ on
of Nuclear Material and Nuclear FaciliƟ es (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) 
document and related Nuclear Security Series documents, and 
refl ect them into naƟ onal pracƟ ce.
3.32–72              
2 We recognize the contribuƟ ons since the 2010 Summit of 
internaƟ onal iniƟ aƟ ves and processes such as the Global IniƟ aƟ ve 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Global Partnership 
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass DestrucƟ on, 
within their respecƟ ve mandates and memberships. We welcome 
the wider parƟ cipaƟ on in the GICNT and the 
Global Partnership and value its extension beyond 2012. NoƟ ng 
the importance of strengthening coordinaƟ on and complementarity 
among nuclear security acƟ viƟ es, we welcome the proposal of the 
IAEA to organize an internaƟ onal conference in 2013. We welcome 
contribuƟ ons from the industry, academia, insƟ tutes and civil 
society that promote nuclear security.
3.62–72            
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Role of the IAEA
3 We reaffi  rm the essenƟ al responsibility and central role of the IAEA 
in strengthening the internaƟ onal nuclear security framework, and 
recognize the value of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013. 
We will work to ensure that the IAEA conƟ nues to have the 
appropriate structure, resources and experƟ se needed to support 
the implementaƟ on of nuclear security objecƟ ves. To this end, we 
encourage States in a posiƟ on to do so and the nuclear industry to 
increase voluntary contribuƟ ons to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security 
Fund, as well as in–kind contribuƟ ons. We also encourage 
conƟ nued IAEA acƟ viƟ es to assist, upon request, naƟ onal eff orts to 
establish and enhance nuclear security infrastructure through its 
various support programs, and encourage States to make use of 
these IAEA resources.
3.73–95             
Nuclear Materials
4 Recognizing that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated 
plutonium require special precauƟ ons, we reemphasize the 
importance of appropriately securing, accounƟ ng for and 
consolidaƟ ng these materials. We also encourage States to consider 
the safe, secure and Ɵ mely removal and disposiƟ on of nuclear 
materials from faciliƟ es no longer using them, as appropriate, and 
consistent with naƟ onal security consideraƟ ons and development 
objecƟ ves.
3.116–30
5 We recognize that the development, within the framework of the 
IAEA, of opƟ ons for naƟ onal policies on HEU management will 
advance nuclear security objecƟ ves. We encourage States to take 
measures to minimize the use of HEU, including through the 
conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel, where technically and economically feasible, 
taking into account the need for assured supplies of medical 
isotopes, and encourage States in a posiƟ on to do so, by the end of 
2013, to announce voluntary specifi c acƟ ons intended to minimize 
the use of HEU. We also encourage States to promote the use of 
LEU fuels and targets in commercial applicaƟ ons such as isotope 
producƟ on, and in this regard, welcome relevant internaƟ onal 
cooperaƟ on on high–density LEU fuel to support the conversion of 
research and test reactors.
3.120–30            
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RadioacƟ ve Sources
6 Taking into account that radioacƟ ve sources are widely used and 
can be vulnerable to malicious acts, we urge States to secure these 
materials, while bearing in mind their uses in industrial, medical, 
agricultural and research applicaƟ ons. To this end, we encourage 
States in a posiƟ on to do so to conƟ nue to work towards the 
process of raƟ fying or acceding to the ICSANT; refl ect into naƟ onal 
pracƟ ces relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents, the 
IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of RadioacƟ ve 
Sources and its supplementary document on the IAEA Guidance on 
the Import and Export of RadioacƟ ve Sources; and establish 
naƟ onal registers of high– acƟ vity radioacƟ ve sources where 
required. We also commit to work closely with the IAEA to 
encourage cooperaƟ on on advanced technologies and systems, 
share best pracƟ ces on the management of radioacƟ ve sources, 
and provide technical assistance to States upon their request. In 
addiƟ on, we encourage conƟ nued naƟ onal eff orts and internaƟ onal 
cooperaƟ on to recover lost, missing or stolen sources and to 
maintain control over disused sources.
3.60–61              
Nuclear Security and Safety
7 Acknowledging that safety measures and security measures have 
in common the aim of protecƟ ng human life and health and the 
environment, we affi  rm that nuclear security and nuclear safety 
measures should be designed, implemented and managed in 
nuclear faciliƟ es in a coherent and synergisƟ c manner. We also 
affi  rm the need to maintain eff ecƟ ve emergency preparedness, 
response and miƟ gaƟ on capabiliƟ es in a manner that addresses 
both nuclear security and nuclear safety. In this regard, we welcome 
the eff orts of the IAEA to organize meeƟ ngs to provide relevant 
recommendaƟ ons on the interface between nuclear security and 
nuclear safety so that neither security nor safety is compromised. 
We also welcome the convening of the High Level MeeƟ ng on 
Nuclear Safety and Security iniƟ ated by the UN Secretary–General, 
held in New York on 22 September 2011. NoƟ ng that the security of 
nuclear and other radioacƟ ve materials also includes spent nuclear 
fuel and radioacƟ ve waste, we encourage States to consider 
establishing appropriate plans for the management of these 
materials.
3.151–54            
4.86–113
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TransportaƟ on Security
8 We will conƟ nue eff orts to enhance the security of nuclear and 
other radioacƟ ve materials while in domesƟ c and internaƟ onal 
transport, and encourage States to share best pracƟ ces and 
cooperate in acquiring the necessary technologies to this end. 
Recognizing the importance of a naƟ onal layered defense against 
the loss or theŌ  of nuclear and other radioacƟ ve materials, we 
encourage the establishment of eff ecƟ ve naƟ onal nuclear material 
inventory management and domesƟ c tracking mechanisms, where 
required, that enable States to take appropriate measures to 
recover lost and stolen materials.
3.107
3.34– 35                
CombaƟ ng Illicit Traffi  cking
9 We underscore the need to develop naƟ onal capabiliƟ es to 
prevent, detect, respond to and prosecute illicit nuclear traffi  cking. 
In this regard, we encourage acƟ on–oriented coordinaƟ on among 
naƟ onal capaciƟ es to combat illicit traffi  cking, consistent with 
naƟ onal laws and regulaƟ ons. We will work to enhance technical 
capabiliƟ es in the fi eld of naƟ onal inspecƟ on and detecƟ on of 
nuclear and other radioacƟ ve materials at the borders. NoƟ ng that 
several countries have passed export control laws to regulate 
nuclear transfers, we encourage further uƟ lizaƟ on of legal, 
intelligence and fi nancial tools to eff ecƟ vely prosecute off enses, as 
appropriate and consistent with naƟ onal laws. In addiƟ on, we 
encourage States to parƟ cipate in the IAEA Illicit Traffi  cking 
Database program and to provide necessary informaƟ on relaƟ ng to 
nuclear and other radioacƟ ve materials outside of regulatory 
control. We will work to strengthen cooperaƟ on among States and 
encourage them to share informaƟ on, consistent with naƟ onal 
regulaƟ ons, on individuals involved in traffi  cking off enses of 
nuclear and other radioacƟ ve materials, including through 
INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism PrevenƟ on Unit and 
the World Customs OrganizaƟ on.
3.108–11            
Nuclear Forensics
10 We recognize that nuclear forensics can be an eff ecƟ ve tool in 
determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioacƟ ve 
materials and in providing evidence for the prosecuƟ on of acts of 
illicit traffi  cking and malicious uses. In this regard, we encourage 
States to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to 
develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabiliƟ es. In this regard, 
they may combine the skills of both tradiƟ onal and nuclear 
forensics through the development of a common set of defi niƟ ons 
and standards, undertake research and share informaƟ on and best 
pracƟ ces, as appropriate. We also underscore the importance of 
internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on both in technology and human resource 
development to advance nuclear forensics.
3.138–45          
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Nuclear Security Culture
11 Recognizing that investment in human capacity building is 
fundamental to promoƟ ng and sustaining a strong nuclear security 
culture, we encourage States to share best pracƟ ces and build 
naƟ onal capabiliƟ es, including through bilateral and mulƟ lateral 
cooperaƟ on. At the naƟ onal level, we encourage all stakeholders, 
including the government, regulatory bodies, industry, academia, 
nongovernmental organizaƟ ons and the media, to fully commit to 
enhancing security culture and to maintain robust communicaƟ on 
and coordinaƟ on of acƟ viƟ es. We also encourage States to promote 
human resource development through educaƟ on and training. In 
this regard, we welcome the establishment of Centers of Excellence 
and other nuclear security training and support centers since the 
Washington Summit, and encourage the establishment of new 
centers. Furthermore, we welcome the eff ort by the IAEA to 
promote networking among such centers to share experience and 
lessons learned and to opƟ mize available resources. We also note 
the holding of the Nuclear Industry Summit and the Nuclear 
Security Symposium on the eve of the Seoul Nuclear Security 
Summit.
3.155–63           
InformaƟ on Security
12 We recognize the importance of prevenƟ ng non–state actors from 
obtaining informaƟ on, technology or experƟ se required to acquire 
or use nuclear materials for malicious purposes, or to disrupt 
informaƟ on technology based control systems at nuclear faciliƟ es. 
We therefore encourage States to: conƟ nue to develop and 
strengthen naƟ onal and facility–level measures for the eff ecƟ ve 
management of such informaƟ on, including informaƟ on on the 
procedures and protocols to protect nuclear materials and faciliƟ es; 
to support relevant capacity building projects; and to enhance 
cyber security measures concerning nuclear faciliƟ es, consistent 
with the IAEA General Conference ResoluƟ on on Nuclear 
Security(GC(55)/Res/10) and bearing in mind the InternaƟ onal 
TelecommunicaƟ on Union ResoluƟ on 174. We also encourage 
States to: promote a security culture that emphasizes the need to 
protect nuclear security related informaƟ on; engage with scienƟ fi c, 
industrial and academic communiƟ es in the pursuit of common 
soluƟ ons; and support the IAEA in producing and disseminaƟ ng 
improved guidance on protecƟ ng informaƟ on.
3.105–06            
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InternaƟ onal CooperaƟ on
13 We encourage all States to enhance their physical protecƟ on of and 
accounƟ ng system for nuclear materials, emergency preparedness 
and response capabiliƟ es and a relevant legal and regulatory 
framework. In this context, we encourage the internaƟ onal 
community to increase internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on and to provide 
assistance, upon request, to countries in need on a bilateral, 
regional, and mulƟ cultural level, as appropriate. In parƟ cular, we 
welcome the intent by the IAEA to conƟ nue to lead eff orts to assist 
States, upon request. We also reaffi  rm the need for various public 
diplomacy and outreach eff orts to enhance public awareness of 
acƟ ons taken and capaciƟ es built to address threats to nuclear 
security, including the threat of nuclear terrorism. We will conƟ nue 
to make voluntary and substanƟ ve eff orts toward strengthening 
nuclear security and implemenƟ ng poliƟ cal commitments made in 
this regard. We welcome the informaƟ on on the progress made in 
the fi eld of nuclear security since the Washington Summit provided 
by the parƟ cipants at this Seoul Summit. The next Nuclear Security 
Summit will be held in the Netherlands in 2014. 
3.96–111           
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C. ICNND REPORT 2009:  RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION PARAGRAPHS 
WHERE 
DISCUSSED IN 
STATE OF PLAY 
REPORT
STATE OF PLAY AS AT 
DECEMBER 2012
On Overall Disarmament Strategy
1 Nuclear disarmament should be pursued as a two–phase process: 
with “minimizaƟ on” to be achieved no later than 2025, and 
“eliminaƟ on” as soon as possible thereaŌ er. Short (to 2012), 
medium (to 2025) and longer term (beyond 2025) acƟ on agendas 
should refl ect those objecƟ ves. [7.1–5; see also SecƟ ons 17,18, 19]
1.22–31               
2 Short and medium term eff orts should focus on achieving the 
general delegiƟ maƟ on of nuclear weapons, and on reaching as 
soon as possible, and no later than 2025, a “minimizaƟ on point” 
characterised by:
1.30–31              
1.233-36
(a)  low numbers: a world with no more than 2,000 warheads 
(less than 10 per cent of present arsenals);
(b)  agreed doctrine: every nuclear–armed state commiƩ ed to no 
fi rst use of nuclear weapons; and
(c)  credible force postures: verifi able deployments and alert 
status refl ecƟ ng that doctrine. [7.6–15; see also SecƟ ons 6 
(on delegiƟ maƟ on) and 17–18]
3 Analysis and debate should commence now on the condiƟ ons 
necessary to move from the minimizaƟ on point to eliminaƟ on, 
even if a target date for geƫ  ng to zero cannot now be credibly 
specifi ed. [7.15–17; see also SecƟ on 19]
1.30–31               
1.228–32
On Overall Non–ProliferaƟ on Strategy
4 Nuclear non–proliferaƟ on eff orts should focus both on the demand 
side – persuading states that nuclear weapons will not advance 
their naƟ onal security or other interests – and the supply side, 
through maintaining and strengthening a comprehensive array of 
measures (addressed in following recommendaƟ ons) designed to 
make it as diffi  cult as possible for states to buy or build such 
weapons. [8.9–16; see also SecƟ ons 9–15]
2.22–35
On NPT Safeguards and Verifi caƟ on
5 All states should accept the applicaƟ on of the AddiƟ onal Protocol. 
To encourage universal take–up, acceptance of it should be a 
condiƟ on of all nuclear exports. [9.7]
2.46–50              
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6 The AddiƟ onal Protocol and its annexes should be updated and 
strengthened to make clear the IAEA’s right to invesƟ gate possible 
weaponizaƟ on acƟ vity, and by adding specifi c reference to dual–
use items, reporƟ ng on export denials, shorter noƟ ce periods and 
the right to interview specifi c individuals. [9.8–9]
2.46–50              
7 With safeguards needing to move from a mechanisƟ c to an 
informaƟ on–driven system, there should be much more 
informaƟ on sharing, in both direcƟ ons, on the part of both states 
and the IAEA, with the agency re–evaluaƟ ng its culture of 
confi denƟ ality and non–transparency. [9.10–11]
2.51–60              
On NPT Compliance and Enforcement
8 In determining compliance, the IAEA should confi ne itself 
essenƟ ally to technical criteria, applying them with consistency 
and credibility, and leaving the poliƟ cal consequences for the 
Security Council to determine. [9.15]
2.67–82              
9 The UN Security Council should severely discourage withdrawal 
from the NPT by making it clear that this will be regarded as prima 
facie a threat to internaƟ onal peace and security, with all the 
puniƟ ve consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. [9.20]
2.83–87              
10 A state withdrawing from the NPT should not be free to use for 
non–peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and 
technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material 
provided before withdrawal should 
so far as possible be returned, with this being enforced by the 
Security Council. [9.21–22]
2.84–87              
11 All states should make it a condiƟ on of nuclear exports that the 
recipient state agree that, in the event it should withdraw from the 
NPT, safeguards shall conƟ nue with respect to any nuclear material 
and equipment provided previously, as well as any material 
produced by using it. [9.23]
2.84–85              
On Strengthening the IAEA
12 The IAEA should make full use of the authority already available to 
it, including special inspecƟ ons, and states should be prepared to 
strengthen its authority as defi ciencies are idenƟ fi ed. [9.24]
2.67–82               
13 If the IAEA is to fully and eff ecƟ vely perform its assigned funcƟ ons, 
it should be given, as recommended in 2008 by the Zedillo 
Commission:
2.90–96              
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(a)  a one–off  injecƟ on of funds to refurbish the Safeguards 
AnalyƟ cal Laboratory;
(b)  a signifi cant increase in its regular budget support, without a 
“zero real growth” constraint, so as to reduce reliance on 
extra–budgetary funding for key funcƟ ons;
(c)  suffi  cient security of future funding to enable medium to 
long–term planning; and
(d)  support from both states and industry in making staff 
secondments and off ering training opportuniƟ es. [9.25–27]
14 ConsideraƟ on should be given to an external review, by the Zedillo 
Commission or a successor panel, of the IAEA’s organizaƟ onal 
culture, in parƟ cular on quesƟ ons of transparency and informaƟ on 
sharing. [9.28]
2.96                                 
On Non–NPT TreaƟ es and Mechanisms
15 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop a criteria–based 
approach to cooperaƟ on agreements with states outside the NPT, 
taking into account factors such as raƟ fi caƟ on of the CTBT, 
willingness to end unsafeguarded fi ssile material producƟ on, and 
states’ records in securing nuclear faciliƟ es and materials and 
controlling nuclear–related exports. [10.3–9]
2.121–23            
16 The ProliferaƟ on Security IniƟ aƟ ve (PSI) should be reconsƟ tuted 
within the UN system as a neutral organizaƟ on to assess intelligence, 
coordinate and fund acƟ viƟ es, and make both generic and specifi c 
recommendaƟ ons or decisions concerning the interdicƟ on of 
suspected materials being carried to or from countries of 
proliferaƟ on concern. [10.10–12]
2.156                 
On Extending ObligaƟ ons to Non–NPT States
17 Recognizing the reality that the three nuclear–armed states now 
outside the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – are not likely to 
become members any Ɵ me soon, every eff ort should be made to 
achieve their parƟ cipaƟ on in parallel instruments and arrangements 
which apply equivalent non–proliferaƟ on and disarmament 
obligaƟ ons. [10.13–16]
1.24–31               
2.33–35
18 Provided they saƟ sfy strong objecƟ ve criteria demonstraƟ ng 
commitment to disarmament and non–proliferaƟ on, and sign up to 
specifi c future commitments in this respect, these states should 
have access to nuclear materials and technology for civilian 
purposes on the same basis as an NPT member. [10.17]
2.33–35              
2.121–23
19 These states should parƟ cipate in mulƟ lateral disarmament 
negoƟ aƟ ons on the same basis as the nuclear–weapon state 
members of the NPT, and not be expected to accept diff erent 
treatment because of their non–membership of that treaty. [10.18]
1.24–31              
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On Banning TesƟ ng
20 All states that have not already done so should sign and raƟ fy the 
CTBT uncondiƟ onally and without delay. Pending entry into force, 
all states should conƟ nue to refrain from nuclear tesƟ ng. [11.1–8]
2.170–81            
21 All signatories should provide the necessary fi nancial, technical and 
poliƟ cal support for the conƟ nued development and operaƟ on of 
the CTBTO, including compleƟ ng the global coverage of its 
monitoring systems, facilitaƟ ng on–site inspecƟ on when warranted, 
and establishing eff ecƟ ve naƟ onal data centres and informaƟ on 
gathering systems. 
[11.9–12]
2.176–79            
On LimiƟ ng the Availability of Fissile Material
22 All states should negoƟ ate to an early conclusion in the Conference 
on Disarmament a non–discriminatory, mulƟ lateral, internaƟ onally 
and eff ecƟ vely verifi able and irreversible Fissile Material Cut–off  
Treaty (FMCT), banning the producƟ on of fi ssile material for 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. [12.1–14] ¬¬
2.182–97            
23 All nuclear–armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium 
on the producƟ on of fi ssile material for weapon purposes pending 
the entry into force of such a treaty. [12.15]
2.199–217      
24 On the quesƟ on of pre–exisƟ ng stocks, a phased approach should 
be adopted, with the fi rst priority a cap on producƟ on; then an 
eff ort to ensure that all fi ssile material other than in weapons 
becomes subject to irreversible, verifi ed non–explosive use 
commitments; and with fi ssile material released through 
dismantlement being brought under these commitments as 
weapon reducƟ ons are agreed. [12.18]
2.198–231      
25 As an interim step, all nuclear–armed states should voluntarily 
declare their fi ssile material stocks and the amount they regard as 
excess to their weapons needs, place such excess material under 
IAEA safeguards as soon as pracƟ cable, and convert it as soon as 
possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. [12.19]
2.199–217      
26 The use of HEU in civil research programs should be ended as soon 
as possible, and the availability and use of separated plutonium in 
energy programs phased out as viable alternaƟ ves are established. 
[12.20–27]
3.120–30
4.60–63           
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On Nuclear Security
27 All states should agree to take further measures to strengthen the 
security of nuclear materials and faciliƟ es, including early adopƟ on 
of the 2005 Amendment to the ConvenƟ on on the Physical 
ProtecƟ on of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the most recent 
internaƟ onal standards, accelerated implementaƟ on of the 
CooperaƟ ve Threat ReducƟ on (CTR) and associated programs 
worldwide, and greater commitment to internaƟ onal capacity 
building and informaƟ on sharing. 
[13.1–16, 22–23]
3.27–72 
3.96–111          
28 At the Global Summit on Nuclear Security in April 2010, and in 
subsequent follow–up acƟ vity, priority aƩ enƟ on should be given to 
the implementaƟ on–focused issues idenƟ fi ed in Box 13–1. [13.4]
3.28–31               
29 On the control of material useable for “dirty bombs,” further eff orts 
need to be made to cooperaƟ vely implement the Code of Conduct 
on the Safety and Security of RadioacƟ ve Sources, with assistance 
to states in updaƟ ng legislaƟ on and licensing pracƟ ce, promoƟ ng 
awareness among users, and generally achieving a safety and 
security culture. [13.17–21]
3.60–61               
30 Eff orts should conƟ nue to be made to establish an intelligence 
clearing house which would provide a mechanism by which 
countries might be willing not only to share their intelligence, but 
also provide the know–how for other countries to interpret and 
deal with it. [13.22]
3.98–104         
31 Strong support should be given to the emerging science of nuclear 
forensics, designed to idenƟ fy the sources of materials found in 
illicit traffi  cking or used in nuclear explosions, including through 
providing addiƟ onal resources to the Nuclear Smuggling 
InternaƟ onal Technical Working Group. [13.24–25]
3.138–45          
On Nuclear Energy Management
32 The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should conƟ nue to 
be strongly supported as one of the three fundamental pillars of 
the NPT, along with disarmament and non–proliferaƟ on. Increased 
resources should be provided, including through the IAEA’s 
Technical CooperaƟ on Programme, to assist developing states in 
taking full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy for human 
development. [14.1–3]
4.22–46               
33 Support should be given to the iniƟ aƟ ve launched at the 2008 
Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit for internaƟ onal cooperaƟ on on 
nuclear energy infrastructure, designed to raise awareness 
worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security 
and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing the 
relevant measures. [14.4–6]
4.36
4.86–113
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34 ProliferaƟ on resistance should be endorsed by governments and 
industry as an essenƟ al objecƟ ve in the design and operaƟ on of 
nuclear faciliƟ es, and promoted through both insƟ tuƟ onal and 
technical measures – neither is suffi  cient without the other. [14.7–8]
4.58-68
35 The increasing use of plutonium recycle, and the prospecƟ ve 
introducƟ on of fast neutron reactors, must be pursued in ways 
which enhance non–proliferaƟ on objecƟ ves and avoid adding to 
proliferaƟ on and terrorism risks. In parƟ cular, a key objecƟ ve of 
research and development on fast neutron reactors should be to 
design and operate them so that weapons grade plutonium is not 
produced. [14.9–15]
4.62–68               
36 InternaƟ onal measures such as spent fuel take–back arrangements 
by fuel suppliers, are desirable to avoid increasing spent fuel 
accumulaƟ ons in a large number of states. ParƟ cular aƩ enƟ on 
should be paid in this respect to take–back of fuel from iniƟ al core 
loads. [14.13]
4.74–75               
37 New technologies for spent fuel treatment should be developed to 
avoid current forms of reprocessing altogether; and, as they are 
established, use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors, and convenƟ onal 
reprocessing plants, can be phased out. [12.26]
4.61–68                  
38 Nuclear industry, and government–industry collaboraƟ on, will 
need to play a greater role in miƟ gaƟ ng the proliferaƟ on risks 
associated with a growing civilian nuclear sector worldwide. 
Industry should become a more acƟ ve partner with governments 
in the draŌ ing of regulaƟ ons and treaƟ es that aff ect its acƟ viƟ es, to 
ensure that they make operaƟ onal sense and to encourage 
compliance. [14.16–24]
3.146–50
4.58–68              
On MulƟ lateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
39 MulƟ lateralizaƟ on of the nuclear fuel cycle – in parƟ cular through 
fuel banks and mulƟ lateral management of enrichment, 
reprocessing and spent fuel storage faciliƟ es – should be strongly 
supported. Such arrangements would play an invaluable role in 
building global confi dence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
and provide an important foundaƟ on for a world free of nuclear 
weapons, for which a necessary requirement will be mulƟ lateral 
verifi caƟ on and control of all sensiƟ ve fuel cycle acƟ viƟ es. [15.48]
4.70–85               
40 Pending the acceptance of more far–reaching proposals, support 
should be given to voluntary arrangements whereby, in return for 
assurances of supply, recipient states would renounce the naƟ onal 
construcƟ on and operaƟ on of sensiƟ ve fuel cycle faciliƟ es for the 
duraƟ on of the agreement. [15.47]
4.70–79               
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On PrioriƟ es for the 2010 NPT Review Conference
41 The following should be the major priority issues for the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference:
1.18–31
2.22–35               
(a) AcƟ on for Disarmament. Agreement on a twenty–point 
statement, “A New InternaƟ onal Consensus for AcƟ on on Nuclear 
Disarmament” (see Box 16–1), updaƟ ng and extending the 
“Thirteen PracƟ cal Steps” agreed in 2000.
(b) Strengthening Safeguards and Enforcement. Agreement: 
– that all states should accept the applicaƟ on of the AddiƟ onal 
Protocol and that, to encourage its universal take–up, acceptance 
should be made a condiƟ on of all states’ nuclear exports;
– to declare that a state withdrawing from the NPT is not free to 
use for non–peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and 
technology acquired while party to the NPT;
– to recommend that the Security Council make it clear that any 
withdrawal will be regarded prima facie as a threat to internaƟ onal 
peace and security; and
(c) to recommend to states that they make it a condiƟ on of nuclear 
exports that safeguards agreements conƟ nue to apply aŌ er any 
such withdrawal. Strengthening the IAEA. Agreement that the 
IAEA’s budget be signifi cantly increased – without any “zero real 
growth” constraint, and so as to reduce reliance on extra–budgetary 
support for key funcƟ ons – as recommended in 2008 by the Zedillo 
Commission.
(d) Middle East Weapons of Mass DestrucƟ on Free Zone. Agreement 
that the Secretary–General of the UN should convene an early 
conference of all relevant states to address creaƟ ve and fresh ways 
to implement the 1995 resoluƟ on, including the idenƟ fi caƟ on of 
confi dence building measures that all key states in the region can 
embrace, and to commence early consultaƟ ons to facilitate that.
(e) Nuclear security. Agreement that states should take further 
measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and 
faciliƟ es, including early adopƟ on of the 2005 Amendment to the 
ConvenƟ on on the Physical ProtecƟ on of Nuclear Material and the 
most recent internaƟ onal standards, accelerated implementaƟ on 
of the cooperaƟ ve threat reducƟ on and associated programs 
worldwide, and greater commitment to internaƟ onal capacity 
building and informaƟ on sharing.
(f) Peaceful uses. Agreement that the inalienable right to the use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes remains one of the 
fundamental objecƟ ves of the NPT and to dedicate increased 
resources, including through the IAEA’s Technical CooperaƟ on 
Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of 
peaceful nuclear energy for human development.
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On Reducing Weapon Numbers: Bilateral and MulƟ lateral Processes
42 The “minimizaƟ on point” objecƟ ve should be to achieve no later 
than 2025 a global total of no more than 2,000 nuclear warheads, 
with the U.S. and Russia reducing to a total of 500 nuclear weapons 
each, and with at least no increases (and desirably signifi cant 
reducƟ ons) in the arsenals of the other nuclear–armed states. The 
objecƟ ve must be to cut not only strategic but all classes of 
weapons, and not only deployed weapons but those in storage and 
those awaiƟ ng destrucƟ on (but sƟ ll capable of reconsƟ tuƟ on and 
deployment) as well. [7.8; 18.1–3]
1.54–57              
43 To bring the bilateral target within achievable range, the U.S. and 
Russia should accelerate implementaƟ on of the START follow–on 
treaty now being negoƟ ated, bringing forward the envisaged 
reducƟ ons under this to no later than 2015. [17.13]
1.79–86          
44 Once this treaty is raƟ fi ed, the U.S. and Russia should resume 
intensive negoƟ aƟ ons with a view to reaching a further START 
agreement no later than 2015, which would bring the total number 
of warheads down to no more than 1000 for each, and hopefully 
much less, by the year 2020. [17.12–13]
1.84–86               
45 To achieve the minimizaƟ on point objecƟ ve of a global maximum 
of no more than 2,000 warheads, with the nuclear–armed states 
other than the U.S. and Russia having no more than 1,000 between 
them, the highest priority need is for all nuclear–armed states to 
explicitly commit not to increase the number of their nuclear 
weapons, and such declaraƟ ons should be sought from them as 
soon as possible. [17.15–16]
1.54–103         
46 To prepare the ground for mulƟ lateral disarmament negoƟ aƟ ons, 
strategic dialogues should be iniƟ ated by all the nuclear–armed 
states with each other, and systemaƟ c and substanƟ al naƟ onal 
studies conducted of all the issues – including missile defence, 
convenƟ onal imbalances and disarmament verifi caƟ on – that will 
arise at all stages of the process. [17.17–19, 22–24]
1.88–94              
47 ConsideraƟ on should be given to the Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva as an appropriate forum for iniƟ al consultaƟ ons, on a 
formal or informal basis, between all the nuclear–armed states, 
given the need, if the mulƟ lateral disarmament process is to 
advance, for there to be early agreement on an appropriate 
negoƟ aƟ ng process. [7.9; 17.20–21]
1.87                                   
48 To facilitate future verifi caƟ on processes, in the credibility of which 
all nuclear–armed states will have a mutual interest, “nuclear 
archaeology” steps should be taken now by them to ensure that all 
relevant records are idenƟ fi ed, secured and preserved, and 
relevant measurements and samples are taken. [17.25–26]
1.52–53             
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On Nuclear Doctrine: No First Use, Extended Deterrence, and NegaƟ ve 
Security Assurances
49 Pending the ulƟ mate eliminaƟ on of nuclear weapons, every 
nuclear–armed state should make an unequivocal “no fi rst use” 
declaraƟ on, commiƫ  ng itself to not using nuclear weapons either 
prevenƟ vely or pre–empƟ vely against any possible nuclear 
adversary, keeping them available only for use, or threat of use, by 
way of retaliaƟ on following a nuclear strike against itself or its 
allies. [17.28]
1.122–24             
50 If not prepared at this stage to make such a declaraƟ on, every 
nuclear–armed state should at least accept the principle that the 
sole purpose of possessing nuclear weapons – unƟ l such Ɵ me as 
they can be eliminated completely – is to deter others from using 
such weapons against that state or its allies. [7.10; 17.28–32]
1.104–24            
51 The allies in quesƟ on – those presently benefi Ɵ ng from extended 
deterrence – should be given fi rm assurances that they will not be 
exposed to unacceptable risk from other sources, including 
especially biological and chemical weapons. In this context, 
conƟ nuing strong eff orts should be made to promote universal 
adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons ConvenƟ on and 
the Chemical Weapons ConvenƟ on, and to develop more eff ecƟ ve 
ways of ensuring compliance with the former. [17.29]
1.125–35            
52 It is parƟ cularly important that at least a “sole purpose” statement 
be made in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review due for publicaƟ on 
early in 2010, placing pressure as this would on other nuclear–
armed states to be more forthcoming, and undermining “double 
standards” arguments at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. [17.32]
1.110–14            
53 New and unequivocal negaƟ ve security assurances (NSAs) should 
be given by all the nuclear–armed states, supported by binding 
Security Council resoluƟ on, that they will not use nuclear weapons 
against non–nuclear weapon states. The only qualifi caƟ on should 
be that the assurance would not extend to a state determined by 
the Security Council to be in non–compliance with the NPT to so 
material an extent as to jusƟ fy the non–applicaƟ on of any NSA. 
[17.33–39]
1.136–46            
54 All NPT nuclear–weapon state members should sign and raƟ fy the 
protocols for all the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, and the other 
nuclear–armed states (so long as they remain outside the NPT) 
should issue stand–alone negaƟ ve security assurances for each of 
them. [16.16]
1.143                                 
2.124-42
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On Nuclear Force Posture: Launch Alert Status and Transparency
55 The basic objecƟ ve is to achieve changes to deployment as soon as 
possible which ensure that, while remaining demonstrably 
survivable to a disarming fi rst strike, nuclear forces are not instantly 
useable. Stability should be maximized by deployments and launch 
alert status being transparent. [7.12–15; 17.40–50]
1.147–74            
56 It is crucial that ways be found to lengthen the decision–making 
fuse for the launch of any nuclear weapons, and in parƟ cular – 
while recognizing the diffi  culty and complexity of the negoƟ aƟ ng 
process involved between the U.S. and Russia – that weapons be 
taken off  launch–on–warning alert as soon as possible. [17.43]
1.153–74            
57 In order to achieve strategic dialogues capable of making real 
progress on disarmament, maximum possible transparency in both 
nuclear doctrine and force postures should be off ered by all 
nuclear–armed states. [17.44]
1.36–45              
58 A relaxaƟ on of Israel’s policy of complete opacity would be helpful 
in this respect, but conƟ nued unwillingness to do so should not 
inhibit its engagement in mulƟ lateral disarmament negoƟ aƟ ons 
(given that nuclear disarmament can be defi ned as a process of 
taking unsafeguarded fi ssile materials and puƫ  ng them under 
internaƟ onal safeguards). [17.45–50]
1.37                                   
1.121
On North Korea and Iran
59 ConƟ nuing eff orts should be made, within the framework of the 
Six-Party Talks, to achieve a saƟ sfactory negoƟ ated soluƟ on of the 
problem of North Korea’s overt pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
program, involving verifi able denuclearizaƟ on and resumed 
commitment to the NPT in return for security guarantees and 
economic assistance. [17.52–56]
1.95–103         
60 ConƟ nuing eff orts should be made by the P5+1, Security Council 
and IAEA member states to achieve a saƟ sfactory negoƟ ated 
resoluƟ on of the issue of Iran’s nuclear capability and intenƟ ons, 
whereby any retenƟ on of any element of its enrichment program 
would be accompanied by a very intrusive inspecƟ on and 
verifi caƟ on regime, giving the internaƟ onal community confi dence 
that Iran neither has nor is seeking nuclear weapons. [17.57–60]
2.70–82               
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On Parallel Security Issues: Missiles, Space, Biological and 
ConvenƟ onal Weapons
61 The issue of anƟ –ballisƟ c missile (ABM) systems should be revisited, 
with a view to allowing the further development of theatre ballisƟ c 
missile defence systems, including potenƟ al joint operaƟ ons in 
areas of mutual concern, but seƫ  ng severe limits on strategic 
ballisƟ c missile defences. It should be recognized that while, in a 
world without nuclear weapons, strategic missile defences could 
play an important stabilizing role as an insurance policy against 
potenƟ al cheaters, they now consƟ tute a serious impediment to 
both bilateral and mulƟ lateral nuclear disarmament negoƟ aƟ ons. 
[18.28–30; see also 2.30–34, 17.18]
1.175–92            
62 InternaƟ onal eff orts to curb missile proliferaƟ on should conƟ nue, 
but conƟ nued failure to mulƟ lateralize the INF should not be used 
as an excuse for either present party to withdraw from it. [2.35–37]
2.157–67
63 Ongoing aƩ empts to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) 
at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and work at the 
Vienna–based UN CommiƩ ee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
should be strongly supported. [18.31]
1.193–98            
64 ConƟ nuing strong eff orts should be made to promote universal 
adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons ConvenƟ on and 
the Chemical Weapons ConvenƟ on, and to develop more eff ecƟ ve 
ways of defending against potenƟ al biological aƩ acks, including – 
for all its diffi  culƟ es – building a workable ConvenƟ on verifi caƟ on 
regime. [17.29; 18.32–33]
1.199–201      
65 The issue of convenƟ onal arms imbalances, both quanƟ taƟ ve and 
qualitaƟ ve, between the nuclear–armed states, and in parƟ cular 
the relaƟ ve scale of U.S. capability, needs to be seriously addressed 
if it is not to become a signifi cant impediment to future bilateral 
and mulƟ lateral nuclear disarmament negoƟ aƟ ons, including by 
revisiƟ ng maƩ ers covered in the Treaty on ConvenƟ onal Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE). The development of more cooperaƟ ve 
approaches to confl ict prevenƟ on and resoluƟ on may well prove 
more producƟ ve in this context than focusing enƟ rely on arms 
limitaƟ on measures. [18.34–36]
1.202–14            
On AcƟ on Agendas: Short, Medium and Longer Term
66 The Short Term AcƟ on Agenda, for the period between now and 
2012 – and including the 2010 NPT Review Conference – should 
focus on the issues we idenƟ fy in Box 17–1.
1.22–31
2.30–32              
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67 ConsideraƟ on should be given to the possibility of the United 
NaƟ ons General Assembly holding a Special Session on 
Disarmament late in 2012, as a way of benchmarking the 
achievements of the short term and defi ning the way forward. Any 
decision should be deferred unƟ l mid–2010, to allow for refl ecƟ on 
on the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, and whether 
enough momentum is building to jusƟ fy the resources and eff ort 
involved. [17.2–3]
1.30–31               
68 The Medium Term AcƟ on Agenda, for the period between 2012 
and 2025, should focus on the issues we idenƟ fy in Box 18–1.
1.22–31            
69 The Longer Term AcƟ on Agenda, for the period beyond 2025, should 
focus on establishing the condiƟ ons we idenƟ fy in Box 19–1.
1.22–31             
70 Given that quesƟ ons of cost–burden sharing are likely to arise as 
disarmament momentum builds over the longer term, it may be 
helpful for interested states to commission a detailed study on the 
calculaƟ on of disarmament and non–proliferaƟ on costs and 
possible ways of funding them. [18.26–27]
1.30–31              
On Mobilizing and Sustaining PoliƟ cal Will
71 Sustained campaigning is needed, through both the tradiƟ onal and 
new media and direct advocacy, to beƩ er inform policy–makers 
and those who infl uence them about nuclear disarmament and 
non–proliferaƟ on issues. Capable non–governmental organizaƟ ons 
should be appropriately supported by governments and 
philanthropic foundaƟ ons to the extent necessary to enable them 
to perform this role eff ecƟ vely. [20.7–10]
1.219–24           
72 There should be a major renewed emphasis on formal educaƟ on 
and training about nuclear disarmament and related issues in 
schools and universiƟ es, focusing on the history of nuclear 
weapons, the risks and threats involved in their conƟ nued 
deployment and proliferaƟ on, and possible ways forward. An 
associated need is for more specialized courses on nuclear–related 
issues – from the scienƟ fi c and technical to the strategic policy and 
legal – in universiƟ es and diplomaƟ c–training and related 
insƟ tuƟ ons. [20.11–12]
1.215–18            
73 Work should commence now on further refi ning and developing 
the concepts in the model Nuclear Weapons ConvenƟ on now in 
circulaƟ on, making its provisions as workable and realisƟ c as 
possible, and building support for them, with the objecƟ ve of 
having a fully–worked through draŌ  available to inform and guide 
mulƟ lateral disarmament negoƟ aƟ ons as they gain momentum. 
Interested governments should support with appropriate resources 
the further development of the NWC. [20.38–44]
1.225–32            
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74 To help sustain poliƟ cal will over Ɵ me, a regular “report card” 
should be published in which a disƟ nguished internaƟ onal panel, 
with appropriately professional and broad–based research support, 
would evaluate the performance of both nuclear–armed and non–
nuclear–armed states against the acƟ on agendas idenƟ fi ed in this 
report. [20.49–50]
This State of Play 
Report        
published in 2013
75 ConsideraƟ on should be given to the establishment of a new 
“Global Centre on Nuclear Non–proliferaƟ on and Disarmament” to 
act as a focal point and clearing house for the work being done on 
nuclear non–proliferaƟ on and disarmament issues by many 
diff erent insƟ tuƟ ons and organizaƟ ons in many diff erent countries, 
to provide research and advocacy support for both like–minded 
governments on the one hand, and civil society organizaƟ ons on 
the other, and to prepare the “report card” described above. 
[20.53]
CNND 
established in 
Canberra in 2011
76 Such a centre might be constructed to perform funcƟ ons at two 
levels: 
(a)  a base of full Ɵ me research and advocacy professionals, 
drawing directly on the resources of a wide internaƟ onal 
network of well–established associated research centres; and
(b)  a superstructure, in the form of a governing or advisory board 
drawn from disƟ nguished global fi gures of wide–ranging 
experience, giving their imprimatur as appropriate to the 
centre’s published reports, policy iniƟ aƟ ves and campaigns. 
[20.51–54]
CNND structure       
accords with 
recommendaƟ on

